

Chapter 6

Special Warfare: From Tactics to Practice*

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Abstract: This research chapter aims to highlight the importance of foreign internal defense operations and unconventional warfare as components of Special Forces Operations within the context of contemporary wars. It initially defines the concept of special warfare as a critical capability of Special Forces and describes two specific operations within this capability: foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. Next, it discusses the benefits of developing Special Forces Operations, generally using examples of special warfare operations implemented by other countries as part of their national strategies. Finally, the chapter examines the impacts of these operations on contemporary conflicts.

Keywords: critical capability; contemporary conflicts; strategy; Special Forces; special warfare.

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COMMANDOS: CHALLENGES FACING SPECIAL FORCES AND INTELLIGENCE IN CONTEMPORARY WARFARE

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Introduction

The changing nature of warfare requires consideration of the appropriate approach to its management. In this context, Special Forces (SF) are emerging as a key component in the planning and development of military operations across an increasingly broad range of approaches and uses.

Although new concepts have recently emerged to identify the different types of warfare in our time, three central factors are related to the new definitions of “war”: the diversification of threats, the multidimensionality of conflicts, and the constant evolution of information technologies. Currently, there is no consensus on a universal definition of war; rather, several meanings define distinct activities: world wars, religious wars, asymmetric warfare, hybrid warfare, conventional warfare, unrestricted warfare, among others. Specifically, for the purposes of this chapter, we refer to Clausewitz's definition of war, which is an act of violence to compel an opponent to do one's will.

In this context, there are also several approaches to classifying wars, such as that of evolutionary generations, which

[...] seeks to frame war within a series of particularities that are repetitive, regardless of the place or region where the armed confrontation occurs, but which also allow us to observe distinctive elements from one generation to another. This theory is based on two variables: the first focuses on technology, understood as the means by which a particular war is fought; and the second variable is strategy, or, better put, the theory of war used in the armed confrontation. (Álvarez Calderón, 2017, p. 156)

Despite these approaches and the variety of definitions, the underlying problem is determining the most adaptive, flexible, and effective means to confront the

threats and dangerous situations that arise in these new wars. Here, SF, based on its unique capabilities, offers an important answer.

The SF of the Colombian National Army has proven to be a decisive capability within the strategy of the General Command of the Colombian Military Forces (CGFM). For Major General Carvajal, “the use of SF units has contributed to the fulfillment of the strategic objectives of the national security and defense policy” (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017a, p. 14). The doctrine of SF in Colombia has been developed based on knowledge from other countries and on experience gained during the internal conflict. From this doctrinal perspective, “Special Operations are military actions conducted by organized, trained, equipped, and certified units with high mobility and flexibility in hostile, uncontrolled, and politically sensitive environments to achieve military objectives with strategic implications” (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017a, p. 1-3).

For this reason, the objective of this chapter is to examine their critical capabilities and analyze which are best suited to addressing hybrid scenarios. As a working hypothesis, it is held that special warfare—specifically, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense—offers the most and best insights in this regard.

The chapter is divided into four parts. The first defines SF capabilities to understand their value in a changing world of warfare and contemporary military operations. The second delves into the analysis of special warfare as not only a differential factor but also, in this case, a leading factor in addressing hybrid scenarios. The third section examines the tasks that, from the perspective of special warfare, encompass the widest range of options: unconventional warfare. The fourth section continues the study of foreign internal defense, as one of the tasks that comprises the special warfare capability ideal for confronting complex and hybrid environments. Finally, the chapter concludes by bringing together the most representative aspects of the study.

Delimiting the Capabilities of Special Forces: A Changing Universe


The Colombian National Army is a benchmark in the region for its ability to wage war across diverse operational environments. Particularly over the last two decades, it has taken the most important actions against irregular organizations operating in the country. In this regard, it is possible to affirm that “the government strategy” and “the actions of the Army, strengthened by Plan Colombia, tilted the counterinsurgency fight in favor of the State” (González & Betancourt, 2018, p. 18),

thereby successfully degrading the insurgents' operational and strategic center of gravity. In this process, it is essential to highlight the strategy the National Army has employed to transform its SF into a factor that empowers military operations throughout the country.

The concept of Unified Land Operations (ULO), adopted in 2015, paved the way for Special Operations (SO) to become, doctrinally speaking, one of the three distinctive competencies for decisive action (Rojas, 2017). Thus, the general concepts of SF were defined and embodied in the *Army Fundamental Manual MFE 3-05 Special Operations* (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017a).

The starting framework for analyzing foreign internal defense operations is provided precisely by the *MFE 3-05*. It distinguishes SO from conventional operations because they are specifically conducted to meet the highest-level objectives outlined in the national military strategy (Figure 1). Due to their mission, SO can be developed through two critical capabilities that are clearly distinct from conventional forces—surgical strikes and special warfare, the central focus of this chapter.

Figure 1. *Critical Capabilities of Special Forces*



Source: Ejército Nacional de Colombia (2017c).

From a doctrinal perspective, special warfare comprises seven activities that imply “the ability to operate within a specific population, addressing sociocultural factors by understanding the culture of that population” (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017b). However, the spectrum of special warfare remains extremely broad, and there are no regulations, manuals, or texts that specifically define unconventional warfare. This condition may have at least two explanations. First, the necessary operational emphasis on counterinsurgency tasks may have followed U.S. doctrinal guidelines—originating in British counterinsurgency—where the main effort lay in adapting conventional units rather than fully deploying SF. Second, by placing the concept of unconventional warfare within the spectrum of special warfare, it distances it from the more common tasks of surgical strikes.

Even the conceptual vagueness of unconventional warfare is present in doctrine. While it is true that the *MFRE 3-05* defines this type of operation as “activities conducted in a conflict environment, aimed at gathering intelligence to weaken the adversary’s fighting capacity indirectly, through actions aimed at limiting its resources and critical capabilities” (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017b, p. 1-14), this definition falls short of the reality and importance of unconventional warfare, especially in the conduct of hybrid warfare.

Unconventional warfare can be considered an art form, where “the negative space between war and peace is where actors are fighting modern wars in unconventional ways, such as activities in the cyber domain by the Anonymous hackers’ collective” (Linnemann, 2016, p. 23). Linnemann’s (2016) definition indeed considers a problem of great significance. The complexity of contemporary operational environments, coupled with a globalized society in which the domains of warfare are increasingly varied and interconnected, makes it difficult to define the operational environment for unconventional warfare—or, in other words, where the dividing line between conventional and unconventional warfare lies.

Therefore, there are multiple approaches to unconventional warfare operations—none of them comprehensive, of course—that nonetheless coincide in highlighting their characteristics for maximizing operational advantages within a hybrid environment. This strategic challenge is especially important for major powers, such as the United States, whose significant challenge, according to Linnemann (2016), is “to innovate, adapt, and adopt unconventional warfare through a broad strategic approach rather than sustaining its current view of a tactical capability for a niche mission” (p. 24).

In essence, unconventional warfare is a combination of direct and indirect applications of national power to achieve a strategic objective, and, due to its characteristics, requires special operationalization. “21st-century unconventional

warfare translates national strategy and policy into an operational concept, providing national policymakers with an appropriate and cost-effective strategic policy option" (Department of the Army, 2013, p. 23).

This is how the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) specifies that unconventional warfare is "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area" (Department of the Army, 2010, p. 14). Thus, the intent of efforts is "to exploit a hostile power's military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives" (Department of the Army, 2010, p. 14).

It is important to emphasize that unconventional warfare has no direct conceptual or doctrinal relationship with military operations conducted abroad, or what are sometimes called *covert operations*, which are the subject of this chapter. Precisely because the concept is vague, unconventional warfare is not doctrinally limited to a specific set of actions; rather, it exploits the gray area to plan and execute the widest possible range of high-impact operations that transcend the limitations of conventional operations.

Thus, it is possible to propose that the conceptual difference lies in the fact that covert operations are another technique of unconventional warfare, or, to put it another way, unconventional warfare is the tactical concept, while covert operations are among the varied techniques used in its development.

Covert operations are usually relegated to the set of possible actions of Military Intelligence, especially when they are strategic-level operations carried out primarily abroad. Evidently, the conceptual limitation arises when covert operations are understood solely as the infiltration of a criminal organization, whereas the concept of *interference* decisively broadens the initial definition and takes it to the strategic level.

In this respect, interference actions carried out by a State cannot only be associated with the tools of strategic power—alongside area denial, deterrence, or compulsion—but also aim to influence security conditions, which could lead to a significant or extended military commitment, or in other words, to neutralize a threat (Rodríguez-Álvarez & Montero-Moncada, 2022).

However, given the evolving operational challenges, the conjunction between SF and Intelligence calls for a move beyond simple synergy toward a more ambitious fusion of capabilities. In this regard, U.S. and Russian fusion models propose that strategic operations in external environments yield much better results while maintaining simplicity and security, in a much more robust and effective manner than in the past (Montero et al., 2020).

Therefore, the scope of covert operations must be expanded to include a series of capabilities previously reserved solely for Intelligence. Clearly, at the doctrinal level, this presents at least two challenges: on the one hand, generating doctrine where none exists and, on the other hand, aligning two concepts that, although broad, differ: *covert operations* and *foreign military defense*. To achieve this, the best common analytical framework is the dyad of special warfare—as a critical capability—and unconventional warfare—as a task.

Special Warfare as a Critical Capability of SF

If we start from the assumption that a critical capability is “a means considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to work and is essential for the fulfillment of imposed or deduced objectives” (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017b, p. 2-2), it can be stated that SO has two critical capabilities: special warfare and surgical strikes. Specifically, “special warfare is the conduct of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions carried out by troops with a broad understanding and comprehension of the operational environment” (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017b, p. 2-2).

In national doctrinal construction, special warfare capabilities comprise the following distinctive types of operations: “unconventional warfare, assistance to security forces, counterinsurgency, preparation of the operational environment, evacuation of non-combatants, foreign internal defense, support for information operations, and civil affairs” (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017b, p. 2-3).

Its strategic importance within the context of SO stems from its role in projecting SF into the new scenario of hybrid warfare, a clearly Western concept that encompasses many contemporary conflicts and finds comparable definitions in Russia—as non-linear warfare—and in China—as unrestricted warfare. This war can be defined as the “natural product of the adaptation of irregular and asymmetric warfare aimed at exploiting the vulnerabilities of regular forces” (Colom, 2018, p. 38) or, in the context of unrestricted warfare, as “a combined war that transcends the main areas and methods of military and non-military affairs, where all dimensions that influence national security must be included” (Ejército de Chile, 2013, p. 4). This way, the aim is to achieve a political objective through violence.

In other words, in the context of hybrid warfare, unconventional warfare—as part of the critical capability of special warfare—plays a very important role. Thus, it is essential to understand the definition of hybrid warfare:

Hybrid warfare is a sophisticated form of warfare characteristic of the Information Age that, leveraging the possibilities offered by globalization and free access to advanced technologies, combines conventional and irregular actions at all levels and phases of an operation. (Colom, 2012, p. 82).

A third definition that illustrates the close relationship between special warfare and hybrid warfare capabilities is “the use of various instruments of power to target a specific social actor. Employing these tools of power becomes an attack aimed at identifying different vulnerabilities to produce various effects” (Equilibrium Global, 2020, para. 4). Because of the diffuse nature of confronting the power of the hybrid adversary, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are central. They enable the State to operate in the elusive terrain of proactivity instead of being confined to a permanent reactive stance.

Special warfare—and the tasks that comprise it—thus acquires prominence. For the United States Army, “the two primary missions of SF are unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense” (Department of the Army, 2014, p. 14). The choice of this path is based on the fact that these are the most powerful tools for containing first asymmetric enemies—adaptive, flexible, and diffuse—and then, hybrid enemies—a confluence of conventional power and unattributable, but highly destabilizing, means. At this point, unconventional warfare, in which special operators fully leverage their flexibility and adaptability to operate in diffuse environments, and foreign internal defense, with its preventive nature and its focus on keeping threats as far from the country as possible, become important.

Given that the concept of hybrid warfare is the most widespread format of contemporary warfare (Montero, 2022), it is essential that armies, starting with the Colombian one, conduct a thorough analysis of their capabilities—within the framework of special warfare—regarding the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures that allow the Colombian SF to ensure victory in a conflict without even firing a bullet.

Likewise, the various ways special warfare can be applied against any adversary must be analyzed, recognizing that the hybrid warfare operational environment is highly variable. Special warfare, developed through unconventional warfare and military defense abroad, is an extremely important military component of the government’s national strategy in 21st-century conflicts, which is why its concepts, scope, and implications must be clear.

Unconventional Warfare as a Driving Force of Special Warfare

Unconventional warfare is the main force behind special warfare. This relationship works because SO must keep innovating as threats change quickly. This fast pace of change requires regularly updated tactics, techniques, and procedures to prevent the enemy from gaining any advantage.

Unconventional warfare has become a decisive tool in shaping the battlefield. Of course, it is not limited to this action, though it is important to answer the following seemingly tautological question: Is unconventional warfare the State's response to 21st-century conflicts?

And the answer is probably yes. It can be argued that unconventional warfare capabilities have been employed, directly or indirectly, across generations of warfare. Suffice it to mention, for example, the operations carried out by the British Special Air Service (SAS) and the French Resistance during World War II, or the missions carried out by the U.S. SF in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks.

Unconventional warfare has several characteristics that make it a flexible technique, capable of being used across different operational environments without restricting it to a single situation. That is why it is so effective in gray, diffuse, asymmetric, or hybrid environments. As mentioned earlier, Colombian doctrine defines unconventional warfare as those "activities conducted in a conflict environment, aimed at gathering intelligence to weaken the adversary's fighting capacity" (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017b, p. 21). This aligns with the proposal discussed in the first section, working alongside Intelligence without being its exclusive focus.

Now, from the perspective of the U.S. Army—which more closely aligns the SF with military intelligence—unconventional warfare is not limited to intelligence-gathering activities but encompasses a range of actions that shape the operational environment, facilitating future military operations structured around national strategy.

According to Appendix "A" of the U.S. Army's *ATP 3-05.1 Unconventional Warfare* (Department of the Army, 2013), the U.S. Army's SF has 17 specific unconventional warfare missions, including "locating and recovering personnel and equipment in and from the joint special operations area, and ensuring or coordinating joint combat." As this definition demonstrates, in some States unconventional warfare is used to go beyond intelligence-related missions and, conversely, to deploy these capabilities for offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

In the Colombian case, although a defined doctrinal structure exists, not all of the Army Field Manuals (MCE) have yet been developed, nor have the Army Technique Manuals (MTE), which has affected the doctrinal development of the SF's critical capabilities.

The first step in establishing or validating unconventional warfare as a core component of critical special warfare capabilities is to define the field and develop the technique manuals aligned with the tasks performed by the SF. Another crucial factor is the High Command's willingness to credibly develop this capability, accepting the strategic risks involved. Unconventional warfare demands highly trained, carefully selected, fully equipped, and morally resilient personnel, since this mission, unlike others, must be executed with a very low profile and always under the authorization and guidance of a nation's highest decision-making authority.

Perhaps one of the biggest challenges in personnel selection is not just understanding foreign operational environments but also the closeness or distance of the special operator to different cultural patterns. In a hyperconnected world where transnational threats mirror the diffuse nature of hybrid threats, soldiers need the ability to operate in foreign languages, understand and internalize cultural norms that are completely different from their own, and have a much greater capacity for mimicry than ever before. This need has increased due to cultural hyperconnectivity and the very high levels of media exposure and databases that could be leaked to adversary governments, agents, or structures.

The process of target selection and prioritization is also a very sensitive issue in unconventional warfare. This process requires walking a fine line, given the blurred boundaries of what constitutes a legitimate military target. Therefore, it demands high-level, exceptional intelligence capabilities to select targets for destruction, sabotage, or neutralization behind enemy lines that do not directly impact civilians but are within the scope of an adversary operating in a gray zone across multiple dimensions.

Given the elements presented in this analysis, it is imperative to reconfigure the doctrinal concept of unconventional warfare in accordance with Colombian doctrine. This should not be limited to intelligence-gathering tasks but, following the U.S. model, be applicable across a broad spectrum, hybrid in nature, and grounded in an understanding of the multidimensionality of present and future threats.

As a preliminary conclusion, it is important to emphasize that operations conducted within the scope of unconventional warfare could be an effective response, at least in theory, to hybrid threats, which cannot be countered with traditional methods, since they involve a "diverse and dynamic combination of conventional

forces, irregular forces, terrorist groups, and criminal elements unified to achieve mutually beneficial effects" (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017c). Perhaps the hybrid threat calls for a hybrid response from the State, where unconventional warfare stands out as the versatile warfare method offering the greatest flexibility in its tactics, objectives, and resources to address this type of threat.

Foreign Internal Defense as a National Security Strategy

Within the spectrum of special warfare, foreign internal defense becomes the ideal complement to combat in hybrid environments.

To begin with, it must be recognized that national security "is the national effort to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce vulnerabilities to them, and respond to natural disasters and other emergencies" (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017c, p. 4-21). Therefore, national security should be viewed as a component of national security policy, which demands genuinely unified action, defined as "the synchronization and/or integration of activities of state and non-state actors with military operations to achieve unity of effort" (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017c, p. 12). Without this coordination, developing a national security strategy becomes very difficult, since, as mentioned earlier, security involves not only the security forces but also political authorities and other stakeholders.

In border areas, unified action should not be limited to internal coordination; if the situation allows, it can be further improved through cooperation with friendly countries. To conduct military operations with other nations, certain conditions must first be met, such as standardizing military procedures among States and, of course, securing the political will to implement these measures. As mentioned, it is important to highlight that, due to their complexity and impact, the development and use of critical capabilities and distinctive operations of the SF must be authorized by the Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces, who, in the Colombian context, is the President of the Republic, as outlined by the Constitution in Article 189: "To lead and use security forces as the supreme commander of the Colombian Armed Forces" (Constitución Política de Colombia, 1991).

As part of special warfare capabilities, foreign internal defense multiplies unified internal action abroad; in other words, this type of SO consists of defending the interior from abroad. This concept should not be confused with other related

concepts such as *intervention*, *interference*, or *instability operations*, which—especially the latter—are controversial and have a very limited conceptualization. Specifically, foreign internal defense is the “participation of a government’s civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs adopted by another government, with the purpose of protecting its society from subversion, anarchy, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats” (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2018, p. 1-6). Analyzing this definition, it can be concluded that foreign internal defense is a unified action coordinated and executed with the participation of organizations from other countries to protect the nation’s interior.

The above statement refers exclusively to the doctrine of the Colombian National Army’s SF. Therefore, it is important to highlight that, in other countries, foreign internal defense is not limited to SF units but rather has a global focus and involves the interaction of multinational efforts and joint operations among armed forces, governmental, and non-governmental agencies. “Army efforts, in general, include special operations forces units, particularly Civil Affairs, military information support operations, and Special Forces” (Department of the Army, 2015, p. 2-31).

It should be noted that, unlike Colombian doctrine, the U.S. Army doctrine includes Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs (CA) units within the organizational structure of SO units. In Colombia, these types of units are not part of the SF organizational structure, specifically speaking (Table 1).

Table 1. *Tasks and Subtasks of Foreign Internal Defense*

Foreign internal defense (FID)	Tasks	Subtasks
Participation of civil and military agencies of a government in any of the programs of action adopted by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, anarchy, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (MFRE 3-0)	Indirect support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security cooperation - Assistance to security forces - Joint and/or multinational exercises - Exchange programs
	Direct support without combat operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil Affairs (CA) - Military information support operations (MISO) - Military training support - Logistics support
	Direct support with combat operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (APQ) Temporary solution, presidential decision

Source: Ejército Nacional de Colombia (2017c).

The development of foreign internal defense is a key element for national security, as these types of SF operations allow the government to design a

multidimensional national security strategy. This strategy is executed through military tools with SF capabilities, which, in conjunction with strong diplomatic relations, especially with neighboring countries, can enable unified action that integrates the military and civilian capabilities of both allied nations.

In U.S. doctrine, foreign internal defense is approached in line with its political and military capabilities, and, clearly, its status as a major power. Recent campaigns, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, have expanded the discussion of the forms, methods, tactics, and techniques used with this tool. Therefore, it can be argued that the shared experiences of the Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were beneficial. However, the joint command and even the SF command must consider the complexity of balancing short-term objectives with tasks aimed at achieving long-term solutions in the global counterterrorism effort. In these long-term strategies, the SF provides States with strategic and operational options that only they have, through special reconnaissance and direct action in support of Joint Task Forces. Thus, foreign internal defense activities are the most effective means of producing results against transnational terrorist structures and their host States (Liller, 2005).

In this regard, the *JP 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, which addresses the issue from a doctrinal perspective, states that

[...] While FID is one of the designated core special operations activities of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its subordinate commands, FID may receive support from the Joint Force, Multinational Forces (MNF), and other USG departments and agencies. (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2021, p. 14)

What is relevant is that, by its nature, the United States does not define foreign internal defense as a primarily military operation. Instead, it proposes that it typically includes an interorganizational approach to support the security, stability, and development of a State. Foreign internal defense requires a whole-of-government focus on achieving and leveraging unified action by all participants through practices such as interoperability, integration, and interdependence (JCS, 2021).

U.S. doctrine is emphatic in this regard, defining characteristics of foreign internal defense that highlight the need for a much broader vision than usual. Specifically, the United States establishes that foreign internal defense (JCS, 2021):


- involves all instruments of national power.
- can occur across the full range of military operations.
- is carried out by both conventional forces and Special Operations Forces.

- supports and influences the host nation's development and internal defense program.
- includes training, material, technical and organizational assistance, advisory services, infrastructure development, and tactical operations.
- has preferred methods of support such as assistance and development programs.

These characteristics allow us to see two elements. First, it requires a concerted, interoperable effort to conduct foreign internal defense. Second, the Range of Military Operations (RMO) is a complementary tool to unconventional warfare in the difficult context of hybrid warfare. Therefore, its military application is not exclusive but essential to the SF.

In its execution, and as shown in Figure 2, the structural nature of foreign internal defense is also evident. U.S. doctrine involves a wide range of actors and processes, ensuring that actions are sustainable and decisive.

Figure 2. *Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model*



Source: JCS (2021).

There is no doubt that, due to its nature, the United States' approach to foreign internal defense differs from Colombia's. However, it is possible to draw parallels in terms of how it complements unconventional warfare and the need to see it as a tool that involves most agencies to expand its reach and ensure coordinated impact.

In conclusion, foreign internal defense enables Colombia, through the SF, to project military capabilities to enhance and secure national security, as well as to build international relations with allied countries, with whom these types of operations would eventually be carried out. It is precisely because of this feature that foreign internal defense sets itself apart from other operations involving critical special warfare capabilities: the direct or indirect participation of another country within a comprehensive security approach, acknowledging that when regional security is maintained, national security is also strengthened.

Conclusions

In extremely changing and dynamic environments such as hybrid wars, equally changing, dynamic, adaptive, and flexible military components are required. This is why SF becomes the most valuable strategic tool in these operational theaters.

Beyond surgical strike capabilities, the answers to hybrid challenges lie in special warfare. Although unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are complementary tasks within special warfare, their definitions and approaches must be reviewed to ensure coordination and full implementation.

First, a unity of effort—the product of successful unified action—is essential to prevent crises and defeat credible threats. Second, the construction of a new intelligence framework is fundamental, such that its optimized use requires that all operations be based on reliable, accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence, and that this intelligence be fused with SF in time, manner, and place.

Third, a synchronized use of MISO with other operational activities is required, as this can enhance the legitimacy of the SF involved in the action.

Finally, synergy must be fostered not only with the political leadership but also with the strategic and operational command. This organization must provide centralized planning and direction, support the decentralized execution of the plan, and be structured and authorized to coordinate and lead unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense efforts. Therefore, the doctrinal challenge in Colombia remains unresolved, and the necessity to develop the doctrine is evident.

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