



Theoretical approach to the notions of war and strategic leadership

Sergio Uribe-Cáceres
Desiderio López Niño
(Editors)

Security and Defense Collection

EDITORIAL ESDEG

Theoretical approach to the notions of war and strategic leadership



Theoretical approach to the notions of war and strategic leadership

SERGIO URIBE-CÁCERES

DESIDERIO LÓPEZ NIÑO

(EDITORS)

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Escuela Militar de Cadetes "General José María Córdova"

Bogotá D.C., 2023

**Cataloging in publication – Escuela Superior de Guerra “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”
and Escuela Militar de Cadetes “General José María Córdova”**

Theoretical approach to the notions of war and strategic leadership / editors Sergio Uribe-Cáceres and Desiderio López Niño -- Bogotá: Editorial ESDEG, ESMIC Sello Editorial, 2023

298 pages : illustration and graphics; 24 cm.
Includes bibliographic reference at the end of each chapter

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

E- ISBN: 978-628-7602-50-2

(Security and Defense Collection)

1. Development leadership 2. Civil-military relations 3. Leadership development 4. Civilian-military power relations 5. War -- History -- Research i. López Niño, Desiderio (author - editor) ii. Uribe Cáceres, Sergio, Captain (R) (author - editor) iii. Salamanca Rodríguez, Edgar Alexander, Brigadier General (preface) iv. Realpe Díaz, Milena Elizabeth, Lieutenant Colonel (author) v. Ardila Castro, Carlos Alberto, Lieutenant Colonel (R) (author) vi. Díaz Rivera, Álvaro Eduardo, Lieutenant Commander (author) vii. Álvarez Calderón, Carlos Enrique (author) viii. Lasprilla Villamizar, Jaime Alfonso, General (R) (author) ix. Atahualpa Pérez, Andrés (author) x. Ramírez Pedraza, Yesid Eduardo, Colonel (A) (author) xi. Arciniegas Londoño, Laura, Second Lieutenant (R) (author) xii. Moreno Pelaez, Jesús Eduardo, Lieutenant Colonel (R) (author) xiii. Monroy Velásquez, Viviana (author) xiv. González Martínez, Miguel Antonio (author) xv. Coronado Camero, Faiver, Teniente Colonel (R) (author) xvi. Sierra Gutiérrez, William Alfredo, Lieutenant Colonel (R) (author) xvii. Colombia. Escuela Superior de Guerra “General Rafael Reyes Prieto (ESDEG) xviii. Colombia. Escuela Militar de Cadetes “General José María Córdova” (ESMIC)

UB210 A6713 2023
355.33041072 23

Catalog record SIBFuP 991275896107231



Downloadable file in MARC format at: <https://tinyurl.com/esdeg991275896107231>

Theoretical approach to notions of war and strategic leadership

First edition, 2023

Editors:

Sergio Uribe-Cáceres
Desiderio López Niño

2023 Escuela Superior de Guerra

“General Rafael Reyes Prieto”

Vice-Directorate for Research

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Carrera 11 N°. 102-50 Bogotá D.C., Colombia

www.esdeglibros.edu.co

Cover:

Raquel Arianne Alvarado Candela based on a photograph by Col. Andrés Eduardo Fernández Osorio

2023 Escuela Militar de Cadetes

“General José María Córdova”

R+D+I Department

Sello Editorial ESMIC

Calle 80 N°. 38-00 Bogotá D.C., Colombia

www.librosesmic.com

Security and Defense Collection

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

E-book published through the Open Monograph Press platform.

Running of 100 copies

Printed in Colombia

Book research result of the Escuela Superior de Guerra “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”, published in co-edition with the Escuela Militar de Cadetes “General José María Córdova”.

The content of this book corresponds exclusively to the authors’ thinking and is their absolute responsibility. The positions and assertions presented here are the result of an academic and research exercise that does not necessarily represent the official or institutional position of the participating institutions, the Escuela Superior de Guerra “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”, the Escuela Militar de Cadetes “General José María Córdova”, the Military Forces of Colombia and the Ministry of National Defense.



Books published by the Sello Editorial ESDEG and the Sello Editorial ESMIC are open access under a Creative Commons license: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International.
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>



Brigadier General
Edgar Alexander Salamanca Rodríguez
DIRECTOR

Rear Admiral
Omar Yesid Moreno Oliveros
DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Colonel
Oscar Otoniel Torres Conde
VICE-DIRECTOR OF ACADEMICS

Colonel
Verónica Pedraza Martínez
VICE-DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

Colonel
Andrés Eduardo Fernández Osorio
VICE-DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH

Captain
Edwin Andrés Alonso Toloza
VICE-DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTIONAL PROJECTION



Colonel
Andrés Eduardo Fernández Osorio
HEAD OF THE SELLO EDITORIAL ESDEG

Lieutenant Colonel (R)
Carlos Alberto Ardila Castro
COORDINATOR OF THE SELLO EDITORIAL ESDEG

Erika Paola Ramírez Benítez
EDITOR IN CHIEF OF THE SELLO EDITORIAL ESDEG

Gustavo Patiño Díaz
PROOFREADER

Raquel Arianne Alvarado Candela
LAYOUT DESIGNER

Lina María Moya Ramírez
TRANSLATOR

Content

Preface <i>BG. Edgar Alexander Salamanca Rodríguez</i>	11-12
Prologue <i>Captain (R) Sergio Uribe-Cáceres</i>	13-18
Chapter I Epistemology of Strategic Leadership <i>Desiderio López Niño</i>	19-38
Chapter II Challenges in finding sustainable leadership in cyberspace and the international system <i>Milena Elizabeth Realpe Díaz</i>	39-58
Chapter III The Thirty Years' War: a space of transformation in the nature of war <i>Carlos Alberto Ardila Castro</i>	59-76
Chapter IV Power and leadership in the 21st century. Case Study: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine <i>Álvaro Eduardo Díaz Rivera</i>	77-98

Chapter V

The failure of political-military integration during the Vietnam War:
are they two divergent types of leadership?

99-118

Carlos Enrique Álvarez Calderón

Chapter VI

An institutional response to confront terrorism in the
Colombian armed conflict (1992-2012)

119-142

Jaime Alfonso Lasprilla Villamizar

Chapter VII

Strategic leadership of Saddam Hussein and George W. Bush
in the context of the second Gulf War

143-162

Andrés Atahualpa Pérez

Chapter VIII

Characterization of drug trafficking as a destabilizing factor
in a national defense and security strategy

163-180

Yesid Eduardo Ramírez Pedraza

Chapter IX

Leadership from the Kremlin's military and ideological strategy:
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

181-204

Laura Arciniegas Londoño

Chapter X

Strategic leadership of the British intelligence community in
World War II

205-222

Jesús Eduardo Moreno Peláez

Chapter XI

Colombian women in transnational organized crime

223-240

Vivian Andrea Monroy Velásquez

Chapter XII

George F. Kennan's Strategic Thinking and the fourth-generation
wars in the framework of the Cold War

241-262

Miguel Antonio González Martínez

Chapter XIII

The Cenepa War from the theory of General Jomini.

The war between Ecuador and Peru

263-280

Faiver Coronado Camero

Chapter XIV

The Transformation of Leadership and Political Systems
in the Six-Day War

281-298

William Alfredo Sierra Gutiérrez

Preface

Brigadier-General Edgar Alexander Salamanca Rodríguez

Director of the Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

The academic, theoretical and research contributions are considered fundamental in the achievement of the mission as a Higher Education Institution of the Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Current and future challenges to national security and defense require the institution to actively participate in that input process, with high-level products that, as a result of scientific research, are offered to the national and international academic community through its interdisciplinary education programs.

It is in this order of ideas that this preface highlights the contribution of our PhD program in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense. With this publication, the doctorate participates pertinently and timely in the development of its responsibility in the training of researchers, analysts, and advisors at the strategic level of the security and defense sector, capable of guiding decision-making and the implementation of national public policies.

This relevant program obtained the Qualified Registry of the Ministry of Education on February 3rd, 2022, and appropriates the 114 years of experience and trajectory of the Escuela de Guerra in the formation and training of Colombian and foreign military, as well as leaders of the public and private sector. It is unique in Colombia in the priority objective of researching, analyzing, evaluating, and understanding the main topics related to national strategy, security, and defense, which occur on a recurrent and unforeseen basis in an increasingly interconnected and unstable global geopolitical environment.

In this way, and with the valuable participation of the teachers and students of the first cohort of the program, we present this remarkable work: A theoretical approach to the notions of war and strategic leadership. An analysis from the Escuela Superior de Guerra. Based on the main notions examined in the application of the initial curriculum of the program and through critical and proactive

thinking, the authors thoroughly discuss different topics - past and current - all with great analytical relevance that reflects, discusses, and proposes.

In fourteen chapters, the book discusses extensively on different topics: from the epistemology of strategic leadership or power and leadership in the 21st century, to the examination of the various classical and modern theories that have been developed on war. Including other important topics such as the role of criminal women in Colombia or the response of the Colombian State to confront terrorism during the period 1992-2012.

Thus, the work remains in the hands of readers, both novice and specialized, who wish to delve into the subjects of the book, which we consider a new and great editorial and academic contribution of our Escuela Superior de Guerra.

Prologue

Si vis pacem, para bellum.

Latin aphorism

Captain (R) Sergio Uribe-Cáceres

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Having as a priority the sovereignty and security, contemporary States have the cooperation resources and the alliances as the best paths to solve the problems that are becoming increasingly more shared and with an undeniable mutual responsibility. The power balance between the States would be the key mechanism to maintain a thriving and safe international system for the compounding nations. Nevertheless, whenever this balance deregulates, the solution through the force of antagonism and rivalries is still there via different magnitude and duration armed confrontations.

This states the importance of conceptualization and the theoretical grounds around the concepts of war, strategic leadership, and their related quandaries. As a basis for the understanding of new challenges that impact positively and become a suitable mechanism for the comprehensive preservation of the State. In this way, it will provide the relevant knowledge to contextualize the main problems -as well as their potential effects- related to the theory of war, leadership, and armed conflicts.

The renowned general and Chinese strategist Sun Tzu stated 2300 years ago on its pinnacle work, *The art of War* (Sun Tzu, 1999), that "the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." The study and analysis of conflicts has evolved through time, tactics, strategies, and advances in technology. Consequently, several theories –mainly, sequenced, and supplementary- have been designed along the human history for understanding and explaining the complex phenomenon of war.

It is a fundamental premise that conflicts are understood, under many perspectives, as enablers of social order. Whether armed conflicts or not, these have always generated social, political, and economic dynamics that have determined the coexistence between nations.

However, some authors have suggested that wars between States could become a matter of the past (Mandelbaum, 1998), some different types of confrontations –during the past 30 years– could prove the contrary.

A brief account of armed conflicts confirms this: the war between Russia and Afghanistan, from 1978 to 1992; the first Gulf War in 1991; the Cenepa war in 1995, between Ecuador and Peru; the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998; the second Gulf War, from 2003 to 2011; the conflict between India and Pakistan in 2019; the war in Afghanistan (the American and its allies' invasions to overthrow the Taliban government), from 2001 to 2021; the conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan, from 2020 to 2012; the conflict between Israel and Palestine; or the sanguinary Russian invasion to Ukraine.

The internal conflicts between armed factions, commonly known as *civil wars*, also abounded during this period as a method of violent solution for disagreements of various origins and nature; whether political, religious, or ethnical. On many occasions, these conflicts are particularly internationalized, it means that other countries have intervened as support of one of the blocs. Among other conflicts, we could mention these: the Syrian civil war, from 2011 to the present day; the Malian war, from 2012 to 2013; the civil war in Yemen, from 2014 to the present day; the Libyan civil war, from 2014 to 2020; the civil war in South Sudan, from 2012 to 2020. Or the wars against terrorism in Colombia and Peru.

Moreover, the current relevance of the research about the classic theories of war and armed conflicts is explained with a maxim by the French Colonel and military theorist Charles Ardant du Picq, from the second half of the 19th century "Only the study of the past can give us a sense of reality and can show us how the soldier will fight in the future". This study of the past and its conclusions can let us advance in the knowledge of the way how the war has been understood and developed in different periods of history of the armed conflict.

Military history has been a frequent source for gaining information (and it is still today) in a relevant and pertinent way. The contributions derived from the analysis of the war phenomena have brought –specially to military science– an important character that tries to determine the causes and effects of the behaviors showed in war. Nonetheless, in this sense Collins (1975) affirmed:

Since the dawn of humanity, millions of men have fought in uncountable battles. However, it is astonishing to prove that, over the centuries, there have been few creative thinkers in the strategy field. Many thinkers, both educators and leaders, who might supposedly have been original in their contributions to strategy, merely imitated their predecessors, giving new forms to old ideas. Very few innovators put their theories or precepts into written form before the 19th century. Most of them left the task of collecting their teachings to historians, who wrote them down long after that happened. (n. p.)

In consequence, the main contributions of ancient thinkers had an outlook solely military that became, in theory, in the foundation of a science attributed only to the interest of military scholars. It is under these circumstances that the war strategic thinking started its evolution. And as a result, true innovative strategists, with their outstanding contributions, helped to their understanding and fostered permanent reflection and learning in the complex area of study of war and conflicts.

The development of previous dissertations, such as Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESDEG), and the teachers and students from the classes of *Theory of War* and *Armed Conflicts*, and *Strategic Leadership and Prospective Analysis* (of the Ph.D. in *Strategic Studies, Security and Defense* of the ESDEG) decided to investigate and to propose different topics discussed in previous paragraphs. To foster constructive dialectic based on current, reflected, evaluated, and developed notions from different professional approaches. So, let's see the results of this valuable joint academic effort.

In a first section, the first four chapters address the complex changes in the nature of war. In the first, entitled "Epistemology of strategic leadership", the author begins the work, as a study preamble, examining the different theories that have been developed on leadership and reviewing paradigms and approaches from which human behavior in organizations has been investigated and, for the present text, in its relationship with the theories of war.

In the second chapter, entitled "Cyber threats in a hyper-connected world", the author discusses the new types of threats and forms of conflict that use cyberspace as a new scenario for their criminal activities.

In the third chapter, entitled "The Thirty Years' War: a space of transformation of the nature of war", its author affirms that war, as a phenomenon of a social nature, adapts and transforms in line with the cultural and social contexts that are constantly evolving. The birth of the modern nation state as a result of the Peace

of Westphalia, in 1648, and the consequent changes suffered in the nature and the character of war could thus demonstrate it.

In the last chapter of this section, entitled “Power and Leadership in the 21st Century. Case study: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”, its author brings us back to the current events, to analyze the causes and effects of the war on the European scene, as part of a dispute for power of ideological, political, historical, and economic origins.

The second section of the book covers four chapters that examine tactics, strategies and leaderships that have led to success or failure both in war enterprises of great scope and magnitude and in sanguinary and extensive internal conflicts with the ability to jeopardize the stability of a State or even its very existence. The section begins in chapter V entitled “The failure of political-military integration during the Vietnam War: are they two divergent types of leadership?”, in which its author analyzes in depth the frictions that can arise in the midst of the national purpose of achieving a fruitful and effective political-military integration; that is, the possibility of optimally linking military strategy with political objectives, in times of both peace and war.

In the next chapter, entitled “An institutional response to confront terrorism in the Colombian armed conflict, from 1992 to 2012”, the author –a prominent protagonist of the time and of the facts–examines terrorism as a multisystemic phenomenon that deserves to be studied in its different forms and expressions, taking as a reference point the terrorist threat to the Colombian State. In turn, in chapter VII, entitled “Strategic leadership of Saddam Hussein and George W. Bush in the framework of the second Gulf War”, the author immerses himself in the in-depth and timely study of the factors that define the ways that leaders use to face challenges of great depth and unpredictable consequences, in the development of vast conflicts of international scope.

In the final chapter of the second section of the book, entitled “Characterization of drug trafficking as a destabilizing factor of a national defense and security strategy”, the author addresses as a main topic the effect caused by illicit drug trafficking in the formulation and application of national security and defense strategies. He also argues that it is necessary to study historically the measures that have been taken to mitigate this destabilizing factor.

The last section of the book comprises its six final chapters, aimed at rethinking strategic leadership from different spatial and historical approaches: chapter IX, entitled “Leadership from the Kremlin’s military and ideological strategy: the

Russian-Ukrainian conflict”, undertakes the analysis by reflecting on the current strategies of Russia’s foreign policy, based on the leadership characteristics of two of its main exponents: General Valery Gerasimov and the politician and ideologist Alexander Dugin.

Chapter X, entitled “Strategic Leadership of the British Intelligence Community in World War II,” focuses on the advances at the strategic level of UK intelligence during the second great global conflagration of the last century and their tangible effects on the outcome of the war. In chapter XI, entitled “Colombian women in transnational organized crime”, the analysis is channeled by its author from an innovative gender approach -based on the study of the social phenomenon of *criminal women*- that allows evaluating and concluding on the various roles assumed by women and their participation in the criminal activities of organized international crime.

Chapter XII, titled “George F. Kennan’s Strategic Thinking and fourth generation wars in the framework of the Cold War,” explores the containment policy pursued by the United States against the Soviet Union during the 44-year period characterized by political, ideological, and military tension between the two countries: the Cold War. In chapter XIII, entitled “The Cenepa War from the theory of General Jomini. The war between Ecuador and Peru”, the author makes a historical investigation of the conflict using chronological, geographical, and ethnographic perspectives, transversalizing them with the concepts of war by the great military strategist Antoine-Henri Jomini.

The third section and the book with chapter XIV, entitled “The transformation of leadership and political systems in the Six-Day War”, are closed, in which the impact of international conflicts is related to the political, social and economic change of the countries involved. The author focuses on the Middle East from the analysis of the Six-Day War and the role of regional leaders in managing post-conflict dynamics.

In summary, it is in this reflective, profound and critical way that the authors of this complete work present and discuss academically relevant and complementary topics on two subjects that are fundamental in the study of war and armed conflicts: their classical and contemporary theories and strategic leadership from a prospective analysis. We hope that you, kind reader, will do the same, and that you will contribute with your impressions and appreciations on the topics covered, in a dialectic that aims to move the frontiers of knowledge, and that we intend to make it fruitful and enriching for all.

References

Collins, J. (1975). *Grand strategy. Principles and practices*. Editorial Lito.

Mandelbaum, M. (1998). Is major war obsolete? *Survival*, 40 (4). <https://doi.org/10.1093/survival/40.4.20>

Sun Tzu. (1999). *The art of war*. Editorial Panamericana.

Chapter I

Epistemology of Strategic Leadership

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.01>

Desiderio López Niño

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: A characteristic of the social sciences are their polysemic concepts, and strategic leadership is not an exception, so a framework is required that bases its study. This chapter explores the various theories that have emerged about leadership, with the purpose of bringing to the surface the interrelationships of diverse knowledge, which do not seem to be interconnected. The paradigms and approaches of the social sciences that have underpinned research on human behavior within organizations were reviewed, which made possible to show that theories on strategic leadership have been built from observations on the actions of leaders and followers, which are represented by words that, when interrelated, have generated concepts that are interwoven in a logical way, and thus account for their rigor as a phenomenon studied by the social sciences.

Keywords: strategic leadership, epistemology, organizations, social sciences, human behavior.

Desiderio López Niño

Ph.D. in Administration, University of Celaya, Mexico. MA in Public Management, ITESEM, Mexico. Specialist in International Cooperation and Project Management for Development, Externado University of Colombia. Economist, University of America. Fellow, "William J. Perry" Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. Professor and research fellow, Doctorate in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3797-0249> - Contact: desiderio.lopez@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: López Niño, D. (2023). Epistemology of Strategic Leadership. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 19-38). Sello Editorial ESDEG.
<https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.01>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

The knowledge of *strategic leadership* is part of the field of social sciences and addresses the study of human behavior, its relationships, power and decision-making; all of them, central issues in the social episteme. The social sciences, says Wallerstein (2001), emerged with Modernity, in the 16th century, when a systematic knowledge was developed that has empirical validation on historical accounts, which allowed us to understand the present and laid the foundations for making decisions about the future; that is, the social sciences were born with the technique of empirical research of archives, genesis of the topics that make up the chapters of this book.

Subsequently, studies on social phenomena acquired more figuration in the sciences with the approaches of Augusto Comte and John Stuart Mill, in the nineteenth century, when these authors investigated human behavior through methods that made it possible to contrast “reality” based on empirical discoveries. But it was only with the approaches of the German sociologist Max Weber and the creation of the German *sociological society*, in the 1920s, when the “scientific” study of the social sciences was institutionalized (Castro et al., 2016), with pretensions of becoming nomothetic sciences. The interest of this type of study was to arrive at general laws on human behavior, using quantitative techniques (Wallerstein, 2001). But with this method, the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary character with which social phenomena are approached was recast, from varied knowledge, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, politics and organizational studies, among others (Myrdal, 1970). The identity of these disciplines and their interactions in the episteme of the activities of human beings originate various fields of study that analyze, in turn, multiple phenomena -one of them, *strategic leadership*-, which are

required to be enthroned in the very foundations of the epistemology of the social sciences.

Therefore, it is important to investigate underlying premises that, apparently, do not come to the surface in studies on leadership, that is, to immerse oneself in the knowledge of knowledge about leadership, but which account for its rigor, such as the precision in the use of concepts, propositions and theories, where the coherence between the ontological and the epistemic of the variables it deals with becomes notorious. Without losing sight of the fact that the phenomena investigated by the social sciences change in accordance with the constellations of power, in both geographical and historical aspects. This practice is innate to the social sciences and has generated various paradigms, without its research losing its place in science. A different view would be to accept that human behavior, such as strategic leadership, obeys universal laws and is indifferent to situations of time, place and culture.

This chapter draws attention to the fact that science is an activity that produces knowledge using a method that finds answers to our questions (Pérez, 2001) But what is also valued is that raised by Creswell & Plano (2018), who affirm that science is not a single method, but several methods that develop procedures and base their approval on the validity of the propositions on the observations of the actions of human beings; said propositions. In addition, are open to evaluation by the community, so that the theories that arise from such evaluation are approved or rejected, in order to improve the understanding of phenomena such as, for the case, strategic leadership.

In the social sciences, the term *theory* serves to describe a set of interlinked propositions. These propositions are constructed from observations of people's activities, and which are represented by words that, when interrelated, form grammatically constructed propositions, which, in turn, generate concepts that are logically interwoven (Tobón, 2009) In strategic leadership, theories have been constructed following this method, which accounts for its rigor as a component of the social sciences and, therefore, validates its category of object of study within the inquiries of social knowledge.

This chapter explores the various theories that have emerged about leadership, as well as its schools of thought, focusing on its epistemology. The purpose is to bring to the surface the interrelationships of diverse knowledge borrowed from multiple disciplines. It explores some paradigms and approaches of the social sciences that have underpinned research on human behavior within organizations,

whether they are public agencies, companies, non-governmental organizations or Military Forces (FF. MM.).

Here it is observed that the different theories do not start from scratch but are generated from certain instrumental capacities. As Sassen (2019) states, it is a process that generates new logic through the construction of analytical tools to study new situations as society and its organizations mature. But it is important not to fall into the trap of endogeneity, which affects the social sciences. As Sassen (2019) insists, or into the tautology that characterizes the social sciences, as Maxim (2002) asserts.

To avoid these situations and understand the evolution of theories on strategic leadership, it is important to isolate the foundational components that make up certain totalities. For example, in this book the theories on leadership can be empirically evidenced, and for their study it is required that in the reading of each chapter of the book it is considered that the relevant totalities are the theories of war and that each one has components on strategic leadership, which, in turn, could be isolated as long as they can adopt different forms and contents in accordance with the historical and geopolitical aspects that were experienced in each war. That is, strategic leadership within each war is an analytical category, with its properties and dimensions that characterize it as an object of study within the social sciences.

Schools in the study of strategic leadership

The word *leadership*, according to the Real Academia Española, is “1 Leader status 2. Exercise of the activities of a leader”(Rae, 2022); and in the words of the Spanish Frigate Captain Federico Aznar, “A leader is a tuner of souls and that is an art that is difficult to rationalize, because science cannot be”(Aznar, 2018, p. 19). This would be a definition in the first instance or, as Nobel laureate Kahneman (2017) would say, derived from *System 1*, with which one thinks quickly; one could hastily conclude that leadership is a subject that distances itself from science.

But when the exercise of the verb *lead* is assigned the adjective *strategic*, the compound word *strategic leadership* is generated, thanks to which leadership acquires a new meaning, and makes. For example, Aznar reviews its definition and affirms: “Strategic leadership incorporates an intellectual dimension, of creation of frameworks” (2018, p. 19); also, that argues about the intellectual dimension through a narrative, by referring to strategy as “an integral term that means, at the same time, clarity of objectives, way of achieving them and rational use of the

instruments. It is the projection and development of thought in time and space”(Aznar, 2018, p. 59). It is inferred from this proposition that the *integral* entails *complex logics* between times, objectives and modes, and that *rational use* implies *cognitive processes* in the projection of thought. This allows us to affirm that leadership is an object of research only through the methods and techniques of the social sciences when reference is made to leadership within the decisive levels in organizations; that is, when strategies are designed that lead to decision making.

In addition, the strategy in the field of leadership becomes an articulating cement of two schools. One of them is the *cultural school* (Parry & Bryman, 2019), which bases its principles on *organizational culture*, an internal belief system that allows the cohesion and enthusiasm of a human group around the achievement of objectives of a common and higher end. The other is the *school of the environment* (Sanabria, 2019), which is based on the exercise of power outside the organization. In this regard, Aznar complements his concept of an organization’s strategy, which he defines as the “crossroads between the culture it offers and what the environment demands for the achievement of its mission” (Aznar, 2018, p. 43). Therefore, its integrating characteristic of the internal with the external is ratified.

On the other hand, the phenomenon of leadership is related to the exercise of influence, and although there are different approaches, the definitions of the leader and the schools that analyze it have as an underlying element the compliance of a human group in order to achieve common objectives (Sastre, 2014). Also, as noted in another definition,

Leadership is a complex phenomenon that affects many organizational, social, and personal processes. It depends on a process of influence, whereby people are inspired to work towards the goals of the group, not by coercion, but by personal motivation. (Bolden, 2004, p. 5)

Yukl et al. (2002) conceptualize in this regard: “Leadership is the process of influencing others to understand and agree on what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to achieve common goals” (p.

Professors Parry and Briman (2019) have identified five approaches in leadership research, which became dynamic after the end of World War II, in line with the dynamics of Europe’s recovery and the creation of various international bodies of the global order, such as the United Nations (UN):

- a) **Trait theory:** This approach, which prevailed until the beginning of the Cold War, is characterized by innate qualities in people who exercise leadership in their organizations, said Stogdill (cited by Sastre, 2014).
- b) **Style approaches:** They changed the look from the characteristics of the leaders, to direct it towards their behaviors. In this field, approaches such as the *theory of skills* were highlighted, according to which leaders are formed from educational processes (Mester Cheryl et al., 2003) and that they originate various types of leadership (autocratic, democratic and *laissez-faire*), based on goal-oriented behaviors. This, in turn, gave rise to *behaviorist theories*, such as those proposed by Blake and Mouton, cited by Josanov-Vrgovic and Pavlovic (2014), through a management matrix, and which were rethought, in turn, by Hersey and Blanchard, cited by Kouzes and Posner (2017), arguing that the emphasis of leaders is on behavior, and not on attitude, depending on the situation in which they found themselves, which led to *situational theory*.
- c) **Contingency approach:** From the variables identified in situational theory, quantitative models emerge to measure the relationship between the leader and team members with a structure of tasks and positions of power. This led to contingency theory (Mendoza, 2009), a model that relates the leader's behaviors to the achievement of results based on a series of contingent factors (Parry & Bryman, 2019). Especially, the relationships between the people who make up an organization in search of fulfilling tasks.
- d) **New leadership approach:** With the rise of free trade and globalization in the 1980s, *systemic analyses* were strengthened, where the leader's achievements depend on his own interaction with each team member. Hence the *transactional theory*, which is characterized by the establishment of a kind of "exchange" between the leader and the members of the group, so that the scope of the goals is harmonized with the roles played by each member of the organization (Cuadrado et al., 2008). This theory is complemented by *transformational leadership*, characterized by establishing a correspondence between the leader and his followers that causes a transformation in the organizational culture, motivating them to achieve better and higher levels of performance and job satisfaction (Cuadrado et al., 2008).
- e) **Post-charismatic and post-transformational leadership approach:** Professors Parry and Briman (2019) consider that current discussions on

leadership continue to maintain the dilemma of whether “the leader is born or made”; that is, whether or not it is the product of a charismatic heritage, a formation or a transformation of beliefs and attitudes. Due to advances in science and technology, these two thoughts on the leaders that give rise to *distributed leadership* have evolved, which is based on a leadership exercised by all members of the organization, as a holistic vision, where the dynamic is more than the sum of individual capacities (Shilton, 2004). Another current within this approach is *Authentic Leadership*, characteristic for being a multidimensional and multilevel process that thrives on positive psychological capacities that allow both leaders and followers to self-regulate (Mendoza, 2009). Hence, in turn, *complex leadership* arises, where the results are obtained by the interrelationships of many parties that interact with each other, and creativity, learning and adaptive capacity are stimulated, to find solutions to the problems that arise in a world marked by uncertainty and complexity (Kouzes & Posner, 2017). This leadership has, in turn, a subverter: *relational leadership*, where the relationships of organizations prevail, promoting the evolution of social order and a mutation of behaviors and paradigms.

These leadership approaches and theories incorporate meaning terms that are polysemic, making conceptualization very difficult. In this regard, it is important to consider what Koselleck stated: “The de-substantiation of the nuclear categories of political and social discourse is already indicating the end of the substantialization of several concepts” (2021, p. 56). The latter is the case of the own leadership of the *influencers* of the 21st century, who may be the leaders of greater importance in contemporary society, by recasting the propositions of the approaches set forth here.

The importance of concepts in strategic leadership knowledge

The evolution of theories on leadership makes it possible to show that, from its conceptual roots, based on disciplines such as history and political science - and lately, in psychology, sociology or the sciences of organizations (García-Guiu & Álvarez, 2022), it has been possible to objectify the study of leadership, making it the object of intellectual analysis. The aforementioned sciences provide a framework to

understand the nature of theoretical guidelines, as well as the type of epistemological problems that will be faced (Koselleck, 2021). In this way, knowledge about leadership goes beyond a narrative regarding an activity, an attitude or a skill, and is seen as a phenomenon that generates questions, based on scientific concepts.

The concepts immersed in strategic leadership, considering their historical trait, from the writings of Sun Tzu and Aristotle, carry diverse meanings that make them plural, almost indefinable. Then it is necessary to explore the origin of each concept, but making a transliteration of past concepts into our present vocabulary; that is, to assimilate those concepts of the past that today could be foreign to us, without pretending to study exclusively the categories with which the same actors could conceive their actions, since it would fall into the trap of endogeneity or tautology, which characterize the social sciences, as already noted above. It is necessary to take an analytical distance that allows the concept to be thematized, as Koselleck suggests, and that Sassen had no longer recommended it.

Therefore, it is important to find semantic nuclei with some permanence, which make it possible to establish a link between modern and premodern categories; something similar to what Imre Lakatos proposed in his scientific research program (Castro et al., 2016). In such a way that significant nuclei that cross the various eras would be identified, and thus return to premodern concepts recoverable in the present, as Koselleck argues, to expand our own definition and incorporate into the analysis of leadership that plurality of areas through which it was deployed at its beginning.

Concepts are grammatical and historical structures insofar as they are constitutive elements of them. It is important to go to its etymological root and to the way it was applied in Antiquity, in such a way that the various significant networks of the exercise of leadership can be identified from the first developments of humanity, both in the productive or survival fields and in the construction of peaceful scenarios. This causes some concept of leadership not to be reduced to traits or knowledge, but to be conceived as significant facts, which can be symbolized, which make sense through a strategy in search of a vision. Only to the extent that events directed by beings within an organization become significant and can be linked to each other by articulating structural orders is strategic leadership conceived.

It is necessary to overcome the aporias that arise among the concepts that make up strategic leadership, avoiding connections between terms that are contradictory due to their nature or etymological origin. It is required to honor the semantic core that remains in different dimensions and multiple levels, such as the

word *strategy*; its scope cannot be exceeded, but it is required to avoid the abuse of its term. It is important to validate its character as a noun (set of techniques to achieve an end) (Farlex, 2023), and *strategic* is an adjective, according to the Real Academia Española.

This analysis provokes lines of action on the construction of an ontological status of the concepts and categories on strategic leadership, which exceeds the scope of this chapter, but is necessary to address the question of the fundamental metatheological problem. The nature of the link between the knowledge of strategic leadership and its object, since there may be the risk of remaining in a mere inventory of individual concepts, and not in a reconstruction of languages on human behaviors in integrated political and social organizations and objectives. What is firm in this chapter is that it is necessary to differentiate between the conceptual framework of strategic leadership and the old descriptions of the actions of commanders or leaders among crowds, decanting a series of eternal antinomies that together cross leadership.

Ultimately, the concepts on strategic leadership are those that all essayists use in a discursive context, those that *saturate theoretical sampling*, in the words of Strauss (Strauss & Corbin, 2016), in the construction of grounded theory, and that, at the same time, surpass ideologies. Those concepts are what limit the battlefield for disputes over the fixing of its framework, the French sociologist Pierre Bordieu (2018) would say. In no way do they propose unanimity or conceptual consensus. On the contrary, they seek the coexistence of various concepts that can interact and demarcate the terrain of strategic leadership. That is, these fundamental concepts, such as the concept of *power*, are not abstractions that circulate in the minds of experts, but actual realities that are immersed in the networks of actions in organizations and institutions, exposed to any understanding or textual representation of them (Koselleck, 2021).

Power as the “core” of the epistemology of strategic leadership

The analysis of the concept of *power* is fundamental to understanding the epistemology of strategic leadership. As observed in the various schools referred to here, the authors support leadership as interrelationships between people in an organization, where different levels of influence and power are presented. The concept of

power generates noise in the social sciences, but Foucault draws attention to the fact that “when defining the effects of power through repression, this conception is very negative, skeletal of power. In this regard, Foucault proposes that if power were always repression, “do you really think that it would be obeyed?” In this sense, he argues:

[...] what makes power persist, that it is accepted, is that it does not weigh only as a force that says no, but that, in fact, it crosses, produces things, induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It must be considered as a productive network that crosses the entire social body. (Foucault, 2019, p. 29)

This Foucaultian concept of “power” has allowed that through the image that the subject forms of himself by the actions that organizations develop, they configure a self-recognition of each individual, which motivates the emergence of strategic leadership, which thus constitutes a new unit of analysis: *subjectivity*, which, in turn, allowed the advancement of knowledge of human behavior in various scenarios. Paradoxically, the relationships that denote power allowed a leap in the epistemology of the social sciences, since not only the Aristotelian substance of the objects of study is analyzed, but also the subjectivity that emerged in Modernity.

The new view of knowledge focuses on human nature. In this regard, Bertrand Russell states that there are several differences between man and other animals; the desires of the former are unlimited, men have taken them as far as the imagination can reach, and one of these desires is *power* (Russell, 2017). When a person has satisfied at least the *basic levels*, of which Maslow speaks (Castro et al., 2013), he pursues power more than wealth; he only seeks wealth as a means to increase power, and that attraction to power is one of the motivators to exercise leadership in society and in organizations.

Based on this premise, Russell suggests that the concept of *power* is the foundation of social science and compares it with energy as a fundamental concept of physics; he adds that the laws of social dynamics are laws that can only be established in terms of power, without confusing them with the means used to exercise power, such as wealth, force or the media (Russell, 2017). Power mutates between these means; the strategic leader achieves this transition of change, and therefore a task of the social sciences is to deepen knowledge about the causes of the transformations caused by leaders in the field of power, within a decision-making process.

The beings who most desire power are the ones most likely to achieve it, and they are the leaders. Therefore, in a social system in which power is open to all, leadership will be assumed by people who distinguish themselves from ordinary individuals. Those who dislike power are not likely to influence strategy much. The leaders who originate social changes are, in general, beings who desire power. The attraction for power, therefore, is a characteristic of leaders: they are not afraid of risk and are attracted to achieve achievements for the benefit of their society or their organization. In this sense, research on human behavior that generates social dynamics must be developed in terms of “power” in its various forms, and thus give rise to theories or models on strategic leadership based on the underlying elements that underpin the ways in which individuals acquire dominion over other individuals.

That domain is volatile and complex; as science and technology have advanced, multiple levels of combination between knowledge and technique have been generated, thus provoking alternative and interdependent powers. A group can acquire growing power over a sector, but it also wants power over the former, for which leaders are required to draw up strategies with a deep, somewhat ambitious prospective look. Spanish Colonel Pedro Baños considers that ambition is a substantial part of human nature and is manifested when it comes to obtaining territories in search of their natural resources, through modern and sophisticated formulas (Baños, 2022). Baños affirms that conquest as a search for power has expanded, that the classic land, sea and air powers, decisive in the past, are not enough today, since new domains have emerged: that of cyberspace and that of knowledge. Therefore, the *multidomain* prevails, which causes the emergence of geopolitics, understood as the struggle between strategic leaders for the dominion of the globe, where soft power based on psychological criteria has acquired an important weight (Baños, 2022, p. 48), and its study is nuclear in the understanding of theories and proposals on strategic leadership.

Multidomains -and particularly the domain of knowledge- mean that each subject, in addition to understanding his own possibility of the constitution of everything he experiences, also comprises other subjects of which he also has experience; these cannot be “real” subjects, according to Luhmann; that is, they cannot be truly “subjective” and, therefore, there cannot be “intersubjectivity”, of which most social researchers speak, but the interrelationships between subjects obey internal logics within organizations, which thus constitute self-referenced systems identifying elements specific to each system (Luhmann, 2005).

Luhmann argues that social systems work from communication that is understood, since in some cases they can cause various types of conflict, by activating the alter ego of some element of an organizational system, resulting in a power that manifests itself in the neutralization of the will of the other. Luhmann adds that in communication power is not the ability of just one of the participants, but that all actors have the option of provoking mobilizations: some use it to accept orders, and another, the leader, to exercise his power (Luhmann, 2005). This new approach to power shows that the study of its concept is fundamental within the epistemology of strategic leadership to understand the functioning of organizations. The various approaches to the concept of *power* in strategic leadership account for the varied methodological routes that can be followed in the path of strategic leadership knowledge.

Exploring social science paradigms for the study of strategic leadership

In his book *Power*, Niklas Luhmann refers to the fact that *functionalism* as an epistemological paradigm of the social sciences was recurrent at the beginning of research on social behavior, but it has also been the most criticized method from different points of view, and that caused the emergence of various paradigms (Luhmann, 2005). As has already been explained in this chapter, social phenomena - and in particular, the approach to strategic leadership - have different perspectives in order to relate thought to the experience of the leader's actions. This relationship has been studied from various disciplines: initially it was made from philosophy; later, from political science, and later, from sociology and organizational studies. Its genesis is in the books *The Republic* and *Politics*, by Plato and Aristotle, respectively, when addressing the characteristics of the citizens who should govern, which gave rise to models of the State from a *natural law* approach, where society is a natural society as far as it corresponds to the social nature of man (Bobbio, 2016).

Subsequently, the study on the issues addressed by leadership distances itself from the philosophical elements and approaches political concepts. Nicolas Machiavelli then appears, as the founder of modern political science, and who considers that the State is the maximum power that is exercised over the inhabitants of a certain territory, through the princes (leaders), who are constantly tested to preserve power (Bobbio, 2016). From the political point of view, Thomas Hobbes

departs from Aristotelian iusnaturalist approaches and considers that in a State society is the antithesis of the state of nature constituted by an agreement of individuals who decide to leave the state of nature. It is an instituted society where leadership is strengthened, since that created society is made up of free and equal men, a subject on which the English philosopher John Locke and the French judge Montesquieu agree (Sabine, 1998).

With the maturity of the social sciences, sociologists, led by Max Weber, go beyond philosophical and political approaches to leadership, and focus on social aspects; one might think that their writings are the prelude to studies on strategic leadership, based on the identification of a charismatic leader with his characteristics of authority, power and influence in socioeconomic structure (Saavedra-Mayorga & Sanabria, 2020). Several paradigms have emerged from this type of study, and in this regard Luhmann (1998) invites us to travel the path of continuity and rupture: continuity to establish links with the questions that characterize the study of strategic leadership and identify it as a field of study. Simultaneously rupture, to get rid of traditional answers, which no longer respond to a society where the domains of cyberspace, knowledge and geopower prevail. Within this framework, some paradigms could be identified:

- a) **Functionalism:** Understanding *function* in the logical sense of the term, which allows comparing with each other, as functional equivalents, mechanisms that interact in the leader's activities, and that reflect their beliefs when drawing up the strategy. That is, moving away from causal analysis and building interaction functions (Maxim, 2002). This is a paradigm that can be used for research on strategic leadership with a quantitative approach.
- b) **Functional structuralism:** It is the function that precedes the structure, and this function consists in the understanding and reduction of complexity; a theoretical framework can be put together from the complexity of human behavior in an organization, where its limits are not physical, but meaningful (Luhmann, 2005). The question to be asked in leadership research is about the functional possibilities that comparable solutions of the same strategy could offer, where the solution proposals make sense.
- c) **Systems theory:** Strategic leadership is related to organization and social dynamic processes, similar to the components of organizational studies, which are behavior, structure and processes (Hamel, 2011), and their relationship can be assimilated to an information system, which, through

various transformations, codifications and processes (beliefs, culture, symbols, meaning, strategy), it goes from the physical and social environment (demands of society to an organization, as input) to decision-making and response (solutions for society, as output) (Bertalanffy, 1981). Thus, knowledge about strategic leadership is dynamic, it is built permanently in the face of a continuous exchange between the individual and his environment.

Within the systemic paradigm, it is pertinent to review Walter Bluckey's (1981) proposal on a transactional epistemological model, supported by three elements, the theory of information as a framework, the transactional between the internal and the external and approaches to a model of knowledge on strategic leadership.

First, the principles of the model (information theory) are based on a relational concept, which involves the application of a subset of elements organized in a certain way (for example, words organized into written sentences) in another subset of elements organized in a correlative way (mental concepts organized according to complete ideas) (Buckley, 1981). Similarly in strategic leadership, a subset of elements (e.g., beliefs organized in an organizational culture). In another subset of elements organized correlatively (the symbols of the leader's actions organized into forward-looking meanings).

Although it is not a narrow analogy, there is a similarity, since in both cases the input signals undergo several transformations, despite which the initial configuration is preserved with a certain degree of fidelity, taken away from other paradigms that concentrate on obtaining the "fundamental data" by sensory means and produce cognitive constructions, which does not make sense, according to Bluckey (1981). Since information is a relational concept and transmitting information is equivalent to preserving through transformations, it goes beyond the single question of how the external world can be known.

Secondly, the functional aspects of the model are based on the entirely transactional nature of the relationships between the subject, who is the protagonist of knowledge, and the external world. The individual helps to organize the reference set corresponding to internal knowledge, a set that gives meaning to the additional signals generated from the thoughts or emotions of the leader. The organization behaves as an open system with the capacity to adapt to the environment, and intervenes in socio-cultural

processes, including the beliefs, symbols, meanings and prospective vision of the leader. Where their perception and decision-making constitute a system of components of the leader, interrelated in a complex way and generating logical concepts that are built from the operations arising from the strategic coordination carried out by the leaders on those objects.

Thirdly, systems theory allows an approach to a model of knowledge about strategic leadership, in that the mental processes of a leader depend on his ability to manipulate symbols and to place his own self in the plane of objects; both skills are developed by exercising the transactions between the leader and his followers. Through followers' response to the leader's actions and using symbols as a means of conceiving of interrelationship as an object, actions and interactions among members of an organization become mentally manipulable.

In this sense, the model of knowledge about strategic leadership considers a wide range of social and cultural scenarios, such as strategic visions and other internal states of people with whom the leader's actions must be coordinated. In this way, "knowledge" about strategic leadership becomes a complex matter, a network of the events of the daily transaction process between the leader and the followers, intimately related to the internal moral, emotional and cognitive schemes.

The model of knowledge on strategic leadership, following Bluckey (1981), comprises three types of correspondence: correspondences between the leader's mind and other individual minds (followers and other leaders), as well as between these and that and a relatively common world of experiences. Since the systems where leaders act are developed in complex contexts, the result is a multidimensional and multilevel correspondence that interrelates external objects and relationships, common symbolic systems and a number of premises of the study of organizations.

In summary, and in accordance with Buckley (1981), one could think of an ontological status of "relationships" in the knowledge of strategic leadership, as is done with objects and facts, since a property or an attribute of an "object of study" in leadership corresponds to that resulting from the interaction of the object with various elements. Thus, the properties of the alleged object or alleged event vary according to contextual relationships or systems. That is, the properties of the object relate to the *properties of the relationship*.

The cognitive development of strategic leadership is a process where inter-related individuals act, and with the ability to adapt, each of them involved in a constructive exchange with the others creating possibilities to be studied from the paradigms of phenomenology and constructivism.

- d) **Phenomenology:** As a philosophical current, Alfred Schutz considered it the most appropriate way to ground the social sciences, arguing that the objective properties of socio-historical realities are based on universal structures of subjective orientation (Dreyer, 2016, p. 97). Later, Dreher states that in phenomenology the concept of *constitution* is fundamental, since it refers to the constitutive processes of subjective consciousness, which form the basis for the development of the individual's world (2016, p. 98). Phenomenology is, mainly, a philosophy of the human being that allows us to explain the meaning of the vital world; its object is the demonstration and explanation of the activities of consciousness of transcendental subjectivity (Dreher, 2016). Phenomenological research in strategic leadership allows to create a link between the structures of subjective orientation of the leader, and the basic forms of intersubjective action of all the individuals of an organization and the objective properties of the socio-historical realities that frame the strategy in a context, in such a way that it can be shown how the transcendental subjectivity of the leader, from his beliefs, gives rise to all meaning to his objective strategy within an organization.
- e) **Constructivism:** It is a field inhabited by different positions that have three axes in common: the subject, reality and knowledge, and agree in the criticism of the epistemological current of positivism. They propose that the subject is inclined to the social construction of reality and the construction of human knowledge, in which scientific knowledge is included (Retamozo, 2016). In the constructivist field, ideas participate that knowledge arises from brain processes from biology (Maturana), and from the philosophy of mind (Rabossi), as well as from psychological developments (Piaget), according to Retamozo (2016). In the face of notions of reality, several positions also converge that, in general, share the critique of realistic positions that postulate a complete and objective external reality, independent of the subject, which constructivists do not share. They propose that reality is configured with some degree of intervention by the subject, that the world is a consequence of language, the world is an image of language (Retamozo, 2016, p. 377). This postmodern vision opens the doors to

relativistic positions on knowledge and reality, and thus creates the possibility that in an investigation on strategic leadership different theories coexist and that these define their world of reference.

The epistemological approaches presented here are based on various ontological sources. In this regard, for example, Bertrand Russell suggests that the concept of *power* is the foundation of social science. Bluckey suggests thinking about an ontological status to *relationships*. Alfred Schutz considers phenomenology to be the most appropriate avenue for the foundation of the social sciences. Luhmann's functionalism proposes that the unit of analysis are dynamic stabilities that allow us to study strategic leadership from diversity, not as constructivism proposes, but as self-referential systems that control the production and distinctiveness of its elements.

Conclusions

There are several theories and approaches to strategic leadership, each of which describes a set of linked propositions, and incorporate terms that are polysemic, and this makes it very difficult to conceptualize. However, its conceptual roots are based on disciplines such as history, political science and, lately, the contributions of more experimental and modern sciences, such as psychology, sociology or the sciences of organizations. The latter favors objectifying the study of leadership, making it the object of intellectual analysis. All the aforementioned sciences provide a framework for understanding the nature of theoretical guidelines, as well as the type of epistemological problems to which it is confronted. This perspective breaks with the imaginary of seeing leadership as an activity, an attitude or a skill, and that it becomes an object of questioning, based on the concepts that make it up.

In the study of the concepts that integrate knowledge about strategic leadership, it is essential to go to its etymological root and to the way it was applied in Antiquity, transliterating past concepts into our present vocabulary. In such a way that the various significant networks of the exercise of leadership can be identified from the first developments of humanity, both in the productive or survival fields and in the construction of peaceful scenarios. In order that no proposition about leadership can be reduced to traits or knowledge but is conceived as a representation of significant facts that can be symbolized, which make sense through a strategy in search of a vision.

References

- Aznar, F. (2018). *Rethinking strategic leadership*. Sílex editions.
- Baños, P. (2022). *The Power. A strategist reads Machiavelli*. Rosaméron Editorial.
- Bertalanffy, L. (1981). History and status of general systems theory. In Alianza (Ed.), *Teoría general de Sistemas*.
- Bobbio, N. (2016). *State, government and society. For a general theory of politics*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Bolden, R. (2004). What is Leadership? *Leadership Southwest*, 1-33. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/29810622_What_is_Leadership
- Bourdieu, P. (2018). *The social sense of taste. Elements for a sociology of culture*. Siglo XXI Editores.
- Buckley, W. (1981). Epistemology, seen through Systems Theory. *General systems theory*. Alianza Editorial.
- Castro, L., Castro, M., & Morales, J. (2013). In the social sciences, the term *theory* serves to describe a set of interlinked propositions. Editorial Tecnos.
- Castro, L., Castro, M., & Morales, J. (2013). *Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Editorial Tecnos.
- Creswell, J., & Plano, V. (2018). *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. Sage Publications.
- Cuadrado, I., Morales, J., & Recio, P. (2008). Women's Access to Managerial Positions: An Experimental Study of Leadership Styles and Gender. *Spanish Journal of Psychology*, 11(1), 55-65. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S113874160000411X>
- Dreher, J. (2016). Phenomenology: Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann. In G. Leyva., E. de la Garza. (Eds.). *Treatise on Social Science Methodology: Current Perspectives*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Farlex. 2023 *Strategy*. The Free Dictionary. <https://en.thefreedictionary.com/strategy>
- Foucault, M. (2019). *Microphysics of power*. Siglo XXI Editores.
- García-Guiú, C., & Pastor, A. (2022). *Military leadership with "ñ": psychosocial scientific approaches in Spain*. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2022/DIEEM02_2022_CARGAR_Liderazgo
- Hamel, G. (2011). *The future of management*. Editorial Norma.
- Josanov-Vrgovic, I., & Pavlovic, N. (2018). *Relationship Between the School Principal Leadership Style and Teachers' Job Satisfaction in Serbia*.
- Kahneman, D. (2017). *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. Penguin Random House.
- Koselleck, R. (2021). *The Concept of the State and Other Essays*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Kouzes, J., & Posner, B. (2017). *The Leadership Challenge*. Jossey-Bass.
- Luhmann, N. (1998). *Complexity and modernity. From unity to difference*. Editorial Trotta.

- Luhmann, N. (2005). *Power*. Anthropos Editorial.
- Maxim, P. (2002). *Quantitative methods applied to the social sciences*. Oxford University Press.
- Mendoza, J. (2009). *Some thoughts on the concept of leadership*. <https://repository.uaeh.edu.mx/bitstream/handle/123456789/11592>
- Mester, C., Visser, D., Roodt, G., & Kellerman, R. (2003). Leadership style and its relationship to employee attitudes and behaviour. *Journal of Industrial Psychology*, 29 (2). <https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC88951>
- Myrdal, G. (1970). *Objectivity in social research*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Parry, K., & Bryman, A. (2019). Leadership in organizations. In D. Gonzales-Miranda & G. Ramírez (Eds.). *Treatise on Organizational Studies*. 2, (pp. 15-46). Editorial EAFIT.
- Pérez, R. (2001). *How to approach science*. Limusa Noriega Editores.
- Real Academia Española (RAE). (2022). *Leadership | Pan-Hispanic Dictionary of Doubts*. <https://www.rae.es/dpd/liderazgo>
- Retamozo, M. (2016). Constructivism: epistemology and methodology of the social sciences. In E. de la Garza & G. Leyva (Coords.). *Treatise on Social Science Methodology: Current Perspectives*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Russell, B. (2017). *The Power. A new social analysis*. RBA Libros.
- Saavedra-Mayorga, J., & Sanabria, M. (2020). Resistance in Organizational Studies: A Literature Review. *Innovar*, 30 (78), 149-166. <https://doi.org/10.15446/innovar.v30n78.90312>
- Sabine, G. (1998). *History of political theory*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Sanabria, M. (2019). Leadership in organizations: a look from the Latin American context. In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, T., Lawrence, W., Nord, D., Gonzales, M., & G. Ramírez (Eds.). *Treatise on Organizational Studies*. (47-123).
- Sassen, S. (2019). *Territory, Authority and Rights: From Medieval Assemblies to Global Assemblies*. Katz Editores. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvm7bcnb>
- Sastre, S. (2014). *Capacity building for leadership in rural development projects. Application to Aymara communities* [Doctoral thesis]. Higher Technical School of Agricultural Engineers. https://oa.upm.es/28995/1/SUSANA_SASTRE_MERINO.pdf
- Shilton, S. (2004). Creating Leaderful Organizations: How to Bring Out Leadership in Everyone. *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 19 (2), 188-191. <https://doi.org/10.1108/02683940410526136>
- Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (2016). *Basis of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*. University of Antioquia.
- Tobón, S. (2009). *Competency-based training*. ECOE Ediciones.
- Wallerstein, I. (2001). *Open up the social sciences*. Siglo XXI Editores.
- Yukl, G., Gordon, A., & Taber, T. (2002). A Hierarchical Taxonomy of Leadership Behavior: Integrating a Half Century of Behavior Research, 9 (1), 15-32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/107179190200900102>

Chapter 2

Challenges in finding sustainable leadership in cyberspace and the international system

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.02>

Milena Elizabeth Realpe Díaz

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: In this chapter, a study is carried out in which the existing difficulties in establishing clear and forceful leadership in both cyberspace and the international system are evidenced, appealing to the *theory of realism of the discipline of international relations* and the study of threats and new forms of conflict. Certainly, the conjunction of economic, political and geostrategic interests has marked the dynamics in various dimensions at the national, regional and international levels, so it will be observed how this prevents some from eventually accumulating power resources in defined periods, but without genuinely establishing a leadership process. Finally, it addresses how cyberspace is analyzed as the preferred scenario of new forms of conflict, and how cyberspace power is not limited to the exclusive use of a nation's Military Forces but can be exercised by a large number of actors with the technical and human capacity for their own convenience in the cyber domain, which could force States to rethink the design of their national security and defense strategies.

Keywords: leadership, cyberspace, threats, international system.

Milena Elizabeth Realpe Díaz

Lieutenant Colonel, Ejército Nacional de Colombia. Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense. Escuela Superior de Guerra. "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in Cybersecurity and Cyberdefense, Escuela Superior de Guerra. Master's degree in Information Security, Universidad de Los Andes. Specialist in Computer Network Security, Catholic University of Colombia, Specialist in Physical and Computer Security, Army Communications School. Specialist in Information Security, Universidad de Los Andes. Systems Engineer, Universidad Cooperativa de Colombia.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4345-6182> - Contact: milena.realpe@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Realpe Díaz, M. E. (2023). Cyber threats in a hyper-connected world. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 39-58). Sello Editorial ESDEG.
<https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.02>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

The technological changes that have accompanied human evolution have been, precisely, the basis for leaps that have led to the transformation of the human body, its environment, and the tools that the species uses to facilitate its life, maximize power resources and generate social, political and cultural changes that adapt to these technological transformations, and for which we enter what some have called *posthumanism*.

It can be understood that the posthuman condition is configured under the tension between the definition of the ontological limits of the 'human', the 'animal' or the 'artificial' and a politics of emancipation that seeks to give a political meaning to these transformations. This means glimpsing the technological potential from the 'singular' historical moment in which the configuration, by way of 'enhancing', of our bio, psycho and physiological characteristics, will allow us, as a species, to shape a projected future, both for our longevity and our physical-cognitive aptitudes. (Cornejo, 2017, p. 222)

Although the central axis of this dissertation is not a bioethical reflection, it is necessary to contextualize that technology currently has interference even in biology, through biotechnology, which translates into an unparalleled power to transform life itself and create new worlds, designed in detail according to the convenience of the manager. Exactly this is close to what has gained popularity today: the *metaverse*.

What once seemed like a science fiction idea, in which the imagination of author William Gibson seemed to break every limit, is now a reality. In 1984, the publication of the novel *Neuromancer* gave the first glimpses of what is now known as cyberspace, recounting the life of a cyber cowboy, which at the time seemed

inconceivable, but now makes sense and focuses the attention of large technology companies, opening the possibility of living in a different context.

The experience of maximum customization will most likely come in the metaverse, which we can translate as a space in creation 'beyond the universe'. This is the next technological stop, resulting from the mixture of virtual reality, social networks, video games and maximum speed internet. That parallel world let's say that, in another dimension, will offer us the possibility of being who we really want to be, without limits even for Physics. We are talking about a hypothesis, of course, of something futuristic, of one of those technological projects that we see on the horizon... But so far Mark Zuckerberg has already announced the hiring of 10,000 people to bring that metaverse to life. (Bueno, 2021, p. 6)

In this sense, it is necessary to examine what happens to the social forms that have taken the form of the nation states in which humanity is currently organized, as well as in intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational corporations and armed groups, which are the main actors of the traditional international system.

Thus, at the beginning of the study of these actors, classical authors, such as Thomas Hobbes or John Locke, made a comparison between the natural condition of man and the behavior of States. In this sense, the first, from a pessimistic viewpoint in anthropological terms, indicated that States, as well as humans in a state of nature, would only favor their benefit, since they are selfish and individualistic (Aparicio, 2018). Therein lies the genesis of one of the classical theories of the discipline of international relations, which will compose the theoretical framework of the present paper, accurately relating that, both in the traditional international system -which was forged since 1648, with the Peace of Westphalia- and in the fifth domain and in the possibility of living an alternative reality in the metaverse, there are clear limitations to consolidate the leadership of a single actor or that of a group of these.

The dynamics inherent in the human condition have led to strategies to concentrate power and wealth, and which are susceptible to the emergence of technological innovations. That is, although industrial revolutions have been conceived with the purpose of evolving -especially in the field of production processes-, in the end they have become excellent tools for the accumulation of power resources. Its ambiguity lies precisely in the interpretation and use that people and organizations

give to technology, which, on the one hand, can be an opportunity to substantially improve the quality of life, but, on the other, can mark the mutation of a series of threats that are present in the now so popular cyberspace.

Thus, from the approach to the qualities and characteristics of a leader and the comparative study of the international system and cyberspace, it will be sought to show that these contexts, although they have visible leaders within the units, do not facilitate the consolidation of a leader who persuades others to follow a certain path, imposes order and guarantees, as could happen in a traditional physical plane, the protection of rights or specific regulations.

The outstanding author and leader in cyber and conflict in cyberspace is Colonel Crowther, who, through the construction of knowledge, evidences his beliefs about the understanding of cyberspace as a domain of warfare that notably impacts the revolution of military affairs in digital realities. These beliefs are based on studying and explaining cyberspace, its conformation, the cybernetic domain, military operations in cyberspace and the art of war in a modern world, among others, all of which demonstrate that this fifth domain, unlike the traditional domains of land, sea, air and space, is a virtual environment created by man, who, therefore, has the possibility of leading, transforming and expanding it.

Consequently, cyberspace, by its nature, is not a safe or protected space: in fact, the attack surface has increased exponentially and, therefore, it is vulnerable to latent or emerging cyber threats or attacks, which can result in significant losses for the economic, political, and social sectors or constitute a serious threat to defense or national interests. For this reason, cyberspace is analyzed as the preferred scenario of new forms of conflict, as is the case of hybrid conflicts (Luque, 2019) and as a domain in, from and through which military operations create intended effects and where the fundamental military objectives related to this domain are essentially the same as in the other domains, and the main objective is freedom of action in, through and from cyberspace, as necessary to support the objectives of the mission.

Finally, the complexity of cyberspace power is addressed considering that it is not limited to the use of the Armed Forces of a nation but can be accessed by a large number of actors with the technical capacity. In the context described the development of capabilities in cyberspace is a state priority, which presumes a redesign of national security and defense strategies. This new scenario serves as a means and an end, to achieve the modification, maintenance, or expansion of the *status quo* of the States and actors that, par excellence, have dominated the international agenda.

Methodology

From a qualitative analysis with the design of the grounded theory, in the first part a conceptual framework will be made to contextualize the transversal axes of this work: cyberspace, international system and metaverse, among others. Subsequently, from a theoretical approach, the guideline will be set for the analysis of the plausibility of a leadership dynamic in these spaces, so that, finally, it can be examined where the main actors are heading in order to guarantee their leadership in their immediate environments.

The design of the *grounded theory* is specifically chosen, since “the researcher produces a general explanation” (Hernández, 2014, p. 93) of a phenomenon, which is applied to a particular context in which various aspects are related.

Thus, by using various variables in this paper, we seek to find a relationship between them that allows us to explain the phenomenon that is being presented, for which a *theory of the discipline of international relations* is used as a basis, in the absence of an explicit one that deals with the proposed phenomenon, given its novelty.

General context of cyberspace and the international system

As already noted, it was in a 1984 novel that the first approximation was given to that space that opened in virtuality, and that was consolidated as the precedent par excellence when talking about cyberspace.

It was the science fiction (cyberfiction) writer William Gibson (1948) who created the concept of cyberspace in his novel *Neuromancer* (1984) to designate the spatial scenario that existed within computers and their interconnections. And which now defines the anthropological space of the computer network where all users of the computer network when entering cyberspace become netizens, and which in turn make up the cybersociety, characterized by its alternative forms of socialization for the social appropriation of ICT, so that Cyberspace is a defining element of the virtual space of relationship between users of the Internet and other telematic or computer networks. (Martínez et al., 2014, p. 45)

Certainly, it is complex to find a single and complete definition; however, the one already provided brings together two fundamental aspects: the technical and

the anthropological. Although at the beginning it could be perceived that it is only a purely technological dimension, the fact that it is finally operated by humans' merits review from anthropology, sociology, etc. Precisely, when these aspects are integrated, it is when it is necessary to review how effective leadership is generated in the field, understanding that the spheres of life intermingle. Moreover, when the new generations do not know any way of interacting other than through the tools available there, and when more and more scenarios, which were usually *physical*, converge on this *virtual* plane, in which relations between States, world leaders and international organizations find opportunities and threats.

Our private space and our public space interact with cyberspace and its services, with or without our authorization or knowledge. Therefore, although it is not perceptible by our senses, it is real because it is a product of the development of telecommunications, computing, interactivity and multimedia message: 'The only way to "see" cyberspace is through a "virtual reality", an 'artificial reality' built by man'. (Pérez, 2013, p. 2)

In that construction, intentionally or not, spaces have been left that can be co-opted by those who indiscriminately seek profit, power or the instability and consequent fall of their opposite. This is possible given the migration of processes to this digital environment, which generates benefits, but also vulnerabilities, especially with regard to critical cyber infrastructure.

In accordance with CONPES 3854 of 2016, the *critical cyber infrastructure* is that supported by information and telecommunications technologies (ICTs), and its operation depends on the State being able to guarantee its essential purposes and the provision of services to all citizens. If a failure were to occur in any of the digital platforms provided for this purpose, economic stability would be seriously affected, as well as the functioning of institutions and public administration; even, depending on the extent of the impact, an environment of uncertainty and chaos could arise.

These scenarios are planned on a national and international scale, as internal or external actors can cause such effects, depending on the interests they seek to collect. That is why it is plausible that, in the context of powerful actors, such as States, a simile is made with the international system, understanding that interdependence and globalization are two precepts that make everything have some connection and correlation; especially if it concerns the public.

Thus, Frederic Pearson and Martin Rochester (2003) refer to the international system as that general pattern that defines the political, social, economic, technological and geographical relations that shape the world agenda or, as they also simplify it, “the general scenario in which international relations occur at a given time” (p. 37).

In this sense, today those interactions across borders are taking place at a time when it is not necessary to take a plane to attend a presidential summit, but technological platforms allow real-time connections; especially, after the pandemic. Likewise, it is not necessary to fire a missile or mobilize troops for a conflict to explode or escalate, but, from an attack on critical cyber infrastructure, even more dire consequences can be caused than those of a trench confrontation.

Now, it is worth asking who is in control of those two spaces: cyberspace and the international system. You may wonder who leads and why. This, following Hoojberg et al. (1997), who establish that there are three axes of complexity in leadership: *cognitive*, *social* and *behavioral*. Therefore, to answer the questions raised, we will address, among other issues, how, from knowledge, the regulation of interactions and the control of the behaviors of those who interact in cyberspace, we can think about the consolidation of a leader.

Realism: the explanation and prescription of a particular world

Although the interactions between the units and various forms of human organization have been studied since ancient times, it was with the world wars when formal studies emerged that sought not only to understand what had caused such a disaster, but to prevent and foresee the possible outbreak of a new conflagration of such a level. Thus, in 1919, in Wales, the first Faculty of International Relations was created and the rigorous study of interactions between States began (Frasson-Quenoz, 2014).

With the end of the First World War, it was thought that the chances of a second war of the same type were, moreover, nil, having witnessed the extraordinary loss of human lives, infrastructure and economic resources. Therefore, liberalism emerged as the other classical theory that insisted on man's capacity for peace and cooperation as the best tools, not only to rebuild Europe after the war, but as a basis for the interaction of actors and, essentially, States.

However, incidents related to the expansionist interests of the Germans, Italians and Japanese were triggered (Venatici, 1978), which showed how the language of joint work was not being interpreted by all from the same perspective. It was then that Realism, as a classic paradigm, took control of the explanation and prescription of what was happening in the international system, not only towards the end of the 1930s, but throughout a history that evidences the individualist and belligerent action of some countries.

In this context, in the study of international relations as a scientific discipline, the principles proposed by Hans Joachim Morgenthau take force. In the first place, this classic author prescribes a theory of international politics with explanatory and prescriptive capacity, since, for him, realism cannot only be about explaining the world, but must also generate lines of behavior suitable for rulers (Frasson-Quenoz, 2014).

Likewise, it identifies that the motivation of the actors, of the politicians, is the interest in terms of power, which is the essential element of politics in general. Likewise, it reflects on morality and politics understanding that moral values can be incompatible with needs, so that, ultimately, these will be given priority.

One of the most important premises in this author was that the international system is anarchic and competitive, and he based his analysis on an essentially pessimistic human nature. Selfishness and the instinct for domination are what can describe the international system for what it is, and not as it should be, which is this author's main critique of classical liberalism (Frasson-Quenoz, 2014).

In this order of ideas, that anarchic nature of the system, as a central idea of Realism, is the key to understanding the limitations that exist when establishing clear leaderships. In addition, unlike a State that has a monopoly on the use of force because all citizens agree to cede part of their rights and freedoms to obtain the greater good of the protection and safeguarding of their primary interests, this is not the case in the international arena.

While the other theoretical approaches have highlighted, through historical examples, the functionality of cooperation and international institutions, among others, it is not possible to omit that potentially violent relationships have also profoundly transformed the international system. World wars and conflicts such as those that occurred with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, etc., show how the particular interests of each State prevail over the possibility of establishing relations of leader and followers, because in this way there would be no control of resources or possibilities of conquering a certain goal.

Thus, before, among all, building a path that leads to the general well-being of humans, each, from his own perspective, culture, religion, history and objectives, takes steps towards what he has prescribed for himself, even if it implies the weakening or elimination of the other. In the same way, it is necessary to take into account that, progressively, States are no longer the only actors with the capacity to act, but that intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, transnational corporations and armed groups have been the protagonists of several of the recent phenomena.

Especially since illegality, there are armed groups that have acquired extraordinary capabilities to destabilize entire nations. That is why in the following section an approach will be made to all the threats that emerge from cyberspace and are strengthened by issues inherent in the inability to fully identify the actors, the possibility of developing varied and innovative tactics and strategies and the failures of a system created by humans.

Cyber threats in a hyper-connected world.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations warned that “cyberwarfare had become a major threat to international peace and security and that massive cyberattacks could well become the first step in the next great war” (UN, 2018). However, there is widespread agreement among the signatory countries of the Charter of the United Nations, whose precepts apply in full to ICTs, together with the obligation on the part of States to resolve disputes by peaceful means. Hence, the behavior of States in cyberspace, in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security, is coming to the forefront of the international agenda (OEWG, 2021).

The consolidation of cyberspace as an issue that has become a general trend for most countries in the world has been triggering the expansion of the new attack surface for the national security spectrum. This, as a consequence of the fact that the greater the intensity of human action in cyberspace, the greater the potential for an eventual provocation of conflicts in cyberspace. This threat is not limited to national cybersecurity, but will also have an impact on the security and defense of States. In this context, it is necessary to mention that the domination of cyberspace was a career initiated by the great powers, such as Russia, the United States and China, and that is why they are a reference point for the creation of instruments that safeguard national security and defense in cyberspace (Gaitán, 2018).

At present, cyberspace is configured as an artificial domain created and modified by man, in which there is no absolute perfection and, consequently, it serves

as a parallel world in which humans can operate. In this way, all human activities carried out in the real world can also be carried out in cyberspace, with their successes and mistakes, their agreements and disagreements and, even, the multiple frictions and controversies that arise from daily coexistence in society. Which causes relations of enmity that could converge in the consolidation of threats or attacks in or through cyberspace or, in the worst case, in conflicts or wars of a cybernetic nature. Threats in cyberspace are classified as real threats, so facing them requires an effective defense strategy with high deterrence capacity (Nur, 2022).

Undoubtedly, if looked beyond the lack of physical consequences, cyberattacks can cause enormous damage by undermining social cohesion and trust in government institutions, given the steady growth of technological convergence, transmission speed, and individual empowerment within the cyber domain. According to the report presented by UNESCO regarding the Forum of the World Summit on the Information Society 2021, it is established that

Societies have been transformed thanks to information and communication technologies in a way that could not even be imagined a decade and a half ago. In many cases, these technologies have fulfilled their promise of development and spectacular expansion of inclusion and participation in society. However, awareness of new risks has increased, such as misinformation and hate speech, digital surveillance, data privacy, and now the rise of artificial intelligence, all of which have important implications for human rights and fundamental freedoms. (UNESCO, 2021)¹

The future of digital conflicts in geopolitics will have broad implications for public and private actors and for civil society. For this reason, in Colombia, since 2011, there has been talk of the importance of close cooperation not only at the national level, with the participation of multiple stakeholders², but also at the international level, which will be essential, but not sufficient, in order to prevent and resolve future digital geopolitical conflicts. The construction of political, social, economic and even military relations in this hyper-connected world not only requires the use of traditional media, but will also require resorting to the tools and means offered by cyberspace, in order to adapt to the new digital reality.

¹ In the first instance, the effects of conflicts or attacks in cyberspace do not have a perception in the physical dimension, however, in the escalation of the conflict, effects can be seen when the critical cybernetic infrastructure is impacted, having effects on the physical survival of people.

² Multiple Stakeholders: five actors: Government, Public and Private Company, Public Force, Academy and Civil Society. (CONPES 3854, 2016).

New forms of conflict

The existence of a parallel world in the form of a metaverse will trigger an expansion of the security spectrum, given the conditions of anonymity and clandestinity that allow one to act freely and, at times, evade laws and regulations. To face these threats, in addition to cooperation, it is necessary to build a defense strategy for the country for society in general, in addition to continuing to strengthen the country's cybersecurity and cyber-resilience capabilities.

With regard to Colombia, through the public policy document CONPES 3701 of 2011, it was established that the national defense would be in charge of the Armed Forces and, in particular, the Joint Cyber Command (CCOCI), based on the postulates according to which multiple stakeholders must be involved for national defense: territorial government entities, public and private companies, the Public Force, owners and operators of critical infrastructure, academia and civil society, making use of modern technologies and appropriate processes; However, above all, under the leadership of people capable of transforming everyday life by innovating under the new conditions of a digital current to make proposals that revolutionize the future in cyberspace.

This is the case of Colonel Crowther, who, through the construction of knowledge, evidences his beliefs about the cybernetic component, which increasingly acquires more strength and becomes a reference when it comes to influencing people through knowledge, and academia, and even in the transformation of military affairs, through issues related to cybersecurity and cyberdefense. These beliefs are based on studying and explaining cyberspace, its conformation, the cybernetic domain, military operations in cyberspace and the art of war in a modern world, among others. All of which demonstrate that this fifth domain, unlike the traditional domains of land, sea, air and space, is a virtual environment created by man, who, therefore, has the possibility of leading, transforming and expanding it.

Consequently, a fundamental variable in this new scenario is the human being, who interacts through their real identity or multiple digital identities. Crowther (2017) establishes that cyberspace has three layers: a *physical network*, which is framed in the *hardware*. A *logical network*, consisting of the *software* that makes the network operable, and a *cyberperson*, which are the humans who are leading and operating in cyberspace with their real identity and their multiple digital identities. Under this concept, both the physical and the personal layer exist within the States and, therefore, are subject to their laws and policies. This allows us to lay a

foundation for understanding the new reality. The human element is a fundamental part of the cyber domain that cannot and should not be ignored. Because humans built the cybernetic architecture, it is presumed inherently imperfect. Under its precepts, the fundamental imperative to mature the understanding of cyberspace is to treat it as a place, and not just as a mission. That is, cyberspace is a domain in, from, and through which military operations create intended effects. Similarly, the fundamental military objectives relating to that domain are essentially the same as in the other domains, and the primary objective is freedom of action in, through, and from cyberspace, as necessary to support mission objectives.

The result is to deny adversaries freedom of action at times and places of our choosing. The ability to do both provides cyber military superiority (USAFT, 2011). Thus, Colonel Crowther, the leader studied in this analysis, has been able to address different types of audiences, with different ages and races, strongly impacting the changes in issues associated with the cybernetic domain. This type of leadership is very well defined by Yulh (2010) when he states that leadership is the “process of influencing others to understand and agree on what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to achieve common goals” (p. 8).

Today's world, marked by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, requires VUCAH leaders (for the initials in English of *Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Hyperconnected*) to face a scenario characterized by instability. Cyberspace requires leaders to face unexpected, unpredictable, and sometimes turbulent changes, where each one is an integral part of the context of change itself, in which the theoretical perspective of Realism can be included, in order to explain and foresee the possible actions of those who, rationally, will pursue their particular interests in terms of power, even if this implies diminishing the capacities of a couple.

In this environment, a contemporary leader requires acting differently from a traditional leader. The role of a modern leader requires becoming successful change agents, with a broad capacity to adapt to continuous transformations and disruptive changes, with the right knowledge to face uncertainty, with the ability to respond to changes and recover to their normal state, despite any situation. That is, with the capacity for resilience not to give way to ambiguity; with the ability to communicate clearly and simply to combat complexity and, without a doubt, with enough emotional capacity to handle the new generations of alphas, *millennials* and *centennials* (IBERDROLA, 2022). Who are highly influenced by everything they

experience, see, hear and what they believe to be true; that is, their own beliefs, with the bias fostered by the explosion of information, not necessarily true.

Although in traditional leadership the use of symbols is not always so obvious and striking, when talking about complex leadership this type of identity is even more blurred, due to the diversity of the environment in which it is developed. A maxim of Crowther (2018), and which symbolizes his thinking, is to define that leaders with more experience and experience must understand how younger followers perceive and use technology. Although military leaders understand the importance of cybernetics and information, not everyone understands the scope of opportunities and challenges offered by cyberspace.

That is why this leader, through his approaches, has allowed us to understand and analyze that the military services will have to spend more resources on training and equipping. Not only the cyber forces, but all the forces that depend on technology and in that environment, they will be serving under a continuous cyber approach.

Nations and their defense capabilities in cyberspace

In the new national and international strategic scenarios, cyberspace is analyzed as the preferred scenario of new forms of conflict, as is the case of hybrid conflicts (Luque, 2019). The cyber domain, unlike traditional domains, presents great differences that deserve to be studied and investigated from different and advanced perspectives; especially, when we are faced with situations never seen before. During the International Security and Defense Symposium, in Peru, in 2005, PhD Kevin Newmeyer stated that, unlike the other domains, in which a potential possibility of conflict prevails, cyberspace has been completely shaped by man with uncertain borders and some rules for governance policy.

In this area, nations increasingly seek to control the cyberspace domain by generating *cyberspace power*, understood as the potential to use the cyber domain to achieve the desired results (Nye, 2011, p. 123). The complexity of cyberspace power is configured because it is not limited to the use of FFs. AA. of a nation, but can be exercised, according to a will, by a large number of actors with the technical and human capacity for their own convenience in the cyber domain, which could be evidence of the correct projection of the realistic paradigm of international relations.

For their part, Major General Evergisto de Vergara and Rear Admiral Gustavo Adolfo Trama, of Argentina's active reserve, point out that

All actions carried out in this field will affect the armed component of national power from various perspectives. The first of these is the use of conventional military force in response to a massive cyberattack. The second involves the use of countries' conventional military power in the face of cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure (p. 11).

Similarly, operations in cyberspace are changing the characteristics of warfare. Although the nature of warfare is constant, the characteristics of warfare can change each time a new weapon or tactical approach is introduced. Cyberspace operations now make it possible to acquire and share more information and exercise better command and control on the battlefield, theoretically reducing the *fog of war* by adding fidelity to the commander's understanding of the battle space.

Thus, cyberspace enables more precise and effective use of the people and logistical capabilities involved by putting the right person or device in the right place, at the right time. These capabilities require governments and their FF AA to modify their practices. It also highlights the need for leaders and organizations to do a better job of selecting and using new technologies. Laws and policies must be updated to take advantage of new technology, also considering an international environment that works from complex geopolitical and geostrategic trends.

All this has led humanity - and especially the military component - to reflect on the intensive use of digital technologies as a trend that will remain in daily life, so that concepts such as cybersecurity and cyberdefense, applied by individuals, organizations and States, are extremely important to guarantee and capitalize on the benefit of connectivity and availability of information in a secure way, in order to provide an environment of greater possibilities for development. As well as social welfare and strengthening democracy in a nation.

Traditional and hierarchical views of leadership are becoming less useful, given the complexities of the modern world. Leadership theory must transition to new perspectives that account for the complex adaptation needs of organizations and states capable of meeting the challenges posed by cyber dominance. And in this context, Colonel Glenn (Alex) Crowther, a distinguished veteran and specialist in cyber policy, defines cyberspace, by nature, as neither a safe nor protected space and, therefore, vulnerable to latent or emerging cyber threats or attacks, which can result in significant losses to the economic, political and social sectors or constitute a serious threat to defense or national interests.

Consequently, states, increasingly dependent on technology, face the challenge of a wide variety of state and non-state actors in cyberspace, which is already enormous and constantly growing, without being clear which interests in terms of power they will manage. The integration of national capacities through their defense, security and justice departments have to operate in this environment as the three main actors of the government, which, in addition, must seek partnerships with the private sector, which operates almost all the internet. Therefore, the development of capabilities in cyberspace is a priority for the defense and security of Colombia, increasingly dependent on technology, while the deployment of military operations in cyberspace is a necessity for the advancement of current defense models (Sánchez, 2006).

Aligning these strategies on a national and international scale in a hyperconnected world is a bit complicated with traditional theories, as it is a dynamic that transcends the capacities of individuals alone. That is why it is necessary to generate new leaders capable of articulating the complexity of systems and establishing guidelines and postulates that allow theorizing and conceptualizing on issues related to cyberspace, which until today shows ambiguity.

In this context, Crowther (2017) has allowed the academic community to address the understanding of cyberspace as a domain of warfare that notably impacts the revolution of military affairs in digital realities. The leadership exercised is disseminated and materialized in societies of different nations through the construction of documents of great interest and international relevance that base their foundation on organizations such as the NATO Center of Excellence in Cyberdefense and other multiple organizations and nations that have taken advantage in the development of the race for the development of capabilities in the cyber field.

In this context, Crowther, whose resume totals more than 30 years of service in the United States Army, and includes eight tours abroad, with an extraordinary academic background and admirable experience, has found that, in this new scenario of confrontation, once societies understand the nature of the threats they face, it will be necessary to mobilize non-governmental assets adopting a *whole-of-society* approach to reduce the nation's risk. Here it is quite clear how, despite the widespread belief that the role of the leader is to "manage conflict", which means "reduce it". On the contrary, the conflict experienced in the dynamic tension between two systems is actually the key to innovation and adaptability in organizations, a clear characteristic of complex leadership.

Conclusions

The cybernetic domain was created by man, and in that context, as has happened with traditional forms of organization and interaction, human relationships have been expanding to unconventional digital environments. Likewise, with the use of the internet and technologies, the attack surface has increased exponentially, and with this, the risks associated with this domain generate the need to change techniques, tactics and procedures applied in the field of defense.

Current conflicts are governed by asymmetric warfare methods, with multiple vectors and activities that are enabled with greater intensity in cyberspace. In this context, it is necessary to have people capable of innovating, proposing and, above all, leading revolutionary changes in state and non-state organizational structures, in the generation of policies, programs, strategies and doctrine, in technological development and production, changes in strategies in the Public Force that allow the agile development of measures and countermeasures that make use of the cyber domain, or others that can be identified in the future.

The uncertainty of the anarchic international panorama, as conceived by the theory of realism of the discipline of international relations, and the rapid changes that are taking place in all areas are having a great impact on security and defense policies, both national and international (Gil, 2017). Which forces preventive actions and capacity building that can respond to an eventual conflict in this domain. To this end, the development of capabilities in cyberspace must be a priority for the security of any technology-dependent country.

As in the international system, the intentions, and interests, in terms of power, of the actors in the domain are not clear; even less so when the anonymity of the digital environment prevents identifying where the cyberattacks or the various emerging threats in the environment come from. This new scenario serves as a means and an end, to achieve the modification, maintenance, or expansion of the *status quo* of the States and actors that, par excellence, have dominated the international agenda.

Faced with this certainly complex scenario, it is imperative that each institution, organization, and State provide for the training of leaders in the new generations who develop the skills and competencies conducive to guaranteeing national interests, always ensuring that ethics and morality are included in such decision-making, whether in a physical or cybernetic dimension.

References

- Aparicio, Z. (2018). El pesimismo antropológico en Hobbes desde una visión poliana. *Mercurio Peruano. Revista de Humanidades*, (531), 51-62. <https://doi.org/10.26441/MP531-2018-A2>
- Bueno, C. (2021). Estoy en el Metaverso, ahora vuelvo. *Digital 4.0. Factoría & Tecnología*, (93), 6-26.
- CONPES 3701. (2011, 14 de julio). *Lineamientos de Política para la Ciberseguridad y Ciberdefensa*. Departamento Nacional de Planeación. <https://bit.ly/2UhnzYC>
- CONPES 3854. (2016, 11 de abril). *Política Nacional de Seguridad Digital*. Departamento Nacional de Planeación. <https://bit.ly/3brazVR>
- Cornejo, S. (2017). La relación naturaleza y ser humano, tecnología y biología bajo la luz del posthumanismo. *Revista Antropologías del Sur*, 4(8), 215-232.
- Crowther, G. (2017). *The Cyber Domain*. *The Cyber Defense Review*, 2(3), 63-78. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26267386>
- Crowther, G. (2018). *National Defense and the Cyber Domain*. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/2018_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_National%20Defense%20and%20the%20Cyber%20Domain.pdf
- Frasson-Quenoz, F. (2014). *Autores y teorías de relaciones internacionales: Una cartografía*. Universidad Externado de Colombia.
- Gaitán, A. (2018). *Ciberguerra. La consolidación de un nuevo poder en las relaciones internacionales contemporáneas*. Universidad Santo Tomás.
- Iberdrola. (2022). *Tipos de liderazgo empresarial*. <https://www.iberdrola.com/talento/tipos-de-liderazgo>
- Libicki, M. (2009). *Cyberdeterrence and cyberwar*. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG877.pdf
- Luque, J. (2019). *Los nuevos conflictos bélicos del siglo XXI: las amenazas híbridas*. [Programa de Doctorado en Ciencias Sociales]. Universidad de Murcia. <https://repositorio.ucam.edu/bitstream/handle/10952/4239/Tesis.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Martínez, L., Leyva, M., & Félix, L. (2014). Qué es el Ciberespacio. En L. Martínez, P. Cedeñas, & V. Ontiveros (Eds.). *Virtualidad, ciberespacio y comunidades virtuales*, (pp. 44-93). Red Durango de Investigadores Educativos, A. C.
- Newmeyer, K., Cubeiro, E., & Sánchez, M. (2015). Ciberespacio, Ciberseguridad y Ciberguerra. En *II Simposio Internacional de Seguridad y Defensa de Perú* [Simposio]. Escuela Superior de Guerra Naval de Perú.
- Nur, A., Ferdion, M., Ari, D., Abdillah, I. (2022) Indonesian StateDefense as an Effort to Counter the Cyber space Security Threat of Metaverse. *International Journal of Arts and Social Science*. <https://www.ijassjournal.com/2022/V5i8/414665868.pdf>

- Nye, J. (2017). Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace. *International Security*. 1(1), 44-71.
- OEWG. (2021). *Open-Ended Working Group OEWG. Reporte Final 2021*. <https://dig.watch/resource/oewg-2021-report>
- ONU, (2018). Documento S/2018/404 (2018, Annex, 3).
- Pearson, F., & Rochester, M. (2003). *Relaciones internacionales. Situación global en el siglo XXI*. Mc Graw Hill.
- Pérez, V. (2013). El ciberespacio: ¿una realidad en construcción? En P. Irala, & V. Pérez (Eds.). *Cibermedios. Palabra, imagen y tecnología*, (pp. 2-5). Ediciones Universidad San Jorge.
- UNESCO. (2021). Informe de la Directora General sobre la aplicación de los resultados de la Cumbre Mundial Sobre la Sociedad de la Información (CMSI). En *Conferencia Anual 41ª reunión* [Conferencia]. UNESCO. Paris, Francia. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000379370_spa
- USAFT. (2011). *Cyberspace – The Fifth Operational Domain*. <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/2/20/2011-cyberspace---the-fifth-operational-domain/2011-cyberspace---the-fifth-operational-domain.ashx>
- Venatici, C. (1978). *Los orígenes de la Segunda Guerra Mundial*. <https://revistamarina.cl/revistas/1978/6/venatici.pdf>

Chapter 3

The Thirty Years' War: a space of transformation in the nature of war

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.03>

Carlos Alberto Ardila Castro

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: War, as a social fact, has been transformed by adapting to the contexts and intentions of the peoples who have used this tool to achieve their ends and impose their interests. In this sense, one of the most interesting periods to study this phenomenon occurred in Europe in the seventeenth century, when political, social, economic, cultural and religious changes imprinted a dynamic that until now had not been observed in war conflicts, and as a result of which the concept of the modern nation state would be strengthened and the theocentric approach would be changed to one based on the humanist view of society.

Keywords: Peace of Westphalia, war, State, international system, politics.

Carlos Alberto Ardila Castro

Lieutenant Colonel, Ejército Nacional de Colombia (R). Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in International Relations and Business, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada. Master's Degree in Military History, Escuela Militar de Cadetes "General José María Córdova". Specialist in Political Studies, EAFIT University. Specialist in National Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra. Professional in Security Management and Sociopolitical Analysis, Escuela de Inteligencia "Brigadier General Ricardo Charry Solano". Professional in Military Sciences, Escuela Militar de Cadetes "General José María Córdova". Professor and research fellow, Escuela Superior de Guerra. MinCiencias researcher.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8774-6176> - Contact: carlos.ardila@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Ardila Castro, C. A. (2023). The Thirty Years' War: a space of transformation in the nature of war. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 59-75). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.03>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

The need to find spaces where conflicts caused by the need for societies to impose their own interests could be resolved generated, as Diamond (2018) states, an entire state infrastructure that would support war efforts. Thus, in the primitive societies of farmers and ranchers, military bodies were created that at the beginning had a purely defensive purpose, and that mutated into a military apparatus that allowed power to be projected beyond the borders of those primitive States. The transformations in this activity that have accompanied the different war scenarios have generated a great opportunity in academic spaces to, from scientific studies, understand the variables that contribute to the construction of theories and concepts that allow evidence of transformations throughout history.

Conflicts are a space where, historically, human societies have sought to fulfill their interests. According to authors such as Macmillan (2021), it is affirmed that war has been a space of transformation, by generating a series of changes that have contributed to the consolidation of some human groups and the disappearance of others. In this sense, it is pertinent to affirm that empires such as the Roman consolidated their lordship through the projection of power using, for that matter, their legions as the main means of warfare. The European kingdoms, heirs of the Roman tradition, resumed this practice and improved it. For example, the Holy Roman Empire, for almost a thousand years managed to influence the political and military scene in medieval and modern Europe.

The Thirty Years' War, which took place between 1618 and 1648, is an example of how a warlike conflict provides elements that allowed the transformation of the nature of war, since in the development of this conflict political, economic, social and religious variables were integrated that, in turn, served to overcome a predominantly military space and move to one where other and diverse characteristics of

European society of the time converged. And this is how we can appreciate, taking up Diamond (2018), that human conflicts have become complex, and that for their understanding a multidisciplinary look is required.

This document aims to demonstrate the contributions generated, from the nature of the war, by the aforementioned conflict, which confronted European States. To achieve this purpose, a look at the aforementioned conflict will be made from the conflict. A) as a *social fact*, where the change that was generated in Europe is evidenced, and which led to the end of the view centered on gods, and gave way to a view that aims to achieve the objectives of the societies that make war. B) as a *war event*, *seeking to identify the causes of the conflict and the contributions that are made* from this field to the nature of war. And finally, C) from the analysis of a case, in which it will be possible to show how a strategic leader contributed to the understanding of some changes in the nature of war from the merely tactical to the strategic.

The social fact: Europe in the Modern Age

The various changes that were generated in the old continent with the consolidation of the nation states and the overcoming of the medieval order, and that materialized in 1492, with the Discovery of America by the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, led to the birth of Modernity. But this was not uniform: in some regions we can observe that "The endemic fragmentation of central Europe inherited from the Middle Ages and harassment due to the asymmetrical romanization of this region was doomed to break out at some point" (Calvo, 2021, p. 166). This caused tensions that were tried to overcome with the intervention of the old and new political entities that emerged on the continent.

The overcoming of the legacy of the Middle Ages meant a series of changes, which began from the political, when the former feudal lords lost power to the monarchs. An example of this situation occurred in Spain, where Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon integrated different kingdoms and lordships that constituted the peninsula around a common cause and against the Muslim invaders. As Calvo (2021) explains, the war for Spanish unification generated a new form of political system, based on the central power of the monarch and his imposition on the warlords, who had ruled throughout the medieval period. But this phenomenon also occurred in Portugal, France and England, which, in turn, led to the first European nation states. The State, and not the fief, was the space where the social

contract was celebrated that the subjects and the rulers built together to achieve mutual well-being.

One of the great political tensions that arose at the beginning of the seventeenth century was the loss of power of the Holy Roman Empire, which emerged in the tenth century, and which picked up the legacy of the Carolingian Empire and the Western Roman Empire. As a political entity, the Holy Empire went through various changes, ranging from the fall of the feudal order to the emergence of the international system and the nation state. The power of this empire was based on the power that the Catholic Church granted it by being a partner in the divine government on Earth, following the theory of the two swords, as expressed by Dyer (2022). And the loss occurred in the face of the new States emerged by geographical discoveries in America, Africa and Asia, which increased the resources of Spain, Portugal, France and England and made them new actors with power in the old continent.

The new situation generated a series of alliances that aimed to increase the power of each of the actors within the European context. This is how the Spanish Empire, with the coronation of King Charles I of Spain and V of Germany, consolidated for the Habsburg house the control of the Holy Empire and consolidated a political unit that influenced Europe for approximately 200 years. This, in turn, caused tensions; especially with the monarchies of France and England, and these tensions led to support for the Danes, Swedes and Dutch, and even some German principalities, turned against the empire. And most paradoxically, strengthening the Ottoman Turkish Empire, the main threat to the existence of Christian Europe.

Within the social fact, everything related to religion should be highlighted, and that is that the political order since the Ancient Age was defined by religions, in the sense that it was God who was in charge of granting sovereignty to the monarch, who, in turn, being his representative on Earth, contributed to the salvation of his subjects. This idea was perfected by the Catholic Church, and in it she founded her own power, which she imposed once the Western Roman Empire fell and the medieval order emerged. The Catholic popes influenced political decisions throughout the Middle Ages and at the beginning of the Modern Age. The friction between the new European monarchs and the Vatican was reflected in a religious movement that transformed the view of God. And that led to an attempt to blame religious causes for the policies:

Religious passions were real, so wars were fought by governments or churches. Accidentally but inevitably, a unified system of European countries was emerging in which everyone participated in the same game on a continental

scale. A balance of power system in which each increase in strength automatically meant a loss of security for others. (Dyer, 2022, p. 274)

Finally, we find as a social fact everything related to the balance between the interaction that the different States of the time maintained and the existing disputes for power. Three conflicts can be evidenced in this context. A) The tensions between the Habsburg empire in its Spanish branch and in its Austrian branch against the Ottoman Turkish Empire, which since the fifteenth century, after the capture of Constantinople, wanted to expand towards Europe; in the same way, taking what was described by Wilson (2018). B) The second conflict occurred between the Spanish monarchy and the Kingdom of France, increased by the disputes of the closeness between the two and by the tensions in Italy - especially, for the possession of Naples, and in France itself, for the Franche-Comté. And finally, C) The disputes with an England that had intentions of snatching the predominance from Spain as a power, and the constant rebellions in Flanders and the Netherlands, all of which gave rise to the famous black legend in which Spain was branded as a despotic and retardant regime. Finally, the problems that Spain had in preserving the regional balance were reflected in the fact that

The outbreak would soon take place, since the Pax Hispanica had barely managed to contain the latent local, national, and universal quarrels. So much so that in the first fifteen years of the seventeenth century various peace agreements that had been signed precariously were shown for what they were: mere truces or breaks to regain strength and return to the load once prescribed. (Calvo, 2021, p. 166)

The war event: the Thirty Years' War and its contributions

Among the causes of the conflict that can be considered the first of the wars on a global scale - because it involved not only the European powers, but their colonies throughout the globe - two were already dealt with: political and religious. It is therefore necessary to highlight the economic aspect, linked, in turn, to the great need that these powers had for the new paradigm based on mercantilism, which implied that each of these States depended on their colonies to obtain raw materials and

sell their processed products. In turn, all of them needed to consolidate their own trade routes, which allowed them to reach their nascent economies globally.

It is important to highlight the progress that England had made in terms of control of maritime routes, to the detriment of what was achieved by Spain and Portugal during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. English advances brought considerable losses to the coffers of the Spanish Empire, and forced it to seek other means of connecting with its colonies; especially those of Flanders and the Netherlands. Hence the expression "Poner una pica en Flandes", through the consolidation of the Spanish road. Likewise, it was impossible to underestimate the constant threat of the Turks, since they had blocked normal trade with the East; above all, with China: one of the main customers of the silver that the Spaniards extracted in the new kingdoms in America.

The confluence of political, economic and religious causes led to the emergence in this conflict of *what is posed as the Thucydides trap*. This leads a dominant power to confront an emerging one, which will dispute its power by all means. The above can be conceptually evidenced:

A Harvard University project has enunciated what is called the 'Thucydides Trap', in honor of the author of *History of the Peloponnesian War*. From his famous phrase about how the growing power of Athens and the fear of Sparta led to war, a rule is elaborated that, he says, almost always ends up being fulfilled: when a rising power puts pressure on an established power, there is a good chance that a war will break out. (MacMillan, 2021, p. 853)

In the particular case of study, the aforementioned trap led Europe to a confrontation from which a new world order would emerge, where the emerging powers managed to impose themselves on the traditional ones.

The war developed in several phases. It began as a local revolt within the Holy Roman Empire, and spread to central Europe and its periphery, to become what Calvo (2021) has called the first world conflagration. That first phase, which spanned from 1618 to 1625, took place in Bohemia: A kingdom that had traditionally had disputes with the Habsburg emperor, based in Vienna; and Ferdinand II sent emissaries there, who were thrown out of a window of the royal palace. The so-called Defenestration of Prague was thus constituted, which led to the beginning of the conflict. Immediately, the emperor sought support from his Spanish cousins to help him quell the revolt, which was resolved in 1625, with the victory of the troops of the Holy Roman Empire against the Bohemians and their allies in the German principalities.

The second phase came with the intervention of the Danes, from 1625 to 1629. The Danish monarchy, backing its German Protestant allies, initiated a series of campaigns in order to neutralize the advances of the Habsburgs, and to consolidate a strong geostrategic position on the Baltic littoral. This phase was not very successful, since the imperial troops managed to neutralize the intentions of the Baltic kingdom and put the balance in favor of the empire again.

The third phase was fought from 1630 to 1635. It is a very interesting stage, since Gustav Adolf, King of Sweden, generated a revolution in military affairs by adapting his armies organizationally and allowing, through the unit known as the *brigade*, to gain mobility and maneuver. Similarly, with the technical improvement of weapons and their articulated use, he managed to enhance the combat capacity of his troops. But, finally, none of this materialized in the strategic space, since Gustav Adolf died facing Marshal Albrecht von Wallerstein at the Battle of Lutzen.

Finally, the fourth and last part took place with the intervention of the French monarchy, from 1635 to 1648, and in which the reason of state was imposed on French interests to undermine Spanish power in Europe. This position went against the universality of the Catholic Church and Spain itself, as it increased the individual power of the State against the aspirations of a kingdom of universal salvation proposed by the Pope and his Habsburg allies. We can see it in

France, which is finding its place in Europe through a cynical policy when it finally realized the potential that its great resources offered it. A Spain that showed itself at decisive moments, no matter how many thoughts it was decadent. The increasingly belligerent united provinces of Holland... and England always an enigma for the continental ones. (Calvo, 2021, pp. 167 – 168)

The French achieved their strategic objective and forced both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire to make a peace, formalized in the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which are generically known as the Treaties of Westphalia. These treaties constitute a significant contribution of the Thirty Years' War: they were the beginning of the consolidation of the modern nation-state and the classical international system. The States were given a non-confessional character, far from the power of the Vatican in the internal decisions of the States. Such a change would be the germ of the liberal revolutions that began in the United States and continued in France. Likewise, the republic was reborn, which, with the constitutions, led to a new social contract between the rulers and the ruled.

Gustav Adolf as a leader and his contributions to the nature of war

In the history of strategic thinking and leadership there are characters who have marked a turning point for their ability to manage knowledge in this field of human knowledge. King Gustav II Adolf of Sweden is one of them, because he managed to articulate an effective transformational leadership, which allowed his State to defend its own vital interests by generating a successful articulation between ends, means and ways, and with this, transform the thinking of his time. Gustav Adolf is a paradigm of military leadership, due to his management to transform the strategic conception of his time, by generating new scenarios between the interaction of the leader with his producers of information.

One of the main challenges of a strategist is to harmonize the elements that build any strategy. In this sense, it is important that said leader, according to Freedman (2016), has an accurate situational awareness, so that he can know where he is, where his adversary is and, finally, what his own operational context is, and thus identify the variables that affect him. For this, the leader, in any field of state power, counts on strategy as a tool that articulates ends, means and ways to achieve the ends of society.

In an ideal situation, sufficient means are available, which, effectively managed, give to achieve the ends imposed on organizations. But in the vast majority of opportunities, this ideal scenario is not achieved. Therefore, the strategic leader must overcome this problem by enhancing the ways in which he manages resources. One such mode is reflected in two capabilities. The first of these is the successful management of employees, managing to generate a convergent space, where all wills are founded in pursuit of achieving organizational goals. The second is the successful communication that the strategist must develop with those who provide the necessary knowledge, which, according to Kent (1978), facilitates decision-making at the highest level.

Gustav II Adolf of Sweden embodies, according to Avolio et al. (1999), a leader who, through a leadership that transforms, managed to generate a process where moral and material factors interact that allow his followers to develop a convergence of values and beliefs, which allowed him to become a reference in his time. And which even today has been taken as a model to develop the paradigm of *transformational leadership*.

Landscape and context frame the main characteristics of human beings. In this sense, our character is not detached from these two variables. Gustav Adolf was born in Stockholm, Sweden, on November 16, 1594, as the grandson of Gustav Vasa, founder of the Vasa dynasty, which, in turn, introduced the thought of Luther and Calvin into his kingdom; that is, Protestantism. Similarly, his father, Charles IX of Sweden, was a great defender, along with the German princes, of the protestant faith in the face of attempts by the Holy Roman Empire to crush it. According to Parker (2004), the conflict between Protestants and Catholics would occupy the efforts and resources of the European imperial houses, headed. On the Catholic side, by the Habsburgs, and on the Protestant group, by the German princes, the English monarch, the monarchs of Sweden and Denmark and, finally, by the powerful Bourbon house, in France. This context became an important factor in Gustav Adolf's thinking.

On the other hand, we find the *landscape*, understood as this term, from geopolitics, as the influence that geographical factors play in the definition of personality characteristics. And it is important to highlight that the Kingdom of Sweden occupies an important territory within the Baltic States, which instills in it a maritime conception that gives advantages for commercial development and prosperity, and which, in turn, are reflected in the ability to concentrate resources for its defense. On the other hand, it is important to note that its Scandinavian character is also a determining factor in the formation of the Swedish landscape. This is reflected, according to Rodríguez (2007), in the difference between the Viking worldview and the thinking of the other European kingdoms of his time, from whose main branch the Nordic perspective departs, with a particular way of conceiving politics and religion.

According to Rodríguez (2007), for the Scandinavians –and among them, the Swedes– there is a causal connection between political conception and faith, and related to the fact that the territories that today comprise Norway, Finland and Sweden, not being under the influence of the Roman Empire or the later Carolingian Empire, developed a political ethics based on the freedom to choose their rulers and autonomously determine what their conception of sovereignty is.

For much of Sweden's history, its rulers were elected according to Nordic traditions, by decision of a council of nobles and with the approval of the people. On many occasions, these leaderships were due to the capacity that the rulers had to inspire, according to Bass (1985), beliefs, values and principles that motivated

society to overcome obstacles and to a greater performance in the achievement of strategic ends as a society.

Taking Weber (2006) as a reference, in the religious aspect, the Protestant ethic, influenced by the thoughts of Calvin and Luther, infused the kingdoms that embraced this faith with a different way of building their political spirit. A social commercial form, since in it a church was not needed to consolidate the relationship with the Creator. Consequently, the intermediation to achieve salvation was an undertaking of a personal nature. According to Keagan (2015), this religious conception instilled in the leaders an anthropocentric vision that requires the leader to concentrate efforts on generating a charisma that manages to instill respect and makes the social goals shared by the group, including heroic leadership. The transformational leadership proposed by Avolio et al. (1999).

There is a factor that in Gustav II Adolf of Sweden is observable, and that comes from Weber's postulates against the Lutheran conception of the profession:

It is evident that in the German word 'profession' (*Befuf*), as perhaps even more clearly in the English *calling*, there is at least a religious reminiscence: the idea of a mission imposed by God. This religious sense of the word is revealed in all its clarity in every context in which it is taken in the fullness of its meaning. (Weber, 2006, p. 69)

It can be said that the strategic leader studied incorporates, due to his Protestant faith, a series of values related to a divine destination, which seeks to become a fundamental axis of the transformations introduced in his kingdom. It is also important to highlight the importance of values in transformational leadership, since, according to Bass (1985), they focus on the actions that the leader must exercise in his organization, and which seek to be the beacon that guides the entire process. For clarity on values, we can note that:

The values of a company or organization are the set of beliefs, principles, and higher rules with which it operates internally. They become the institutional philosophy and are the support of the organization's culture. Its definition establishes the frame of reference that inspires and regulates its life.

The values thus become specific to each company and correspond to its organizational culture, its competitive characteristics, the conditions of the environment and the expectations of its stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, managers and employees, or their equivalents in the military world. (Aznar, 2018, p. 142)

Gustav II Adolf of Sweden managed to consolidate a transformational leadership, according to Aznar (2018), influencing his followers by generating a convergence in the mission, vision and values that made up his strategy, to adapt to the context and landscape that were lived in Europe at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century. In this case, Gustav Adolf managed to instill his own principles linked to his Protestant ethic in the culture of his society, and at the same time, in the States that accompanied him in his great strategic campaign developed during the Swedish phase of the Thirty Years' War. Next, we will delve into the contributions that were developed at that time in the field of strategy, and how they continue to exert influence today.

Main elements of the strategic thinking of Gustav II Adolf of Sweden

The historical context is very important to determine the elements of the strategy developed by a leader at a certain stage of history. In the case under study, in Europe, the consolidation of Modernity marked a political, social, cultural, and economic scenario, based mainly on the rupture of the old order, dominated by a theocentric vision. And where religion was the main variable to explain all phenomena, towards a new order, where it is the individual and his self-determination that found the principle of modern liberal sovereignty.

This was the scenario in which Gustav II Adolf of Sweden gave his contributions to modern strategic thinking, by articulating the ends of his society with the means and the ways his kingdom had to achieve them. And one conflict in particular allowed these contributions to be made in the rest of the seventeenth-century European terrain. The Thirty Years' War; specifically, the Swedish phase of that conflict, which occurred between 1630 and 1635. It is important to state the reasons why this kingdom joined the conflict: according to Parker (2004), both the Holy Roman Empire, the great heir of the Roman Empire, and the Carolingian Empire had always exercised power over the Baltic kingdoms, seeking through their influence to consolidate the hegemony of the Habsburg house in Europe. Curbing such interference would be the main goal of the Swedish strategy.

According to a certain geopolitical principle, the proximity of one State against another increases the risk of an invasion materializing, in the midst of the attempt at political and economic domination by the stronger against the weaker. And this was precisely what happened in 1630, given the intention of the Holy Roman Empire

to increase its control over Prussia, which (Wilson, 2018) put it on a collision course with Sweden, since the former sought to increase its influence over the Baltic Sea. Similarly, Emperor Ferdinand II intended to ignore the Treaty of Augsburg, of 1555, whereby Emperor Charles V granted the kingdoms the freedom to choose religion according to the faith of their ruler, thus seeking to overcome the political problems generated by the Reformation. This imperial position posed a threat to Swedish political stability, based on its Protestant faith. Defending his political independence from the emperor, and his religious freedom from the pope, became the end of the strategy developed by Gustav Adolf, and the fundamental axis of his transformations.

We can affirm that the means that Sweden had at the beginning of the conflict were represented in the capacity that it had developed in the commercial aspect (Wilson, 2018), to consolidate a network of transactions in the Baltic, which allowed it to consolidate a military power, represented in an army that, in turn, enhanced its operations with the support of a navy that extended its supply lines from its own territory to that of the imperial enemy. This can be seen in

The basis of Gustav Adolf's underlying success lay in his understanding of administration and organization, Sweden could not afford a mercenary army large enough to contend with the combined armies of its enemies, and therefore Gustav introduced a recruitment system, eventually creating the first national army recruited, paid for, fed and equipped by the state. (Montgomery, 1969, p. 266)

Following his strategy, the Scandinavian sovereign optimized the human and material resources he had at the time (Montgomery, 1969) taking as a model the changes developed by Mauricio de Nassau in his war against the Spaniards. In addition, he restructured his infantry from the traditional model, of the Spanish third, to a much more flexible and more mobile unit. It is important to note that within the means used by Gustav Adolf, importance was given to the use of weapons, by generating, first, changes in their technical characteristics that were reflected in their tactical use, as they led to the convergence between infantry, artillery, engineers, and logistics.

Another component of the strategy to which the Swedish king gave more importance were the ways in which he managed knowledge to integrate the ever-increasing ends with the sometimes scarce means in his kingdom. As a first step, it incorporated the spirit of the Renaissance, evidenced in that

In fact, Gustav Adolf was the first great soldier to approach the art of war with the mental attitude of the Renaissance. His ideas regarding organization and tactics were original and brilliant; in addition, he was energetic and efficient in applying them. (Montgomery, 1969, p. 265)

In the formation of the Swedish army, and mutating to the model of the national army, it became essential that the training of both officers and non-commissioned officers and soldiers became a factor generating combat power. In this sense, tasks were developed (Montgomery, 1969) aimed at strengthening this aspect; discipline was the fundamental axis on which these changes were consolidated. According to Aznar (2018), implementing military instruction made the transformational values that Gustav Adolf established radiate to each of his men, and that they were an important factor of cohesion in war, campaigns, and battle, which thus influenced from the strategic to the tactical.

The articulation of his strategic vision, reflected in the convergence of ends, means and ways to achieve the interest of his kingdom, was complemented by knowledge management. It allowed him, as we will see in the next section, to build a solid relationship between those who produced knowledge and those who used it to make strategic decisions.

Relationship between the strategic decision maker and the knowledge provider

The strategic leader (from now on, *user*) must develop a synergistic relationship with the people and organizations that provide him with knowledge (from now on, *producers*), and even more, in a transformational leadership model, where, according to Aznar (2018), it is necessary to develop a situational awareness that allows them to interpret the moment lived like this:

The great military leaders have been sublime interpreters of the lived moment and through that interpretation they have achieved victory (not necessarily peace, which belongs to politics). There are many examples: Alexander, Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal, Hasdrubal, Caesar, Napoleon, Grant, Patton, Eisenhower... All of them were able to understand the situation faster than their rivals, draw conclusions and apply them before them, demonstrating at the same time sensitivity, practical intelligence and resolution. Each strategic moment may require its leader, understood as a person with a set of qualities especially suitable for it. (Aznar, 2018, p. 263)

Likewise, the user must generate a structure in which the means and modes that configure the producers of knowledge that support their strategic decisions can be articulated. Throughout the history of humanity (Navarro, 2009), a fundamental character has been generated for this work: the *spy*, who develops his activity in secret, behind the lines of the enemy, observing armies and cities, seeking to find secrets that give his user an advantage. One of the principles on which this relationship is based is trust, which allows the user to be sure that the information provided serves their own interests, and that the person who provided it does not betray the trust placed in them.

Similarly, it is important for the user to clearly understand their vision in the face of the goals they perceive; this is achieved, according to Aznar (2018), with assertive communication, where symbols, languages and strategic culture are understood by the parties involved in the process. In the case of Gustav Adolf, this was fully achieved by instilling a deep understanding of his intentions among the producers.

An example of such synergistic interaction, based on trust and understanding, occurred during the battle of Lützen, on November 16, 1632, when the Swedish army, under the command of Gustav Adolf, and the army of the Empire, under the command of Albrecht von Wallerstein, clashed. The exact knowledge provided by the Swedish knowledge producers allowed the strategic decisions of the Scandinavian side to be developed under the deep knowledge of the enemy, of time and terrain, which allowed, according to Jorgensen (2007), that the Swedes maneuvered correctly, that they managed to wear down the imperial troops and foresee each of the maneuvers developed by them during the contest. The result, at the tactical level, was the defeat of the troops of the Holy Roman Empire; and although in the midst of the fighting the Nordic king was killed, the strategic implications, according to Jorgensen (2007), included that the intentions of the Habsburgs to cement their dominance in Germany were stopped.

Gustav Adolf, ahead of his time, was able to understand the problems enunciated by Kent (1978), in the face of the interaction between user and intelligence producer, and thus managed to guide and assertively guide his subordinates at all levels, understandable the ends that guided his own strategy. In the same way and taking what was expressed by Keagan (2004), the external variables that affected decision-making by the Scandinavian sovereign became understandable. And finally, returning to Kent (1978), through the instruction given at all levels of the Swedish military apparatus, various sources could be concentrated and, in this way, overcome the predisposition to believe that there is a single source of information for decision-making.

To conclude

As a final reflection, it can be evidenced that the Thirty Years' War, as a warlike conflict, generated a series of changes that can be reflected in political, economic, and social aspects. Leading to a transition point that brought Europe, fully, to Modernity, with the consolidation of the current nation state, and with the beginning of the classical international system, fundamental pillars of political Modernity, and which still has repercussions on a global scale today. As a consequence of this, there was also evidence of leadership that contributed to the permanent construction of the nature of war.

It should be noted how the transformational leadership exercised by King Gustav II Adolf of Sweden managed to stimulate, at all levels of state decisions. A relation that is reflected in the creation of common values, behaviors, culture and beliefs, which allowed him to achieve the purposes of his strategy. That in fact was to preserve the independence of his country against the threat of the Holy Roman Empire, and to consolidate the position of the States of the Protestant side, which would lead to the Peace of Westphalia, which put an end to the political-religious disputes caused in Europe by the Thirty Years' War.

In the same way, the articulation of ends, means and ways achieved by Gustav Adolf transformed the vision of medieval strategy, and gave way to Modernity, which is evidenced in the profound revolution in military affairs that has since managed to articulate national armies and the objective of achieving the reason of state, and with it, the beginning of the concept of the *modern nation-state*. The contributions to strategic thinking introduced by Gustav Adolf are still studied in the different academies on a global scale.

Finally, regarding the phenomenon of the interaction of users and producers of intelligence, it was possible to show that the Swedish king was ahead of his time, managing to settle the problems evidenced by Kent (1978). Thereby ensuring that decision-making was based on knowledge management, understanding contexts. Identifying the problems that affect the achievement of strategic ends. Seeking solutions that articulate resources and knowledge. And, finally, transferring the teaching received by learning from what has been learned and learning to unlearn.

References

- Avolio, B., Bass, B., & Jung, D. (1995). *MLQ Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire*. Technical report. Mind Garden.
- Aznar, F. (2018). *Repensando el liderazgo estratégico*. Sílex.
- Bass, B. (1985). *Leadership and performance beyond expectations*. Free Press.
- Calvo, F. (2021). *Homo bellicus. Una historia de la humanidad a través de las guerras*. Arzalia Ediciones.
- Diamond, J. (2018). *Armas, Gérmenes y Aceros*. Debate.
- Dyer, G. (2022). *Breve historia de la guerra*. Antoni Bosch editor.
- Freedman, L. (2016). *Estrategia una historia*. La Esfera de los Libros.
- Jorgensen. (2007). *Great Battles: Decisive Conflicts That Have Shaped History*. Parragon Publishing.
- Keagan, J. (2015). *La máscara del mando. Un estudio del liderazgo*. Turner Noema.
- Keagan, J. (2004). *Inteligencia Militar. Conocer al enemigo, de Napoleón a Al Qaeda*. Turner Noema.
- MacMillan, M. (2021). *La guerra. Cómo nos han marcado los conflictos*. Turner.
- Montgomery, B. (1969). *Historia del arte de la guerra*. Aguilar.
- Navarro, D. (2009). *Espías. Tres mil años de información y secreto*. Plaza y Valdés.
- Parker, G. (2004). *La guerra de los 30 años*. Antonio Machado Libros.
- Kent, S. (1978). *Inteligencia estratégica*. Pleamar.
- Rodríguez, J. (2007). *Historia de las ideas y del pensamiento político, una perspectiva de occidente*. Ibáñez.
- Weber, M. (2006). *La ética protestante y el espíritu del capitalismo*. Premia.
- Wilson, P. (2018). *La guerra de los 30 años. Una tragedia europea (I) 1618-1630 - 3.ª edición*. Despertar Férreo.

Chapter 4

Power and leadership in the 21st century. Case Study: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.04>

Álvaro Eduardo Díaz Rivera

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: The young 21st century is unfolding through a evolution of discourses and political ideologies in which the actions of what remains the main actor of the world order are framed and developed. States, which do not lose their realistic interest in the use and exercise of power to protect and impose their aspirations on the international system. This headed by national leaders with contradictory positions whose actions generate instability and conflicts in various latitudes. The current war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine is a clear example of the ideological, historical and economic struggle being waged on a global scale. Its consequences are already being felt not only in Europe, but also in the economy and trade dynamics of all continents. Consequently, the threat of war returns to the forefront of the agendas of the so-called First World countries.

Keywords: authority, strategy, geography, war, influence, leadership, power, realism.

Álvaro Eduardo Díaz Rivera

Captain (R), Colombian Navy. Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in National Security and Defense, and Strategy and Geopolitics, Escuela Superior de Guerra. Naval Engineer, Electronic and Professional Specialty in Naval Sciences, Escuela Naval de Cadetes "Almirante Padilla". Specialist in Maritime Policy and Strategy, Escuela Naval de Cadetes "Almirante Padilla".

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7974-3648> - Contact: diazal@esdeg.edu.co

APA Citation: Díaz Rivera, Á. E. (2023). Power and leadership in the 21st century. Case Study: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 77-98). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.04>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Sir Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" and the amalgamation of Glasnost and *Perestroika*, which led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, constitute a milestone in history that marked the beginning of a new era in the exercise of power and leadership in the political and strategic sphere on a global scale.

These events generated a massive movement of people across the borders of the Eastern bloc countries and the uprising of the nationals of the Soviet republics against the Moscow government. These facts eroded the power and leadership structure of the Russian giant. The world order went from bipolarity to unipolarity, as the advent of globalism put the capitalist power at the head of the system: the United States (USA). Who was the great beneficiary of the Soviet collapse and the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist structure.

However, at that time in history, neither American power nor leadership considered deploying a "Marshall plan" to "rescue" Russia - like the one carried out after the end of World War II, and whose "help" to the ruined European countries resulted in obtaining the undisputed supremacy of the US. during the second half of the twentieth century on the international stage-; but, on the contrary, a new global system of a transnationalist nature was staged, based on the economy, with a style of power and leadership of a limited nature (as the US considered that he could not continue to be "the world's cop"). Such a relatively "passive" position of the world hegemon, far from achieving a world balance, caused the emergence of several leaders with a desire for power and impulses to be able to dispute it, who resort to war or the threat of it to move away from the orbit and dominion of the US.

Clear examples of this imbalance are perceived in several parts. For example, in Southeast Asia: Kim Jong-un, de facto ruler and supreme leader of the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea since 2011 with his fervent opposition to the West (represented by US and its allies around the world) and Xi Jinping, president of the People's Republic of China since 2013, with his promise to completely unify China (this concerns, of course, the island of Formosa, which since 1949 hosted the *Kuomintang* nationalists who lost the communist revolution), which generates an atmosphere of maximum tension in which the US is stalling for its support for Taiwan and the government of its president Tsai Ing-wen (in power since 2016).

But the key event and object of study is the conflict in Eastern Europe (already escalated to a warlike confrontation since February 24, 2022) between the government of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, president of the Russian Federation, and the government of Volodymyr Oleksandrovich Zelensky, president of Ukraine. Which already has consequences at the regional level, for the countries bordering Ukraine, and on the continent, for the countries of the European Union (EU), and even on the world stage. Since its effects are already felt on all continents, due to the confrontation it causes between the States belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia, which, however, will also end up involving its political-military allies members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

To address the issue at hand, the situation between Russia and Ukraine will be analyzed in two key and fundamental areas: power and leadership. The first, to understand the behavior of the actors in the current complicated global context, and the second, to glimpse the actions of the leaders of both nations in the scenario of a conflict that is not recent. Power and leadership have confronted Russia and Ukraine for several centuries, as the differences began long ago, when the Russians first subdued the Ukrainians.

But why are two peoples with a similar genesis in history and who share a fertile region abundant in renewable and non-renewable resources as their "cradle", staunch enemies in the 21st century? The answer to this question is cardinal to understanding the development and evolution of a historical divergence that not only prevails, but threatens to generate a new confrontation of global scope with serious consequences for all humanity.

This analysis hypothesizes the following statement: *the use of the power-leadership combination by Russia and Ukraine, within the scope of the realistic paradigm, defines the maneuverability in war and state management of both countries as actors of the international system, delimiting their past, present and future actions and aspirations.*

Background to the Russian-Ukrainian dispute

The *Hetmanate* (first Ukrainian State) emerged in 1648, the product of a social and religious revolution that pitted the so-called Kievan Rus' against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which had previously shared with the Principality of Moscow the Slavic territories abandoned by the heirs of Genghis Khan due to the decline of the Mongol Empire. In 1654, the Ukrainian Cossacks went to Tsar Alexander I to request his protection by signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav, but Russia applied a policy of land absorption that led to the Hetmanate rebelling against its "protector" being defeated in 1709. Empress Catherine the Great definitively abolished the Hetmanate in 1764, and the Russian army destroyed the Cossack bastions of the Dnieper River. And with the split of the Republic of the Two Nations (Poland and Lithuania), in 1795, the Tsarina took control of the lands of Ukraine. In 1876, Tsar Alexander II prohibited any type of publication in Ukrainian, through the "Ems" Law¹.

To the facts enunciated are added the events that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century that were decisive in the future of Ukraine as a sovereign country. After the syncope of the tsarist empire, in 1917, the Ukrainian patriots took the opportunity to establish a revolutionary parliament, called the *Rada*, unified their territory, declared their emancipation, and signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Central Powers to achieve the recognition of their sovereignty. With the end of the First World War, in 1918, Lenin granted autonomy to the Ukrainian territories, and that same year the People's Republic of Ukraine declared its independence for the first time. Curiously enough, no power of the time wanted to recognize its sovereignty, and the Bolsheviks changed their minds and invaded the young nation to annex it to the nascent Soviet state. In 1922, the victors in the Russian civil war proclaimed the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as one of the four founders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). And initiated a process of Ukrainianization, which Stalin later turned into *Russification*, and whose outcome was two adverse episodes for the Ukrainian people. The so-called holodomorgenocide, between 1932 and 1933, and the mass deportation from Crimea of 1944².

The extensive chain of adverse events characterized by the traditional "breach of agreement" continued during the second half of the twentieth century. In 1954

¹ Summary made from the videos "The truth of the history of Ukraine and Russia" and "The true origins of Ukrainians", taken from the website "History misunderstood".

² Summary made from the videos "The truth of the history of Ukraine and Russia" and "The true origins of Ukrainians" taken from the website "History misunderstood".

Nikita Khrushchev transferred the Crimean Peninsula (Autonomous Republic since 1921) to Ukraine, but in 2014 Russia invaded Crimea and annexed it to its territory. In 1991 a first referendum was held to vote for the independence of Ukraine (that country's second declaration of independence), in the midst of chaos over the dissolution of the USSR. Although at that time Ukraine was able to retain Crimea, Russia retained control of the Sevastopol naval base.

And so it goes with events that occurred from the 1990s to the second decade of the 21st century. In 1994, the parties to the dispute signed the Budapest Memorandum, through which Ukraine handed over its nuclear arsenal to Russia in exchange for guarantees of its autonomy, to certify Ukraine's territorial integrity. In 1997, the parties in question signed the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (strategic partnership and recognition of the inviolability of borders) to ratify Ukraine's territorial integrity. In 2014, a second referendum was held - only recognized by Russia - to vote on the accession³ of the Crimean Oblast to Russia. In 2022, a third referendum was held, with results, according to Putin, favorable to Russia, to vote for the independence of Ukraine from the Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts.

However, the aftermath of this whole network of events throughout history, far from pointing towards a reconciliation between the two countries, increased the differences between them. They reached, in fact, a "point of no return" with the beginning of the war, on February 24, 2022. And were also, therefore, the triggers of actions of a diplomatic and economic nature both of the countries in contention and of other States and supranational organizations with a common denominator: disrespect for the sovereignty, borders and, therefore, territorial integrity, of Ukraine. Although at the time the government of Boris Yeltsin accepted the results of the first referendum, the results of the second and third were not accepted by Ukraine or the international community - only Russia and its allies recognized them - which motivated the US. And the EU to gradually adopt economic sanctions against the Russian government. In short, Russia invaded Crimea in March 2014 and adhered to its territory. In February 2022 Russia launched a "special military operation" in Ukraine that ended up being an invasion (ongoing to date) and, finally, in September 2022, Russia annexed 23% of Ukrainian territory.

It could therefore be assured that the repeated breach of the commitments agreed between Russia and Ukraine is the main ingredient - linked to the

³ An Oblast (region) is a territorial administrative unit in countries such as Belarus, Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine.

aforementioned historical differences - that cements the eternal discord between the two European nations.

Power and War

Power is an inherent element in the existence of man that has always been present in the interaction of cultures and countries throughout the history of humanity; the advent of conflicts and wars is one of the consequences of its use towards other actors. Such disputes have affected the relationship between States and the drawing of their dividing lines, both on land and at sea. Therefore, power has an indelible relationship with war, as the latter is a resource to exert control or dominion over rivals and enemies, as well as a mechanism to put one's own interests before those of others.

For Max Weber, power is the probability of imposing one's will, within a social relationship, even against all resistance and whatever the basis of that probability. For Michel Foucault there is an interrelationship between political power and economic power. In the Hobbesian tradition, the interaction of States is based on war and this is inevitable because it is considered intrinsic to the nature of the human being. (Langa, 2016)

Making war as a way of implementing power has long been related to a third element. Geography, since its valuation establishes the importance of preserving one's own territory and justifies the need to conquer the space of others, in favor of survival and national aspirations. Even now, in the 21st century, the power-war-geography triangle is still present in the planning and action of leaders and rulers around the world.

Putin and his methodology for exercising power

On the last weekend of July, Russia annually celebrates its Navy Day, the main event being a naval parade involving ships from the Pacific Ocean, Baltic Sea and Black Sea fleets. In 2022, this commemoration was held on the 31st of that month, in St. Petersburg, the second most important city in Russia, located at the mouth of the Neva River and a relevant seaport on the Gulf of Finland. At that military parade, Putin gave a speech in which, in addition to issuing threats and warnings to the

West. He clearly exposed to his countrymen his new defense capabilities (for war) and Russia's new strategy.

From the former imperial capital, Putin pointed out that the US is its main rival for its interest in wanting to dominate the oceans and that NATO is one of the greatest threats to Russia. In addition, it enunciated the Kremlin's strategic objectives and established Russia's global maritime ambitions in the Arctic Ocean, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov. (France24, 2022)

It is clear, then, that Russian policy sets the strategy from its priorities and interests, and is based, among other aspects, on the changes generated relative to the current war with Ukraine. In accordance with his political position, the highest Russian dignitary focuses on the use of power to impose himself at the regional level and ascend to the first step of the international order. A position that Putin considers it belongs to Russia in its own right. And for achieving this, he is willing to use the mechanisms that the power-war-geography triangle gives him for this.

This, at the cost, even, of amending history. "In July 2021, Putin wrote a public letter describing that Lenin's creation of the Socialist Republic of Ukraine had been a historic mistake and that the Russian and Ukrainian people were the same" (Torres, 2022, p. 154).

Putin and his methodology for exercising power

On August 24, 2022, Ukraine's Independence Day, a "parade" of land military assets seized and destroyed by Ukraine in the war with Russia was held on Khreshchatyk Street in Kiev. At that time, Zelenski addressed his nation - as he usually does through messages on the web - adopting a nationalist position that emphasizes what he points out as a "turning point" that occurred six months ago, on February 24, 2022 and heroically exposing a national interest. Territorial integrity, which is a clear strategic objective for his government. His words highlighted the elements of Ukraine's national policy, at the head of the president.

This flag has to be hoisted in all the places where it has the right to be; in the Dombas, in Crimea [...] For us, Ukraine means the whole of Ukraine. The 25 regions, without concessions or commitments [...] Dombas is Ukraine and we will recover it no matter how hard this road is; Crimea is Ukraine and we will recover it no matter how difficult this road is. (El País, 2022)

The importance of nationalism in the Ukrainian collective is significant, given that it is a nation that has suffered several violent episodes that have decimated its population.

Historically there are several cases that prove it. "In 1840, the country was divided between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires; this did not prevent culturally traditional people from fighting for the recognition and identification of their language" (Pinto, 2015, p. 9).

Thus, Ukrainian politics considers priorities and vital interests to recover territorial integrity and maintain nationalism - the latter, revitalized in the wake of the war -. Therefore, the Ukrainian president's strategy focuses on the use of power in keeping his country together and in the power-war-geography triangle, where war is only a defense mechanism.

Leadership and War

A strategic leader, and even more so an institutional leader - insofar as he or she must ensure the durability of the organization to which he or she belongs - needs to find [...] a balance between the group and the mission. (Aznar, 2017, p. 11)

It is here that the characteristics and elements of leadership are combined, which determine the actions of political leaders in their role as current rulers in an environment rarefied by the complex reality of a clearly multipolar and extremely unstable international system. In addition, leadership is a dynamic social phenomenon that is put into practice throughout the "spectrum of conflict" (peace, tension, crisis and war)⁴ by leaders who hold power. And so it also evolves, since lessons learned and new learning arise from all adverse situations that generate changes in the leadership construct.

The uncertain future demands new skills from the leader that were not considered in the same way in previous centuries. It is not enough to touch something on the capabilities of the person, the context or the degree of commitment (Cuesta, 2022, p. 11).

And it is that leadership and its relationship with another social phenomenon such as war, demands and demands that leaders understand the nature of the conflict - which at present is a mixture of classic and asymmetric elements in

⁴ Concept defined by the Colombian Navy in the Plan de Desarrollo Naval 2042. First edition. 2020.

increasingly complex scenarios - to effectively exercise their authority, in favor of the fulfillment of their interests - which, of course, must be aligned with the wishes of the collective - and retaining the support of the population.

In the case of the war between Russia and Ukraine, the leaders of the two sides denote a strategic leadership with different nuances. The leadership-war-influence triangle is oriented towards the achievement of an ultimate end that justifies decisions within the framework of the conflict.

Putin and his techniques of employing leadership

Putin's profile narrates that the Russian leader is a lawyer and politician of the United Russia party, president of the Government of Russia on two occasions (1999-2000 and 2008-2012) and president of the Russian Federation from 2000 to 2008 and from 2012 to the present. His father was a militar -he served in the navy- he served from 1975 to 1990 as a strategic intelligence officer of the intelligence agency and secret police KGB, of the Soviet Union. His qualities characterize him as an individual with a remarkable cult of his own personality and with rooted religious beliefs of an orthodox type.

Putin is a leader with a vision, a future project for Russia, consisting of his country regaining influence and, if possible, control over the territories that were once part of the USSR. Its strategy is based on ensuring internal stability by strengthening the role of the state in all Russian territories. (Ballesteros, 2014, p. 4)

Putin's leadership style denotes strength and vigor, with clear and specific statements of his intentions, which show the desire to impose himself in the global context, since his vision revolves around placing Russia at a higher level as an indisputable world power.

Putin strongly criticizes some former Russian leaders who, in his opinion, condemned the Soviet Union to its disintegration [...] Lenin destroyed the Russian world and did not form a real Russia [...] Gorbachev and Yeltsin are the authors of the dismemberment of the true heart of Russia. In that sense, he admires more the tsars like Catherine the Great or Ivan the Terrible. (Paul, 2022)

This behavior aims to display an ideal authoritarian figure in which the leadership-war-influence triangle will allow *Mother Russia* to resume its leading role.

Putin and his techniques of employing leadership

Zelensky's profile refers to the leader as a Ukrainian actor and politician of the People's Servant party, a law graduate of the Kiev National Economic University, sixth president of Ukraine since independence in 1991 and with a family of Jewish origin. He was a well-known comedian who rejected the ban on Russian artists in Ukraine. At the end of 2018, without yet exercising politics, he was the main candidate for the presidency of his country. His qualities define him as a subject that denotes courage and authenticity, of a high emotional charge and unconventional style that impassions his fellow citizens and convulses the world.

Dear Nation, during my lifetime I have done my best to make Ukrainians laugh. I felt that it was not just my job, but my mission [...] I assure you that, in order for our heroes to stop dying, I am prepared to do everything. I am not afraid to make difficult decisions [...] A president is not an icon or an idol. A president is not a portrait [...]. (MAS Consulting, 2022)

Zelensky's leadership style borders on the utopian, on thinking the unthinkable, succeeding in attracting the country's social conglomerate to new directions and horizons previously considered an illusion. Since the enormous influence of the Kremlin in Ukrainian politics is not something from which it can be easily detached. In this ideal, the leadership-war-influence triangle inclines it towards greater rapprochement and greater interconnection with the West: the EU and NATO.

In September 2020, the new national security strategy of Ukraine, promoted by Zelensky, was approved, precisely with the aim of being a member of NATO; although the military alliance has not yet accepted Kiev among its members, it has been said that as an independent country it is free to join it. (BBC, 2022)

Of course, Putin is adamantly opposed to it, considering it a clear threat.

Power-war-geography trilogy

To analyze power, it has been related to the concepts of geography and war, in a trinomial that will be framed in the realistic paradigm, which is one of the basic paradigms that remain valid in the 21st century. Realism and its theories tend to examine (from the social sciences and international relations) the behavior of States.

Often the one with the most power is the one who sets the terms. According to the realistic approach, this logic does not explain the entire history of humanity, but a considerable part of it does (Jordan, 2022, p. 2).

It should be noted that in Realism the power-war-geography triangle fits perfectly, because among the parameters that condition “what normally is” in politics there is one that is called *strategic behavior*, governed by the national interest of a State.

In realism “States try to increase their respective share of power. This desire, in addition to deriving from the will to power of the individuals who are at the head of the State, is explained by the fact that a greater share of power guarantees the achievement of the rest of the interests (security, economic prosperity, ideological, etc.)”. (Morgenthau, 2006)

However, there are several branches of contemporary Realism: classical realism, structural realism or neorealism (offensive or defensive) and neoclassical realism. Although they all share fundamental premises (power is the primary currency and to guarantee security power is maximized) and seek to determine the meaning of what power is for, up to what level of power is sufficient, and what the actor is willing to do to obtain it. All the aforementioned types of Realism differ in the level of analysis they incorporate: the individual, the State or the international system (differential parameter established by the precursor of neorealism, by Kenneth Neal Waltz).

Neorealism employs the third level of analysis (the structure of the international system) and is therefore a useful resource for examining both power and competition to obtain it and war as a social phenomenon, and for intuiting the behavior of the opponents under study.

Neorealism is based on five assumptions of the international system. The first one: the great powers are the main actors in world politics and operate in an anarchic system. The second one: all states possess some offensive military capability. The third one: States can never be sure of the intentions of other States. The fourth one: the main objective of States is survival. The fifth one: States are rational actors, they are able to devise sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival. (Mearsheimer, 2022, pp. 3.4)

By analyzing Russia’s behavior (a country that seeks to “be a power” of the system) and Ukraine’s (a country that seeks to “survive” in the system) it can be confirmed that both countries -each on their own terms- are using the five assumptions enunciated in the materialization of power. One intends to maximize it:

Russia, through the use of offensive structural realism. And the other one, intends to preserve it: Ukraine, through the use of defensive structural realism.

In offensive structural realism - which defines the use of power and war by Russia - a great power will always try to increase its own power instigated by distrust in other actors, because for that power the basic way to guarantee its security lies in maximizing its power by collecting a percentage of it that is higher than that of others. To do this, the strategies to be employed - and here geography comes into play - would be war (high cost) and blackmail (low cost) to incorporate "terrestrial or maritime" territory of the adversary, to obtain "*commodities*"⁵, in order to create security areas "buffer zones", etc.

In defensive structural realism - which defines Ukraine's use of power and war - weaker countries opt for restraint and self-restraint as ways to preserve their security, as they tend to reach and maintain an appropriate (or limited) level of power that allows them to stay in the system. For this, the strategies to be used - here geography comes into play- would be cooperation and partnership (both low-cost) with other countries or international organizations that share similar interests (to preserve their own "terrestrial or maritime" territories, in order to maintain control over "*commodities*" and create alliances with other actors in the system, such as "States or supranational organizations", etc.).

However, in return for the aforementioned, Realism does not promulgate violence or conflict. "Realist theories recommend the balance of power (internal and external), rather than war, when it comes to maintaining or altering the distribution of relative power for one's own benefit" (Jordan, 2022, p. 4).

Moreover, structural realism, by not including Waltz's first two levels of analysis, "ignores cultural differences between states, as well as differences in the type of regime, mainly because the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers" (Mearsheimer, 2022, p. 2).

Due to these circumstances, the aspect of neoclassical realism is incorporated, whose pioneer is Gideon Rose, to fully understand the reason for the struggle between Russia and Ukraine. Since neoclassical realism incorporates the three levels of analysis (individual, state and international system) without opposing offensive/defensive structural realism, considering power and its distribution in the international system together with the power capacities of the actors, such as independent variables, and state behavior, such as the dependent variable, and a series of intervening variables (perception of decision makers, degree of consensus, etc.).

⁵ A *commodity* is a tangible material that can be traded, bought or sold; it is usually a raw material for manufacturing refined products. They can be energy, agriculture, metals, livestock, finance...".

Russian perspective

Russia reveals its power-geography-war triangle in its clear desire to obtain politically valuable territories for its national interests.

On the mainland, first of all, is the coastline of the Crimean Peninsula, where the ports of Yevpatoria, Sevastopol, Yalta and Feodosia are located. Secondly, on the other hand, there is the basin of the Dnieper River, which originates in Russia and into which the Pripyat, Zaporizhka and Desná rivers flow, and where Kiev and the ports of Cherkasy, Kremenchuk, Dnipró, Zaporizhka and Kherson are located. As well as the nuclear power plants of Chernobyl, officially "inactive", and Zaporizhka, "the largest in Europe with six nuclear reactors and a nominal generation capacity of 6,000 megawatts of power" (DW, 2022). In addition, in the last kilometers of the Dniester, before flowing into the Black Sea, there is a large estuary with a succession of reservoirs. Thirdly, there are regions of Ukraine rich in mineral-energy resources: in the east, the Luhansk and Donetsk "Donbas" Oblasts; in the west, the Lviv Oblast; in the center, the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and in the south, the Zaporizhka Oblast. Fourthly, there is a chokepoint⁶: the Kerch Strait, located between the Crimean and Tamal peninsulas, is the entrance to the Sea of Azov and, therefore, the entry and exit route of Russian ports located in that area.

On the maritime side, first of all, there are the natural resources (oil and gas reserves) located in Ukrainian waters, both in the Black Sea and in the Sea of Azov. Secondly, although Russia has more than 60 sea and river ports distributed in the Baltic Sea, the White Sea, the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea, the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, the Caspian Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. In the last two Russia has nine maritime terminals relevant to its economy and maritime trade, for allowing it to exit to the Mediterranean Sea, through the Turkish straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

Ukrainian Perspective

Russia reveals its power-geography-war triangle in its clear desire to obtain politically valuable territories for its national interests.

On the mainland, in the first place, there is the Crimean Peninsula -regain territorial control of the 27,000km² of the Crimean Oblast- which, according to Cuenca

⁶ Achoke point is a key geographic point for global maritime traffic and international trade

(2019), "is a geopolitical enclave that Russia chose in 2014 to invade and annex" (p. 1) and the four ports located there: Yevpatoria, Sevastopol, Yalta and Feodosia—. Secondly, there is a *chokepoint*: the aforementioned Kerch Strait -recovering its western side, where there are iron deposits, and retaking control of the port of Kerch, which is currently under Russian control- which is the only access route to the Sea of Azov and, therefore, the entry and exit route of the Ukrainian ports located in that area.

In the maritime part, in the first place, there are the aforementioned *commodities* that Ukraine owns both in the Black Sea and in the Sea of Azov. Secondly, maritime communications lines⁷ (SLOC) of ten Ukrainian ports; two of them are located on the Sea of Azov, and eight on the Black Sea.

Leadership-war-influence trilogy

To analyze leadership, it has been associated with the concepts of war and influence, in a trinomial that will include some constructs exhibited by Maximilian Karl Emil Weber in his theories of domination and legitimacy that retain validity and applicability in the 21st century. For Weber, leadership is a vast and complex subject, in which there is *trustworthy authority*, which can be characterized by three configurations: *rationally or legally, traditionally, and charismatically*.

According to Max Weber, every historical relationship between rulers and ruled contains elements that can be analyzed on the basis of three pure types of domination (charismatic, traditional, and legal) and the State is the institution that employs domination by attributing - legitimately or not - the monopoly of physical coercion. (Hernández, 2011)

It should be noted that what Weber stated is articulately coupled to the leadership-war-influence triangle, because it determines the ability of a subject to be at the forefront of a process or an organization and to have a decisive influence on situations related to their interests.

For Weber, leadership 'is a function that a social entity occupies in a certain circle or space. The leader must be able to make sound decisions around collective needs or interests. In seeking to understand power and differentiate it

⁷ Maritime communications lines (SLOC) is a term that describes the main maritime routes between ports that are used for trade and logistics, and by navies or navies around the world.

from leadership, Weber posited a distinction involving the ability to force people to obey or do something. ' (Khamlichi, n.d.)

Based on this, an assessment of the leadership exercise of the leaders of both parties can be done Russia and Ukraine; their presidents, although they share the use of legal leadership also called "bureaucratic", exercise command in very different ways.

Putin could be considered a traditional leader, as his way of being could be pointed out as deeply rooted in the history, customs, and socio-cultural tradition of Russia. His methodology at the time of exercising leadership aims to resemble that of a political predecessor object of his admiration: Tsar Peter the Great. On the contrary, Zelenski could be pointed out as a charismatic leader, because his way of being denotes enthusiastic and passionate performances that generate great empathy with his leaders; it does not require oppressive mechanisms to generate obedience. His personality generates respect, trust and voluntary motivation in his followers.

Leadership is also "a complex process of a social, historical and psychological nature that, according to historical circumstances, has been transmuted. As a status, role or function, it is a social category located at the center of social and organizational dynamics " (Méndez & Rojas, 2009, p. 30).

As for this process to generate empathy, leadership has two nuances: *power* and *authority*, which set the tone in the performance of the political driver, who holds the highest position in a specific society (for the matter at hand, the nations of Russia and Ukraine).

Putin could be considered as a leader with a "power" profile – whose practice is intimidation – because he has the following characteristics "he borrows from the desire to have more to be more. He belongs to the order of individualistic privacy, expresses strength. He is strengthened in contempt and exclusion, exercises through the imposition that dominates. He rejects difference, operates from the logic of individualism. He coheses through fear, inspires fear and terror". (Cáceres et al., 2013)

While "power" forcibly imposes the will, "authority" achieves the same thing, but through personal influence and persuasion.

Zelenski could be pointed out as a leader with a profile of "authority" – whose practice is law – because he demonstrates the following characteristics: "he

was born from the will of the community that wants to be governed by the best, belongs to the order of the relationship that says reference to the person. He expresses transcendence, he is conferred by the community aware of personal merits. He exercises through the dialogical word generating consensus. He seeks convergence in diversity, he operates from the logic of pluralism and complacency, he unifies by agreement. He respects freedom and promotes growth". (Cáceres et al., 2013)

However, to glimpse the leadership-war-influence triangle of both Russia and Ukraine, another concept must be added to stitch together the evaluation of the perspective of each of them: the *new institutionalism*, which is understood as "a set of theoretical and applied efforts that assume the importance of political institutions, which incorporate various approaches and methods, constituting the return of institutions to the main research agenda of political science" (Caballero, 2007, p. 10).

In addition, the new institutionalism "represents a heterogeneous set of approaches [...] It is based on notions such as individual, actor, roles, identities, behaviors, rules, regulation, environments, structures, (limited) rationality, among others" (De la Rosa, 2022, p. 28).

Russian perspective

Various constitutive elements can be identified in Putin's type of leadership. For example, *symbols*: his image reflects a defiant position vis-à-vis the other actors of the international system. In war, his aspiration is that the victory over Ukraine be a historical milestone, just as the episodes called the *Great Patriotic War* were at the time: that of Tsarist Russia against Napoleonic France and of the USSR against Nazi Germany. The use of the "Z" in military media and, in general, in all means of communication, means the abbreviation "towards victory". The *meaning* is also involved: recovering the imposing nature of what he considers "Mother Russia" is the aspiration that determines the desired strategic political end state; one of the culminating points of his expansionist policy is the firm determination to recover the extension of the former USSR. As for *beliefs*, his firm desire is to resurrect the inspiration of the greatness of the red flag of the Soviet era; the territory of the so-called "Kievan Rus" is part of the Russian *heartland*.⁸

⁸ The *heartland* (cardinal region, continental heart, pivot area or world island) corresponds to the theory of the English geographer and politician Halford John Mackinder.

In addition to this, Putin's leadership model can be considered transactional, because the relationship with his followers is practically reduced to a simple exchange. In which, based on the goals, roles and tasks imposed by him as a political authority. His work is almost completely limited to verifying and check its compliance and execution, giving little value to the considerations of his subordinates. In addition, it can be related to Zaleznik's definition of leadership, since, inevitably, it requires the power to influence the thoughts and actions of his followers. As far as the new institutionalism is concerned, Putin's leadership rests fully on his personality and Russia's institutionality unfolds almost exclusively under the personal vision and parameters imposed by the Kremlin leader. Moscow's fate rests on the strong personality of its current leader, who does not seem to give up power in the short or medium term.

Ukrainian Perspective

In Zelensky's type of leadership, the aforementioned constituent elements can also be identified. As for symbols, his image radiates a firm desire to detach himself from the Russian orbit and fully integrate into Western culture, of a capitalist nature. In war, his greatest aspiration is that the victory over Russia be a historical milestone that cuts off the eternal streak of defeats suffered by Ukraine in a long chain of confrontations between the two and although not as popular as the "Z" of Russia. The emblem of Ukraine is a mallet, which embodies the highest authority of the Ukrainian Cossack leaders. As for the meaning, this is to restore and maintain trust in the public institutions of the State. In addition, regaining control of the 25 Oblasts that make up Ukrainian territory is the aspiration that determines the desired strategic political end state. One of the highlights of its policy is the full and permanent entry into all regional economic and social organizations of the "Eurozone" and political and military establishments such as the EU and NATO, to consolidate its sovereignty and disconnect from Russian influence. As for beliefs, his firm desire is the rebirth of the Ukrainian people under the banner of freedom. Moreover, he desires to bury the aspirations of submission and domination that the nostalgics of the Soviet era still maintain.

In addition to what was mentioned before, Zelenski's leadership model can be considered transformational, because it maintains a fluid relationship with his followers using the media and social networks. Through which he decisively influences the values, attitudes and beliefs of his subordinates maintaining a permanent

motivation to achieve exponentially increasing levels in the performance of all people in favor of the achievement of the proposed objectives. Furthermore, it can be related to the definition of leadership of Kouzes and Posner. Since its influence is supported by the exercise of authority that attracts and motivates his followers to stand up to move forward with the vision of the leader that is shared by his subordinates. As far as the new institutionalism is concerned, Zelensky's leadership is supported by aspects such as communication, exemplarity, influence, a sense of belonging, courage and commitment. In this context, the political institutions of Ukraine develop under a vision of the future that recognizes a defined horizon with defined limits and room for maneuver. Kiev's fate lies in a leader who is fully aware that morality is an indispensable asset and who asserts that the future of Europe depends on the outcome of the war.

Conclusions

The answer to the initial question must be approached from both sides. Regarding the Russian perspective: from the corner of power, Putin fervently wishes to reverse the humiliation of his people due to the disintegration of the USSR, since, for him, Kiev is a creation of the Russians. From the corner of leadership, Putin has the idea of gathering all the *Russian speakers* who geographically belonged to the great territory established by what he considers "the tsar of the tsars": Peter the Great, in the so-called Russian world *Russkiy Mir*. In that order of ideas, Russians and Ukrainians belong, then, to the same original Russian people. Regarding the Ukrainian perspective, the opinion is completely different: from the corner of power, Zelensky vehemently wishes to maintain the territorial cohesion of his country, which has long wanted to preserve its traditions, culture and folklore with a national identity outside of Moscow. That is because, for the Ukrainian leader, Kiev already existed when the Russians arrived. From the corner of leadership, the war turned Zelensky into a visionary who aspires to subdue a superior enemy. And for this, he uses a dialectical discourse that has managed to maintain the hope and motivation of his people to resist the Russian onslaught by infecting his leaders with the idea that they can achieve a victory that will allow them to disconnect from the domination of Russia.

The geographical position of Ukraine is of great geostrategic importance and is part of Russia's eternal political ambitions on Eurasian soil. The mining-energy resources and *commodities* reserves in the territory and coastlines of the Sea

of Azov and the Black Sea, together with the importance of SLOC) through both bodies of water to and from the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, make Ukraine a Russian national interest.

The war between Russia and Ukraine revolves around Moscow's desire to control the geography of Kiev in order to maximize its influence in Europe in the political, economic, and social spheres. Although it is true that this phenomenon causes enormous human and material losses, along with great adverse economic impacts. It has been used and will continue to be used for reason to guarantee one's own security, to keep current and potential rivals "at bay" and to obtain a higher position or status in the hierarchy of the international system.

As long as the leaders of the powers aspiring to be the new hegemon - in this case, Russia - do not satisfy their political appetites in the scenarios or spheres of domination of their interest - in this case, Ukraine -. The war will continue, because if the interests maintain their intrinsic relationship with geography. As it has happened historically, and whose tendency will most certainly be maintained over time, their relationship with power and leadership will be perpetual. In the current war, Russia is likely to lose more than it can gain from great political and military attrition, and Ukraine is likely to gain more than it can lose from just grabbing the world's attention.

Leadership is not just power: leadership also requires authority, which is the moral force. Power alone is not enough to achieve goals, to satisfy interests, or to execute a particular strategy. Authority is the differentiating factor that complements the role of a leader, because thanks to it the need to resort to force (like any form of violence) to achieve respect, trust and voluntary motivation will be practically minimal. Moreover, leadership requires the support and legitimacy given by institutions (political actors with an influential role in national decisions), because in the new institutionalism the role of the State directly impacts society.

Finally, the hypothesis proposed at the beginning of this study is summarized in a proposal consisting of the use of the neoclassical theory of the realistic paradigm. This starts from a structural analysis and uses means that allow analyzing the particular uncertainty of the international system (structure composed of units that interact with each other), with a systemic approach (explanation based on the concept of systems, the interaction between their parts and their relationship with the environment). To analyze and understand the behavior and performance of Russia and Ukraine in the international system; through the proposed and developed conjugation of the concepts power-war-geography and leadership-war-influence.

References

- Aznar, F. (2017). *Repensando el liderazgo estratégico. Sobre los líderes y el liderazgo*, -3ª. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2017/DIEEEA38-2017_Repensando_Liderazgo_Estrategico_Parte_3_FAFM.pdf
- Ballesteros, M. (2014). *La importancia de los líderes en la crisis de Ucrania*. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2014/DIEEEA38-2014_Liderazgo_en_la_crisis_de_Ucrania_MABM.pdf
- BBC. (2022, 8 de marzo). *Volodymyr Zelenski, el presidente poco convencional que se enfrenta a Putin* [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lmqtZZgA-P8&t=11s>
- Caballero, G. (2007). Nuevo institucionalismo en ciencia política, institucionalismo de elección racional y análisis político de costes de transacción: una primera aproximación. *Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas (RIPS)*, 6(2), 9-27. <https://minerva.usc.es/xmlui/handle/10347/8319>
- Cáceres, C., Hernández, V., & Vargas, F. (2013). *Liderazgo, poder, autoridad y empatía según Max Weber*. <https://www.gestiopolis.com/liderazgo-poder-autoridad-y-empatia-segun-max-weber/>
- Cuenca, A. (2019). *Crimea, una península por la que se enfrentan imperios*. El Orden Mundial. <https://elordenmundial.com/crimea-una-peninsula-por-la-que-se-enfrentaron-imperios/>
- Cuesta, D. (2022). *Repercusiones de un escenario estratégico. Liderazgo "Zelenski", las 3 C*. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2022/DIEEE085_2022_DAVCUE_Liderazgo.pdf
- De la Rosa, A. (2002). *Teoría de la organización y nuevo institucionalismo en el análisis organizacional*. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317887594_Teoria_de_la_Organizacion_y_Nuevo_Institucionalismo_en_el_Analisis_Organizacional
- DW. (2022, 25 de agosto). *Ucrania: central de Zaporíyia se desconecta de la red eléctrica*. DW. <https://www.dw.com/es/central-de-zaporiiya-se-desconecta-de-la-red-el%C3%A9ctrica-de-ucrania-por-primera-vez/a-62933718>
- El País. (2022, 24 de agosto). *Mensaje de Zelenski en el Día de la Independencia de Ucrania* [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQUJ4kFjfG0&list=LL&index=2>
- France 24 Español. (2022, 31 de julio). *Rusia: en el día de la Armada, Putin aprobó por decreto la nueva doctrina naval*. [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5UScl8nP4>
- Hernández, A. (2011). Max Weber: sus principales aportes a la ciencia política. *Revista Jurídica "Docentia et Invetigatio"*, 13(1). <https://revistasinvestigacion.unmsm.edu.pe/index.php/derecho/article/view/10274/9009>
- Jordán, J. (2022). Teorías realistas para comprender la política internacional. *Global Strategy Report* (4). <https://www.printfriendly.com/p/g/RH3jHr>

- Khamlich, M. (s.f.). *El liderazgo según Max Weber*. <https://www.cientifiko.com/liderazgo-segun-max-weber/>
- Langa, A. (2016). Relaciones de poder y guerra. *Revista Política y Sociedad*, 53(2), 603-620. https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_POSO.2016.v53.n2.48427
- MAS Consulting. (2022). 10 claves para entender el liderazgo de Volodímir Zelenski. *Diálogo Político*. <https://dialogopolitico.org/agenda/10-claves-liderazgo-zelenski/>
- Mearsheimer, J. (2022). *Realismo estructural. Teorías de las relaciones internacionales*. Club de Relaciones Internacionales. <https://www.rrii.club/recursos/teoria-rrii/teorias/realismo-estructural/>
- Méndez, E., & Rojas, L. (2009). La transmutación del liderazgo en las organizaciones. *Revista de Formación Gerencial*, 8(1), 11-32. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=3296565>
- Morgenthau, H. (2006). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. McGraw Hill Higher Education.
- Paúl, F. (2022, 5 de marzo). *Rusia y Ucrania: qué es el "Russkiy Mir" ("Mundo Ruso") al que Putin quiere unificar*. BBC News Mundo. <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-60528995>
- Pinto, J. (2015). *Ucrania, Rusia y la geoestrategia europea: Un acercamiento a la reanimación de la Guerra Fría* [Tesis de pregrado]. Universidad Militar Nueva Granada. <https://repository.unimilitar.edu.co/handle/10654/6404>
- Torres, R. (2022). Guerra en Ucrania: pasado, presente y futuro del peor conflicto militar en Europa desde 1945. *CUPEA Cuadernos de Política Exterior Argentina*, (135), 151-159. <https://doi.org/10.35305/cc.vi135.138>

Chapter 5

The failure of political-military integration during the Vietnam War: are they two divergent types of leadership?

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.05>

Carlos Enrique Álvarez Calderón

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: There has traditionally been considerable friction between political and military leaders over how best to integrate the Armed Forces in the national security decision-making process during peacetime and wartime. Consequently, one of the main challenges that States seem to face is political-military integration (PMI), or the ability to closely link military strategy to political objectives. Understanding the characteristics of the PMI is important for both academics and strategists, because in order to better explain why wars developed and ended as they did, it is necessary to understand the factors that affect coordination between political objectives and military missions.

Keywords: political-military integration, Vietnam War, civil-military relations, national security.

Carlos Enrique Álvarez Calderón

Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra. "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in International Relations, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Colombia. Master's Degree in Ontological Business Coaching, Universidad San Sebastián, Chile. Political scientist, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Colombia. Professor and research fellow, Escuela Superior de Guerra.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2401-2789> - Contact: carlos.alvarez@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Álvarez Calderón, C.E. (2023). The failure of political-military integration during the Vietnam War: are they two divergent types of leadership? In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 105-118). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.05>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

One of the main challenges that states seem to face in times of war is PMI (political-military integration), or the ability to closely link military strategy to political objectives, as the PMI determines whether or not a state can achieve its strategic objectives in war. Alternatively, if it becomes clear to leaders that achieving their initial war goals is impossible, or that such goals can only be achieved by paying much higher costs than initially anticipated, then strategic reviews will occur only when the Armed Forces of the State will be sensitive to political direction.

Understanding the characteristics of the PMI is important for both academics and strategists, because in order to better explain why wars developed and ended as they did, it is necessary to understand the factors that affect coordination between political objectives and military missions. For their part, state leaders need to know when are more or less likely that the Armed Forces under their command respond appropriately to their strategic orientation and, if necessary, how to better structure civil-military relations.

Within the literature on civil-military relations in wartime, Cohen (2002) offers the most influential explanation of the origins of PMI. According to Cohen, PMI is the product of the leadership qualities of senior civilian officials; specifically, when they exercise management of their military organizations. In their view, effective civilian leaders investigate and incite their generals - and, if necessary, fire them - to ensure that the war being waged has the best chance of achieving the political objectives they have set themselves at an acceptable cost. Such an approach recognizes that while military officers may come to have extensive experience in the matters of the application of military force, their advice may not translate into effective strategy at the highest level. In this regard, responsible civilian leaders

must engage their military in an ongoing, but uneven, strategic dialogue to align military behavior with political objectives (Cohen, 2022).

Well, the American political system is that of a liberal democracy and, therefore, there is an inherent distrust of the American people towards the relevance of a large standing army (Lindell, 1995). Consequently, there has traditionally been considerable friction between political leaders and the military over how best to integrate the AA.) in the national security decision-making process during peacetime and wartime. Before World War II, in the interwar period, the issue was resolved by not having a large standing army. Then, during World War II, a successful balance was achieved that integrated political and military views to form a national security policy. Nonetheless, the Cold War upset the balance as the political view expanded and stifled the military view of the national security policymaking process. And this political expansion resulted in an army separate from the national security decision-making process during the Vietnam War. The result was a failure of the PMI that generated the political and military debacle of the United States in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War (1955-1975) is considered one of the main conflicts of the Cold War, as it tested American military power as no previous war fought by that country had done, except for the Korean War (1950-1953). The United States had been clearly victorious in the great conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century, such as the two world wars. Álvarez et al. (2017) point out that “during the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, the United States assumed a position of preeminent power in the world, by demonstrating its ability to project its military capabilities simultaneously in several theaters of operations” (p. 169).

This capability of speed, freedom of maneuver and logistics wielded by the northern titan in the theater of operations of Europe and the Pacific during World War II was the product of a military structure configured for third-generation wars. But the Vietnam War was a fourth-generation warfare, with a logic and dynamics very different from those of previous military conflicts, and that the American strategic culture in security and defense of the time had a hard time understanding (Daddis, 2014). Indeed, the Vietnam War was a limited war for the United States, characterized by the *limited* nature of its objectives. It means that it was limited from the American point of view, because although North Vietnam presented itself

as a threat to international stability. It did not represent an existential threat to the survival of the northern colossus.

Limited or unlimited objectives in war depend on the perceived threat of the adversary you are going to face. If the adversary is perceived as an existential threat, the objectives will be unlimited and the conduct of the war will be total. If, on the other hand, the adversary to be faced is not perceived as an existential threat to one's survival, the objectives in war will be limited, with the limited use of military capabilities. *Limited objectives* are understood to weaken the enemy politically, economically and militarily to force them to negotiate. On the contrary, unlimited objectives seek the political, economic and military annihilation of the adversary, to impose on him the terms of surrender that please the victor. During World War II, Imperial Japan posed an existential threat to the United States, so the objectives were unlimited, and consequently, the use of means by the United States was unlimited. In contrast, North Vietnam did not pose an existential threat to the United States. Therefore, "the war was aimed at considerably less grandiose objectives, so North American political and military leaders found it very difficult to design effective national and operational strategies to obtain those objectives" (Álvarez et al., 2017, p. 170).

Background to the Vietnam War

In the 19th century, France conquered Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, where it created the colony of French Indochina and divided Vietnam into three parts: Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina. By suppressing nationalist revolts, France maintained colonial rule in those territories until World War II, when Indochina was occupied by the Japanese. At the end of that conflict, the communist-led Viet Minh declared independence from Vietnam, but France struggled to regain control of its colonies. After prolonged fighting, Viet Minh guerrillas defeated the French in the First Indochina War. After the Geneva Conference, Vietnam became independent in two States: North Vietnam, under a communist regime, and South Vietnam, under the orbit and protection of the United States.

But starting in 1959, North Vietnamese leaders decided to support a subversive uprising among the rural population of South Vietnam. Since, while in the late 1950s South Vietnam appeared to be prosperous and stable, thanks to more than

200 million dollars in military and economic assistance from the United States each¹ year. Little or nothing was done in practice to improve conditions in rural South Vietnam, where 90% of the population lived (Bradley, 2009). In December 1960, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) was founded; its military wing, known as the Vietcong, was divided into three operational forces; the main one, composed of full-time regulars. This was also divided into battalions and regiments and, as of 1965, divisions, which had an operational force of 7,350 men (Adams, 1994). There were also full-time regional forces under provincial command and part-time guerrilla units, which were mainly used for village defense².

The NLF aimed to overthrow the South Vietnamese government and reintegrate it into North Vietnam. By then, the insurgents dominated large areas of the Mekong Delta, the central highlands, and the coastal plains. Its combat strength had grown to an estimated 25,000 guerrillas, while the political wing of the NFL had as many as 200,000 active sympathizers (Adams, 1994). When it appeared that Vietcong guerrillas and the North Vietnamese army might become a serious threat. The United States sent aid, weapons, and training to South Vietnam to shore up Diem's faltering government. In 1963, when Diem's regime lost the guerrilla war and faced protests from Vietnamese Buddhists and chaos in the streets, the United States backed a military coup in which Diem was killed. The following year, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which was a naval confrontation with North Vietnam, led the U.S. Congress to authorize an indefinite escalation of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.

Between 1964 and 1968, the United States conducted an air war over North Vietnam and a land war in South Vietnam in an attempt to preserve an independent South Vietnam free of communist interference. American air power was employed in an attempt to coerce Hanoi to stop supporting the southern insurgency and prevent Chinese intervention in the war. While American land power, represented in the Army and Marine Corps, was employed to break the insurgency in the south, and thus prevent the prolongation of the conflict. However, in terms of PMI, air and land wars were worlds apart. According to Summers (1982), politically, the United States wanted to coerce Hanoi from the air, demand restraint from the Chinese, and stabilize the South Vietnamese government. From the point of view of military strategy, it employed massive, albeit restricted, doses of air power against the north and sent hundreds of thousands of troops south, but with clear geographical limitations in its use.

¹ By 1960, such aid represented up to 70% of the country's total budget (Bradley, 2009).

² The insurgents attacked local officials who had the power to imprison for life or execute any communist opponent of the regime. By the end of 1960, more than 1,400 government officials had been killed (Adams, 1994).

The Air War in Vietnam

From August 1964 to July 1965, the United States waged air war against North Vietnam in three discernible phases. First, according to Kaiser (2000), Lyndon Johnson ordered, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, retaliatory strikes against targets in the north and, shortly thereafter, bolstered American air power in South Vietnam. Second, in response to the massive mortar attack on Pleiku airfield in February 1965, Washington again responded with heavy retaliatory attacks on the north, followed shortly thereafter by the protracted bombing campaign known as the *Rolling Thunder* (Clodfelter, 1989). Third, in early April 1965, VanDeMark (1991) notes that the United States modified its strategy by leveling the intensity of *Rolling Thunder* operations and opting instead to focus on fighting the land war in the south.

Faced with the escalation of military operations in Indochina, the threat perception of the People's Republic of China increased significantly following the Gulf of Tonkin incident. At this point, Mao Zedong no longer considered his southern border secure, as the United States had increased its power projection capacity to attack the heart of China from the air (Zhai, 2000). In response, Beijing initiated an intensive military mobilization program in southern China by engaging MIG fighter pilots with the North Vietnamese government. It also increased its diplomatic offensive denouncing "US imperialism," began an internal mobilization campaign that would prepare the Chinese people for war, and undertook a massive industrial relocation program that transferred a considerable amount of China's economic assets from the borders to the interior of the country (Jian, 2001). Washington's launch of Operation Rolling Thunder presented China with a major security challenge. Beginning in April 1965, the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam reached a series of agreements, such as sending anti-aircraft artillery and mine-sweeping units to North Vietnam. This was the beginning of a three-year period of extensive military support, during which the People's Republic of China deployed more than 320,000 troops in North Vietnam (Zhai, 2000).

In the summer of 1965, the United States made the decision to move to an offensive-oriented land strategy in the south. The limited effects the bombing campaign appeared to have on Hanoi's leaders, along with new information about the Vietcong's strength in the south, combined to create a sense of deep frustration among Johnson and his top advisers (Nalty, 2001), most notably Robert McNamara³.

³ Robert S. McNamara (1916-2009) was one of the most important Secretaries of Defense in American history (Shapley, 1993). He is considered the "father" of strategic planning in the United States federal government.

Given concerns about the lack of progress in the air campaign, it was decided to move to an offensive “counterinsurgency” strategy, in order to increase the size and capabilities of U.S. land forces in the south, and “stabilize” Rolling Thunder’s tempo. Based on their understanding of Chinese intentions, it was clear to leading policy-makers that the only aspect of U.S. strategy in Vietnam that was open to alteration was the intensity of the land effort in the south.

The main focus itself was the deployment of more troops in South Vietnam; the Johnson administration announced on July 6, 1965, a commitment of 55,000 additional troops, but gave up calling up reserves. The reason, McNamara asserted, was to minimize “actions that might induce communist China or the Soviet Union to take initiatives that they might not otherwise undertake” (Kaiser, 2000, p. 478), attempting to reduce the likelihood of provoking reactions from any of the communist powers. But on July 28, 1965 Johnson announced that he had decided to increase the American force in South Vietnam to 125,000 men (Kaiser, 2000). No mention was made of the air campaign, because there had been no fundamental change in strategy. Ultimately, the air war failed militarily, first, because the amount of coercive pressure applied against North Vietnam was never enough to change Hanoi’s behavior. And second, because the strategic concept applied by Washington (gradualism accompanied by frequent pauses in bombing) convinced Hanoi that it could survive the war against the United States (Nalty, 2001).

Despite its inherent limitations, this approach was adopted because it was the only one available, given the overriding goal of avoiding Chinese intervention. Officials in Washington understood, correctly, that too strong an application of air power could lead the People’s Republic of China to war, and the air strategy adopted was a direct result of such concern. In short, the air war against North Vietnam failed because of a compromise between the objectives of coercing Hanoi and avoiding direct Chinese intervention. Because political objectives and military operations were closely integrated, Washington was in a position to modify the air war from the outset to avoid the very real possibility of Chinese intervention against US forces.

The Land Warfare in Vietnam

While the continuation of the air war against North Vietnam was strongly influenced by changes in the strategic environment. The United States fought a land war in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1968, because of the threat posed to the South Vietnamese government by the activities of a communist insurgency waged in that

territory by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army. According to Krepinevich (1986), the Vietnamese insurgency was moving away in July 1965, from guerrilla operations of the second phase of protracted people's war theory (strategic equilibrium), towards large-scale conventional operations, as was arranged in the third phase of protracted people's war (strategic offensive).

But with the introduction of American land forces in mid-1965, the balance of power quickly turned against the Vietcong. Moreover, the main way the United States waged war in the south (large-scale formations employing large doses of firepower exploiting technologically advanced weapons systems) had a good chance of defeating South Vietnam's opponents. If the insurgents had been remained committed to third-phase-style operations, it is likely that the United States would have been able to secure its political objectives in the war, as a conventional standoff would have ensured the destruction of North Vietnamese forces. However, in a relatively short time, the insurgents returned to the fighting style of the second phase, once it was clear that they could not compete with the technology or firepower of the United States (Krepinevich, 1986).

This strategic adaptation by the Vietcong was not matched by the US military. Rather, the Military Assistance Command continued to conduct land warfare, adhering to the lines of conventional U.S. Army doctrine suitable for a third-generation war, but not a fourth-generation one. The effect of such strategic rigidity would have profoundly negative effects on the US ability to achieve its military and political objectives in war (Nagl, 2005). The insurgency's goal in returning to guerrilla warfare was to expand its base of support among the population by attacking local government leaders and gaining control over the population, as cultivating links between the insurgency and the population was seen as critical, given the introduction of US troops. Through coercion and persuasion of the population, guerrilla forces attempted to protect and supply themselves, as well as demonstrate the inability of the South Vietnamese government to stem the tide of revolution.

In order to effectively combat the second-phase insurgency, South Vietnam and the United States had to have the security of the population as their primary objective. Only by severing the links between the guerrillas and the population could both actors deny the North Vietnamese insurgency its main source of strength. Larger-scale search and destruction operations, of the type employed by the United States, were not simply unproductive in the fight against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army but were counterproductive. Relying so heavily on firepower provided an early warning to the guerrillas that attacks were coming, and they ran

substantial risks of alienating the population. Moreover, this type of operation could not guarantee the safety of the population, as villagers continued to be susceptible to coercion and indoctrination actions by guerrilla forces (Krepinevich, 1986).

The U.S. Army employed a strategy of attrition against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army, intending to reach a point where the enemy's losses outweighed their ability to replace them with new forces. As explained by William Westmoreland, commanding general of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam,

[...] I do not see any practical alternative, apart from nuclear war, to continue as we are, preparing for the long term by building our forces and facilities in order to gain a qualitative advantage and quantitative margin over the enemy that will wear it down. (Daddis, 2014, p. 239)

General Westmoreland's plan to achieve victory would unfold in three steps (Westmoreland, 1989): 1). The United States would seek stabilization of the war by the end of 1965, using the commitment of 44 battalions that Johnson agreed to in July of that year. 2) In 1966, an additional 24 battalions would be employed to resume the offensive against enemy forces. 3). Clearance operations would be conducted with the aim of destroying the remaining insurgent forces in the South.

Critical to the success of this plan was the ability of the United States to force the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army to fight pitched battles. In doing so, American firepower could wear down enemy forces at a faster rate than they could be replaced. According to Tomes (2007), the main metric by which this approach would be judged was the "body count", which focused on the number of enemy soldiers killed in action, and which would lead the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam to give more importance to the body count than to the safety of the population. However, the defection strategy failed to reach the required tipping point or provide Army commanders with the incentive to accurately report progress.

On the one hand, the use of great firepower gave the guerrilla forces advance notice of the Army's intentions; as such, the insurgents retained the ability to dictate the timing and intensity of battles. And although the Army killed many insurgent forces, the dominant American strategy failed to decouple the population from the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army, so the insurgency was able to continually increase its numbers. On the other hand, by relying on body counts as a key measure of success, commanders were given an incentive to inflate the number of enemy soldiers killed. Such altered statistics were easily achieved due to the

inherent difficulty of differentiating between an insurgent and a villager. Moreover, "increasing the count often provided an elegant explanation for why a particular American unit suffered many casualties in a confrontation" (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 202).

As time went on, American officials became increasingly concerned about the viability of the Military Assistance Command's wartime approach in Vietnam. Nevertheless, Schandler (1999) explains that, although many in the Office of the Secretary of Defense were convinced that the strategy of attrition would not lead to military victory, this remained. The strategic continuity was largely due to the fact that the Army had not suffered a substantial defeat on the battlefield, but for the Johnson administration, that "defeat" came with the Tet Offensive, in early 1968. Although U.S. forces were able to withstand the offensive and deal a substantial blow to the insurgency, the Tet Offensive clearly demonstrated the limits of U.S. strategy; to respond to the attack, Westmoreland requested the dispatch of an additional 10,500 troops (Daddis, 2014).

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Johnson to take a step that the president had so far rejected: the call-up of the reserves of the Military Forces. In his view, the ability of the United States to meet the challenges posed by the Tet Offensive, and in order to ensure that the United States possessed a minimum level of preparedness to face additional contingencies, was in doubt if the president refused to mobilize reserves (Herring, 2002). Astonished by the capabilities of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army to launch the offensive, the US president finally realized that victory in Vietnam was not a possibility. Consequently, the Army's approach had lost all credibility with the president and his main advisers (Schulzinger, 1997). So it was necessary to design a withdrawal plan that would lead to the Paris Agreements and the end of the Vietnam War.

As the United States staggered away from failure in Vietnam, the tragic toll was staggering. Nearly 58,000 U.S. military personnel and more than 700,000 North Vietnamese dead. And unsurprisingly, American military leaders began looking for an explanation for what went wrong. In particular, American airpower leaders declared that politicians had prevented the military from accomplishing its mission. They stated that the gradual use of air power and overly restrictive rules of engagement, imposed by political prohibitions, led to wasting air power in a senseless war of attrition. Leaders of air power claimed that political constraints prevented air power from gaining victory in Vietnam. And they cited the 1972 eleven-day bombing offensive, Linebacker U, as a demonstration that air power can win limited wars if

not hampered by uncomfortable political controls. Admiral Grant Sharp, operational commander of Pacific Command during the Rolling Thunder, stated, “our air power did not fail us; it was the decision makers who failed” (Kearns, 1976, p. 208).

Analysis of the failure of politico-military integration in the Vietnam War

As already explained, the result of the air war was that of a timely rational compensation between competing objectives. Although the United States could not coerce Hanoi, it could prevent Chinese intervention in the war, and thus prevented the limited war in Vietnam from escalating into an unlimited war of dire consequences for international security. Leading policymakers in Washington were able to confront this dilemma directly because political ends and military means were closely integrated. On the contrary, the land war failed because of the adoption of an inappropriate strategy by an isolated organization immune to the direction of its superiors in Washington. From 1965 to 1968, the United States employed land power to achieve an illusory goal, and the end result was a strategic defeat, because the political ends were poorly matched with the strategy adopted by the Army.

But what explains these divergent results? One explanation focuses on the nature of Armed Forces’ strategic cultures and the defense community as a whole⁴. Indeed, numerous studies (Snyder, 1977; Wendt, 1995; Desch, 1998; Hudson, 1999; Bloomfield, 2012; Haglund, 2014) have agreed that the organizational cultures of defense communities have a profound impact on the way states employ their Armed Forces and when they do it. According to Gray (1981), a *strategic culture* consists of a set of beliefs influenced by national characteristics that are unique to an actor; these characteristics will include geography, economic development, political philosophy and traditions, national history, and the self-characterization of its own citizenship. Thus, the concept of *strategic culture* is often used to analyze national policymaking, as it suggests that different security communities think and behave differently about strategic issues.

⁴ The *defense community* of a state comprises the political and military leadership of a state, as well as the institutions that are responsible for shaping security policy and military transformation processes. Based on this, a strategic community is made up of the Armed Forces, intelligence agencies, and executive and legislative elements of government dealing with foreign affairs and external and internal security, as well as the defense industrial complex and associated think tanks (academic community).

Therefore, organizational culture - that is, the pattern of assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal affairs - plays a fundamental role in determining Armed Forces' priorities and behaviors both in times of war and in times of peace. Well, most of what the military does on a daily basis happens during peacetime, and internally derived standards tend, necessarily, to focus on modes of conduct. In doing so, military organizations are likely to focus not on the objectives that might be assigned to them, but, rather, on the means by which they should act. This approach has a direct impact on the behavior of the state in times of war.

According to Legro (1995), the preferences and objectives of military organizations become more prominent than those of other state organizations during the war. Because the military is organized hierarchically, with a uniform set of beliefs. And because it possesses a monopoly of expertise in a complex subject area, and because the time frame for action is very short. Under these conditions, civilian leaders turn to the military more voluntarily and less critically than they would in peacetime. In the case of Vietnam, the organizational culture approach expects a significant mismatch between the political objectives pursued and the military means employed to achieve those ends in both land warfare and air warfare. The vast majority of uniformed officers believed that limited wars such as Vietnam, fought on the periphery of the main strategic theater of the Cold War. And they were a fundamental distraction from the strategy of containment against the Soviet Union.

Those preferences were, moreover, doctrinally codified. For example, the U.S. Army's approach to warfare was based on medium-intensity conflict, with a strong penchant for the massive use of firepower to destroy the enemy and mitigate American casualties. For the Army, the wars of the recent past confirmed that approach, as, in both World War II and the Korean War, the Army employed massive firepower in an attempt to substitute materiel for combat forces. In terms of the opponent in a future war, the U.S. Army focused almost exclusively on the Soviet Union and planned extensively for a general war in Europe. The predominance of the Soviet threat meant that in peacetime the Army constantly based its planning on worst-case scenarios. Over time, such an approach translated into a preference for threat. Army officers considered planning for war with the Soviet Union to be the goal of their careers. So little attention was paid to other potential opponents and, more seriously, to consideration of other modes of warfare (Long, 2008). While the Korean War vindicated the Army's preferred approach to waging war, the scale and scope of military operations imposed by the civilian leadership were deemed

unacceptable. And in the aftermath of Chinese intervention in the Korean War, civilian leaders imposed limitations on the conduct of military leaders. This attitude meant that, in the future, Army officers would do their best to avoid being placed in a position to wage wars without a significant degree of autonomy.

The military's detachment from national security decisions began at the top of the Johnson administration. President Johnson clearly did not trust the military, and relied less on military advice than any American president since Woodrow Wilson (Karnow, 1984). The root of this mistrust stemmed from the experience of the Korean War, when General MacArthur, during the Allied offensive in North Korea, not only encouraged China's entry into the war with his reckless actions, but also recommended using nuclear weapons in the conflict once China and North Korea forced the Allied forces to retreat. However, the critical action that alienated the military leaders from the political leadership - and thus from the political-military balance - was not the rejection of advice about the escalation of the war, but the tight political control exercised by the Johnson administration.

President Johnson also ordered political restrictions that limited, even more, air operations. There were many bombing arrests-the longest of which lasted more than 37 days, under the guise of increasing the propaganda effort and, at other times, to commemorate Buddha's birthday (Herring, 2002). Johnson's emphasis on preferentially addressing his internal agenda also disconnected the Armed Forces of domestic state policy; according to Kearns (1976), President Johnson's *Great Society* program was the centerpiece of his national agenda that promoted the most radical social reforms since Franklin D. Roosevelt's *New Deal* program. For his part, Johnson saw that the *New Deal* had been stifled by World War II, and he was determined not to let the Vietnam issue take center stage in American politics.

Robert McNamara, Johnson's defense secretary, also played an important role in moving the military away from the politico-military decision-making process. McNamara elevated individual the Armed Forces' strategic planning. at the departmental level by assigning it to units of systems analysis and financial management (Halberstam, 1992). Secretary McNamara considered that the Pentagon's strategic planning should have a quantitative orientation. In order to produce efficiencies in the military system and options that integrated all forces to achieve this objective. This would generate a fierce resentment among the forces, whose precious autonomy was now besieged by civilian technologists. According to Tarpgaard (1995), in the years following the establishment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the holder of such a portfolio was more of an arbiter than the actual leader.

McNamara's predecessors, from James V. Forrestal in 1947 to Thomas S. Gates, acted as referees in the continuing struggles between the Army, Navy, and newly created Air Force for missions and budget share. And before McNamara, the U.S. Secretary of Defense did not have the personnel or resources to make informed, independent decisions.

Now, if *analysis* is understood as the collection and processing of information relevant to rational and informed decision-making, then analysis in U.S. defense planning predates the McNamara era. But what would change with McNamara would be the institutionalization of analysis within the US Department of Defense, as well as its active use to impose managerial control over the Armed Forces' individual services, which, for obvious reasons, generated discontent among the American military leadership. McNamara's first major reform was to review the Department of Defense's budget to reflect the military missions for which he was responsible. McNamara considered that what the United States needed was a flexible response strategy, "capable of facing all levels of conflict, from the Cold War, through *limited war*, to *total war*". Consequently, the three military services would be reorganized similarly to operational commands, while the three service departments would be organized to mobilize, train, and support them (Halberstam, 1992).

But given the flexibility demanded in the reforms implemented by McNamara and his civilian subordinates, operational decisions were routinely made without military advice. This not only tended to alienate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from McNamara, but further complicated an already antagonistic relationship that existed between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his civilian chief. And while the Army was "politically" separated during the early years in Vietnam, military leaders also demonstrated a lack of political awareness by making strategic recommendations to the civilian government. As military leaders repeatedly presented President Johnson and McNamara with proposals that were out of step with the policy of the incumbent government. It fueled this political distrust until the end of the Vietnam War, the revelation in 1972 that senior military officers falsified mission reports.

Conclusions

When Clausewitz (1899) stated that war is a continuation of politics by other means, he posed the following question:

[...] the only question, therefore, is whether, when war is planned, the political point of view should give way to the purely military (if a purely military point of view is conceivable). That is, should it disappear altogether or be subordinated, or should the political point of view remain dominant and the military be subordinated to it? (p. 76)

This is a question that all governments - and certainly democratic governments - have had to answer. In the American experience, political and military viewpoints are rarely balanced in the national security policymaking process. From revolutionary beginnings, the peacetime military point of view had little influence on national security policy. During the war, the military point of view gained considerable credibility and became an important part of national security policy.

The Cold War changed this traditional pattern, and when the United States went to war in Vietnam, the military point of view did not balance the political point of view. However, after the failure of Vietnam, corrections were applied to the PMI process. Balanced political and military views are the key to more effective decision-making in national security policy. And in the two decades following the Vietnam War, both political and military views in the United States struck a balance during the Gulf War, in 1991, through various political and military corrections to make sure there was "never again" another Vietnam.

When civilian and military leaders have access to multiple institutional sources of information, and when information flows freely between national security organizations at the lowest levels, civilian and military leaders are more likely to dominate the strategic policymaking process. Under such conditions, civilian leaders can better understand the strategic environment, design and execute complex security and defense policies, and be less vulnerable to the military's culturally determined strategic preferences. Conversely, when civilian leaders receive vital information only from the Armed Forces, and when little information is shared among the organizations that make up the advocacy community, Armed Forces are likely to have a supreme influence on the strategic decision-making process. In this case, the Armed Forces' organizational culture will determine the preferences of the State and the approach to war.

But as an explanation of PMI's sources, Cohen's (2002) argument from civilian *supreme command* contains two important limitations. First, because of its focus on individual leadership, it devotes little analytical attention to the institutional environment in which leadership is exercised. And to the ability of leaders to overcome powerful structural impediments to political-military coordination. While Cohen

(2002) acknowledges that professional militaries possess distinctive characteristics that incline them to seek autonomy, his focus is squarely on the capabilities of leaders to force PMI. However, as scholars of organizational cultures have long recognized, the military often resists intentional direction, even by the most gifted civilian leaders. Thus, the critical question remains: *Under what conditions can leaders break military cultures to effectively align military behavior with political objectives in warfare?*

Secondly, the supreme command argument does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the variation of the PMI in a critical case: the Vietnam War, from 1964 to 1968. Cohen's (2002) description of this pattern is concise and accurate. President Lyndon B. Johnson restricted bombing targets in North Vietnam for the sensible reason that he did not want to involve China or Russia in a larger conflict. The campaign in the south, which included massive bombings and search and destroy missions, was the product of a conventional army that understood war primarily in terms of killing the enemy, not fighting an insurgency. Cohen's (2002) explanation of this pattern, however, is incomplete, for his argument fails to acknowledge that just as Army officers fought to maintain control over land strategy in the south, so did Air Force officers in the North Vietnam War. Both the U.S. Army and Air Force possessed powerful organizational cultures, neither of which provided a strategic approach that matched political objectives, but only one directly determined the strategic choice. On the other hand, Cohen's treatment of the president and his top advisers suggests that, while Johnson did not achieve political-military integration in land warfare, his performance was far superior in air warfare.

References

- Adams, S. (1994). *War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir of the Vietnam War's Uncounted Enemy*. Steerforth Press.
- Álvarez, C., Santafé, J., & Urbano, O. (2017). Metamorphosis Bellum: ¿Mutando a Guerras de Quinta Generación? En Álvarez, C. (Ed.), *Escenarios y Desafíos de la Seguridad Multidimensional en Colombia*, (pp. 145-248). Sello Editorial Esdeg.
- Bloomfield, A. (2012). Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33(3), 437-61.
- Bradley, M. (2009). *Vietnam at War*. Oxford University Press.
- Clausewitz, C. von (1989). *On War*. Princeton University Press.
- Clodfelter, M. (1989). *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*. Free Press.
- Cohen, E. (2002). *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. Free Press.
- Daddis, G. (2014). *Westmoreland's War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam*. Oxford University Press.
- Desch, M. (1998). Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. *International Security*, 23(1), 141-170.
- Gray, C. (1981). National Style in Strategy: The American Example. *International Security*, 6(2), 35-57.
- Haglund, D. (2014). What Can Strategic Culture Contribute to Our Understanding of Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region? *Contemporary Security Policy*, 35(2), 310-28.
- Halberstam, D. (1992). *The Best and the Brightest*. Ballantine.
- Herring, G. (2002). *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*. McGraw-Hill.
- Hudson, V. (1999). Cultural Expectations of One's Own and Other Nation's Foreign Policy Action Templates. *Political Psychology*, 20(4), 767-801.
- Jian, C. (2001). *Mao's China and the Cold War*. University of North Carolina Press.
- Kaiser, D. (2000). *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War*. Harvard University Press.
- Karnow, S. (1984). *Vietnam: A History*. Penguin Books.
- Kearns, D. (1976). *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*. Harper & Row.
- Krepinevich, A. (1986). *The Army and Vietnam*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Legro, J. (1995). *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II*. Cornell University Press.
- Lindell, J. (1995). *Political-Military Integration the American Experience*. Maxwell Air Force.

- Long, A. (2008). *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The US Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine*. Rand Corporation.
- Nagl, J. (2005). *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. University of Chicago Press.
- Nalty, B. (2001). *Air War Over South Vietnam, 1968-1975*. US Air Force Press.
- Schandler, H. (1999). US Military Victory in Vietnam: A Dangerous Illusion? En McNamara, R., Blight, J., & Brigham, R. (Eds.). *Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy*, (pp. 313-371). Public Affairs.
- Schulzinger, R. (1997). *Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975*. Oxford University Press.
- Shapley, D. (1993). *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara*. Little Brown.
- Snyder, J. (1977). *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*. Rand Corporation.
- Summers, H. (1982). *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Random House.
- Tarpgaard, P. (1995). McNamara and the Rise of Analysis in Defense Planning: A Retrospective. *Naval War College Review*, 48(4), 67-87.
- Tomes, R. (2007). *US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military innovation and the new American way of war, 1973-2003*. Routledge.
- VanDeMark, B. (1991). *Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War*. Oxford University Press.
- Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing International Politics. *International Security*, 20(1), 73-94.
- Westmoreland, W. (1989). *A Soldier Reports*. Da Capo Press.
- Zhai, Q (2000). *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975*. University of North Carolina Press.

Chapter 6

An institutional response to confront terrorism in the Colombian armed conflict (1992-2012)

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.06>

Jaime Alfonso Lasprilla Villamizar

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: Terrorism as a multisystemic social phenomenon, difficult to conceptualize due to its multiple backgrounds, origins, causes and effects, deserves to be studied in its different manifestations and interpretations for its understanding. Under the light of the leadership exercised at the strategic level in the period 1992-2012, the greatest upheaval in the recent history of Colombia: the armed conflict, which coincides with the so-called hybrid wars and their connivance with transnational organized crime. The aim is to deepen the conceptualization of hybrid wars, and terrorism, as its main component, based on modern theories of war, highlighting the importance of institutionality and transformational leadership in response to the great difficulties of the moment. Establishing what the scenario for the Public Force could be, in light of the current dynamics of the war or conflict in Colombia, and its internal and external repercussions.

Keywords: conflict, terrorism, hybrid wars, transformational leadership, prospective.

Jaime Alfonso Lasprilla Villamizar

General (R), Ejército Nacional de Colombia. Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in National Security Strategy, Defense University, Washington, United States. Master's Degree in National Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra. Professional in Military Sciences, Escuela Militar de Cadetes "General José María Córdova". Business Administrator, UMNG. Professor, School of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1099-8164> - Contact: lasprillaj@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Lasprilla Villamizar, J. A. (2023). An institutional response to confront terrorism in the Colombian armed conflict (1992-2012). In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 119-142). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.06>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

Many views on the armed conflict in Colombia point him to describe it as a process of assimilation, adaptation, and transformation of circumstances in time, space and contexts that define it as an evolving multisystemic phenomenon. And that, due to its connotations of social, political, economic, ideological, cultural, religious and, of course, security order, does not escape similar experiences in the region or in the world, because it gathers nuances studied from modern theories, the so-called *generations of war* and, above all, experiences of many years (Lasprilla, 2022).

The fundamental purposes of this paper are, on the one hand, to analyze the dominant factors that contributed to the dynamization of the Colombian armed conflict in the period 1992-2012, from the perspective of terrorism. Within the framework of the theory of fourth-generation wars. On the other, to establish what was the response of the State in the field of institutionalism. In the light of the transformational leadership that allowed to improve security conditions, promote the development of the country and recover governability.

Starting from examining the different existing approaches in relation to the theory of fourth generation wars, new wars or hybrid wars, we will try, first, to point out the background, conditions, characteristics and particular manifestations of the armed conflict in Colombia, taking into account terrorism as a cardinal component to specify the persistent elements (nature), the motivations (character) and the specific forms as it has been given (conduct) as governing factors.

As a second measure, it seeks to identify the characteristics of the selected leader of greater importance, the aspects of leadership found in the broad-spectrum strategy that was applied to reverse the adverse conditions of the time and mention the school of leadership whose reference was necessary in overcoming difficulties.

Finally, it will be concluded, in the light of a prospective analysis of the political, social, economic, environmental and defense and security conditions, what that future immersion scenario for the Armed Forces could be, and the National Police in the face of the current dynamics of the conflict and the repercussions at the global, regional and local levels of action in the context of hybrid wars and the preponderant role of the military leader in decision-making in volatile, complex, uncertain and ambiguous environments (VUCA).

Being the theory of war, in general terms, an analyzed historical compilation of confrontations, to conceive the evolution of military strategic thinking and the doctrinal, strategic, operational, and tactical transformations that have taken place based on the interdependence between political configurations taken by humanity and the means of warfare used for defense. Terrorism, as a fundamental component of hybrid wars. Due to the implications, it has had in various scenarios and contexts, must be considered, for its epistemological approach, in a separate chapter.

By understanding the principles and foundations that govern the theory of war and recording its march in time. While seeking to understand thinkers, theoretical guidelines, historical moments that determine the structural basis of human conflict and its main instrument, which is war, together with who makes it and why, it also focuses on knowing the nature (essence), the character (typology) and conduct (how) of war.

In Modernity, and due to the importance of its impact, the dilemma around understanding terrorism from multidimensional and multifactorial perspectives as an instrument to achieve the ends of wars and conflicts. Today imposes a significant challenge to academics, experts, civil and military leaders, which consists of establishing the level of dependence that hybrid wars and transnational organized crime have on this phenomenon, to dimension its true scope.

In this particular case, the armed conflict in Colombia has gone through external and internal dynamics that have corresponded to the historical evolution of similar global, regional and local processes, of political, ideological and armed roots, intrinsically connected and carried out by illegal groups of all origins and characteristics, which in recent decades have found in terrorism their main ally in the achievement of objectives, having as a corollary the affectation of territorial integrity, the civilian population, the Government and institutions -including the Public Force-, as well as infrastructure, the economy and the environment.

The State as an institution has undoubtedly marked a response to terrorism, in line with the trends of each era, the governments of the day and their dependence on external strategic allies. In such a way that it has had variations between thematically focused decisions, public policies, government policies and the implementation of strategies through its Armed Forces and the National Police, which in some cases have had interagency and multilateral efforts and, despite the imponderables, vicissitudes, and errors, have partially mitigated the causes and prevented the extension of the effects.

In line with the proposed task of understanding the phenomenon of terrorism in Colombia as a means, from the perspective of hybrid wars as an end, and of transformational leadership as the foundation of the institutional role of the State to face the armed conflict during the period 1992-2012. Given the most recent cognitive approaches and the identification of the dominant factors, they could illuminate the path of uncertainty that exists from the conceptual, interpretative, analytical, and conclusive points of view around the main theme of the paper.

A look into the conceptualization of hybrid wars, and terrorism, as its main component, from modern theories of war

The thinking of the great strategists, military men, scholars and experts of old, such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides and Alexander the Great, served as inspiration for Napoleon, Machiavelli, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. In turn, the postulates of Clausewitz, Jomini and Liddell Hart, were a reference to strengthen the concepts of war in contemporary times, and to this day, both have survived despite significant changes. Especially, in the character and conduct of war.

“The whole art of war is based on deception and the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” (Sun Tzu, 500 BC). In the deepening of its essence, typology and strategies, perhaps a reflection on some of the episodes of the great conflagrations. The post-war conflicts, the wars of the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq, they incorporated those postulates that have not yet lost their validity.

The Thucydides Trap “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that it instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable” - lethal structural tension that occurs when a new power challenges an established one, and creates the conditions for a war to break

out - has been, perhaps, the greatest excuse for some countries to invade others, impose their will and maintain a dominant pulse for power.

The Cold War itself, between the United States and the Soviet Union (it represents success in escaping the Thucydides Trap to avoid a nuclear provocation). And, in the current circumstances, between China and the United States, for antagonistic positions on the internationally called seas of China, their vital interests are at stake. For the first one, it is about the use of the seas for one's own benefit, while for the second one it is about free navigation through all of them (Figueroa, 2021).

The possible trend towards war when an emerging power threatens to displace an existing great power, with international hegemony, corresponds to a fateful structural tension that occurs at the behest of the challenge of a new power to an established one, which creates the conditions for a war to break out (Allison, 2015).

But it is, perhaps, in a chronological connection and more recent events, since Mao-Zedong, who conceptualized and carried out in China the model of *protracted people's war* (Taber, 2002). Where we delve into: the so-called *new wars*, by Mary Kaldor (2001). In the "Hybrid Wars, When the Context is Everything", by Colom, P. (2018). In the *fourth generation wars*, by Lind, W. (2004). In *The Non-Trinitarian War*, by Van Creveld, M. (2004), and in *the Epochs of War*, by Bunker, R. (2011), to name just some of the references on the main theme: terrorism and its symbiosis with transnational organized crime and hybrid wars, which, according to these approaches, cannot be ignored.

From a more updated and grounded perspective, with a different connotation, in his article "Terrorist and Criminal Dynamics: A Look Beyond the Horizon", from the book *Beyond Convergence*, Dishman (2016) refers "that from the 80s an additional ingredient increased the complexity in the interpretation and fight against terrorism originated in multiple motivations: Political, ideological, theological and particularly economic by the alliances between criminals and terrorists" (p. 139). Perhaps here we find a first dominant factor in the problematization of the armed conflict in Colombia in the last 30 years.

In an attempt to consolidate the path towards a vision perhaps different in the essence, peculiarities and conduct of war, and coinciding, in part, with the assessments of authors such as Kaldor (2001). In what has been called *the new wars*. Guattari (1977) and López (2021), with "The Molecular Revolution" and "The Molecular Revolution Dissipated", respectively, or the so-called "Latin American Spring", of Austria (2021). "Asymmetric Wars", by Humire (2021) and *The Hybrid Wars*, by Giles (2016), in whose works it can be seen that, undoubtedly, they have

been nourished by the wisdom of their own experiences and knowledge, genuinely expressed in their writings, but at the same time they have received the influence of political, social, military and especially, academic scenarios of their sphere of action.

Of course, there is no exact model, neither exclusive nor pure (Barrera, 2010a). Theories are not totalizing nor, much less, a finished product, given their evolutionary and progressive nature. Therefore, they share some aspects of previous doctrines, coinciding in points of view that perhaps add up when it comes to clearing the way for inconsistencies, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the attempt to approach an underlying reality.

But if something is evident, it is that the authors, collectively, consider that tensions escalate to a war and power, threats, interests are calculated as criteria for launching a war. For Sir Lawrence Freedman, wars of any kind invariably lead to unsuspected consequences.

For her part, Mary Kaldor (1999) does not depart from Clausewitz's Trinitarian concept to refer to the total wars of the first half of the twentieth century. On the contrary, she highlights the notion of *absolute war* with the discovery of nuclear weapons. However, some of the characteristics of the new wars were already announced. The irregular and informal wars of the second half of the twentieth century, starting with the resistance movements and guerrilla warfare of Mao Zedong and his successors, are the prelude to what Luttwak calls "the new bellicosity".

Clausewitz's trinity and revolutionary thought in the context of the Vietnam War, mentioned by Moisés de Pablo (2019), also come together to mean that both Mao Zedong, creator of the revolutionary war, and Ho Chi Minh based their strategic current on the State-People-Army trilogy. Under the concepts of the mobilization of the people in arms as a psychological factor and moral sustenance and the strategy of time, uniting political and military theory in an indivisible whole, combining the eastern vision of war, by Sun Tzu, with Clausewitz's main conceptualization.

In the eagerness to achieve a coherent response to the presence of differential elements in the successive wars of the 1990s and in the new millennium, which were characterized by the disparity of opponents. The combination of regular and irregular methods, the presence of criminal economies and terrorism as a means, emerge in the military academic domain the so-called *Generations of War* (Lind, 2004). *Epochs of War* (Bunker, 1994); *Ages of War* (Fuller, 1949); *The Wars of the Future* (Toffler, 1994), and *The Non-Trinitarian War* (Creveld, 1991), which mean new approaches or dimensions on wars.

A way of associating wars with geographical, chronological, factual, phenomenological factors, and that correspond to ideas, technological bases, resizing according to threats, dominant strategies, suppose a "Revolution of Military Affairs"- which allows differentiating between types of wars and distinguishing between periods.

In the opinion of some authors, this revolution must be guided by three essential conditions: the application of a new technology, a modification of procedures and a generational change, and that all of which results in a change in the way of making war that determines a variation in the schemes of thought and doctrine.

For this, new and old factors are valued, which operate contrary to the traditional thesis of war: psychological operations, new communication technologies, rights and freedoms of societies that are used against them. Also, surprise, speed, indirect approach, the use of adversary vulnerabilities and terrorism as the main resource, all of which are part of the portfolio of opportunities of the contenders.

Technology has a fundamental role: robotics and artificial intelligence applied to the autonomy of vehicles and soldiers, and cultural intelligence as an integrating element in terms of *command, control, communication, cyber and computerized system (C4I)*.

The interventions of the United States in Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan; those of France in Indochina and Algeria; those of Great Britain in Africa and Asia; those of the USSR in Afghanistan and, recently, Russia in Ukraine - all of them, of course, coinciding in having been defeats for the great powers - demonstrate, on the one hand, enormous gaps in the interpretation of the nature, character and conduct of the confrontations, difficulties in defining the strategic political objective and, above all, a call to understand that terrorism has been present in each of these conflicts as a means and not as an end in itself. Hence a second dominant factor when pondering the Colombian conflict: the asymmetry of war is faced by understanding the ultimate goal and applying the correct strategy.

Of the advanced theories, the one corresponding to hybrid wars is, perhaps, the one that most fits within the current scenarios of confrontation, as a variant of the nature of war, its character and conduct based on the adaptation of elements of irregular warfare. And the fact of using the scope of globalization, violence as a strategic resource and transnational organized crime, among others, to support its own structure.

Points of view found around the subject, and that lead us to deep reflections, include that of Frank Hoffman, the main exponent of hybrid wars (2007, p. 43). And

who, paraphrasing Cohen, says: “the conventional military doctrines of the twentieth century directed against nation states and mass armies of the industrial era are effectively dead”. Or as Colom (2018) establishes,

“[...] when the context is everything, where threats are more diffuse, the battlefield is society in general, the centers of gravity public opinion and political legitimacy. And the manipulation of social networks the vehicle to exacerbate tempers and promote terrorist acts of impact”. (w. p.)

At the beginning of this work it was pointed out that the theoretical references of all eras cannot be ignored. On the contrary, there are aspects that have given life to the new approaches, in such a way that, inevitably, they must be taken into account. Times and contexts are completely different and have their own dynamics. And terrorism has been a persistent phenomenon -especially in the wars and conflicts of Modernity-. And it has been energized by transnational organized crime, which requires understanding it from the perspective of the means, and not of the ends. And where appropriating the legacy of great thinkers of Antiquity and merging their teachings with the new paradigms is not in itself a weakness, but a strength.

So hybrid wars, according to Hoffman (2007), so-called *irregular wars*, in this new era will be increasingly common, but with “greater speed and lethality than in the past, due in part to the spread of advanced military technology” (p. 16).

Conventional and unconventional tactics, battlefield preferably constituted by developing urban centers and combat zones “include the dense urban jungles and congested coastlines where most of the world’s population and economy is concentrated”.

These areas provide safe havens for terrorists or urban guerrillas where population density, transportation networks, infrastructure and utilities, and structures provide them with multiple escape routes and the ability to hide while planning and practicing (future) operations.

With regard to the time factor, these adversaries, States and non-state actors, will try to extend the conflict indefinitely, avoiding the predictable, the decisive confrontation and seeking the advantage of “unexpected ways and with forms of surprise attacks” (Hoffman, 2007). For Mao Zedong, time and people were his best allies.

Russia, to achieve its political objectives, has apparently employed a mixture of special operations, economic pressure, intelligence agents, instrumentalization of

the flow of natural gas, cyberattacks, information warfare and the use of conventional military force as a measure of pressure/deterrence. All this, perfectly synchronized as part of an operations plan... which can be totally framed within what has been called *hybrid warfare* (Sánchez, 2014).

Finally, in 2006, during the conflict with Israel, Hezbollah turned to a mix of militiamen, specially trained forces, anti-tank missile equipment, signals intelligence, tactical and operational deployment of rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which in many cases were state-of-the-art equipment and weaponry.

Having explored historical patterns and universal experiences in the light of war theories and the most recent approaches to fourth-generation wars, irregular wars and hybrid wars. Mentioning the armed conflict in Colombia is a fact that the violence has been chronic, deep-rooted and with its genesis in accumulated events, phenomena and actors, cyclical in the transformation of its protagonists (peasant self-defense groups, guerrillas, paramilitaries, organized armed groups [GAO]). Permanent insofar as there has been no place for peace and understandable in the transition it has suffered from a revolutionary-type conflict to a new model of organized and criminal violence that has the veneers of a hybrid war (Lasprilla, 2022).

For its part, the armed conflict has been conditioned by globalized political, social, economic and cultural phenomena, and therefore has its foundation in marked ideological bases that have remained over time and have been transformed: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao, Castro, Chaves. And according to power relations, they have adapted or transcended from the external to the internal: France, England, USSR, Asia, Africa, Latin America.

From a global project (socialism, communism, Islamism) with a persistent ingredient of violence that aims to subvert the State and institutions, to differential models of local populism; illegal economies and dynamizing terrorism.

Immersed in the tensions of Bipolarity (after World War II within the framework of the Cold War) he gave way, depending on the conditions, to unipolarity (fall of the Berlin Wall) or multipolarity (alignment by interests). This meant that the roots and evolution of the conflict in Colombia corresponded to a pendulum movement according to the times and phenomena that conditioned it.

As it has its origin in the model, implanted in China, of *prolonged people's war*, where the political-armed effort is prioritized by incorporating all forms of struggle for the seizure of power, it sought to channel dissatisfaction to manipulate objective causes.

A countless number of actors - banditry, guerrillas, self-defense groups, liberals, conservatives, communists - gave violence a cyclical character - reflected in the greatest peaks -, mutant - agents that generate violence - and permanent politics nor violence are alien to it.

To refer to the dominant factors that contributed to the dynamization of the armed conflict in Colombia in the period 1992-2012 from the perspective of terrorism, within the framework of the theories of fourth-generation wars, irregular wars or hybrid wars, already widely addressed. It should be noted that, externally, four events gained the attention of the world for their political and security significance. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, the emergence and prominence of the terrorist groups Al Qaeda and Isis and the Arab Spring.

Coinciding with the world events that marked a milestone in history and had as protagonists terrorism associated with transnational organized crime and social explosions with political and economic repercussions, the 1990s and 2000s reflected in Colombia the highest rates of expressions of violence, caused by all existing armed groups, which showed a great weakness of the State and its law enforcement agencies to confront and weaken them.

A parochial vision and traumatic relations with the United States, due to the so-called 8,000 Process, which decertified Colombia and left it *ad portas* of being considered a failed State, reduced room for maneuver in the diplomatic field and considerably affected the legitimacy of the governments of the day.

Political changes in Latin America; triumphs of the democratic left in Brazil. Uruguay, Chile and El Salvador, and radical governments in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, favorable to the FARC, sought to support the status of belligerence. In accordance with their strategic plan and the pretensions around achieving the dynamic balance of the Forces, which was decisive when prioritizing the armed part of the agenda over the political scope.

The participation of the FARC in the entire drug trafficking chain and the depredation of natural and private resources and other practices associated with criminal economies consolidated the financial logistics structure and gave strength to the sustainability of the organization. Kidnappings, extortion, money laundering and front organizations supported its growth and projection.

The transition from the guerrilla warfare phase to the movement warfare phase. As a result, the permanent offensive attitude of the FARC, coups against the public force, assaults on populations and mass kidnappings created in the collective

imagination of the civilian population the perception of military defeat and the possibility of the seizure of power by arms.

The de-escalation zone (1999-2002) was the great opportunity and the greatest laboratory to boost the qualitative and quantitative leap of the FARC, strengthen itself from illicit finance, expand its influence towards the civilian population and negotiate, as had been traditional, from a favorable position. If the intention was to delay the process, they succeeded at the expense of weakening the government and wearing down the Armed Forces and the National Police.

The empowerment of the FARC against the Colombian State and the possibility of gaining time to consolidate its strategic plan unraveled the concepts of the *war of attrition*, conceived by Clausewitz. The *indirect approach*, proposed by Liddell Hart, and the *new wars*, suggested by Mary Kaldor, as a prelude to the outcome of a project whose desired final state was always the seizure of power through the combination of all forms of struggle, and where terrorism associated with criminal economies was its center of gravity.

Institutionality and transformational leadership as a response of the State

Unraveling epistemological positions, hermeneutics and the use of phenomenology, in order to give reading to those who, as academics and experts, with their dissertations, have contributed to the study of wars and conflicts. Following the legacy of Clausewitz's trilogy, could help clear the fog around the three factors that were decisive to overcome the almost disadvantage of institutionality in the confrontation that Colombia had with terrorist groups, self-defense and transnational crime during the period 2002-2012.

In that sense, the political will and leadership, the support of the civilian population and a sustained combination of State policies, national government plans, strategic design and joint employment of the Armed Forces, and coordinated with the National Police, marked the sustained weakening of the FARC, which resulted in a reduction in their capabilities by more than 70% (MDN, 2012).

In the introductory study on the new institutionalisms: their differences, their closeness, Jorge Javier Romero (1991) points out that the institutional question has regained prominence in political and economic analysis in recent years. And various authors have incorporated institutions as a central part of the examination

of social reality. Thus, we have begun to talk about the existence of a contemporary current in the social sciences: the *new institutionalism*.

In fact, this is where the overcoming of disagreements, of conceptual heterogeneity, of differences in approaches in relation to social phenomena. And, particularly, on the way of seeing terrorism in all its dimensions as a component of hybrid wars and its symbiosis with transnational organized crime, as we have already addressed it, and as a fundamental reference of restrictions for political-strategic decision-makers.

Institutions are those that formulate the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the constraints or obligations created by human beings that shape human interaction. Consequently, such institutions structure the incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic. Institutional change delineates the way society evolves over time and is, at the same time, the key to understanding historical change (North, 1990, p. 3).

To corroborate the importance of institutions and, perhaps, highlight the effects of the incoherence between ends, modes and means in the face of the dysautonomy between politics and grand strategy. A BBC interview with Mary Kaldor in London, on the subject "New wars as a way of organizing society through violence" (2021), suggests the dilemma that the United States had in Afghanistan. On the one hand, in the task understood by the Expeditionary Force to build a nation, create a centralized and unified democracy, protect the population and bring development. On the other, in the face of the political approach, expressed by President Joe Biden, of undermining nation-building, in his approach to the war against terrorism and his concern more to defeat Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Islamic State than to create conditions for the well-being of the Afghan people.

With this great reference, he testifies to the importance of institutions as forgers or not of security and development, and transfers these musings to the armed conflict in Colombia, at the end of the nineties and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Perhaps, a myopic vision of the real context at the different levels of political-military decision and external factors. Such as the decertification of the country, the feeling of a failed state and the weakening of the Public Force contributed to the greater armed and financial strengthening of the FARC, the ELN and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), as main narcoterrorist groups that disputed territories of great strategic value, criminal economies and the influence on the civilian population, and imposed immense challenges on the State and its institutions in terms of defense, security and development (McKenzie, E. 2007).

It is worth taking into account the introductory prologue of Spanish Admiral Fernando García Sánchez, in the book *Repensando el Liderazgo Estratégico*, by Federico Aznar Fernández-Montesinos, when quoting General George Casey:

The strategic leader leads to the achievement of their organizational vision. In a high-level framework through the development of policies and strategies, building consensus, acquiring and allocating resources, influencing organizational culture and shaping a complex and ambiguous context. Leads by example to build an effective organization, develop the next generation of leaders, energize subordinates, seek opportunities to advance organizational goals and personal and professional balance.

The aforementioned prologue points out, for the particular case of our country, the characteristics and competencies of strategic leadership in the fundamental role played in the transformation of the Army by General Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel for the recovery of the values, capacities and strengths of the institution in the face of the challenge of facing with height and patriotic courage one of the most critical periods of the armed conflict in Colombia.

In his article "Instituciones y conflicto colombiano: la metáfora del espejo" (2017), Álvaro Alban Moreno states that

[...] the historical configuration of the Colombian social order and its exclusionary and refractory character to changes, is reflected, as an image in the mirror. In an institutional order in which any transformation in a post-conflict context would be sterile as long as the factual conditions of the population subject to the transformations remain unchanged. Once again frustrating development aspirations, as has been evidenced in Colombian history. (Moreno, 2017, p. 1)

This reflection leads us to understand that overcoming the objective causes of the conflict must be considered when designing a State policy that, with a holistic approach, integrates interagency efforts, broad-spectrum strategy, general military strategy and operational strategies.

From the previous concerns, some considerations emerge that it is important to take into account to understand what the State's response was in the field of institutionality and, in light of the transformational leadership applied as a watering hole to reverse the existing adverse security conditions and pave the way towards the search for true peace.

There is no state or nation building if there is no strengthening of institutions hand in hand with genuine leadership that stimulates the changes necessary to overcome the vicissitudes posed by the challenges of the moment. Great men forge great institutions, and these, in turn, arise from the most difficult battles (Lasprilla, 2022).

In the face of this uncertain panorama of continuous military defeats, acts of extreme violence, institutional weakness and national clamor for a change that was necessary and urgent, and in the face of the dilemma of understanding the phenomenon of terrorism, a component of hybrid wars (Colom, 2018), as a means used by these violence-generating agents (FARC, ELN, AUC) to achieve their main end, and in the task of proposing plausible, comprehensive, multilateral, regional and local solutions on their causes and effects and -perhaps, what was more important-. In a prospective way, anticipating their manifestations, the national government of the moment drew up a holistic policy, whose interpretation, conception and execution required leadership as a fundamental factor.

The then government of President Andrés Pastrana, which had granted guarantees to the narcoterrorist groups beyond the logic of negotiation, was forced to harden its position and resort to a *systemic type of leadership*. Which, in the words of General Mc Crystal (2014), "is exercised in the midst of very complex systems and subsystems, relies on consolidated state bureaucracies, requires communication and coordination skills, high-level strategic decisions, and far-reaching effects and repercussions".

In general terms, leadership is a process of influence that has been categorized according to circumstances and styles, which does not admit schemes or formulas and is considered an empirical and factual discipline. So it can be said that the best leadership style is the one that best suits the leader, his followers, the environment and the situation. Therefore, success is the only criterion of truth, even if it is useful to look for objective conditions that can serve as a framework for its development (Aznar, 2018).

Certainly, the best leadership is that promoted through example, and more, among the military. Example is commitment and expression of a firm belief. Words seduce and example creates highways of virtue, but only example drags (Aznar, 2018)

According to the previous analysis between the duty to be, the definitions of leadership and the intrinsic value of the example, General Mora exercised a model of charismatic-transformational leadership. Since he identifies with Burns (1978),

who states: "leaders and followers do with each other to advance to a higher level of morale and motivation". With this he intended to bring out the consciousness of subordinates. And he also emphasizes: "what you can do for your country." This indicates the superlative purposes of the mission: the homeland is above personal interests. It is focused on human needs, related to personal growth, self-esteem and self-actualization, inspiring commitment and union, projecting a desirable future for all (Aznar, 2018).

The strategy undoubtedly pointed the way towards transformation. From the highest level of decision, the ends, ways and means were harmonized in the Democratic Defense and Security Policies and the Consolidation of Democratic Security, and in the Defense and Security Policy for Prosperity, which aimed to consolidate territorial control and strengthen the social rule of law. To protect the population by maintaining strategic initiative. To minimize the production of narcotics and eliminate their illicit trade. To maintain a legitimate, modern and effective Public Force. To maintain the decreasing trend of all crime indicators. To dismantle the Outlaw Organizations (OAML) and create sufficient security conditions for consolidation. To move towards a credible, integrated and interoperable system of deterrent capacities; to contribute to timely attention to natural disasters and catastrophes, and to strengthen the institutionality and well-being of the national security and defense sector (MDN, 2015).

An adequate interpretation of the great strategy of the national government and its defense policies emanating from the Ministry of Defense was manifested in the Colombia, Patriot, Consolidation, Bicentennial and Sword of Honor war plans of the General Command of the Military Forces, which gave life to the General Military Strategy, whose campaign plans became the backbone of the operational military strategy.

As John Kotter (1997) points out, "leaders define the vision for the future and set the strategies for getting there." And according to Federico Aznar (2018), "that is the fundamental task of the strategic leader: to define the strategic framework". This was relevant for General Mora to sow a motivation in the mind and heart of each soldier and forge in all of them a change of attitude and behavior that, as an armor, invigorated them in the face of stumbles and difficulties.

Each leader has had in his life -especially the military- a pedagogy, an experience that validates his knowledge and historical icons that in the art of war are definitive for decision-making. However, the relationship with leadership schools marks particular characteristics that need their strengths. Especially, in the management of chaos and uncertainty.

The book *Repensando el Liderazgo Estratégico* (Aznar, 2018), highlights, in relation to schools in the study of strategic leadership, how, on the one hand, there is the *Cultural School*, which heralds the process of strategy formation as a collective product based on the beliefs demonstrated by the members of the organization, and operates internally, supported by symbolic actions, vision and creation of meaning. On the other hand, in the *School of the Environment* leadership is applied knowing the structure and functioning of the groups where it is manifested, and sets the strategy in the environment rather than in the organization itself.

In the particular case of General Mora, as a transformative leader, he managed to integrate these two schools (Cultural and Environmental) as a cross between the culture he offers and what the environment demands for the achievement of a mission. A change in the attitude of the members of the institution, through awareness of their role, understanding the arms race as a vocation dedicated to the service of the homeland and professionalization at all levels, as well as changing the image of an Army defeated by an efficient institution, were the expressions of that fusion.

Leadership, undoubtedly, is weighted by the results of a management based on the motivation, example and commitment of each of the members of the organization, regardless of the leadership style or the school with which it best identifies or the one that best fits the profile of the leader and the demands of the environment.

The strategy of General Jorge Mora Rangel, supported by his transformative leadership style and the successive leaders -in others, General Carlos Ospina Ovalle-, could be summarized in the following achievements:

- Decisive strategy in contributing to the strategic political objective of the State (neutralizing the FARC's strategic plan for the seizure of power).
- Confront and substantially weaken the FARC and other narco-terrorist organizations.
- Prevent the staggering of FARC structures over the Strategic Deployment Center (CDE).
- Break the expectations of the FARC in relation to campaigns sustained in time and space.
- Configure the unobjectionable defeat of the FARC, to the extent that its command and control (operations against ringleaders and structures of high strategic value) was considerably affected. Interruption of its communications and coordination capacity, as well as its logistical and financial structure (occupation of mobility corridors and affectation to the flows of criminal economies), its financial ringleaders, and its collection centers,

lines and distribution axes. Affectation of the recruitment capacity, to the detriment of its growth, expansion and influence plan.

- Recovery of the territory, key regions, governance and the rule of law and legality.
- Example of synergy as a reference for joint, coordinated, interagency work; creation of conditions for Unified Action.
- Play a decisive role in the FARC's forced decision to accept a negotiated solution to the conflict.
- Intelligence, in-depth operations, territorial control, special operations, mobility, application of force, synchronization, humanitarian assistance programs for demobilized and prevention of recruitment and comprehensive action, as well as leadership as an irreplaceable intangible, were determining factors in the conduct and success of the strategy.

Conclusions

A great historical component has surrounded politicians, scholars, writers and specialists when it comes to conceptualizing the issue of violence, to integrate, dismantle or observe its components, including terrorism as a means or as an end, depending on how it has been treated; this corroborates that we have been in the presence of one of the main obstacles in the search for unity of epistemological criteria.

For the first time it is possible to differentiate the levels of war: the grand strategy (Álvarez & Fernández, 2018), formulated by the political leader, and included in the Democratic Defense and Security Policy (2002-2006), and the Democratic Security Consolidation Policy (2006-2010). The general military strategy expressed in the war plans (Colombia-Patriot-Bicentennial) of the General Command of the Military Forces, and the Operational Military Strategy, conceived through the campaign plans of the forces, joint task forces and joint commands, with a synergistic approach to operations and integral action.

Three pillars were decisive in reversing the tendency of the FARC, the ELN and the AUC in the face of initial gains and discouraging terrorist actions: territorial control and the campaign of the Omega Joint Task Force, which confronted and defeated the FARC's strategic plan and special operations.

It should be noted that an institutional vision beyond the horizon underpinned the path of operational military strategy, in response to the political objective established at the time, and that, despite having focused on reducing the causes and

effects of terrorism, in the long term it also served as a prelude to confronting and defeating the FARC's strategy for the seizure of power through the combination of all forms of struggle. With this, General Mora gave meaning to the constitutional mission of an Army in transformation, by harmonizing ends, ways and means and channeling consensus around a task that involved understanding it from a philosophy of life: the military vocation.

To give a practical reading to Aznar's work and that of Luhmann in his theory of the environment and functional structuralism, respectively, and incorporate Saskia Sassen's concept of important changes in complex systems. Through the Venh diagram of set theory, used in mathematics and probabilities, it would be worth reflecting on the approach of an approach to a suggested model such as *the diagram of the logic of effectiveness*, which contemplates the dynamics of integration of leadership, strategy and foresight, adding another fundamental element, which is governance, and which can respond to the demand for a comprehensive defense and security system.

Governance, as an exercise in political articulation that involves different actors in the process of deciding, executing and evaluating decisions on matters of public interest, carries out an interactive management by the convergence of different sectors and their interests that impact on the quality of life of the system and of individuals. At the same time, it is *inclusive*, as it seeks to form teams of excellence (balance between the political and the technical).

By seeking a relationship for the complementarity of roles (joint, coordinated, interagency, multilateral, combined operations), it establishes unified action (institutional harmonization).

As long as the strategy is determined by actions that are carried out to achieve an end, it involves setting long-term goals, choosing the actions and allocating the resources necessary to achieve them.


Foresight is an instrument to think about the future and achieve proactive action through the correct formulation and execution of vision, mission, capacities and learning for the achievement of adequate governance and for the formulation of effective policies.

Leadership and information are at the intersection of governance, strategy and foresight, increasing results in the face of expectations that impact the defense and security system, reducing risks, reducing complexities and enhancing capabilities.

At that intersection of components, and which corresponds to their intertwining, value is created for the system, for its elements and depending on the

common objectives of the nations in particular or as a whole, on a neighboring, regional, or global scale.

Figure 1. *Diagram of the logic of effectiveness.*



Source: Own elaboration.

Future scenario

- Confront adverse political and ideological dynamics that seek to weaken the capacities of the Armed Forces: legal shielding, strategic platforms, professionalization, resources.
- Territorial extension vs. political leadership and military-population-control-mobility (if there is disconnection, it must be compensated).
- Permeable borders vs. capacity for military-police control and state control (if development does not occur, effective military-police control of the area is imperative).
- Difficulty in communications vs. availability of communication lines, means of transport and connectivity (road infrastructure, communications).
- Border law based on the connectivity and development of the national territory and the increase in security and defense coverage that requires sustained investment by the State.

- Defense and Security Law: security and defense considered an asset of the nation, moving from government policy to the integral dimension of the State.
- Organized transnational crime vs. response capacity, and transition to the concept of combined operations.
- Marginal gains vs. possibilities of sovereignty and effective territorial integrity: coherence between ends, strategy and means.
- Facing challenges to authority; governability; legal shielding vs. legitimacy.

References

- Allison, G. (2017). *Destined for War: Can America and China Scape Thucydides's Trap?* Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Álvarez, C., & Fernández, A. (2018). *La gran estrategia: instrumento para una política integral en seguridad y defensa*. Escuela Militar de Cadetes General José María Córdova.
- Aznar, F. (2018). *Repensando el Liderazgo Estratégico*. Sílex Ediciones.
- Cimadevilla, J. (2019). *De viejas cicatrices a nuevas heridas*. Planeta.
- Colom, G. (2018). Guerras híbridas, cuando el contexto lo es todo. *Revista Ejército de Tierra*, 927.
- Cronin, A., & Ludes, J. (2004). *Attacking terrorism, elements of a grand strategy*. Editors.
- Dishman, C. (2016). *Terrorist and Criminal Dynamics: A look Beyond the Horizon*. Center for Complex Operations. National Defense University.
- Figueroa, A. (2021). La Trampa de Tucídides y los Mares de China. *Visión Conjunta*, 13(24), 53-62.
- Font, T., & Ortega, P. (2012). Seguridad nacional, seguridad multidimensional, seguridad humana. *Papeles de relaciones ecosociales y cambio global*, (119), 161-172.
- García, M. (2013). *El concepto de insurgencia a debate; una aproximación teórica*. Universidad de Jaén España.
- Griffith, S. (1999). *El arte de la guerra*. Panamericana Editorial.
- Guattari, F. (2017). *La revolución molecular*. Editorial Errata Naturae.
- Hammes, T. (2004). *The Sling and the Stone*. Zenith Press.
- Humire, J. (2021). *Asalto asimétrico a Colombia*. Center for a Secure Free Society.
- Kaldor, M. (2001). Las nuevas guerras: Violencia organizada en la era global. *Revista Andaluza de Ciencias Sociales*, (1). Tusquets.
- Lasprilla, J. (2022). *Poder nacional de Colombia. Volumen II: El Terrorismo como amenaza en los ámbitos global y nacional*. Editorial Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- Lind, W. (2004). Understanding Fourth Generation War. *Military Review*.
- López, A. (2021). La revolución molecular disipada. *El Tiempo*.
- Luttwak, E. (2003). *Fundamentos de la Estrategia para el Siglo XXI*. Imprenta Ministerio de Defensa.
- Mackenzie, E. (2007). *Las FARC fracaso de un terrorismo*. Editions Publibook.
- Maldonado, E. (2011). Bunker, Lind y Van Creveld: Tres visiones de las Nuevas Guerras. *Tiempo y Espacio*, 27(67), 259-284.
- Matfess, H., & Miklaucic, M. (2016). *Beyond convergence*. Center for Complex Operations.
- O'Neill, B. (2005). *Insurgency & Terrorism*. Potomac Books, Inc.
- Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU). (s. f). *Informe de la República de Colombia sobre la aplicación y cumplimiento de la declaración sobre las medidas para eliminar el terrorismo internacional*. Res 49/60.

- Ospina, C. (2014). *Los años en que Colombia recuperó la esperanza*. Editorial Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana.
- Ospina, C. (2012). *A la cima sobre los hombres del diablo*. Editorial Académica Española.
- Pizarro, E. (2018). *De la guerra a la paz*. Planeta.
- Pizarro, E. (2011). *Las Farc de guerrilla campesina a máquina de guerra*. Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Pérez, G. (2004). *Investigación cualitativa. Retos e Interrogantes. I Métodos*. La muralla.
- Pérez, V., Nieto, B., & Santamaría, R. (2019). La Hermenéutica y la Fenomenología en la investigación en ciencias Humanas y Sociales. *Civilizar. Ciencias Sociales y Humanísticas*, 19(37), 21-30.
- Porta, D., & Keating, M. (2018). *How many approaches in the social sciences? An epistemological introduction*. UCL Institute of Education.
- Powell, W., & Dimaggio, P. (1999). *El Nuevo Institucionalismo en el análisis Organizacional*. Universidad Autónoma de México.
- Sánchez, P. (2014). *La nueva Guerra Híbrida: un somero análisis estratégico*. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. Documento de Análisis. Número 54.
- Sun, T. (2016). *El Arte de la Guerra*. Editorial Createspace.
- Taber, R. (2002). *War of the flea, the classic study of guerrilla warfare*. Editions Brassey's Inc.
- Tucídides. (2005). *Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso*. Editorial Cátedra.
- Vasilachis, I. (1997). El pensamiento de Habermas a la luz de una metodología propuesta de acceso a la teoría. *Revista Estudios Sociológicos*, 15(43).
- Vásquez, O. (2016). *Guerras de Cuarta Generación: Una aproximación a las Guerras del Siglo XXI*. Editorial Episteme.
- Verstrynge, J. (s. f.). *La guerra periférica y el islam revolucionario*. Editorial El viejo Topo.
- Valencia, A. (2009). *Mis adversarios Guerrilleros*. Planeta.

Chapter 7

Strategic leadership of Saddam Hussein and George W. Bush in the context of the second Gulf War

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.07>

Andrés Atahualpa Pérez

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: This paper analyzes the strategic leadership of George W. Bush and Saddam Hussein in the framework of the so-called second Gulf War, in the light of Clausewitz's classic theory. The factors that influenced the formation of these leaders and how their leaderships were evidenced during the conflict are examined. Finally, some conclusions are proposed about the type of leadership observed, its relationship with institutionalism and how it was a fundamental element in their bets and strategies during the development of the conflict.

Keywords: Clausewitz, strategic, institutionalism, leadership, second Gulf War.

Andrés Atahualpa Pérez

Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Lawyer, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. Degree in Law, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea. Specialist, Commercial Law and Insurance Law, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. Master's Degree in Administration of Educational Institutions, Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey. Master's Degree in Educational Technology, Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey. Member, Scientific Committee of the Observatory on Military Law, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2830-4973> - Contact: atahualpaa@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Atahualpa Pérez, A. (2023). Strategic leadership of Saddam Hussein and George W. Bush in the context of the second Gulf War. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 143-162). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.07>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

Much has been analyzed in the face of the phenomenon of leadership and, in particular, of strategic leadership in the military field. This essay seeks to explore the way in which the organizational and leadership capacities of a group are developed; particularly, in the development of the second Gulf War.

For these purposes, the concept of strategic leadership and how it approached the second Gulf War will be analyzed first. Subsequently, the construction of the leadership styles of the two protagonists of the war: George W. Bush and Saddam Hussein will be examined. In this scenario, the elements and characteristics of leadership, their definitions and the corresponding schools will be taken into account.

Next, we will study the way in which the strategic leaderships of the protagonists developed within the framework of the second Gulf War, in the light of von Clausewitz's classical theory. In this way, we will continue with the study of the way in which *normative neo-institutionalism* was a founding element within these leadership schemes and the way in which Bush and Hussein agreed on the same institutional model. Finally, conclusions will be drawn.

Approach to Strategic Leadership

As Aznar (2018) refers to it, a leader is a person capable of setting goals and getting a group of people to follow him, so that leaders become subjects capable of intuiting processes of change. Reading the signs of the times and adapting to new realities by taking advantage of opportunities and service and leading the conglomerate to achieve its higher purposes.

For the purposes of this document, we start from a broad definition of leadership, following the meaning collected by the Spanish Navy. In the sense of indicating that it comprises “the personal capacity of the person who leads a human group to influence its components so that they work cohesively and enthusiastically in the achievement of objectives subordinated to a common and higher end” (Aznar, 2018, p. 42).

Thus, leadership ability does not fall under the umbrella of Manichaeon visions where leadership must be oriented towards the achievement of goodness or what is socially acceptable. On the contrary, all actions that guide the achievement of ends greater than the group, whether or not they are oriented within the framework of the law or what is understood as good or right in a certain social context, also imply expressions of leadership. In this scenario, leadership is able to arise naturally being interdependent and finalist, responding to the approach that is made to the problem or the group. The way in which the person relates to the conglomerate, the responsibilities and the challenges and bearing in mind that the leader can be born or following the thesis of need. It can also be done after the group agrees on the objectives and according to the requirements of the context of place or time (Aznar, 2018).

In the particular case of military leadership, it should be borne in mind that the informal aspects of leadership are usually overcome by institutions that focus on the construction of professional and moral, as well as cognitive, affective, and psychomotor references, which usually brings them closer to formal looks at these senses of exercise (Monsalve-Castro et al., 2018). However, beyond such meanings, it is commonly recognized that military leadership is currently assumed as an art of persuasion and direction of subordinates to obtain their support and loyal collaboration from them. Thus, in the military field, it is highlighted that strategic leadership must have the capacity to predict, negotiate, understand the dynamics of the global world, reach consensus and communicate assertively (Cifuentes, 2008).

Context of Iraq under Hussein's regime

Saddam Hussein led Iraq from 1979 to 2003. During his rule, he projected himself as the most influential leader in the country and, at the same time, as a courageous modernizer and institutional reformer. However, the regime under his command stood out for carrying out an important repression of different groups in the interior of the country, which implied the death of thousands of people (Miller & Mylroie, 1990).

The borders of Iraq, as well as those of different countries in the Middle East, were defined as a product of the Sykes-Picot Agreements, as a result of the end of the Great War. The unilateral and artificial division of the different countries did not take into account the diversity of the population groups in the region. This meant that various population groups, such as Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites and Christians, were settled in Iraq. During the development of his regime, Hussein relied especially on the Sunnis, which involved marginalizing and attacking various population groups that even represented the majority of the country (Moaddalet al., 2008).

Hussein was overthrown in April 2003, in the context of the second Gulf War, an operation led by the United States. Yet nearly two decades after his death, Hussein's legacy to history continues to generate quite a bit of controversy. The instability in Iraq, produced, among other factors, as a result of the war, has meant that several Iraqis continue to yearn for the return of a repressive regime (Blinderman, 2009). For the victims, however, the Hussein era is a period that will hardly be forgotten, and that will continue to generate deep pain, given the countless losses of lives, the violation of human rights and the social and political instability generated by repression (Moaddel et al., 2008).

Approach to Hussein's Strategic Leadership and Institutional Sense

For the construction of strategic leadership it is necessary to take into account the interrelationship between symbols, meaning and beliefs, to fix the elements of culture, vision and meaning. In the framework of strategic leadership, it is necessary to keep in mind management skills, cognitive competencies, security and defense expertise, and personality and attitude elements.

However, as referred to by Macagnan (2013), Thoman Veblen highlights the importance of institutions being created by human beings through consensus. Sánchez (2013), for his part, indicates that institutions are political definitions that establish who are the holders of political rights, as well as the entities that fight for power itself. For example, the parties and elite groups, which are, ultimately, those that make up the legislative branch as part of an institution that establishes policies that affect the decision to maintain the *status quo* or to promote an institutional reorganization.

In this way, a relationship is created between leadership, institutions and incentives. The incentives that are promoted within organizations will affect the behavior of the actors. Therefore, it can be affirmed that the institutions at their origin have three elements: the *rules of the game*, the *actors* and the *incentives* that make the changes generated vary in decision-making. In terms of security and defense, there are undoubtedly actors, rules of the game and incentives (Sánchez, 2013).

At this point, it is appropriate to analyze the type of leadership developed by Hussein, under the gaze of the definitions of leadership collected by Sastre (2014). For the purposes of this document, the following definitions should be noted, which fall under the symbols, senses and beliefs:

- **Zaleznik (1977):** "Leadership inevitably requires the use of power to influence the thoughts and actions of others."
- **Burns (1978):** "Leadership over human beings is exercised when people with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources in order to awaken, encourage, and satisfy the motives of followers."
- **Yukl and van Fleet (1990):** "Leadership is seen as a process that includes influencing the objectives of the tasks and strategies of a group or organization. In people in the organization to implement the strategies and achieve the objectives. In the maintenance and identification of the group; and in the culture of the organization."
- **Caravedo (2011):** "Leadership is a type of bond between people that occurs within the framework of systems and that manifests itself in different ways".

As Jerrold (2005) notes, during his government Hussein managed to build and foster a cult of personality, to inspire the devotion of the Iraqi people. This meant that his image was widely disseminated and respected in different scenarios. Hussein's image was also deeply misrepresented in Iraq, as he depicted himself in a variety of attire, from traditional attire to modern business attire, to appeal to various strata of Iraqi society.

In 2003, during the start of the second Gulf War, a 40-foot statue of Hussein was destroyed on the grounds of Zawra Park, where the Iraqi president used to address his troops. Likewise, in the south of the country, it was possible to see how some residents helped to demolish other statues of the Iraqi leader. One of the most notorious symbols of Hussein's power corresponded to his luxurious palaces. As collected at that time, coalition troops entered these fortresses by knocking

down the doors of different palaces, which were characterized by their spacious rooms, delicate ceilings with stained glass, marble and carpentry floors and detailed panels, but without furniture.

Perhaps one of the most prominent aspects of Hussein's type of leadership was his marked repression and violation of human rights. In fact, as Zadeh and Shafiee (2017) refer, the crimes of the Ba'ath regime, of forced displacement and the murder of thousands of Kurds in the eighties, were configured in a genocide announced by the High Criminal Court of Iraq. In 1982 there was a failed assassination attempt on Saddam Husain, in Dujail, a village located 40 km from Baghdad. This meant that almost two hundred people, including children, were sentenced and hanged in retaliation. In addition, around 1,500 people from the village were tortured and sent to prison. The locals, in addition, were fined, and their houses, demolished. In addition, they were prohibited from planting, to limit their food. At the end of the eighties, what is called the most tragic operation ordered by Hussein was carried out: the Anfal campaign, against the Kurds. As Zadeh and Shafiee (2017) indicate,

The operation was carried out from 1988 to 1989, during which more than 100,000 Kurds from Iraq (182,000 people, including 80,000 Barzani and several tens of thousands of Germiyani) were massacred by the forces of the Ba'ath regime, which received orders directly from Saddam Hussein (Naami, 2008). (p. 218)

As Weber stated, the following expressions of will can be found in leadership: the *charismatic*, which is related to devotion to holiness or heroism - that is, to the condition of serving as an example or reference -; the *traditional*, which is based on the evolution of time and the continuation of certain entities and on the legitimacy represented by their status, and the *legal*, based on the legitimacy of the laws (Aznar, 2018).

As can be seen, the leadership developed by Hussein managed to correspond to the three types of authority: a charismatic one, which sought the development of propaganda to maintain the domination of the masses. The traditional one, through the legitimacy that it represented to maintain institutionalism and repression, and the legal one, through the power obtained thanks to the fact of commanding the Armed Forces. However, following Soriano (2013), it can be said that the leadership style to which Hussein came closest was *coercive*; that is, the leadership

style based on fear and repression, in which there are no limits to the performance of the subject.

In fact, this type of leadership does not tend to last over time, to the extent that it produces inefficiencies that end up limiting the performance of subordinates, eliminating the ability to reward, limiting innovation and establishing a blow to the organization. In this sense, as Soriano (2013) points out,

Coercive leadership is characterized by having subordinates act according to the leader's rules to avoid possible punishments that may be applied to them. Coercive leaders often set arbitrary goals and rules, limit the range of their subordinates, control information, and set guidelines and rules to follow to avoid punishment. This type of leadership usually manifests itself when leaders act under pressure or have lost their ability to reward. Thus, this leadership does not encourage motivation, one of the main weapons of the leader, although it is not ruled out when you want to give a "helm" to the situation and completely change the dynamics established in a group or organization.

This type of leadership is most effective when applied to simple tasks or in crisis situations, when employees need a clear set of guidelines. On the contrary, it is not the most suitable to face complex tasks or with employees who are expected to have a high degree of initiative or autonomy. (p. 43)

Building George W. Bush's Leadership as a Brave Horseman of Faith

Some authors, such as Skowronek (2005), point to the fact that, in principle, it is reasonable to assume that the position of leadership assumed results both from strategic political calculation and an expression of an innate character. For this reason, character, as an expression of personality,

[...] may place limits on what a particular actor can credibly agree to in their own belief, but within those limits, a president's strategic leadership stance tends to be deliberately constructed with a view to leveraging its appeal within politics. (p. 817)

George W. Bush's leadership has been studied by various authors. Gergen (2003) points out how the former president, during his time as governor of the state of Texas, hung in his office the painting "*A Charge to Keep*", which, Bush said,

represented the figure of a cowboy who, on his horse, is responsible for spreading the Methodist faith throughout the West. This symbol, which in principle would seem harmless, is not so harmless if we dive into the analysis of what is behind that decision.

According to Gergen (2003), when Bush decided to hang the painting in his office, he also sent a memorandum to his entire work team requesting that, when they entered his office, they take a look at the beautiful painting of the rider riding towards a steep summit, insofar as the message is that "we serve purposes greater than ourselves." Thus, this special identification with the painting reveals Bush's good sense of himself as a political leader, the role he played, and the core point of religious faith.

In this way, the former president also indicated about this painting, a certain rider is "on a very difficult path and at least two people follow him and perhaps thousands" (Gavaler, 2015). Thus, it can be seen that identification with painting is a sign of what he believes about himself and the way his followers see him. As a brave and intrepid leader, capable of entering unknown terrain and giving goals to unknown enemies. Until he gets them out of their hiding places and achieve, in the same sense of the picture, do the will of God (Gavaler, 2015).

The autobiography written by the former president in 1999 - that is, during the race for his first presidency - was entitled *A Charge to Keep*. Bailey (2008) points out how in this work the former president states that Jesus changed his heart during the competition for the presidency, and that the religious sense resulted in repeated rhetoric, such as, for example, during the speeches related to 9/11.

In his 2010 autobiography, Bush notes that each president decorates the Oval Office in his own style, and that he decided to hang there different paintings of Texas that included remembrances of the battle of the Alamo and the landscape of the west of the state. However, it is striking how Bush himself dedicates, in a special way, a few lines to justify his decision in front of the painting "*A Charge to Keep*" when he indicates:

[I also brought] a painting of a rider riding on a hill by W.H.D. Koerner. The name of the piece, "*A Charge to Keep*", recalls Charles Weley's Methodist hymn, which we sang at my first inauguration as governor. Both the painting and the anthem reflect the importance of serving a cause greater than oneself. (Bush, 2010, n.d.)

Following Aznar (2018), it can be identified that Bush's position is in no way gratuitous. In fact, it is intertwined with what is called *military culture as a heroic culture*, where that sum of complicities, ideas and signs, associations and patterns of conduct and communication are based on honor. In this way, "A community of honor is closely linked to the power structure of society insofar as it possesses the concrete powers to impose honorary criteria" (p. 311). However, what is most striking is the way in which symbols and beliefs are also intertwined in a leader like Bush, who prides himself on being a commander of the Armed Forces. In this way, the military camp presupposes a moral code and guidelines of conduct, and here it resembles, to a large extent, the elements of religion, the same ones to which Bush referred so much through the painting:

[...] let us remember again Calderón's description of the militia as a 'religion of honest men', although its goals are pointed out by the community they serve and, in principle, do not incorporate the specific transcendent dimension of religiosity. The military is a humanism. (Aznar, 2018, p. 319)

This special interplay between the military, political and religious powers was endorsed by Bush himself both in his appearances in the Oval Office and in the portrait that hangs in the room of former presidents of the White House where it appears right in front of the same painting. Additionally, the legacy of his presidency, collected in the book "*A Charge Kept*", shows the importance that this symbol had for the development of his effective leadership.

The development of the second Gulf War under the gaze of Clausewitz and in the face of strategic and institutional leadership developments

General von Clausewitz lived at a crucial moment of the war, and as a child he witnessed Napoleon's wars. His work is the product of the work carried out by his wife collecting his writings, a situation that has called into question the scope of the meaning of the statements contained in *De la Guerra*, his key work (Pommerin, 2014).

Some of its essential postulates rest on the fact that war itself is nothing more than a duel of brute force, and where whoever uses violence more and with greater intensity will have an advantage. And it is at that moment that politics brings a

rationality, to the extent that when politics is used, greater benefits will be obtained. Therefore, a war without politics is meaningless; hence his acknowledged maxim that “war is a continuation of politics by other means” (Howard, 2002).

In this sense, it can be said that war is a strategic action, that war is political in nature and that there are general guidelines for its conduct. Therefore, depending on the ambitions, strategies will have to be chosen. A *policy*, which has the final objectives, and a *military* one, on how to achieve the objectives outlined by the political strategy. Military strategy is subordinated to politics, but the politician cannot harm military strategy itself. It is a dialogue and a dialectic that is by no means simple (Freedman, 2013).

In this interrelation, frictions are generated, on the occasion of the dissimilar looks of the military and the politician. In this sense, the political objective of war (its *political end*, according to Clausewitz) is a primary axis and establishes the conditions to evaluate the possibility of assuming war and the actions that constitute it (Hughes, 2020). In turn, the political driver must verify that the actions carried out during the war are measures against the affectation of the national interest. Therefore, according to Clausewitz, victory and military actions during the war must be politically acceptable, for which the subsequent purpose of the war must be calculated, which is to achieve peace. War has no end in itself, but must be linked to political considerations. Therefore, the subjection of the military level to the political level does not constitute interference, but, on the contrary, gives a rational sense to military action that reaches an equilibrium in which, mutually, both powers are necessary.

War is the continuation of politics by other means

During the course of the second Gulf War, it was evident that the Allied troops carried out a deployment of combat means that allowed them to confront the old and demoralized Iraqi troops in a very advantageous way. This meant having a sufficient number of troops that guaranteed progress in enemy territory in a matter of days, using state-of-the-art military means and devices, so that an efficient military operation could be carried out guaranteeing the least number of casualties (Wunderlich, 2003).

This Clausewitzian *concept* was presented at every opportunity by President George W. Bush, who constantly appealed in his interventions to the political sense

that legitimized military action (*The Guardian*, 2003). In this way, the developed war went from being a mere duel of brute force, to being endowed with a particular political rationality that represented greater returns: overcoming the threat in the use of weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism by the Iraqi regime.

The Trinity

In war there are three elements that must be taken into account. The *rational aspect*, rooted in the political component. *Uncertainty*, whose management corresponds to the military. And the *emotional component*, which develops in the people.

Therefore, war is not only a struggle of armies, but also involves involving the population, which places this element in what is currently known as *hybrid wars*, where belligerent action is not carried out for the conquest of territories, but is placed in the interest of fighting for the mind, thought, attitudes and behaviors of the population (Manolea, 2021).

The strategic leadership of the two main protagonists of the coalition - George W. Bush and Tony Blair - showed that Clausewitz's concept of the Trinity was fully valid during the second Gulf War. In the specific case of the emotional component, the importance of the legitimacy of their peoples to make the decision to attack Iraq and, subsequently, to maintain the war during the following years was brought to mind, for which it was necessary to appeal to data and reports that later, and unfortunately, turned out not to sympathize with reality (Porter, 2019).

For the decision to go to war with Iraq, the fact was brought to mind that Saddam Hussein was a dictator who had persecuted his people and used chemical weapons. Additionally, a dictator who used weapons of mass destruction sponsored terrorists, paid the families of suicide bombers, invaded his neighbors, mistreated his people, deceived international inspectors, and refused to comply with more than a dozen United Nations (UN) standards (Thiessen, 2009). In 2003, the UN Security Council gave him one last chance to reveal and disarm, or face serious consequences. And the Iraqi leader refused to disarm. This led Bush to assemble an international coalition that began the second Gulf War in March 2003. According to Thiessen (2009),

The overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime freed 25 million Iraqis. And it had benefits beyond the borders of Iraq. Libya's leader announced in December 2003 that he was abandoning his country's pursuit of weapons of mass

destruction. Libya's nuclear program - uranium, centrifuges, bomb-making designs, as well as key missile components - was moved to secure storage facilities in the United States. Libya pledged to destroy its chemical weapons. Today, Libya is out of the business of searching for weapons of mass destruction and off the list of state sponsors of terrorism. (p. 5)

However, the subsequent evidence that the Hussein regime did not have weapons of mass destruction led to undermining the sense of strategic leadership deployed by the West and, even, the very relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States, who did not calculate the effects of the military intervention and, therefore, could not face the subsequent guerrilla war (Porter, 2019).

Chaos

From Clausewitz's classic view, there is no one-size-fits-all formula for victory. What is generated is chaos, and the procedure serves to advance the path that leads to victory. However, in the end, decision-making is not based on the scientific field, but on the elements that the battlefield itself gives. In this scenario, the battlefields are becoming more intense, faster and with greater challenges, so the military must have the ability to understand what is happening on the battlefield to maintain the final objective of the mission.

For Fontela (2006), there were two phases in the second Gulf War. The first, corresponding to the invasion, was characterized by its speed, its effectiveness, and the low number of deaths in the coalition army. However, the second phase showed a wear and tear in strategic leadership, marked by chaos and guerrilla warfare, which meant a lack of territorial dominance, which triggered a limitation to the control of the situation and facilitated the organization of the resistance. In this sense,

Post-war urban guerrilla warfare is proving more effective, has taken the lead, produces greater attrition of coalition forces and less resistance despite its seemingly sporadic and improvised character. The latest actions demonstrate a unity of criteria in the designation of objectives (military or civilian) which demonstrates a strategic direction, which can force the main effort of the occupation forces on their own security, leaving control of the population in the hands of the resistance. (p. 7)

In this scenario, Record (2010) indicates that it was unimaginable to the main defenders of the war that some Iraqis - especially those in the Sunni Arab community, who, by the way, were close to losing power - considered an invasion and an American occupation acts of conquest worthy of being resisted by recourse to all available means. Including tried and tested methods of insurgent guerrilla warfare.

For this reason, the possibility that an invasion would bring about the collapse of the state "leaving American forces adrift in a sea of anarchy, evidently also escaped the administration's imagination despite the fact that, for all practical purposes, Saddam Hussein was the Iraqi state" (p. 83).

The above facts, added to the fact that it was possible to demonstrate the combination of false and petty assumptions about the danger and imminence of the Iraqi threat to the security of the United States. And the need to assume the costs and consequences of the war at all costs "condemned Operation Iraqi Freedom to strategic failure" (p. 83), which undermined, within the United States and throughout the world, the strategic leadership of the protagonists of the operation, such as George W. Bush and Tony Blair.

Types of Leadership Developed in the Second Gulf War

George W. Bush

Bush identifies several elements that, taken together, outline the way in which symbols, senses and beliefs constituted leadership during the second Gulf War.

There was evidence of a leader who adopted a style of command and control that managed to stand out from the figure of other presidents. Thus, Gergen (2003) indicates, he was seen as a sensible, decisive male, capable of setting his sights on the distant future and without fear of reaching it. He expects others to follow him along the way, or at least get out of his way. From his business studies he learned to focus on a few goals at a time and to take on problems as distractions:

He actively asks questions and listens before deciding, but does not agonize, and once the decision is made, he does not tolerate internal dissent. He happily delegates details, but closely monitors his team. If they deviate abruptly from their course, it brings them back online. He is a man from West Texas, a man of God and proud of both. (Gergen, 2003)

During the development of the conflict, there was evidence of a president capable of establishing and achieving a common national agenda. On the occasion of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, he twice sent US forces on military campaigns and overthrew two regimes of power, being able to reformulate US foreign policy and moving away from multilateral commitments (Gergen, 2003). In this way, as recorded by Thiessen (2009),

President Bush responded to the attacks by launching a broad and sustained war against terrorist networks around the world. He promised the American people "We will direct every resource at our disposal to win the war against terrorists: every means of diplomacy, every intelligence tool, every law enforcement instrument, every financial influence. We will starve terrorists of funds, pit them against each other, take them out of their safe hiding places, and bring them to justice. '(p. 3)

In this new war, Bush developed his self-proclaimed doctrine, which consisted of three elements." The first was the fact that your country would make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support them. The second was in the sense that the United States will not be attacked again and, therefore, will fight terrorists abroad, so as not to have to face them on their own soil. The third, finally, is a frontal war against terrorist ideology promoting the alternative of freedom (Thiessen, 2009).

In this way, Bush managed to trace a relationship of learning and mutual advantage between the leader and his followers, which allowed him to adjust the scale of the values, attitudes and beliefs of those who continued to motivate them to achieve actions that were not even expected at the beginning. In this case, the promise of freedom led to higher levels of satisfaction, and thus a charismatic leader was configured, capable of generating a common vision and mission for the members of the group (Avolio et al., 1995; Bass et al., 2003; Cuadrado & Molero, 2002).

Finally, it is worth highlighting the way in which Bush led as commander in chief of the United States Armed Forces, through countless appearances both on battlefields and in symbolic sites of power. For example, aircraft carriers and destroyers, where he made explicit his sense of leadership and order. This approach, as Freedman (2013) points out, is a fundamental aspect of the leader, insofar as, in battle, an army that lacks the figure of leadership could be faced with losing its discipline and its will to advance, and therefore condemning its own efforts to chaos.

Saddam Hussein

As Soriano (2013) points out, military leadership is defined by the capacity that the personnel who are part of a military force must possess to direct and lead their men and add to the development of the conglomerate, so that they can obtain the results either in war or in peace.

In the particular case of the Gulf War, one could see how Hussein's leadership collapsed in the face of coalition forces. In fact, as Fontanela (2006) notes, the "numerous and apparently powerful Iraqi Army was a colossus with feet of clay, only suitable for internal repression" (p. 2). Thus, as evidenced at the end of the war with Iran, no advantage was achieved, despite having been the aggressor country and having had in its favor the surprise factor and even the same Western support in the supply of weapons. The particular situation of the Iraqi army showed a weakened military corps as a result of the first Gulf War and the subsequent sanctions and embargoes (Fontanela, 2006).

In this sense, as Soriano (2013) refers to it, the leaders of the moment are those capable of being profoundly innovative and of handling the problems derived from the ever-increasing obsolescence. In Hussein's case, it could be evidenced that his apparent power did not go beyond just that: a mere appearance. And it failed to modernize its own instructional capacity towards modern leadership, in which the leader is able to process information and take advantage of opportunities, to intelligently interpret adversities and use tools in a modern and creative way. Perhaps, part of this internal collapse in the leadership of the Iraqi troops responded to the style of leadership based on coercion, a style that, as noted above, was the one that Hussein preferably developed, and which, by its very nature, meant limitations for the proper conduct of the war.

The normative neo-institutionalism of Hussein and Bush

Institutional theories focus on the behavioral and social bases of information and preferences in a rational choice theory. In this sense, March and Olsen (1989) constantly speak of *organizations* and *political institutions* "as systems of rules and structures of meaning" (Torres, 2015, p. 123). They also refer to *institutional structures* and *regulatory structures*, which are assimilated as "collections of standard operating procedures... that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs" (Torres, 2015, p. 123). Thus, political institutions begin to radiate their importance in different areas of the social sciences, from a broad perspective in the

light of the behaviors of the same individual and the aggregate individual action of the members of society.

Following Torres (2015), institutions can be considered as regulatory frameworks in a broad perspective. This scheme is composed of "rules, norms, procedures, customs, conventions, roles and rituals" (p. 123), so that institutions can be from regulations determined by the same individuals against what and who is included in decision-making to recognized practices that consist of identifiable functions, while containing norms or rules that guide the dynamics of those who hold those functions.

The institutional atmosphere in Bush's and Hussein's leadership was evident. From a sociological perspective, each of the two leaders exercised their power from a historical and sociological perspective, appealing to the structures of the institutions they led. In this way, following Ostrom (2005), institutions functioned as *prescriptions* to create an order in the face of repetitive and structured social interactions and dynamics, which radiates both to families and to businesses, neighborhoods, and government entities at all levels.

As Torres (2001) points out, the predominant idea about institutions is based on the fact that there are sets of rules or regulatory systems that control the way in which people behave individually. The rules, thus understood, are the result of the action of specific social entities that are recognized as "formal organizations", which are responsible for establishing and enforcing the rules that govern them. Thus, "the institutional phenomenon cannot be understood if entities such as the family, legislatures, armies, churches and businesses are not considered. Thus, institutions should be seen as organizations that have reached a certain state or property that allows them to generate and impose patterns of behavior and that can be studied independently of the individual members that make it up (p. 128)". However, if we take into account the role that religion, symbols and beliefs had in the leaderships of Bush and Hussein, it can be seen that, from the institutional perspective, in the case of the Second Gulf War a special normative neo-institutional perspective was developed. This, since the development of human behaviors is based on the structuring of rules of behavior. In the case of Bush, in what, from his perspective and faith, corresponds to freedom from the Western vision. In the case of Hussein, from the rational understanding of the dictates of Baathism. This implied that, within the framework of the second Gulf War, the behaviors of individuals, both in the United States and in the Middle East - and also in different regions of the planet - were developed based on the influence of norms (restriction of movements, limitation of

privacy rights, immigration controls). Individuals' preferences were made based on the logic of what is appropriate, correct, or in accordance with the higher standard.

Thus, society's preferences were channeled to what was legally the right thing to do, in a kind of "inertial and collective reciprocity, unless there is strong leadership or powerful disagreement that alters stability" (Sánchez, 2013).

Conclusions

George W. Bush and Saddam Hussein are leaders who, in principle, sailed on completely different shores. The first one, attached to the fundamental values of the West. The second one, seen as a revolutionary capable of looking ahead to the traditional imperial powers; especially, that of the United States.

Bush stood out as a special president, given his leadership in the fight against terrorism, for which he appealed to the support of his people. In this way he represented traditional American politics, where the values of courage and risk are exalted. Hussein managed to subdue his people under the congregation of military and political support while maintaining great elements of unity during the three decades in which he managed to stay in power in defiance of the international community.

Both leaders stood out for the fact that they managed to influence others in their thoughts and actions. In this way, they were protagonists of the motives and purposes that mobilized them and that allowed them to remain in power.

However, in the Second Gulf War the leaderships of both protagonists had different dynamics, understood from the classical perspective of Clausewitz. In this confrontation, the military superiority of the Allies showed how the apparent Iraqi military fortress turned out to be a mere illusion.

Finally, the leadership styles of Hussein and Bush can be understood from a normative neo-institutional perspective, taking into account the role of the norm and religion, symbols and beliefs for the structuring of the due and expected behaviors of their peoples.

References

- Aburish, S. (2003). Saddam Hussein. método, astucia, codicia y crueldad. *Vanguardia dossier*, (5), 17-23.
- Avolio, B., Bass, B., & Jung, D. (1995). *MLQ Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire*. Technical report. Mind Garden.
- Bailey, D. (2008). Enacting Transformation: George W. Bush and the Pauline conversion narrative in "A Charge to Keep". *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, 11(2), 215-241.
- Bass, B., Avolio, B., Jung, D., & Berson, Y. (2003). Predicting unit performance by assessing transformational and transactional leadership. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88(2), 207-218.
- Blinderman, E. (2009). The Conviction of Saddam Hussein for the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts. *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law*, 30(4), 1239-1264.
- Bush, G. (2010). *Decision points*. Crown Publishers.
- Cifuentes, I. (2008). *Liderazgo estratégico, Consideraciones*. Perspectiva militar. Temas académicos militares. <https://perspectivamilitar.blogspot.com/2008/01/liderazgo-estrategico-consideraciones.html>
- Clausewitz, C. (2007). *On war*. Oxford University Press.
- Cuadrado, I., & Molero, F. (2002). Liderazgo transformacional y género: autoevaluaciones de directivos y directivas españoles. *Revista de Psicología del Trabajo y de las Organizaciones*, 18(1), 39-55. <http://www.uned.es/474031/rpwo.pdf>
- Etkin, J. (2006) *Liderazgo estratégico*. Leadership-Agenda.
- Fernández-Montesinos, A. (2018). *Repensando el liderazgo estratégico*. Sílex.
- Fontalela, S. (2006). Reflexiones tácticas sobre la Guerra de Irak (2003-2005). *Boletín de Información* (293). <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4574796>
- Freedman, L. (2013). *Strategy, a history*. Oxford University Press. New York.
- Gavaler, C. (2015). *Super cowboy in the white house*. The patron saints of superheroes. <https://thepatronsofsuperheroes.wordpress.com/tag/a-charge-to-keep/>
- Gergen, D. (2003). *Leadership in the Bush White House*. Harvard Business School. <https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/leadership-in-the-bush-white-house>
- Howard, M. (2002). *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction*. OUP Oxford.
- Hughes, G. (2020). Carl von Clausewitz and his Philosophy of War: The Evolution of a Reputation, 1831-2021. *History*, 105(368), 773-805. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-229X.13085>
- Jerrold, M. (2005). *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton*. University of Michigan Press.
- Katz, R. (1974). Skills of an effective administrator. *Harvard Business Review*, 52(5), 90-102.
- Macagnan, C. (2013). Teoría institucional: escrito teórico sobre los protagonistas de la escuela institucionalista de Economía. *BASE, revista de administración y contabilidad de Unisinos*, 10(2), 130-141. <https://doi.org/10.4013/base.2013.102.03>

- Mahnken, T., & Keaney, T. (2007). *War in Iraq: planning and execution*. Routledge.
- Manolea, A. (2021). The transpersonal war - Constituent of the hybrid war. *Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre*, 26(4), 372-376. <https://doi.org/10.2478/raft-2021-0048>
- Miller, J., & Mylroie, L. (1990). *Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf*. Times Bks.
- Moaddel, M., Tessler, M., & Inglehart, R. (2008). Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Insurgency: Findings from Values Surveys. *Political Science Quarterly*, 123(4), 623-644.
- Monsalve-Castro, C., Chamorro, L., & Luzardo, M. (2018). Liderazgo militar y su relación con la moral combativa de la Segunda División del Ejército Nacional de Colombia. *Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas: Investigación y Reflexión*, 26(2), 115-127. <https://doi.org/10.18359/rfce.3049>
- Ostrom, E. (2005). *Understanding institutional diversity*. Princeton University Press.
- Perry, B. (2022). Bush, George H. W. *American National Biography*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.013.369770>
- Pommerin, R. (2014). *Clausewitz goes global: Carl Von Clausewitz in the 21st Century*. Miles-Verlag.
- Porter, P. (2019). Behind the times: not Blair's war, but Britain's. *History Today*, 69(4), 90-94.
- Record, J. (2010). *Wanting war: why the Bush administration invaded Iraq*. Potomac Books.
- Sánchez, J. (2013). *Teoría institucional y ciencia política como factores de cambio en la seguridad nacional y gobernanza democrática*. CLAD.
- Sastre, S. (2014). *Desarrollo de capacidades para el liderazgo en proyectos de desarrollo rural. Aplicación a comunidades Aymaras*. [Tesis doctoral] Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Agrónomos.
- Skowronek, S. (2005). Leadership by definition: first term reflections on George W. Bush's political stance. *Perspectives on Politics*, 3(4), 817-831.
- Soriano, T. (2013). Buscando un líder. En Ministerio de Defensa (Ed.), *El liderazgo de las fuerzas armadas en el siglo XXI* (pp. 39-62). Ministerio de Defensa.
- The Guardian. (2003). *Full text: Bush's speech*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq>
- Torres, E. (2015). El nuevo institucionalismo: ¿hacia un nuevo paradigma? *Estudios Políticos*, 9(34), 117-137.
- Torres, E. (2001). Enfoques y modalidades del análisis de las instituciones políticas. *Estudios Políticos*, 6(27), 123-155.
- Thiessen, M. (Ed). (2009). *A Charge Kept: The Record of the Bush Presidency 2001-2009*. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/charge-kept.pdf>
- Wunderlich, H. (2003). Sistemas de armas utilizados en la Guerra en Irak-coalición 2003. *Revista de Marina*, 120(874).
- Zadeh, S., & Shafiee, E. (2017). The Study of Human Rights Situation in Iraq during Saddam Hussein Era. *Journal of Politics and Law*, 10(2), 216-219.

Chapter 8

Characterization of drug trafficking as a destabilizing factor in a national defense and security strategy

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.08>

Yesid Eduardo Ramírez Pedraza

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: The development of a national defense and security strategy must seek a holistic and comprehensive view of various aspects. Likewise, it is necessary to know what has been developed historically to mitigate the destabilization factor and determine milestones that can be considered successes or failures. In this way, a planning model for the National Defense and Security Strategy is proposed, using drug trafficking as a destabilizing factor, which requires the attention of the Colombian State from all its fields of action, in an articulated way. Therefore, and through multidimensional security, it is expected to expand the strategic landscape to allow the realization of plans and programs as inputs for the development of a National Security Plan that mitigates such destabilization and not only its legalization.

Keywords: defense, strategy, national, drug trafficking, security.

Yesid Eduardo Ramírez Pedraza

Lieutenant Colonel (R), Ejército Nacional de Colombia. PhD student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in Security and Hemispheric Defense, Interamerican Defense College. Master's Degree in Business Administration, University of Phoenix. Specialist, University Teaching, Centro de Educación Militar. Professional, Logistics Administration and Business Administration, Universidad Cooperativa de Colombia. Junior researcher categorized by MinCiencias. Professor and research fellow, Escuela Superior de Guerra.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0509-0995> - Contact: yesid.ramirez@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Ramírez Pedraza, Y. E. (2023). Characterization of drug trafficking as a destabilizing factor in a national defense and security strategy. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 163-190). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.08>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

The development of a national defense and security strategy must seek a holistic and comprehensive view of various aspects. First of all, the different factors that can destabilize a country must be taken into account, and that is why it is proposed to observe each of them from the different environments that exist: global, hemispheric, regional, neighborhood and national. These environments, in turn, must be analyzed within each of the fields of action of the State: the political, the social, the military and the economic. Likewise, it is necessary to know what has been developed historically to mitigate the destabilization factor and determine milestones that can be considered successes or failures.

For this, it is essential to use tools that provide large areas of knowledge, such as political science, international relations, geography, geopolitics, geostrategy, military sciences, economics, defense economics, strategy, and administration sciences. Only in this way can we aim for a 360° analysis that provides enough information to decision makers to generate a path that responds in the most appropriate way possible to the realities that affect the daily lives of the inhabitants of a State.

In this way, a planning model for the National Defense and Security Strategy is proposed, using drug trafficking as a destabilizing factor, which requires the attention of the Colombian State from all its fields of action, in an articulated way. In this way, authentic situational leadership is generated, in which the government acts as a cohesive unit guided by the contributions of academia in an environment of fifth-generation wars.

Fifth Generation Wars

Lind and Thiele (2015) made a characterization of wars by classifying them into generations and taking into account the armament used, the dimensions in which the battles are fought and the combatants they face. In this regard, Álvarez-Calderón et al. (2017) carry out a study of the changing nature of war, highlighting the challenges that have existed to typify and classify it.

The aforementioned authors analyze that this changing character is produced not only by technological advances that allow a change in the weapons used. But also by the changes that occur in the structure of the international system and within States, with respect to human activity, industrialization and infrastructure. Consequently, generations of war are not defined by the moment in which they were waged, but by the way they are carried out. In this way, today there can be a combination of first, second, third, fourth and fifth generation wars, depending on the means, resources and, above all, the dimensions in which the combatants move.

First-generation wars took place within the framework of the professionalization of armies, while second-generation wars were based on strategies of attrition. Third-generation wars, on the other hand, are blitzkrieg and maneuver wars, based on deflection and collapse (Álvarez-Calderón et al., 2017). Already in fourth-generation wars there is the greatest transformation, while the State is no longer the only actor that makes war, but the space is opened for guerrilla warfare and insurgencies (Álvarez-Calderón et al., 2017).

Fifth-generation wars differ from fourth-generation wars in several respects. According to Álvarez-Calderón et al. (2017), first of all fifth-generation wars are fought in the physical, information, cognitive and social domains. Likewise, as in unrestricted warfare, the limits on the actors fighting are dissipated, and in this way civilians from areas other than the military participate in them. Finally, this war seeks the implosion of the State through disinformation, the dismantling of the entities that compose it, the destruction of trust and the affectation of centers of gravity that lead to generalized destabilization (Álvarez-Calderón et al., 2017).

Fifth-generation wars manifest diluted and dispersed violence, which weakens the adversary's defense systems. They are carried out through influence on the perception of information, so their tools have to do with misinformation and the use or distortion of cultural, moral and religious values. This makes fifth-generation wars silent wars with diffuse limits, so they require a comprehensive response from the State beyond the use of the military instrument (Qureshi, 2019).

Drug trafficking as a destabilizing factor

The consumption of psychoactive substances dates back to ancient civilizations. Whether for religious, magical, medical or recreational purposes, elements such as opium, ayahuasca, coca, marijuana, and hallucinogenic mushrooms, were used by societies around the world to alter their mental state (de San Jorge Cárdenas et al., 2019; Longrich, 2021). However, it is not until the Opium Wars when a war conflict is documented due to the consequences for national sovereignty brought by drug trafficking.

The Opium Wars, which took place between 1839 and 1860, were the product of an escalation of tensions between the United Kingdom and the Chinese Empire, due to their differences in terms of the commercialization of opium in the eastern territory. The Chinese Empire watched with concern the decay of Chinese society, beginning with the detriment on the individual and extending to the family, social, economic and political aspects of the country.

For their part, the English sought an economic advantage over China, and gradually entered their territory, which was facilitated by the widespread addiction that opium had generated (Feige & Miron, 2008). In this regard, the violent escalation and use of military power as a response to defend Chinese sovereignty is striking. However, England won the victory, which generated great concessions for itself and led China to a whole century of humiliation.

It was not until 1912 that the International Opium Convention was signed. With this, greater awareness was generated regarding the negative consequences of drug trafficking, not only in terms of the health of the individual, but also, in terms of the structural damage it means for societies, for the leisure and violence it produces. In this regard, other treaties were signed such as the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, in New York, and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and, finally, the creation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

The United States has been a relevant actor in the illegal treatment of drugs, leading not only the first convention on the subject, signed in 1912, but also the war on drugs since the 1970s. Nixon and, later, Reagan carried out a campaign of criminalization and a war waged not from the military instrument, but from the Police, to which was added the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

This war has echoed throughout the Americas, and Colombia is not an exception. On the contrary, the declared war on drugs has allowed Colombia to carry out

actions against drug trafficking, such as Plan Colombia, Plan Libertad I, Operation Black Cat, the creation of the National Army's Anti-Drug Trafficking Brigade, the Emerald Strategy, and operations Orion and Zeus, among others.

The foregoing has been carried out under the understanding of the threat posed by drug trafficking to security. Seen from the perspective of human security, which is, in turn, composed of seven dimensions, drug trafficking generates damage no matter from which angle it is analyzed. Regarding health safety, depending on which drug is used, different damage is generated in the body. Marijuana produces neurological and psychological damage. Cocaine damages the oral and nasal mucous membranes and, with the exception of marijuana, the number of overdose deaths in the world increases year after year.

In terms of economic security, drug trafficking generates criminal ecosystems based on illegal economies. Political security is affected by the infiltration of groups with considerable economic power that corrupt the system with the so-called *narco-politics*. Soils suffer from deforestation and mineral loss, which threatens both food security and environmental security. Community and personal safety is also affected; especially in areas of cultivation and drug production in the country, such as, for example, Tumaco, Cauca and El Catatumbo.

And it is that from 2020 to 2021 alone, illicit crops in Colombia increased by 43%, which, according to the UNODC (2022), is due to the increase in demand on a global scale, the persistence of territorial vulnerability, the expectations derived from the peace agreements, the increase in illegal actors and the growth of incentives to produce the drug. This, according to the Attorney General's Office (2020), has resulted in an *outsourcing* of each of the elements of the drug trafficking supply chain, in which there are already specialized groups for each of the processes that are carried out.

Thus, in Colombia, outlaw groups are experts in cultivation and production, and have alliances with Mexican cartels and European mafias for the continuity of the chain in terms of distribution, marketing, and consumption. Money laundering, due to its organizational dynamics, manages to position itself globally, which is why one of the strategies to be carried out is the cybernetic tracking of money for the imprisonment of the heads of criminal structures.

On the other hand, drug trafficking is moving towards legalization, which in turn has its own difficulties. First of all, because so far there is talk of the legalization of marijuana and the possibility of doing the same with cocaine, but new drugs continue to be created, through the chemical manipulation of substances that can increase the level of addiction and, therefore, the risks of overdose. The legalization

of some drugs does not ensure the non-use of others, which generates uncertainty as to the actual control over illicit substances.

In the same way, legalization implies a look at the problem of drug trafficking as a public health problem, in which not only the physical but also the mental health aspects should be taken into account. With this, it would be necessary to prepare for the distribution of drugs, but also for the loss of cognitive and motor skills of society, which would have effects on the workforce, the available workforce, and its quality.

The planning models of national defense and security strategies

Due to the multiple effects of the drug trafficking phenomenon, an adequate analysis is required to integrate it into a national defense and security strategy. Therefore, there are various models for the planning and management of such strategies, which are pointed out and analyzed by Ballesteros (2016), who exposes the models of Barlett, Lykke, the Naval War College articulated by R. Lloyd, Drew and Snow. Fillberti's strategic guide; the guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, published by the Army War College, and the Deibel model. These structures will be fundamental for the reader to visualize the different elements that make up these methodologies and how they managed to influence the development of the following model.

With this in mind, this essay proposes a model that, although it includes elements of the aforementioned models, also starts from three main sources. First, it takes into account the *Apreciación Política Estratégica Nacional* (APEN in Spanish), which is the methodology currently used in Colombia to carry out national security strategies for the Course of Advanced Military Studies (CAEM) and the Comprehensive Course of National Defense (CIDENAL), at the *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (ESDEG). Secondly, it uses the elements of the strategy formula proposed by Sánchez-Hurtado (2012), in which they take into account not only the classic elements, means, ends and modes, but also add the environment, the adversary's strategy and risks. Finally, the elements of analysis and formulation of public policy are integrated, as this is the tool used by the States to carry out the political agenda of their government using the means at their disposal.


Regarding the APEN, as described by Cabrera-Ortiz (2021), this is one of the documents for the planning of the defense and security of Colombia, which was

established with Decree 1573 of July 31, 1974. The APEN seeks to materialize national interests through an analysis of the different fields of action of the State in the global, continental, neighborhood, and internal environments, as will be deepened later. We proceed with the evaluation of the hypotheses of war, or conflict, and actions are generated for these.

The National Strategic Concepts, the Government Guidelines, which serve as input for the National Security Plan, as well as other plans and programs including war plans and campaign plans, are built from the APEN. This, subsequently, seeks integration into the National Security Plan, the Public Security and Defense Policy and other technical and economic documents (Cabrera-Ortiz, 2021)

With this in mind, Figure 1 is presented, which establishes the steps and edges proposed for the planning of a national security strategy.

Figure 1. Management method to formulate the National Security Strategy.



Source: Own elaboration.

Although all the steps proposed in the center of Figure 1 have elements obtained from the APEN, the left side shows the formula of the strategy carried out by Sánchez-Hurtado (2012). Said author proposes the following formula, which was another proposal contemplated for the formulation of the model in question:

Strategy = Aims + Environment + Adversary Strategy + Risks + Means + Ways

Sánchez Hurtado's formula is novel in that it adds new elements to the analysis of strategy, which has been classically seen from the ends, means and modes. Thus, it adds the elements of the environment, which allows us to capture the opportunities and challenges presented by the international system. The hemisphere, the dynamics of the region, the phenomena present at the borders and, finally, the realities of the nation.

In the same way, identify the risks coming from the aforementioned environments and the adversary's strategy, which is essential, as Sun Tzu (2015) argued: "Know your enemy and know yourself, and you will be successful in a thousand battles". The adversary's strategy provides the strategy with a dynamic element and proactive and non-reactive responses.

All these elements are essential, but for the present test, the formula has been modified, as follows:

$$\text{Strategy} = \frac{\text{Aims (Means + Modes)} + \text{Environment (Adversary's Strategy + Risks)}}{\text{Time}}$$

The modification is due to the way in which the elements of Sánchez's strategic formulation interact. First, ends are understood as logical only if they are managed in terms of means and modes, since any goal is meaningless unless you have the resources and plans to articulate them. In particular, the proposal understands modes such as public policies, plans and programs, as will be discussed later.

On the other hand, the adversary's strategy and risks are evaluated according to the environment, or environments, as the global, hemispheric, regional, and national are taken into account. Each of these analyses how the State's fields of action face challenges or opportunities that the adversaries themselves, due to their strategies, suggest.


However, with regard to the analysis of public policy as a source, Figure 1 shows that, to begin with, an analysis of how the destabilization factor affects the essential purposes of the State is proposed. These goals are tied both to the national objectives, which are in line with the current National Development Plan (PND in Spanish), and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) within the global 2030 agenda. After that, it is studied what public policies have been developed to affect the scourge that is being determined: for example, in the case of drug trafficking there are security and defense policies, as shown below:

1. Democratic Security Policy.
2. Democratic Security Consolidation Policy.
3. Comprehensive Security and Defense Policy for Prosperity.
4. Defense and Security Policy. All for a new country.
5. Defense and Security Policy. Legality, Equity and Entrepreneurship.

These policies, in turn, are analyzed, for which, implementing contributions from Roth (2002) and Bardach (2001), among others, the analysis cycle represented in Figure 2 has been created. Through this, essential conclusions are reached that allow us to elucidate what has been done, what has worked and why it has worked and what has not worked and why it has not worked.

Undoubtedly, it is an arduous job and requires a multidisciplinary team, in which not only the qualitative aspects of the problem in question are analyzed, but also the statistics. For example: how many hectares have been planted over the years? Have they increased or decreased? How many people have died from overdoses in the country and in the hemisphere? etc.

Figure 2. *Public Policy Analysis Cycle*




Source: Own elaboration, based on Roth (2002) and Bardach (2001).

This is one of the most important contributions of this proposal, as it allows the achievement of two objectives. First, it is clearly evident how the fields of action of the State have been articulated since the actions of the national, regional, or municipal government. That is, it is an objective analysis of what has been done. On the other hand, an evaluation of the actions taken to attack the destabilization factor is achieved, thus obtaining a complete picture of the country, which guides the analysis towards the measures that can be taken.

With the above, the first step of the proposed model has been covered, so, in a succinct way, we proceed with the following steps. For the environment, an analysis similar to that of the APEN is made, in which, by means of a table, the following questions are answered. 1) Which national interests predominate in the environment? 2) Which geographical areas deserve attention? 3) What risks of destabilization exist? 4) What commitments does the country have with intergovernmental organizations, or domestically, for the ratification of treaties?

The answers are tabulated generating a matrix of five rows and six columns, which facilitates the analysis in terms of the global, hemispheric, regional, neighborhood and national environments in each of the fields of action of the State: political, economic, social, and military. It is essential not to omit any of these steps, in order to give the decision maker a visualization of the areas that require State attention.

Figure 3. Threat differentiators



Source: own elaboration, based on Sánchez-Hurtado (2012).

As seen in Figure 3, the identification and assessment of pressures or destabilization factors is continued. For this, the evolutionary dynamics of the threat is

used, where, taking into account the capacity, will and use of force by the adversary, plus the interference that said adversary produces in the State, the destabilization factor is classified, where the least serious is the *obstacle*, and the most serious, the *hypothesis of war*. This step introduces the decision maker to the type of tools and instruments they can use.

In the case of drug trafficking, it has been concluded that it is a dominant pressure. This is because the criminal structures that produce this scourge are not militarized and require a comprehensive response, based on situational leadership, as will be discussed later. Drug trafficking does not represent a hypothesis of war or conflict, where the greatest weight of the State's response must be of a military nature.

However, the model continues with the determination and hierarchy of hypotheses and the delimitation and determination of strategic areas. This step takes into account that national security strategies seek to respond to various threats, and that, as has been done with drug trafficking, an analysis is made of each of the destabilization factors.

Finally, an analysis is made of the resources available to the State. Such resources can be *material* or *immaterial*, as Morgenthau (1986) argued. That is, geography (climate, position, territorial extension, population), economy, political stability, and culture, among others, are taken into account. In a context of fifth-generation wars, such an analysis is essential, since the State must analyze all its instruments of power based on its means, to give a unified, cohesive, and articulated response to the scourges that are presented to it.

This is reaffirmed by UNODC (2022), which recommends the use of social, cultural, and physical and technological infrastructure tools to facilitate more options for rural citizens, to avoid falling into illicit economies. Likewise, regarding consumption, it is suggested to review education, culture and, above all, public health plans, including both physical and mental health. In all this, the Armed Forces may be an articulating axis, but, definitely, they cannot be the only answer, since the articulation of all the fields of action of the State is required for an efficient, effective and, therefore, effective response.

Situational leadership

All of the exposed above is based on situational leadership that exists when a leader manages to have a strategic and updated vision and promotes articulation and

teamwork. Such is the case of *"The Surge strategy"*, carried out by General David Petraeus in Iraq. In 2006, prior to the arrival of General Petraeus, the situation in Iraq escalated into civil war (Miron, 2019a). More than 50 attacks and three car bombs were reported per day only in Baghdad (Petraeus, 2013), which showed that the strategies used were not working. Such strategies were directed towards the annihilation of the enemy, so they were based on kinetic tactics, which involved the use of force in a conventional manner.

The strategy General Petraeus implemented was based on four big ideas. First of all, the general evidenced that the violence in Iraq affected the population in the first place and, therefore, it was necessary to think about the security of the people rather than the transition to the Iraqi Armed Forces. In this way, he developed his strategy considering the human terrain as the center of gravity, for which he determined that it was essential for the US military to live with the Iraqis.

In this way, Petraeus rediscovered the theoretical discourse of authors such as Robert Thompson and David Galula. These twentieth-century authors had emphasized the importance of winning minds and hearts to gain victory in a counterinsurgency war (Miron, 2019b). Their population-centric *approach* was reflected in the Armed Forces of the United States, as described by the Royal Elcano Institute:

The US military recognized that a purely military operation was counterproductive if other actions were not carried out that included collaboration with local forces and their training, protection and attention to the needs of the population, the development of the economy and infrastructures, the empowerment of a representative central government, and the importance of establishing bonds of trust with tribal and religious leaders to counter the propaganda carried out by the insurgent side, creating in turn a narrative of victory attractive to the imaginary. (2015 [author's bold]).

The Royal Institute (2015) also names two concepts that appear in the manual FM 3-24, essential to work with the population as a center of gravity. The first is *cultural awareness*, and the second, *comprehensive approach*. Regarding cultural awareness, for Petraeus, social and cultural studies were key. Because if they were not taken into account, it was impossible to understand the reality of the operational environment and it was easier for the enemy to win the support of the population, which would enable him to postpone the counterinsurgency fight. On the contrary, if the aforementioned studies were taken into account, it was possible to generate alliances with tribal and religious leaders, in addition to working with various governmental, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations.

As for the comprehensive approach, it refers to the integrality of the elements, which seeks to understand the social, political, cultural and religious realities of the operational environment. Petraeus (2013) points out that a 360° look was sought, in which even field reporters were given space to communicate their perspectives and visions. Likewise, a change was generated in the training of the military who would serve in Iraq, to prepare them in the aforementioned areas in order to generate links with the population.

Regarding the links with the population, the second idea of Petraeus' strategy was that to achieve victory in the war it was necessary to seek reconciliation with as many insurgents as possible, understanding that annihilation is not always the best way to go (Petraeus, 2016). Under this idea, the Elcano Royal Institute (2015), mentions that:

"The U.S. military changed its notion of enemy, differentiating al-Qaeda from other Sunni tribes it previously considered enemies. By negotiating with them, he managed to form an entire army of "Sons of Iraq", 100,000 volunteers who went from fighting against the Americans to fighting hand in hand with them in a phenomenon that was called "the Awakening of Anbar". (Real Instituto Elcano, 2015, n.d.)

However, it was clear to Petraeus and his team that not all combatants were reconcilable; not, especially, the leaders of insurgent and terrorist groups (Petraeus, 2016). These irreconcilable individuals were to be given conventional treatment using the direct method, to achieve their annihilation or imprisonment. This would be achieved through completely regular operations, by kinetic means.

Thus, as Marina Miron (2019) expresses, direct methods, focused on the destruction of the enemy, were combined with indirect methods, which eroded the population's support for the insurgents. These ideas had been explored by the expert David Kilcullen, who served as an advisor to General David Petraeus, and became the most cited author in the FM 3-24 manual.

These ideas formed an operational concept that was developed iteratively in three steps: *clear*, *maintain*, and *build*. That is, clear the geographical areas of insurgent and terrorist groups that attacked the population; maintain the areas through the coexistence between the US military, religious and tribal leaders, and the population, and build a democratic system, in which the representation of society was strengthened, seeking to reach the transition for the consolidation of the State.

Due to the decentralized nature of transnational organized crime structures, each of the elements of *The Surge* strategy are applicable to attack the phenomenon of drug trafficking. In this way, a comprehensive response would be achieved that does not mean impunity, but, rather, a work in society to work against the culture of illegality, fast money and social and individual decadence.

Conclusions

In this essay, different axes have been integrated to exemplify a proposal for a management and planning model for the national defense and security strategy. First, a journey has been made through the generations of war, up to the fifth-generation wars, in order to understand the type of conflict that is faced today.

A characterization of the drug trafficking phenomenon was continued, in order to show, in a six-step model, how to evaluate the destabilization factors in a national defense and security strategy. Finally, elements of the school of situational leadership used by General David Petraeus in Iraq were used to bring elements to reflection regarding the response to decentralized structures such as those of transnational organized crime.

References

- Álvarez-Calderón, C., Santafé, J., & Urbano, O. (2017). Methamorphosis bellum: ¿Mutando a guerras de quinta generación? En C. Álvarez (Ed.), *Escenarios y Desafíos de la Seguridad Multidimensional en Colombia* (pp. 145-247). Ediciones ESDEG.
- Ballesteros, M. (2016). *En busca de una estrategia de seguridad nacional*. Ministerio de Defensa de España.
- Bardach, E. (2001). *Los ocho pasos para el análisis de políticas públicas. Un manual para la práctica*. Miguel Ángel Porrúa Grupo Editorial.
- Belfer Center. (2016). *David Petraeus: Four Tasks of a Strategic Leader* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ej4SmxDfEgQ&list=PLp1QSxtgPnf5-Undo0jPj0_fliYS5iSfC&index=3
- Cabrera-Ortiz, F. (2021). Propuesta para el planeamiento estratégico de la seguridad nacional desde una perspectiva multidimensional. *Revista Científica General José María Córdova*, 19(33), 5-28. <https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.747>
- de San Jorge, X., Beverido, P., & Salas, B. (2019). El consumo de drogas a través de la historia. En V. Moreno, E. Casas, & L. Ramírez (Eds.), *La planificación de políticas y programas de prevención de adicciones* (pp. 53-64). UAT, Consejo de Publicaciones, Fomento Editorial, Colofón.
- Feige, C., & Miron, J. (2008). The opium wars, opium legalization and opium consumption in China. *Applied Economics Letters*, 15(12), 911-913. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504850600972295>
- Fiscalía General de la Nación. (2020). *Estrategia disruptiva contra el narcotráfico 2.0*. Class Print S.A.S.
- Lind, W., & Thiele, G. (2015). *4th Generation Warfare Handbook*. Castalia House.
- Longrich, N. (2021, 16 de agosto). ¿Cuándo empezaron los humanos a experimentar con el alcohol y las drogas? El País. <https://elpais.com/ciencia/2021-08-16/cuando-empezaron-los-humanos-a-experimentar-con-el-alcohol-y-las-drogas.html>
- Miron, M. (2019a). *Counterinsurgency Operations in the 21st Century. Insights from the U.S Army Experiences in Iraq*. Sello Editorial ESMIC.
- Miron, M. (2019b). *Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice: From Early Renaissance to Present Day*. Sello Editorial ESMIC. <https://doi.org/10.21830/9789585200890>

- Morgenthau, H. (1986). *Política entre las naciones: la lucha por el poder y la paz*. Grupo Editor Latinoamericano: GEL.
- Petraeus, D. (2013, 29 de octubre). *How We Won in Iraq*. Foreign Policy. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/29/how-we-won-in-iraq/>
- Qureshi, W. (2019). Fourth and Fifth-Generation Warfare: Technology and Perceptions. *San Diego International Law Journal*, 21(1), 188-215.
- Real Instituto Elcano. (2015, 15 de enero). *David Petraeus: auge y caída de un gran general*. <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/david-petraeus-auge-y-caida-de-un-gran-general/>
- Roth, A. (2002). *Políticas Públicas. Formulación, implementación y evaluación*. Ediciones Aurora. https://polpublicas.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/roth_andre-politicas-publicas-libro-completo.pdf
- Sánchez-Hurtado, J. (2012). *En la mente de los estrategas*. Ediciones ESDEG.
- Tzu, S. (2015). *El Arte de la Guerra*. [eBook] e-artnow. <https://www.amazon.com/-/es/Sun-Tzu-ebook/dp/B011VIVOF0>
- UNODC. (2022). *Colombia. Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2021*. Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito.

Chapter 9

Leadership from the Kremlin's military and ideological strategy: the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.09>

Laura Arciniegas Londoño

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: The Russian incursion into Ukraine has exposed Russia's foreign policy tactics worldwide, forged from an ideological and military approach. These tactics highlight the leadership qualities of key figures such as Valery Gerasimov and Alexander Dugin, both pillars in strategy and support for Vladimir Putin. This chapter will address how these military and ideological strategies align with the Kremlin's territorial ambitions. It will begin by examining the different leadership styles and their evolution, followed by how these strategic figures have established themselves as leadership models not only in Russia, but also globally. Finally, your skills for strategic execution in a crisis that has captured international attention and affects conflict dynamics in the 21st century will be detailed..

Palabras clave: conflict, ideology, leadership, Russia, Ukraine.

Laura Arciniegas Londoño

Second Lieutenant (R), Ejército Nacional de Colombia. Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in Strategic Intelligence (Magna cum Laude), School of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (ESICI). Civil Engineer, UMNG. Professional, Military Sciences, Escuela Militar de Cadetes "General José María Córdova". Researcher, Centro de Investigación de Guerra Asimétrica (CIGA), ESICI.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9614-935X> - Contact: arciniegasl@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Arciniegas Londoño, L. (2023). Leadership from the Kremlin's military and ideological strategy: the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 181-204). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.09>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

Leadership is presented as a fundamental factor for the development of military operations. In fact, strategies must be led by an exceptional leader, who manages to lead any military force to success. Leaders are not only responsible for making extreme decisions that depend on life or death, but they are responsible for structuring a total vision of the panorama to achieve greater control over the operational climate and the quality of life of subordinates. The leader will be able to influence people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization they lead (Roberts, 2018).

In this sense, leadership will have to be directed by a person capable of influencing a context of tension, as their ability to make correct decisions that reduce the success gap before structured goals is key. In contexts such as the one currently arising between nations such as Russia and Ukraine, it is possible to perceive individuals with great leadership skills. These capacities, positive or not, have managed to insistently guide the conditions of expansionism outlined by Vladimir Putin.

The first of the leaders to emerge in the context described is Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov, Russian general and current chief of staff of the Russian Armed Forces and first deputy minister of defense. General Gerasimov has managed to position his military thinking from a strategic vision, in which it is possible to make visible the new dynamics of the war from Russia to the countries of the Middle East. A series of political analysts have given him the name of "military genius", on the understanding that he managed to build Gerasimov's famous concept of war. It focuses on "guiding its General Staff to initiate the tasks of planning the evolution of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" (Calderón, 2020). His leadership is based on an ideological concept based on strategies, in addition to the recognition

of military actions that have managed to position Gerasimov as one of the most influential leaders of the moment.

On the other hand, by taking as a reference the role that General Gerasimov has built, it is possible to take into account the second leader identified. This is Russian historian and philosopher Alexander Dugin, responsible for the idea of Russian expansionism after President Vladimir Putin came to power. Dugin has been considered an influential figure in goals such as renewed *Eurasianism*, linked to Russian national interests in the region (Redondo, 2018).

In accordance with the above, the following lines will contain a description of leadership from the military strategy of Valery Gerasimov with respect to the structured direction under the ideas of Alexander Dugin towards the development of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Therefore, first of all, an approach will be made to the concept of leadership, its types, and its various schemes. Secondly, it is necessary to describe the selected leader, Valery Gerasimov, analyzing the establishment of his strategies and ideas that have led him to position himself as a global leader. Finally, a case study focused on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will be presented, in which it is possible to observe how Russia's foreign policy has been structured taking into account what was established by Dugin and the strategies led by Gerasimov, in order to make visible which are the centers of conflict that seek to strengthen and how this Russian-Ukrainian expansion develops.

The leadership of Russian General Valery Gerasimov and that of Alexander Dugin have managed to strengthen Russian foreign policy and its race towards control of the territory of interest. These leaders have managed to considerably influence Russian politics in recent years, from its traditionalist components to the strategies that channel the desired territorial purpose: *Eurasianism*.

Before analyzing the behaviors of Valery Gerasimov and the ideas of Alexander Dugin focused on the establishment of Russian leadership. It is important to understand how leadership develops, how it manages to influence conflict scenarios, what its elements and characteristics are and what its main schools are, in order to specify the point of integration of Russian military actions. In this, the trajectory and evolution of Russian intentions from Gerasimov's strategies to the ideological support formed by Dugin will be taken into account, so that an integration of points directed towards the analysis of the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict can be presented, from the description of the leader.

Leadership from the analysis of a war

In simple terms, leadership consists of the ability to influence people in order to achieve an important objective for the leader, the group, or the organization. In this sense, the human characteristic or factor is taken into account, which seeks to guide, motivate and inspire, and to do so, especially during times of crisis, conflict, chaos and complexity, since directives, political statements and communiqués have little effect on the development of conflict. By doing so, establishing strong leadership encourages subordinates to work beyond the obligation to obey. In fact, it rather manages to connect with the commitment to the mission in a way that maximizes the potential of said subordinates (Walker & Horn, 2008).

Leadership can occur in a multiplicity of settings. However, crisis situations encourage people to make use of their skills and abilities to demonstrate characteristics of leaders in the midst of a conflict situation, taking into account that it is necessary to seek a prompt solution to the problem. In this sense, Baran and Scott (2010) argue that leadership in chaotic environments becomes a collective process of creating meaning, which works to reduce the inherent ambiguity of the environment and, at the same time, promotes resilience in the face of danger. As a consequence, leadership is constituted from coordinated reciprocal interactions during the conflict situation.

Taking this idea into account, it is possible to argue why the actions of Russian General Valery Gerasimov are taken as a reference, understanding his abilities as an excellent organizer and driver (Calderón, 2020). Leadership is built on the *theory of the great man*, which is known as a way to identify the key characteristics of successful leaders. This approach was common in the Army and is still used as a study to identify leadership characteristics such as technical skill, application to task, group or organizational task support, social skill, emotional control, administrative skill, general charisma, and intelligence (Bolden et al., 2003). Therefore, it is necessary to identify the elements and characteristics that are part of leadership, focusing on the construction of tactics and strategies aimed at a pre-established goal.

Elements and Characteristics of Leadership

Despite the multiplicity of research around leadership, there does not seem to be a guaranteed consensus of what makes a leader effective. Leaders usually establish a balance between their traits, ability, behaviors, sources of power and aspects of

the situation, which will be the main factors to influence a given population, as is the case of Russia on Ukraine. In this sense, any member of the organization or group could assume the leadership role; however, it is necessary to recognize what is the differential element that makes him a significant leader. The most effective measure of a leader and their competencies is the degree to which the organization achieves its objectives and how long they last over time (Vojta, 2010). A leader will be able to take a phrase and bring it to life.

Leadership will then be the core of any organization, as it leads to the establishment of a strategic plan that considers the probability of failure that the group could have in combat; even so, the success of the organization will depend on a superior team that supports each of its practices. In this case, as with the close link between General Gerasimov and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and in which the need to identify and meet the needs and expectations of projects that protect national security and expand Russian power is recognized (Caporicci, 2013).


The effectiveness of the leader is composed of distinctive characteristics, which will serve as a focus in a chaotic scenario in which it is required to demonstrate leadership skills to the fullest. The list of qualities that are part of leadership is virtually endless, so military members are expected to consider six vital traits that strengthen them not only from the individual level, but also from the collective environment.

Among this list, it is important to recognize the factor of integrity for the development of strategic leadership actions; without integrity, the moral pillars of the Armed Forces -among them, public confidence, and self-esteem- fade. Consecutively, a three-dimensional trait is taken into account: *loyalty*. And from this it is necessary to maintain an attitude of *loyalty* to superiors, colleagues, and subordinates, hoping to generate close links that make it possible to implement the objectives. Finally, *commitment* is taken into consideration, in the name of which it is essential to have a complete devotion to duty: leaders must demonstrate a total dedication to their country (Jeanne, 2019).

Over time, many emperors, kings and warriors, among others, have benefited from the elements of leadership, which have been presented since the organization of civilizations. Little by little, these characteristics contributed to the construction of a hierarchical structure that allowed societies to be governed in a more controlled, direct and stable way. While kingdoms and populations were strengthened and expanded, leadership also did so. That is why leaders evolved and the ways in which society was administered improved, which is why the academics of the time

managed to affirm that leaders were born, and not made (Giraldo & Naranjo, 2014), referring to the *theory of traits*, which states that "leadership is something innate; you are born a leader" (Digital Library of the University of Alcalá, n.d.). From this idea, it is possible to make visible the construction of leadership taking into account the theories shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. *Evolution of leadership theories.*



Source: Giraldo and Naranjo (2014).

Each of the theories that connect with the leadership structure has management and direction as its characteristics. On the one hand, *management* refers to the ability to manage a set of elements that drive the efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity of organizations. On the other hand, *management* is the result of administration. It is seen as an activity carried out by each individual who guides and manages a group of people. At this point it is key that leadership is involved to achieve a more enjoyable and positive relationship of influence (Giraldo & Naranjo, 2014). Both characteristics are part of a constant construction process that must be coordinated by a leader, in order to reflect the achievement of the objectives; the leader must be able to transmit a proactive attitude to the people involved in the development processes. And in this sense, it will be key for the leader to consider each of the characteristics shown in figure 2, in order to present a comprehensive leadership.

Figure 2. *Components of leadership.*



Source: Giraldo and Naranjo (2014).

Now, before starting the description of each theory, it is necessary to recognize that a leader is different from a boss. The *boss* is responsible for assigning functions, does not have much interaction with the people in charge, gives few moments of feedback, his work becomes monotonous, his vision is short-term, and his focus is on managing, maintaining and controlling. For his part, the *leader* is responsible for instilling teamwork, creating a highly stimulating scenario, generating spaces for constant feedback, encouraging creative work, his vision focuses on the long term, and is responsible for innovating, developing and inspiring (Giraldo & Naranjo, 2014).

Leadership theories

Introducing the development of theories contributes to the gradual approach to understanding the actions of a leader like the Russian general Gerasimov; these actions are intended, in turn, for other actions that are not always positive for the global vision, but for their strategies, objectives and goals. In this sense, the tour begins with the *theory of the great man*, the first to evolve along with the history that surrounds the world. This theory is characterized by recognizing that human

beings are born with certain traits that contribute to their identification of leaders, who have the ability to express their power and influence before other human beings (Daft, 2006). In this theory, leaders such as Alexander the Great stand out, who ruled his country and, at the same time, led great warrior expeditions, being one of the pioneers in developing interaction activities, through shared qualities that led him to success. (Mejía, 2007).

Secondly, the *theory of traits is developed*, which evolved by the 1920s, this is derived from the theory of the great man and suggests that the characteristics of leadership are called *traits*; that is, traits that allow differentiating between a true leader and who is not. In this sense, it is possible to highlight the differential traits taking into account the various personalities of the population and recognizing the following list to identify the leader. He has high levels of energy, his intelligence is superior, and he has the ability to predict and persuade more easily (Castro & Lupano, 2007).

However, Ralph Stodgill affirms, after an investigation of this type of leadership, that there are no unique characteristics to define who is a leader and who is not, so he concludes that leadership is formed and determined from specific situations (Giraldo & Naranjo, 2014). On the other hand, it is important to analyze a new level of behavior within the evolution of leadership. *Behavior theory* presents a new approach, as analysts do not focus on studying the qualities that are part of the leader, but, rather, observe how the leader acts with respect to his followers. In this approach, leadership is learned through behaviors, so at this point it is possible to affirm that the leader is built from a training, through which he gradually strengthens the learning of certain behaviors. In this sense, it is important to note that trait theory focused on two factors: traits and attributes, while behavior theory proposes a generalized change of approach, by putting it in the *behaviors* and *behaviors* of the leader (Sánchez, 2022).

Consequently, the *contingency theory* is presented, which is based on the effectiveness of leadership and the context in which it is developed, so here it is key to know the scenario where the leader develops, to know his reaction and to know whether or not he meets the necessary characteristics to be one. However, in this theory it is mentioned that when the situation presents a wide variability, the type of leadership tends to vary (Daft, 2006). In this way, it is possible to recognize that this theory focuses on the determination of three variables: the *relationship between the leader and his followers*, the *structuring of the tasks* and the *power that the leader exercises* (Giraldo & Naranjo, 2014).

This theory mentions that the motivation of the activity or relationship of the leader is measured by resorting to the *scale of the least preferred partner*, by means of which leaders are asked to remember a co-worker with whom they least work well, and to characterize this individual with qualifications in a series of adjectives (distant, cold, etc.). This, in order to take into account external perceptions (Encyclopedia of Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, n.d.), which would motivate people to have increasingly harmonious interpersonal relationships, as would be done in a theatrical space.

Figure 3 shows how theories on leadership have evolved, which, in their entirety, allow us to establish traits and characteristics of an integral leader.

Figure 3. Evolution of theories about leadership.



Source: Giraldo and Naranjo (2014).

Continuing with the theoretical evolution, there is the *theory of influence*, which is based on *charismatic leadership*. This new leadership bases its ideas on the qualities and personality of charisma that the leader has. A charismatic leader will be one who has total confidence in himself, as he will be able to build a clear vision about the goals and will structure a strong commitment to meet them. A particular factor is that this type of leader has atypical behavior, which changes constantly, according to his environment (Rada, 2018).

Likewise, this theory is based on a constant cycle of *learning*, which allows the leader to create new knowledge and present himself to his followers as a key actor, in order to always put them at the service of the organization (Sánchez, 2022). In

turn, the influence aspect in this type of theory takes into account the analysis of *social identity*, which explains leadership as a phenomenon of social influence, so it can be configured and focused from organizational and management contexts (Hogg et al., 2012).

In this way, a scheme is presented where it is important to recognize the characteristics of a charismatic leader, with the aim of identifying what characteristics the selected leaders possess, as shown in figure 4.

Figure 4. *Qualities of the charismatic leader.*



Source: Giraldo & Naranjo (2014).

Sometimes, the factor of doing good, mentioned in figure 4, can be diffuse, since it will depend, for example, on the objectives and perspectives of each nation and on the way in which it is applied. There are leaders who act in their interests by affirming that their actions are correct. However, from an overview, it is not possible for such actions to be recognized as lawful or to be seen well, so a dilemma is created within an endless cycle, in which it is possible to recognize leadership characteristics, but not always good behavior.

Finally, the final evolution of leadership theories is presented from the *theory of relationships*. At this point, two new types of leadership are recognized: *transactional*

and *transformational*. The first one refers to the *transaction*, or exchange made between the leader and his followers (Giraldo & Naranjo, 2014). In turn, transactional leadership is responsible for generating a *contingent reward*, which offers a benefit for the followers in charge of achieving the goals and achieving the objectives. Also, a *direction by exception*, a scenario in which it is possible to generate negative feedback, sanctions, and corrections for not achieving the objectives or achieving the goals (Fernández & Quintero, 2017).

For its part, *transformational leadership* is responsible for generating an intellectual stimulus for the worker, taking into account their ideas, motivating them, and generating interest so that they can participate in the results of the organization (Arévalo & Tikhomirova, 2015). This theory considers the vision of the ideal future. This factor does not take into account rewards or punishments. It rather promotes the development of followers with the aim of generating greater contributions to the group (Giraldo & Naranjo, 2014).

In this way it is possible to consider particular attributes taken from the theoretical review, and which will be key to analyze the behavior of the leader and the construction of his strategies towards a military direction. First, there would be the attitude of being a charismatic person based on values. From this point of view, the leader will be a visionary, inspiring, willing to self-sacrifice. This is seen from their integrity, their decision, and their orientation to performance. Secondly, the orientation towards teamwork is considered. Here we seek to create a group that is collaborative, cohesive and diplomatic, but that can also have a malevolent cunning, all while maintaining administrative competence. (Guterman, 2017).

In addition, the leader could adopt a position of self-protection, focusing on his own well-being and demonstrating an acute awareness of his status, which makes him capable of generating conflicts and elaborating procedural strategies. Alternatively, you could project a participatory image, but act in an autocratic and non-inclusive way, overlooking qualities such as humility and orientation towards others. Finally, it is considered an element of autonomy, in which the leader is distinguished as an individualistic, independent, and unique figure. (Guterman, 2017).

Institutionalism

Before connecting each of the ideas with the case study, one last factor that connects with leadership is presented: *institutionalism*. *Institutional theory* takes into account a number of methodological approaches that emphasize the importance

of institutions, understood as the regularities, structures, and context that influence policy outcomes and shape behaviors (Schmidt, 2014). The impact of institutionalism has positioned institutions from economic levels, with the aim of reducing market uncertainty since the establishment of regulations, conventions and practices that manage to regulate atypical scenarios.

Institutionalism is responsible for examining the adaptations and conformations on the part of organizations, taking into account the various pressures generated from the institutional environment, with the aim of achieving legitimacy. Institutions also go hand in hand with evolving environments, which vary according to the situations that arise. The context presented from this factor will be determined from the opportunities that organizations build to explore the construction of theories and applied methods (Vargas-Hernández, 2008).

In this sense, institutions must prepare to face any scenario and make timely decisions that achieve each of the pre-established objectives. In the specific case of the military sector, institutionalism reinforces its administrative structure and strengthens combat, service and support units, thus achieving a stronger structuring of the Ministry of Defense (Bodnieks, 2020).

Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: Leadership Structure in the Midst of a Crisis

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has developed since the emergence of several internal and external challenges. Such as institutional changes, changes in land use, climate change, and global economic trends, all of which have significantly affected their agricultural future. In addition, Russian foreign policy attempts to preserve its own hegemony in both regions through diplomacy and confrontation, making use of Russian and Western military technologies, which continue to compete in the region (Nasir et al., 2022).

From the recognition of the different dynamics, Vladimir Putin, Russian president, mobilized, on May 9, 2022, the support of the country's citizens for their eleven-week war against Ukraine, mentioning that Moscow must defend itself from an imminent attack. This, considering that Russia has shifted its military efforts towards the east and southeast of Ukraine, and has focused on the bombing of critical infrastructure, after failing to take Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. In addition, Russia has initiated non-military strategies since the cut-off of gas supplies to

Bulgaria and Poland, and this escalated the conflict with the European Union (EU) (Grajewski, 2022).

This conflict has become the most violent in the world since the second invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia has made some progress in the eastern part of Donbass and Luhansk and has also taken control of almost all state media, thus becoming a conflictive actor on the international scene that represses and uses illegal means of action (Nagy & Beng, 2022).

However, each of its strategies has achieved its objectives, led by General Valery Gerasimov, who has adopted his doctrine on Ukrainian territory to win this war through the use of hybrid warfare through unconventional weapons. In this way, it is necessary to identify its leadership characteristics during the construction of this war, which has made use of non-military, political, economic, informational, and other factors, which have been called *new hybrid methods*.

Valery Gerasimov - Russia's Strategic Military Leader

Understanding each of the concepts focused on the recognition of the characteristics that a leader must have, the actions and ideas that General Gerasimov has developed since his condition of power are considered. In 2014, a new perspective of military conflict on the European continent, between Russia and Ukraine, is presented on a global scale. Since Russia's annexation of Crimea and the ensuing conflict in eastern Ukraine's Donbass region, security analysts around the world have begun to review the approach being taken to Russia's foreign policy, which had allowed for an illegal annexation of the neighboring country. It was stated that due to the success of the operation by Russia, that country had implemented a new theoretical strategic framework (Giles, 2020).

In this sense, it is possible to identify how General Gerasimov's participation has been found behind each military security strategy through the Gerasimov doctrine and the idea in which Russia uses hybrid warfare against its adversaries. This concept of hybrid warfare was discovered from the article "The value of science is in foresight", presented by General Gerasimov before taking up his current position in the Russian Armed Forces (Calderón, 2020). In the article, the general was in charge of exposing a new tactic, which has become one of the modern weapons of contemporary warfare: "hacker, unauthorized access to computers, networks or

computer systems, or their data. Perform this action against the enemy to generate an environment of permanent restlessness and conflict. This is how propaganda 2.0 was born " (Ruedas, 2019).

Regarding this new type of propaganda, Raquel Montenegro (2022) explains that this type of strategy is being used through the implementation of false information, or *fake news*, which has become a key factor in the new politics and the rise of populism on a global scale. These actions were known as the famous *junk information*, which was used to confuse citizens in the middle of an election. Thus, it is possible to observe how Gerasimov's strategy develops from the use of a manipulation tool, so that the use of the internet has become a new weapon and ammunition of the so-called *digital war* (Ruedas, 2019).

In turn, the military strategy on the part of the leader is built gradually. In fact, military action begins by groups of troops in peacetime, taking into account actions such as: non-contact confrontations between interspecific combat groups Annihilation of the adversary's military and economic power by means of precise and short-lived attacks on strategic military and civilian infrastructure. Massive use of high-precision and special operations weapons, robotics and weapons that make use of new physical principles (direct energy weapons, lasers, short-wave radiation, among others). Use of armed civilians (four civilians by one military); simultaneous attack on the adversary's units and facilities throughout the territory, and simultaneous combat on land, in the air, at sea and in information space (Jaeski, 2014).

In this sense, it is possible to identify how the intervention towards the development of the war is structured from the minimum to the maximum attacks. In fact, General Gerasimov stated: "wars are no longer declared and once initiated, proceed according to an unknown template" (Gerasimov, 2016). In turn, it points out that it is necessary to consider the appearance of mobile groups and mixed force groups, which make use of intelligence and sophisticated command and control systems to avoid frontal clashes. Gerasimov mentions that asymmetric actions have become widespread, which allow to nullify the advantages of the enemy in the armed conflict, so these asymmetric forces must be integrated with global attack capabilities from the information space (Duncan, 2017).

In fact, the use of this information space is key in the thought of this leader, because, from his perspective, this scenario opens wide asymmetric possibilities to reduce the enemy's fighting potential. Likewise, it complements his idea by mentioning that it is necessary to generate greater control of the territory, highlighting

the importance of generating a “whole-of-government” approach, and in which the Russian Federation Armed Forces are integrated. with other departments and agencies of the Russian Government to counter forces of distraction, reconciliation, and terrorists (Gerasimov, 2016).


At this point it is key to highlight that, as a leader, the Russian general has chosen to characterize himself from a cooperative and resilient environment. The cooperation between military and diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power creates a space of correlation of non-military matters with the military, in which it is possible to obtain more complete strategies about how to face the adversary from a global scene. In this way, it is possible to recognize the possibility of applying everything from economic sanctions to military conduct operations (Duncan, 2017).

It is possible to analyze that General Gerasimov has built his strategy from a vision of a leader who adheres to the theory of leadership relationships, because, as mentioned from transformational leadership, the leader is responsible for generating an intellectual stimulus for the worker:

In this context, the other government institutions that contribute to the formulation of the strategy are considered by the leader. He will value their contributions and maintain a sustained interest in ensuring their participation in the results achieved by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Even so, it should be noted that Valery Gerasimov considers the importance of institutionalism to achieve the desired objectives in favor of success, given that, from his ideas, “armed conflicts are no longer and cannot only be faced by military actors exclusively. Currently, the battlefield is multidimensional” (Calderón, 2020).

General Gerasimov employs discursive techniques to emphasize that it is not simply a matter of imitating foreign experiences or following leading countries. Instead, he advocates overcoming them and taking on leadership roles of their own (Gerasimov, 2016). With this, he presents an inspiring vision that seeks to mobilize various organizations to work in accordance with their strategy or doctrine. In figure 5 it is possible to observe how the conflict is structured from the ideas of Valery Gerasimov from a minimum to a maximum level of attack, up to a process of restoration of peace.

Figure 5. Non-linear warfare.



Source: Masalleras (2022).

Note: adapted by Samuel Morales from the article "The value of science lies in anticipation", by Valery Gerasimov, in VPK.

The construction of this strategy focuses on a work between the political-military elites, which began in a stage of unknown crisis, through a process of intensification of contradictions, so that a crisis scenario explodes, which hopes to achieve a space of resolution in favor of Russian interests that end in a restoration of peace from the implementation of non-military and military measures. Such development could be connected with the idea of being a charismatic leader, who

at first intervenes in a deliberate way, tends towards a common participation, is inclusive -because it considers all possible measures of intervention without being strictly military and without using weapons in a mandatory way-, and then justifies the development of the crisis from the discarding of said less offensive operations.

Alexander Dugin: an approach to Russian foreign policy

Dugin's ideological thinking is built on the belief that there is an irresolvable confrontation between the *Atlanticist world*, which refers to the United States and the United Kingdom, and Eurasia; in the latter, predominantly Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, all of which resist globalization and *ethno-cultural* universalization led by the United States (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Such ideas connect with the *multipolar world* concept, whereby Dugin asserts that Russia must achieve the goal of dominating its neighbors: it divides Georgia, annexes Ukraine, Finland, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, and "gives" Azerbaijan to Iran (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

Following the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and Russia's subsequent war against Ukraine, political thinker Alexander Dugin became "the mad mystic who inspired Russia's leader" or "Putin's brain." Dugin became especially famous in Russia, given his neo-Eurasian version of classical geopolitics. According to this politician and thinker, neo-Eurasian foreign policy is revisionist and expansionist and relentlessly opposes the United States, so his theory focuses on a collaborative approach, since his ideas include not only Russia, but also the whole of Europe, considering the construction of an agenda that implies the liberation of said continent from all Atlanticist influences (Shekhovtsov, 2014).

Likewise, Dugin actively supported the Russian invasion of Georgia; in fact, he longs for the complete occupation of this country. For Dugin, the Georgian war represented an essential battle against Atlanticism, so he mentioned: "If Russia decides not to enter the conflict, it will be a fatal choice. It will mean that Russia renounces its sovereignty" (Shekhovtsov, 2014). Additionally, this thinker fanatically supported the annexation of Crimea and urged Putin to invade southeastern Ukraine, through ideas such as:

The sovereignty of Ukraine represents such a negative phenomenon for Russian geopolitics that it can, at first, easily provoke a military conflict. Ukraine as an independent state constitutes a huge threat to all of Eurasia and without the solution of the Ukrainian problem, it makes no sense to talk about continental geopolitics. (Shekhovtsov, 2014)

Likewise, his ideas are consolidated through thoughts against Western practices. In this way, he affirms that the current crisis is a logical result of the decline of the global liberal system, clearly under the leadership of the West. It is, then, a crisis caused by Western and unipolar liberalism and system. In addition, he argues that nations are built from a selfish and realistic attitude. Therefore, from the realistic point of view, rivalry, competitions, and conflicts are always possible. In this sense, he suggests that Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and other countries, such as India, Pakistan and many other Arab countries, African countries, and Europe itself can ensure true independence only by creating a kind of Eurasian geopolitical alliance, called a *multipolar alliance* (Dugin, 2020).

In this sense, Dugin affirms that the initiatives must be led by Russia, since it must be a great power or empire gathering and putting under its control the lands of the former Soviet Union. Alexander Dugin has become Putin's ideologue and has made clear to him the idea that European leaders have not been able to think of a response to this type of threat. So, in a sense, the EU and Russia are operating on different frequencies, in ways that prevent the European Union from effectively mitigating Russia's actions (Starr & Cornell, 2014). Regarding the analysis of his ideas, Dugin could be characterized by using factors from the theory of the great man, given that he contributes to his identification as a leader from his ideas. In addition, he has the ability to express his power and influence before other human beings. In this case, the Russian president: Vladimir Putin.

Despite the leadership characteristics demonstrated by General Valery Gerasimov and the politician and thinker Alexander Dugin, it is necessary to mention that their successful strategies have not contemplated a little respect for Human Rights or the independence of each of the affected territories - in this current case, over Ukraine - which can generate diverse global perspectives on how this leadership of Russia in the military sector is carried out towards the global arena. Even so, there is no doubt about his ability to create key strategies in advancing Russian objectives.

Conclusions

During the analytical development presented, it is possible to consider that the conflict scenario is not a situation that highlights positive factors in the global vision. However, it allows us to identify the characteristics that make General Valery Gerasimov and the thinker Alexander Dugin strategic leaders who have contributed to the creation of structured programs and plans in favor of Russian success.

In this way, it is recognized that its characteristics are based on the different theories of leadership, which have nuances of institutionalism, but continue to focus on a field of charismatic leaders, strategists, in favor of the opening of relations, among other factors that have been part of the development of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in order to position Russia as a power in the Middle Eastern region and, from a future perspective, throughout the world.

General Gerasimov and Dugin have found a way to intervene in the construction of Russian foreign policy, either from the structuring of military strategies or from the ideological construction that leads Russia to think of itself in a favorable scenario of expansion that makes use of unconventional means of warfare in a changing and multipolar scenario, as mentioned by the leaders studied.

In this sense, leadership has been presented as a crucial factor that leads leaders to determine the objectives that Russia must achieve to position itself on the international stage to achieve territorial goals such as the acquisition of new territories, which favor its political, economic, and military interests. All this makes the region a center of conflict that, through the use of strategies, gives Russia the role of power for which it fights.

References

- Arévalo, V., & Tikhomirova, A. (2015). Liderazgo transaccional vs liderazgo transformacional. *REIDOCREA*, 4(4), 24-27. https://digibug.ugr.es/bitstream/handle/10481/34629/AlmironArevalo_V4_Art4.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y
- Baran, B., & Scott, C. (2010). Organizing Ambiguity: a grounded theory of leadership and sensemaking within dangerous contexts. *Military Psychology*, 22(1), 42-69. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08995601003644262>
- Biblioteca Digital de la Universidad de Alcalá. (s.f.). *Capítulo II: Antecedentes y desarrollo de las teorías de liderazgo*. <https://ebuah.uah.es/dspace/bitstream/handle/10017/20002/Capitulo%202.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y>
- Bodnieks, V. (2020). The new institutionalism: a tool for analyzing defense and security institutions. *Security and Defence Quarterly*, 32(5), 83-94. <https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/130903>
- Bolden, R., Gosling, J., Marturano, A., & Denninson, P. (2003). *A review of leadership theory and competency frameworks*. https://businessschool.exeter.ac.uk/documents/discussion_papers/cls/mgmt_standards.pdf
- Calderón, M. (2020). El pensamiento militar de Valery Gerasimov sobre los actuales conflictos armados (2011-2015). *Visión conjunta*. <http://www.cefadigital.edu.ar/bitstream/1847939/1701/1/VC%2023-2020%20Calderon.pdf>
- Caporicci, K. (2013). A descriptive study of the key leadership characteristics of mid-level managers in the business division at federally funded research and development center (FFRDC). *Theses and Dissertations*. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/288853812.pdf>
- Castro, A., & Lupano, M. (2007). Teorías implícitas del liderazgo y calidad de la relación entre líder y seguidor. *Boletín de Psicología*, (89), 7-28. <https://www.uv.es/seoane/boletin/previos/N89-1.pdf>
- Daft, R. (2006). *La experiencia del liderazgo*. <https://books.google.com.co/books?id=azuJyFsqS28C&printsec=frontcover>
- Dugin, A. (2020). *Russian Strategist Dr. Alexander Dugin: "The belt and road initiative: a Eurasian Road"*. https://briqjournal.com/sites/default/files/yazi-ici-dosyalar/2020-11/BRIQ_INGILIZCE%20-%204.%20SAYI%20-%20ALEXANDER%20DUGIN%20-%20ENG.pdf
- Duncan, A. (2017). New "Hybrid War" or "Dirty Tricks"? The Gerasimov debate and Russia's response to the contemporary operating environment. *Canadian Military Journal*, 17(3), 6-16. <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/Vol17/no3/PDF/CMJ173Ep6.pdf>
- Encyclopedia of Group Processes and Intergroup Relations. (s.f.). *Contingency Theories of Leadership*. <https://study.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/reference6.1.pdf>
- Fernández, M., & Quintero, N. (2017). Liderazgo transformacional y transaccional en emprendedores venezolanos. *Revista venezolana de gerencia*, 22(77), 56-74. <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/290/29051457005.pdf>

- Gerasimov, V. (2016). The value of science is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations". *Military Review*.
- Giles, A. (2020). *Valery Gerasimov's Doctrine*. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346195526_'Valery_Gerasimov's_Doctrine'
- Giraldo, D., & Naranjo, J. (2014). *Liderazgo: desarrollo del concepto, evolución y tendencias* [Monografía]. Universidad del Rosario. <https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/8672/1026275656-2014.pdf?sequence=1>
- Grajewski, M. (2022). *The latest on Russia's war on Ukraine*. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729427/EPRS_BRI\(2022\)729427_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729427/EPRS_BRI(2022)729427_EN.pdf)
- Gutterman, D. (2017). *Leadership: a global survey of theory and research*. https://www.academia.edu/34381114/Leadership_A_Global_Survey_of_Theory_and_Research
- Hogg, M., Knippenberg, D., & Rast, D. (2012). The social identity theory of leadership: theoretical origins, research findings, and conceptual developments. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 23, 258-304. <https://www.psychologie.uni-frankfurt.de/51622358/Hogg-et-al-2012-The-social-identity-model-of-leadership1.pdf>
- Jaeski, C. (2014). *Russia's Information Campaign Against Ukraine*.
- Jeanne, M. (2019). *The air force leader*. Holm Center.
- Masalleras, M. (2022). *Rusia, Ucrania y la Doctrina Gerasimov*. <https://athenalab.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Doctrina-Gerasimov-Marcelo-Masalleras.pdf>
- Mejía, S. (2007). Liderazgo a través de la historia. *Scientia Et Technica*, 13(34), 343-348. <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/849/84934058.pdf>
- Montenegro, R. (2022). Propaganda 2.0: whatsapps, bots y tuits para captar al elector. *Diario de Sevilla*. https://www.diariodesevilla.es/andalucia/elecciones_andalucia/propaganda-whatsapps-bots-tuits-elector_0_1693632513.html
- Nagy, S., & Beng, P. (2022). *Ukraine-Russia War. A prelude to a post-Western international order?* <https://www.isdp.eu/content/uploads/2022/06/Ukraine-Russia-War-Stephen-Nagy-and-Phar-Kim-Beng.pdf>
- Nasir, M., Nugroho, A., & Lakner, Z. (2022). Impact of the Russian –Ukrainian Conflict on Global Food Crops. *Foods*, 11(19). <https://doi.org/10.3390/foods11192979>
- Rada, C. (2018). Liderazgo o poder en las organizaciones: perspectivas teóricas, análisis crítico e implicaciones para las organizaciones. En M. García-Rubiano, J. Ferro-Vásquez, C. Forero-Aponte, C. Gómez-Rada, & J. Vesga-Rodríguez. *Actualizaciones en psicología organizacional*. Universidad Católica de Colombia. <https://repository.uca-tolica.edu.co/bitstream/10983/26077/1/Actualizaciones%20en%20psicolog%C3%A1Da%20organizacional-Capitulo%204.pdf>
- Redondo, J. (2018). *Evolución e influencia del Eurasianismo en la idea nacional rusa* [Tesis de pregrado]. Universidad Pontificia Comillas. [https://repositorio.comillas.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11531/22220/TFG%20Ortiz%20Redondo%2C%20JesAs.%20\(1\).pdf?sequence=2](https://repositorio.comillas.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11531/22220/TFG%20Ortiz%20Redondo%2C%20JesAs.%20(1).pdf?sequence=2)

- Roberts, C. (2018). *Twelve Principles of Modern Military Leadership*. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D101-8b9501d68665247742aff4bcb5ef76a2/pdf/GOVPUB-D101-8b9501d68665247742aff4bcb5ef76a2.pdf>
- Ruedas, J. (2019). *Una defensa nacional para una sociedad digital*. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2019/DIEEEM08_2019JESGOM_Defdigital.pdf
- Sánchez, E. (2022). *Análisis de las diferentes teorías del liderazgo enfocada en las organizaciones* [Tesis de pregrado]. Universidad Nacional Abierta y a Distancia. <https://repository.unad.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10596/47685/eosolartes.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Schmidt, V. (2014). *Institutionalism*. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313505827_Institutionalism
- Shekhovtsov, A. (2014). *Putin's Brain? (On Aleksandr Dugin)*. https://www.academia.edu/8249892/Putins_Brain_on_Aleksandr_Dugin_
- Starr, S., & Cornell, S. (2014). *Putin's Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents*. <https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/1409GrandStrategy.pdf>
- U.S. Department of State. (2020). *GEC Special Report: Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem*. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf
- Vargas-Hernández, J. (2008). *Institutional and neo-institutionalism theory in the international management of organizations*. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/7404964.pdf>
- Vojta, M. (2010). *Characteristics of the Effective Leader*. <https://www.tnstate.edu/service-learning/documents/Leadership%20Characteristics.pdf>
- Walker, R., & Horn, B. (2008). *The military leadership handbook*. <https://www.perlego.com/book/2992265/the-military-leadership-handbook-pdf>

Chapter 10

Strategic leadership of the British intelligence community in World War II

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.10>

Jesús Eduardo Moreno Peláez

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: Since the beginning of humanity, the systematic violation of Human Rights has been witnessed as a consequence of war conflicts, which affects the lives of people outside the war and led to agreements in the name of which the participants adhered to not affecting the civilian population or food resources, among others, and this led to the creation of the Rights of War, or International Humanitarian Law (IHL). However, during the twentieth century there were considerable effects on humanity during the development of the two world wars: the First World War, from 1914 to 1918, and the Second, from 1939 to 1945. This chapter analyzes how during World War II an advance in strategic intelligence was observed, led by the United Kingdom, in which different scientists -including Alan Moore- managed to decode the information of the German attacks to end the conflict.

Palabras clave: military intelligence, coded information, leadership, armed conflict.

Jesús Eduardo Moreno Peláez

Lieutenant Colonel (R), Ejército Nacional de Colombia. Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in Strategic Intelligence, School of Intelligence and Counterintelligence "BG. Ricardo Charry Solano". Master's Degree in National Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra. Professional, Military Sciences, Escuela Militar de Cadetes "General José María Córdova". Professor and research fellow, Escuela Superior de Guerra..

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8516-3893> - Contact: jesus.moreno@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Moreno Peláez, J. E. (2023). Strategic leadership of the British intelligence community in World War II. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 205-222). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.10>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

War is the manifestation of armed struggle between two or more nations or between two or more sides of the same nation. It is even the opposition of one thing to another in the military sphere (RAE, n.d.). Considering this definition, it is important to recognize that in a state of nature, conflicts between individuals of the same species, especially between human beings, can trigger conflicts of as significant a magnitude as war.

To develop an advantage during the exercise of war, it was necessary to develop activities that would allow this situation. For example, the weapons advance of changing from sticks and stones to arrows and knives, to swords, to firearms and bombs, to culminate today with the nuclear bomb and cyber-attacks.

Another of the mechanisms of advantage in the exercise of war that can be observed is espionage, which can be traced back to the very origins of the history of man. However, because this technique had as its main function to be secret, it is difficult to find testimonies of the ancient activities of espionage (Herrera, 2012).

In the same way, cryptography can be observed in the exercise of war, because considering that the messages of the same side could be intercepted by the enemy side, the art of writing with a secret key or in an enigmatic way was developed (RAE, n.d.).

One of the recorded examples of the use of military intelligence and espionage in warfare is seen in Mesopotamia, approximately 3000 BC. A time when King Sargon I of Akkad used explorers-merchants (or spies) to inform him about the characteristics of the lands he intended to conquer, and who transmitted this information through cuneiform writing (Herrera, 2012).

Over the years, spies were no longer used only as explorers to determine the characteristics of the terrain to be conquered. But were also used to obtain information about the strength of the enemy and the forces of their defensive or

offensive weapons using mechanisms such as posing as merchants or messengers. Therefore, it was normal for the knowledge of a site to become one of the most important sources of power for the development of the war.

With the above it is observed that, for many years, the subject - especially the king or the general - who used military intelligence, and, above all, espionage would ultimately be the winner in an armed conflict (Herrera, 2012).

Now, as humanity advanced, at the beginning of the twentieth century Britain saw the weakening of its political relations with the German Empire, and thus, the constant perception of espionage that was lived in Europe in the nineteenth century (Herrera, 2012) gave way to the creation of the Secret Service Bureau (Security Service, MI5 n.d.) by the British Government in October 1909.

The Secret Service Bureau was distributed in 19 Military Intelligence departments, from MI-1 to MI-19, and had its greatest exponents in MI-5, in charge of the country's internal security using counterespionage, and MI-6, as the one in charge of external security using British espionage in other nations (Herrera, 2012).

This type of espionage tools helped Britain to be among the victorious powers during the two world wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945). It should be remembered that the Second World War was an unprecedented historical event and, in that sense, far superior to the First World War. Since during the WWII both military and legal, political, commercial, food and scientific advances emerged on a much larger scale and with a much greater sophistication. In this research we will focus, precisely, on the advances that were developed, especially in the military context, and secondarily, on legal advances.

During the second planetary conflagration, the Allied powers (Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, among others), originally led by Great Britain, managed to access coded information of the troops of the Third Reich, through espionage and the decryption of German messages, and achieved with this that the losses of human lives were less than those that could have occurred if these elements had not been activated.

Therefore, this research will allow us to know how the leadership of Great Britain, through strategy in the field of war, provided elements of study for today.

Military cooperation between States and progress in war

Among the first international relations that one nation had with another was trade. However, as technology advanced and the conquests were carried out in continents such as America and Africa, various European nations, such as Spain, the United Kingdom and France, began to relate economically, despite their differences and historical disputes, with the aim of having greater power in their territories, dividing the “New World”.

In accordance with the evolution of relations between States; military cooperation was also carried out. For example, by sharing intelligence and analysis on issues of mutual interest between countries. The ownership of lands to be conquered, the defenses and armament of a territory, among others.

Over time, until the two world wars, cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies was necessary, in order to limit any situation that affected not only a nation, but an entire region, as in the case of the military cooperation of allied states and the Axis powers.

Examples of common forms of international cooperation through intelligence services include the following:

- A State may agree to collect or analyze information in one area and share the results in exchange for similar information obtained in another area by the partner State's intelligence agency.
- One State may allow another to operate in its territory to collect information in exchange for sharing the results obtained.
- One State can help another to acquire the capacity to collect information in order to achieve its own objectives, on the understanding that it must allow the supplying State to share the results obtained.
- Joint intelligence-gathering operations may be conducted, and in which members of a country's intelligence service work side by side or in a complementary manner with their colleagues in the foreign intelligence service.
- There may be an exchange of analysts or technicians between the intelligence services of the two countries.
- A State may offer training in exchange for services provided by the intelligence agency of another country. This occurs when a foreign intelligence agency can provide capabilities that the other intelligence agency does not have (Born & Leigh, 2004, p. 55).

The activity of the British military intelligence community during World War II

The current concept of military intelligence has a close relationship with Great Britain, due to the fact that in that country, through the development of military operations, and due to the fear of espionage, military intelligence departments were created at the beginning of the 20th century.

However, despite the fact that this type of tool was available in Great Britain. It is also recognized that initially military intelligence was disorganized and, therefore, results were obtained through trial and error, with which, being a modern system in terms of the armed conflict, it was necessary to adapt each of the situations of the conflict to reach a better solution (Uribe & Mesa, 2020).

Thus, *strategic intelligence* is defined as "All information, processed, contextualized, analyzed and prepared to be used in decision-making aimed at confronting, neutralizing or preventing threats to national security and its inhabitants at all times and places" (Paredes, 2011).

Now, taking up that the espionage of the World War II had to focus on collecting information to decode the encrypted messages that were sent between the troops of different nations, it is worth noting. For example, how the German Enigma machine, which was reputed to be impenetrable, was deciphered by the decoding machines known as *Turing bombs*, in honor of the mathematician Alan Turing, one of the members of Bonifare, or secret department that the Allies created in 1939, and whose duty was to decipher the code of the German Enigma (Herrera, 2012).

As already mentioned, the United Kingdom had different units responsible for developing military intelligence for espionage and counterespionage. However, during World War II there was a unit that stood out in the Directorate of Military Intelligence: MI7, which prior to the start of World War II had the following functions:

- **MI7 (a):** Censorship.
- **MI7 (b):** Domestic and foreign propaganda, including press releases on military matters.
- **MI7 (c):** Translation, and since 1917, regulation of foreign visitors.
- **MI7 (d):** Propaganda and review of the foreign press (part of subsection [b], until subsection [d] was formed, in late 1916) (Hmong, n.d.).

The exercise of the functions that MI7 had, such as censorship and national and foreign propaganda, as well as press releases on military matters, were activities that allowed Britain to control its own population, by keeping it informed

of certain acts abroad or propaganda about the war, because in the absence of a department that was reviewing what foreign propaganda was, it could happen that inside the United Kingdom there was a sector related to the mission of the Nazis in World War II.

Strategic leadership in the operational exercise of war

Due to the different armed conflicts that have happened during the history of humanity, it has been seen that certain people are born, create and adapt leadership in order to be applied in war, and seek that through said means the result they seek is given winning the armed conflict.

Different kings and generals of Antiquity developed this type of leadership. Great exponents of that include Attila I, king of the Huns, and Alexander the Great and his conquests throughout much of the ancient world. Also, Napoleon Bonaparte and Simon Bolivar, in more recent conflicts, and Adolf Hitler and British Marshal Bernard Montgomery in World War II.

However, leadership was not studied in principle, as were mathematics, history, and so many other sciences. This was due to the traditional conception that leadership is a gift in itself and cannot be obtained through study. This conception was modified between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, with which one of the first theories to be developed was *the theory of traits*, in which the *leader* is seen as a human personality whose thought and emotion are harmoniously linked. Towards 1940 the *theory of style* was developed, which considers that leaders can be created from training in an organization. In the 1960s, *contingency theory* was introduced, which consisted of observing the state of the organization and its relationship with the effectiveness of the leader. In the 1980s it was identified that the leader must be a manager who defines the organization through his vision, in which he aims to establish a stimulus among his workers to improve the organization (Pantoja, n.d.).

Thus, in the 1990s, *post-charismatic and post-transformational theory* was developed, which focuses on the personality and skills of the leader, based on a more collaborative and participatory leadership, where members “learn for the sake of learning”. (Pantoja, n.d.).

The American writer and lecturer John Maxwell identified in his book *The 21 indispensable qualities of a Leader* (1999) the 21 qualities that a leader must have, and among which we can observe the following:

- **Self-discipline:** Faculty of discernment that a person must have to self-regulate.
- **Commitment:** Obligation focused on agreeing, contracting, or fulfilling the obligations of the organization or the working group.
- **Listening:** Skill thanks to which the leader captures not only the words of the interlocutor, but also their feelings and meaning.

Considering the above, we will also mention the contributions that Sherman Kent (1903-1986), as one of the architects of strategic leadership, provided in the development of armed conflicts:

1. Information is knowledge: In this section, Kent described the knowledge that the population of a given country must have for relations with other States, considering the following quote: "our men, civilian and military, who occupy high positions, must possess to safeguard the national welfare" (Senmache, 2022). This is intended to preserve the security of a State through the knowledge acquired by the people at the top, not applying as we observe direct espionage, but the knowledge that can be of help to guarantee national security. (Kent, 1994, p. 25)
2. Intelligence is organization: Kent stated how an organization must be structured to meet the objectives described in the previous axis, detailing the characteristics and qualities of the men who must deal with strategic intelligence tasks. (Kent, 1994, p. 89)
3. Intelligence is Activity: Kent explained that Intelligence is a process and that it is necessary to face methodological problems in different ways. Since the knowledge produced by the strategic intelligence process has its origin in research and this is produced in the following way: of political origin or by the own systematic and continuous observation of what happens abroad. (Kent, 1994, p. 168)

Taking the above into account, strategic leadership can be defined as the ability of a leader to anticipate the coordination of his organization by creating a dynamic environment in which the skills of the processes allow motivating and directing the members of the corporation in the most appropriate way possible based on their duties (Urrego, 2020).

Strategic leadership has emerged as a mechanism through which there is a clear relationship between the community and the organization. In the field of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces is the relationship between the targeting of troops and the chain of command.

Therefore, leadership is an inherent component of a military's activity, as it is necessary to complete the physical and mental capabilities with the direction of their unit in the combat environment, so that the member of the Public Force can effectively adjust to the context while ensuring national security and defense (Acosta & Ardila, 2020).

The strategies of the British military intelligence community that can be used today

Britain officially formalized its intelligence agencies in 1989, having enacted the Security Service Act (SSA) and the Official Secrets Act (OSA).

The following functions of the SSA should be highlighted:

[...] the protection of national security and its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism, and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial, or violent means.

It shall also be [...] to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.

It shall also be [...] in support of the activities of police forces [...] and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime. (Legislation, gov UK, n.d.)

As already noted, the intelligence services of the States intend to protect them from threats of espionage or sabotage in their investigations, with the aim that the spy obtains relevant information in another country. During the civil wars, the world wars and, particularly, in the conflict against Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom found it necessary to articulate to its operational exercise obtaining information from the enemy to resolve the situation in its favour.

In the same way, it is evident how safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom is a duty of the utmost importance, because once the currency of

a State loses its purchasing power, it begins to lose economic sovereignty, and this leaves its market at the mercy of the currencies of other countries, such as, in such a case, the dollar, the euro or the yen.

The fact that a State loses economic sovereignty makes it the target of activities of other States, which can gradually influence its economy, as is the case with the foreign relations that the Colombian State - or even the Latin American States - maintains with the United States. Whereas, by having one of the world powers on the continent, and once different free trade agreements (FTAs) have been agreed and various public policies have been articulated, the United States has permeated the sovereignty of said nations, and therefore makes the governments in the region must comply with what a subject other than their own State indicates to them.

As for the OSA, the following stands out:

[...] there were six categories of official information which were subject to criminal sanctions if disclosed. The concept of harm or damage caused by particular disclosure of information by Crown servants and government contractors was applied to these categories. However, the new Act exempted the intelligence and security services from the 'damage' tests and made the fact of disclosure by members of these services an 'absolute' offence. (Bartlett & Everett, 2017, p. 20)

It is necessary to restrict the use of certain information for the security of a State. At this point you can see the strategies of the Public Force for the operations it is going to carry out, or some confidential information of the officials, as is the case of the British monarchy. In the same way, that it is declared a crime to disclose confidential information is an advance in the exercise of the power of a State. Because despite the fact that, utopically, the population wants to know everything that happens with their State, this is not feasible, since the exercise of the operations of the Public Force requires, in many cases, reservation so that the expected result is given.

In 1994, through the Intelligence Services Act (ICA), the Intelligence Act was passed, which consisted of keeping the entity under the authority of the Secretary of State, and whose functions consisted of: "[...] to obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands; and to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons" (Legislation for UK, n.d.)

In turn, the functions of the Intelligence Service were established, such as:

- (a) in the interests of national security, with particular reference to the defense and foreign policies of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom; or
- (b) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom; or
- (c) in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime. (Legislation for UK, n.d.)

National security is precisely the interest that a government has in protecting the interests of the State. In the case of Great Britain, it is in the interest of defending the Crown Government, that of foreign policy, the economic well-being of the United Kingdom and that serious crimes can be prevented, as well as detected. In a State it is normal that it is intended to prevent the commission of crimes, since through such development of activities it is not necessary to make exaggerated investments in the judiciary or the legislative power, which have the functions of judging and creating rules. Therefore, a State that has a high crime rate and a considerable number of rules that seek to regulate the conduct of people through prohibition and punishment (in application of the *Ius Puniendi*) does not have a good management result and, therefore, the investments made in it are not considerable, compared to other States.

This allows us to observe as examples the technological development of the United Kingdom, compared to the development of Colombia. Clearly, in Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, technology and development are at least ten years behind from those of London. Much more, other cities in Colombia, such as Medellín, Villavicencio, Cali, or Cartagena.

However, another measure developed by Great Britain is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), through which the covert surveillance activities of the State were regulated, in terms of the use of trackers and hidden cameras, which could be used against the Police, intelligence services - especially MI5 and MI6, and even local government agencies - (Open Rights Group, 2013).

Through the interception of communications, messages and conversations that transit through a network or are distributed by a service can be obtained (Justice, 2011). However, this type of interception clearly violates the rights to privacy and dignity that people have, which is why it is necessary that a legal authority (*Lawful Authority*) is the subject that allows the interception of communications from a third party. In this case of the legal authority, this is the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Interior, who will be in charge of preventing or detecting the serious crime that is being committed, so that the protection of the security of the United Kingdom is maintained (Castillo, 2014).

However, there are situations in which in the United Kingdom it is not necessary to issue an interception order for communications (Castillo, 2014, p. 33):

- When both parties consent to the interception or are reasonably believed to have consented.
- One of the parties has given consent - for example, when one of the parties is the one who records the conversation - and the surveillance is directed (a category of RIPA that refers to a type of surveillance that. Although it is covert, does not imply entering a home or private space and is done in the course of an operation or investigation).
- The communication takes place in a private telecommunications network - a company, for example - and the interception has the consent of the person who controls the system - in other words, the boss.
- Communication is made to or from a prison or psychiatric hospital.
- In order for the request for an interception of communications to be approved, the Secretary of State has to ensure that such interception is necessary for: A) the interest of national security. B) preventing or detecting crime. And C) safeguarding the economic welfare of the United Kingdom.

The above exceptions to authorize the interception of communications make it possible to observe a clear respect for the principles of autonomy, freedom of choice and the crime prevention function. All this, without losing sight of the need to maintain national security, prevent crime and safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.

To designate responsibilities on the interception of communications, there is a commissioner, who, through his experience as an official of the judicial branch of high position, has knowledge about the development of the rules to prevent crimes and guarantee the rights of the people investigated (Castillo, 2014).

To summarize the above information, in the United Kingdom you can find the rules on intelligence shown in Table 1.

Table 1. *Intelligence Communities Legislation in the UK*

Laws of economic matters	Classified Information Laws	Legal Bases of Intelligence Communities	Supplemental Standards to Intelligence Community Objectives
Economic Reform Act 1782 (Civil List Money and Secret Service Act of 1782).	Official Secrets Act 1889 (Regulation and Judicialization of State Secrets).	Security Service Act 1989 (Legal basis of MI5).	Counterterrorism laws (2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2019).

Secret Service Money (Repeal) Act 1886.	Official Secrets Act 1920 (Prosecution of impersonation or obstruction of security agents).	Intelligence Services Act 1994 (Legal Bases of MI6 and GCHQ).	Investigation and surveillance laws (2000, 2016).
Fraud Act 2006.	Official Secrets Act 1911 (Regularization of Espionage and Counterintelligence Response During Armed Peace).	Security Service Act 1996 (Legal basis of other intelligence communities).	Serious crime laws (2007, 2015).
Criminal Finances Act 2017 (criminal finance act of 2017).	Official Secrets Act 1939 (modification of confession of state secrets in court).	Human Rights Act 1998.	Laws against organized crime (2005).
Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (Sanctions and Money Laundering Act of 2018).	Official Secrets Act 1989 (Elimination of Public Interest Defense).	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (OSCT Legal Basis).	Covert Human Intelligence Sources Act (2021).

Source: Guzmán and Rivera (n.d.).

As can be seen from the information in Table 1, in the United Kingdom, the interest in safeguarding national security starts from the development of regulations both to prevent terrorist attacks, espionage or sabotage, and for economic protection, since there is a sense of belonging - patriotism - to protect the population, the Government and the crown.

Finally, it can be found that the main objectives of British intelligence are: the defense of national interests. The protection of citizens against external and internal threats. Counterintelligence activities, and the prevention of terrorist attacks at the domestic and international levels.

Conclusions

Espionage services and what we now know as strategic leadership allowed Britain to colonize much of the world, in territories of what we now know as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, among others.

The constant evolution in the technologies of war and in the operational systems of the Armed Forces allowed Britain to fight with powers of the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as the German Empire, Spain, and France. As well as to achieve an alliance with some of these states to fight

against the German Empire during World War I and against Nazi Germany of World War II. Thus, Britain was classified as the first power to bring together former combat enemies, such as France and the United States, to make a front against powers of different ideological perception.

The advance developed by Britain during the Second World War - mainly in its espionage and counter-espionage work - made the Allied countries the victors, a circumstance that probably would not have occurred if not for the meeting of brilliant minds such as Alan Turing, creator of the bombs that bear his name, or without having managed to decipher the Enigma code of Nazi Germany.

This is still a reason for Britain to continue its constant evolution in preventing serious crimes and better stabilizing the development of national security.

Thus, the Colombian State must learn from these elements, so that it can advance in the protection of its national security, since an enemy to face is corruption. A phenomenon like these attacks and affects not only the stability of the country in terms of health, education, and food rights, but also makes other countries perceive Colombia as a weak nation, which allows the devaluation of its own currency, and that drug trafficking increases considerably. Which causes, then, that through various treaties, conventions and international agreements, part of the sovereignty is surrendered, and, with it, economic power is lost. And this leaves the country exposed to possible attacks from other nations or even from guerrillas or organizations outside the law.

One of the problems that generated the birth of outlaw organizations such as guerrillas, paramilitaries and drug traffickers was the Nation's lack of interest in protecting its national security, and its permissiveness when it came to allowing money to be extracted from different sectors of the population, and thus generating unprecedented corruption in each and every one of the country's public institutions.

Therefore, for the Colombian State to achieve a sufficiently strengthened intelligence directorate, it is necessary that, in the first place, officials who have been proven to be corrupt in the performance of their duties be dismissed. As well as that their management has not been efficient, since the problem of not being able to advance in the establishment of national security lies in corruption.

Secondly, it is necessary to establish protocols that allow the exercise of intelligence and leadership of the Public Force to be expanded, so that the population's trust in public institutions can be restored.

Finally, it is required that the State work in harmony with the population, since the fact that for more than 80 years the same people have governed, and their

management has not been effective is what has caused the weakening of the institutions. At the same time, by strengthening the intelligence system of the Public Force with the development of issues such as intelligence in public institutions to prevent corruption and sanction those who behave like criminals, it would help control institutions, such as the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General's Office, the Attorney General's Office and even the judiciary, sanction those who have affected the stability of the State.

References

- Acosta, H., & Ardila, C. (2020). Liderazgo Militar en entornos complejos: el rol de las fuerzas militares de Colombia en el conflicto armado interno. En Cunha, L. (Ed.), *Liderança militar. Associação dos Colégios de Defesa Iberoamericanos (ACDIA)* (pp. 109-133).
- Bartlett, G., & Everett, M. (2017). *The Official Secrets Acts an Official Secrecy*. Briefing Paper. <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7422/CBP-7422.pdf>
- Born, H., & Leigh, I. (2004). *Hacia un control democrático de las actividades de inteligencia*. Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. <https://www.dcaf.ch/hacia-un-control-democratico-de-las-actividades-de-inteligencia>
- Castillo, C. (2014). *Vigilancia de las comunicaciones en Colombia. El abismo entre la capacidad tecnológica y los controles legales*. Dejusticia. https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/fi_name_recurso_643.pdf
- Guzmán, J., & Rivera, J. (s.f.). *Comunidad de Inteligencia UK*. Perspectivas contemporáneas de inteligencia estratégica. Universidad del Rosario.
- Herrera, J. (2012). *Breve historia del espionaje*. Ediciones Nowtilus.
- Hmong. (s.f.). MI7. <https://hmong.es/wiki/MI7>
- Justice. (2011). *Freedom from Suspicion. Building a Surveillance Reform for a Digital Age*. <https://files.justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/06170801/Building-a-Surveillance-Framework-for-a-Digital-Age.pdf>
- Kent, S. (1994). *Inteligencia Estratégica para la Política Mundial Norteamericana*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar.
- Legislation.gov.uk. (s.f.). *Security Service Act 1989*. <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/5/section/1>
- Legislation.gov.uk. (s.f.). *The secret Intelligence Service. 1994*. <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/section/1>
- Open Rights Group. (2013). *Digital Surveillance. Why the Snoopers' Charter is the wrong approach: A call for targeted and accountable investigatory powers*. <https://www.openrightsgroup.org/app/uploads/2020/03/digital-surveillance.pdf>
- Pantoja, M. (s.f.). *Los enfoques del liderazgo a través de la historia*. <https://www3.ugto.mx/eugreka/contribuciones/116-los-enfoques-del-liderazgo-a-traves-de-la-historia>
- Paredes, O. (2011, 16 de septiembre). Conformación del sistema de inteligencia y alerta temprana para entidades bancarias. En XXVI Congreso de Seguridad Bancaria. CELAES 2011. [Congreso]. FELABAN. FIBA. Miami, Estados Unidos. <https://felaban.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/memorias/archivo20141111191718PM.pdf>
- Real Academia de la Lengua Española (RAE). (s.f.) *Criptografía*. <https://dle.rae.es/criptograf%C3%ADa>
- Real Academia de la Lengua Española (RAE). (s.f.) *Guerra*. <https://dle.rae.es/guerra>

- Security Service. MI5. (s.f.). *The Establishment of the Secret Service Bureau*. <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/the-establishment-of-the-secret-service-bureau>
- Senmache, D. [@Senmache] (2022, 3 de marzo). *Para Sherman Kent la inteligencia es "el conocimiento que nuestros hombres, civiles y militares que ocupan cargos elevados, deben poseer* [Fotografía de Sherman Kent]. [Tweet]. Twitter. <https://mobile.twitter.com/Senmache/status/1499283676449976320>
- Uribe, A., & Mesa, L. (2020). La inteligencia militar como actor fundamental en el afianzamiento de los escenarios de paz. *Ciencia y Poder Aéreo* 15(1), 87-107. <https://doi.org/10.18667/cienciaypoderaaereo.656>
- Urrego, L. (2020). Liderazgo Estratégico: Perspectiva clave hacia la responsabilidad social en Instituciones de Educación Superior. *Revista Arbitrada interdisciplinaria Koinonía*, 5(9), 29-43. <https://www.redalyc.org/journal/5768/576869060002/html/>

Chapter 11

Colombian women in transnational organized crime

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.11>

Vivian Andrea Monroy Velázquez

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: The gender approach in strategic studies in security and defense is an advance in the multidisciplinary vision that the sector must address to understand the threat. The participation of women in transnational organized crime has been limited to subordinate positions or that of victims, which makes the design of public policy in Colombia focused on prevention. The study of the phenomenon of *women criminals* must be made more complex to understand the roles of women in shaping one of the main threats facing the continent: transnational organized crime.

Keywords: transnational organized crime, gender approach, criminal woman, public policy.

Vivian Andrea Monroy Velázquez

Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in National Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra. Professional, Government and International Relations, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá. Specialist, Armed Conflict Resolution, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá. Professor and research fellow, Escuela Superior de Guerra.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7101-6921> - Contact: monroyv@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Monroy V., V. A. (2023). Colombian women in transnational organized crime. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 223-240). Sello Editorial ESDEG.
<https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.11>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

In the context of globalization and economic development in today's world, the dynamics of women, in general, have changed. Women have managed to open spaces that were exclusively for men; criminal organizations are no exception. In this sense, understanding the *criminal woman* phenomenon allows us to understand the roles that these women have developed or exercised in transnational criminal organizations in the context of Colombia, in order to evaluate whether the strategies to face such organizations have adopted a gender approach.

Economic conditions have favored, in some cases, the equality of gender roles, from the point of view of greater access to the labor market. However, it can also be evidenced that economic pressures are aggravating some of women's spaces, compared to the need to have a source of income. Among the factors that can be identified as generating pressure on the social status of women to opt for illegal activities as a means of subsistence can be found. Households headed by women, segmentation of the labor market, segregation of women in low-paying jobs and growing inequality in the distribution of income between men and women (Steffensmeier, 1989, p. 263). Some of these factors can be configured as conducive to the increase in "traditional crimes of female consumption: such as theft, theft of services, welfare fraud (receiving subsidies from the State), among others" (p. 264). Therefore, there is no clear evidence that the increase in gender equality is directly related to the increase in levels of economic development. To consider the fact of the increase in female crime, variables that consider female status must be considered, such as, for example, the level of education and participation in the labor force. Women do not necessarily benefit from economic development: on the contrary, such development can even increase their marginalization.

In the case of Colombia, economic development is a parameter of analysis to determine the affectation of criminal women. However, the increase in criminal organizations in the national territory and socioeconomic conditions also determine the opportunities to commit crimes. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the context in which criminal organizations operate, in order to determine criminal opportunities and, above all, how they have affected the roles played by criminal women.

The participation of women in criminal activities in the country is not an isolated event: Colombia has a background that cannot be ignored. The leadership exercised by Griselda Blanco, who is recognized as one of the pioneers in the formation of drug cartels in Colombia, is a case that will be addressed in this document.

Gender Approach in Public Policy

In order to claim the need to include the gender approach in the strategies to face transnational organized crime, it is necessary to review the conceptualization under which countries define *public policy against criminal organizations*. That is, the processes, empowerment, and identity of criminal women.

For example, on the UN Women website it can be seen that the interventions are focused on the attention of women as victims; that is, on the prevention and resolution of conflicts, so the objective is to empower women in the leadership of these processes. In reference to the empowerment of women, there is a recognition of women who have managed to position themselves in different fields, such as music or politics. Obviously, the rise of criminal women within criminal organizations is not worthy of praise, as it would be an apology for crime, but it should be an approach for the design and formulation of public policy in this regard.

In reference to the gender approach in the design and formulation of public policy, in September 2021 the Ministry of Justice and Law of Colombia and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Colombia (UNODC), developed the Exchange of National and International Experiences on Women and Drug Trafficking, which was configured as a meeting to reflect on the situation of women with respect to the production, trafficking and consumption of drugs. Although the focus was exclusively for one of the crimes involving criminal organizations, it is worth recognizing that first effort to understand the way in which women participate in the activities of the drug trafficking chain.

With this first effort, it is possible to show progress in the socioeconomic characterization of women deprived of liberty for drug-related crimes. The objective of Wilson Ruiz Orejuela, Minister of Justice and Law at the time, was, as he stated:

[...] we plan to address the drug problem from a gender perspective. We also reviewed the lessons learned and public policy initiatives that allow us to strengthen the capacities of Colombia and other nations. We identify a particular role of women in the field of illicit crops, therefore the substitution program, and in general social investment aimed at transforming the territories affected by illicit crops, have specific actions for rural women. (diariojuridico.com, 2021)

For the minister, the dynamic has changed; according to his speech,

[...] it is common to hear that drug trafficking is a men's affair. However, nothing is so far from reality: the drug trafficking chain not only involves women in carrying out several of the processes of drug production, processing and distribution around the world, but it is also women who are the direct victims of this illegal economy. One of the most outstanding evidences is that about 35% of women who have been deprived of their liberty in the world are convicted of drug-related crimes. (United Nations, September 2021, para. 10)

This important initiative is an advance in the recognition of the problem of criminal women, but within the framework of the research it is also essential to review public policy in Colombia, determine if today an effective application of the gender approach can be identified in strategies to fight organized crime, so the national development plans (PND) of the previous government (2018-2022) and the current one (2022-2026) were reviewed.

Within the revision of the PND "Pact for Equity" (2018-2022), of the government of President Iván Duque, in the component "Dismantling organized crime and guaranteeing citizen security" the strategies are aimed exclusively at strengthening the capacities of the Public Force to face this type of organizations.

However, once the analysis of the document has been carried out, a component that could indirectly include the gender approach can be evidenced: *advocacy*. As mentioned in the document, incidence is a factor that allows articulating the actions that the State can implement in the prevention of crime, since it corresponds to *criminal recurrence*. That is, the number of cases that occur during a specific period, and the probability that a person from a certain population may be affected. Incidence can be a useful indicator to identify the motivations that lead

women to join a criminal organization. According to data reported by the National Penitentiary Institute (INPEC) for the end of 2021, criminal recidivism is one of the major problems that afflict the penal system in Colombia and that generate the main burden for the authorities of the government system. During the year, 56,820 cases of recidivism were recorded. Among the list of crimes with the most recidivism are theft, with 12,229 cases, and the manufacture, trafficking and carrying of firearms or ammunition, with 8,047 cases.

The second crime on the list is drug trafficking with 7,062 repeat offenders and homicide with 6,443 cases. The figures reported by INPEC correspond to the total number of offenders who serve both intramural and home sentences or who are in the review stage. The report differentiates between men and women, from which it can be concluded that men are more likely, not only to commit the crime, but to reoffend. Thus, 53,350 of the repeat offenders (94%) are men, while 3,481 (6%) are women (Caracol News, December 7, 2021). In this sense, the contribution in reference to the gender approach may be limited to the presentation of figures separated by gender.

For the current NDP "Colombia world power of life" (2022-2026), in its conception of multicrime, transnational organized crime is considered as a problem that must be overcome to protect life and institutional control for the construction of a society without violence. However, as in the previous plan, the approach to face is aimed at strengthening the operational capacities of the institutionality of the operational level of the security and defense strategy. Likewise, like the previous government, it considers prevention a factor, but in order to specifically determine if there is a gender focus in the formulation of public policy on security and defense, within the framework of the investigation it is necessary to wait for the document of the Ministry of Defense, to evaluate the frameworks of action of the latter, which has not yet been published.

Criminal woman in Colombia

The interest in investigating this phenomenon stems from three situations that have been occurring in the country. First, the increase in women in prison. Secondly, the greater participation of women in criminal organizations. Third, the configuration of transnational organized crime as a threat. According to the article "Women and prison in Colombia: challenges for criminal policy from a gender perspective" by the Observatory of Justice and Criminal Policy of the Javeriana University, in

the period between 1991 and 2018, the number of women in prison per 100,000 inhabitants increased more than threefold, from 9.9 in 1991 to 31.5 in June 2018. In figures published by INPEC, from 1,500 women in 1991, it reached 7,944 in June 2018, which denotes an increase of 429% (Sánchez, 2018).

Although the participation of women in criminal organizations is still low compared to the participation of men, this is a phenomenon that is not only evident in Colombia. For example, in Mexico Jorge Balderas (2021), a sociologist and researcher at the Autonomous University of Ciudad Juárez, affirms that, gradually, women have left secondary roles; before, women were companions and partners, or mothers and relatives, of those who participate in organized crime. They now play other roles, such as instigators of revenge, messengers of clandestine business on the streets or interlocutors with detained subjects, which increases their participation in other dynamics of drug trafficking. Women have also gained spaces for scientific development, with the implementation of technological devices, which allows a greater participation of them in production processes in general. Likewise, women, not being directly associated with the criminal structure, can, from the perspective of organized crime, camouflage themselves better. A woman in the criminal sphere passes as a mother or a housewife, and generates less suspicion (Balderas, 2021).

In the case of Colombia, other factors may be evident. The criminal woman began to use *narco-aesthetics* as a way to exhibit power and success. Then, women began to use these supposedly feminine aesthetic criteria, derived from *narco-culture*, to have the opportunity for social advancement, to reach important positions within criminal organizations. “Consequently, over the years, the image of the ‘show’ woman that accompanies the male drug trafficker has evolved towards that of the ‘bosses’.” (Insight Crime, 2020, pp. 10-12). This evolution of the criminal woman within the criminal organization responds to the fact that her motivation to be a criminal is greater than the costs she can assume for the violation of the law, which responds to the learning process of the criminal culture.

Consequently, in order to understand the roles of criminal women in Colombia, it is important, first, to make it more complex how to identify who the Colombian criminal woman is. The article “Description of female criminality in Colombia”, by the Crime Observatory of the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Interpol of the National Police (Dijin) (2012), turned out to be one of the most complete documents for an initial characterization that allows understanding the context of criminal women in Colombia. Although the figures correspond to 2012, they are

taken as a baseline to advance the investigation process and be taken up again in the application phase of data collection tools.

The document can stand out

[...] as the criminal woman varies her participation in criminal activities both in space (different municipalities of Colombia) and in time and in the type of criminal activity. In the comparison they made of the databases of the Penitentiary Centers and the National Police, 57% of the population of incarcerated women is between 21 and 35 years old, which suggests that they are relatively young people, who on many occasions have started their criminal careers at an early age. On the other hand, about 70% of this population lived, before entering prisons, in socioeconomic strata 1 and 2. In addition, most had access to the health service, through the Identification System of Potential Beneficiaries of Social Programs (Sisbén). (Norza et al., 2012, p. 347)

Giving continuity to the data of the article of the Dijin Observatory (2012), it can be inferred that one of the causes corresponds to economic conditions; however, this type of phenomena is multicausal and other factors must be considered. This population has low levels of education or early school leavers.

92% of the population interviewed said they had attended some school degree, only 13% had studied a technical degree, a trade course, an undergraduate or a professional postgraduate degree. Another risk factor that is recorded, thanks to the information provided by convicted and imprisoned women, is that of belonging to or coming from an unstructured home. More than 53% of the women who participated stated that they came from a home where there was evidence of mistreatment and abuse. This characteristic has a considerable impact on people's behaviors and, therefore, may be, in a certain way, associated with the beginning of a criminal career, although not necessarily.

In the case of adult women, the Observatory was able to identify other common characteristics that can be considered as risk factors; 75% stated that at some point in their lives they worked in a legal activity (even if it was informal). The abandonment of legal activities may be due to insufficient income to support third parties, as well as the lack of opportunities to get a stable job, 84% identified themselves as female heads of household. More than half of women in prisons have started their criminal career before the age of 25. 13% of the population surveyed during the development of the study said they had ever been held in a juvenile correctional facility, and 67% said they had reoffended in the commission of crimes, after having been in prison before. (pp. 348-349)

Once these data have been reviewed, a preliminary profile of the criminal woman in Colombia could be made. Young women between the ages of 21 and 35 who begin their criminal career at an early age, from socioeconomic strata 1 and 2, belonging to the subsidized level, with very low levels of schooling and with a rising percentage of recidivism levels.

Organized crime in Colombia

The importance of understanding the impact of the roles of criminal women in criminal organizations in the Security and Defense Strategy in Colombia lies in the fact that transnational criminal organizations, according to the latest biennial report of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC), which evaluates these aspects in the 193 member countries of the United Nations, Colombia ranks as the second country in the world - after the Democratic Republic of the Congo - with the largest number of criminal organizations and markets (López, 2022). Likewise, the General Gutiérrez Mellado University Institute recognizes how violence associated with crime affects individuals who inhabit the American continent, and is thus one of the “most dangerous transnational threats of the post-Cold War” (Sampó, 2017, p. 26).

To begin with, it is important to define the concept of organized crime. The Palermo Convention of 2000, recognized as ‘the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’, constitutes a historic milestone of consensus on this modern criminality that was strengthened thanks to the processes of globalization. However, there is a precedent in which the United Nations dealt with this phenomenon and formally recognized its existence in 1975, in the United Nations in the V Convention in 1975 for the Prevention of Crime, called “Changes in the Forms and Dimension of Transnational and National Crime”. They also highlighted the importance of criminality as a company, pointing out three levels of organization: *organized crime*, *corporate crime* (in English, *white-collar crime*) and *corruption*. This makes it possible to establish that organized crime is a threat to developing countries. (Rodríguez, 2016, pp. 68-70).

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) characterized a gang or criminal group under the following criteria. They are not necessarily armed; they are structured in a business, military, or associative way; they have a unified direction or command. They use violence, intimidation, bribery, corruption, or other methods. They exercise permanent or transitory control over

areas of territory. They seek the expansion of the territory under their dominion, power, and strength. They assume different names and activities. They hide their illegal financial capacity and seek to increase their influence over public powers and society (Angarita, 2016, cited by Álvarez, 2017. p. 601).

These criminal organizations have the advantage of three fundamental elements. One of them is the large number of profits obtained from transnational criminal operations. Another is the ability of these organizations to recruit new talent and reorganize their structures in spaces that were previously reserved for state agencies. Another is its ability to operate on lines traditionally considered exclusive to States, as in the case of diplomacy. Transnational organized crime, according to Stayridis, has developed such capabilities that allow it to operate like the State. So much so, that, due to its capacity for development and reengineering, these new evil multinationals now directly rival many States and even surpass some. (Álvarez, 2017, pp. 608-609).

Among the activities or related crimes of criminal organizations are drug trafficking, kidnapping, trafficking and trafficking in persons, illegal exploitation of minerals, trafficking in arms and technology - also, that of human organs and nuclear material -, selective murders, extortion, intimidation, torture and money laundering. All this allows diversifying the risk of the business and increasing profits; drug trafficking is the main source of income for these structures. It is important to emphasize that the effects of the criminal activities of these criminal groups not only translate into acts of violence, but also affect the environment. The corruption of institutions, both private and state, also generates a deterioration of society and also forges public health problems (Rojas, 2008). Criminal structures seek to monopolize the areas of influence of state agents, regardless of ideology or political orientation. To achieve this, they use extortion and violence as fundamental instruments, and this characteristic is the one that represents the greatest danger for the societies of the region (Rojas, 2018, cited by Suárez, 2021).

Combating organized crime is one of the main challenges that the Colombian State has been facing; with Permanent Directive No. 015 of 2016, of the Ministry of Defense, the characterization of criminal groups in Colombia was rethought. On the one hand, organized criminal groups (GDO in Spanish), which are groups of three or more people dedicated to the commission of crimes whose predominant purpose is the pursuit of profit, through a structure that remains over time. On the other hand, there are organized armed groups (GAO in Spanish), or collectives with a higher level of armed capacity and organizational structure. The relevance of this

classification is that GAO can be fought even by the Armed Forces and not only with the police force (Rincón, 2018, pp. 28-29).

Drug trafficking in Colombia, unfortunately, has allowed organized crime to be configured by drug trafficking gangs, active guerrillas, and dissident groups from the last peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Conflicts to control the business, in addition to other profitable illegal activities - such as illegal mining, smuggling or extortion - are increasingly violent. With the demobilization of the FARC, there were power vacuums in the territories that reconfigured the balance of power, a scenario that was exploited by criminal organizations such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), which achieved greater territorial and criminal control, followed by the growth of the Urabeños, who are considered their greatest rivals in several regions (Insight Crime, 2021). In this scenario, it is convenient to analyze the positions of power that women currently occupy, what their functions are and how they identify with the organization to which they belong.

The current government (2022-2026) has initiated a negotiation process with the ELN, which, within the framework of the classification of Permanent Directive No. 015 of 2016, of the Ministry of Defense, is considered GAO, which will imply a process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, in case of reaching the signing of a ceasefire agreement. Faced with the experience of other peace processes advanced in Colombia, for example, with the FARC, group demobilizations require special attention, so that dissidents or other groups are not generated that enter to occupy spaces left by these groups due to the financial income they generated.

A woman in a world of criminals

The criminal woman must assume either a male or female role to position herself within the organization. Organized crime is exercised through organizations with a strong burden of gender implications, in which masculinity is a projection of power. Therefore, the presence of women in criminal organizations is generally associated with subordinate positions (Sodupe, pp. 119-200). In the case of Colombia, many of the criminal organizations have women in subordinate positions who have been climbing positions. However, history has a background that is decisive for Colombia's positioning as a country that produced and exported narcotics in the 1980s.

This antecedent has its own name and is that of a woman: Griselda Blanco. Recognized as the queen of cocaine, she was born in Cartagena in 1943 and has great importance in the criminal world because she was a pioneer in the design and operation of drug trafficking routes from Colombia to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. These routes were used by the Medellín Cartel, and Pablo Escobar Gaviria recognized her as his teacher. He is also responsible for smuggling using mules, so since the 1970s he has been on the list of the most wanted and wealthy drug traffickers. It is estimated that he trafficked a ton and a half of cocaine every month, amassing a fortune of more than 500 million dollars at the time (Tregunna, 2014a).

In 1985 she was arrested in California and sentenced to fifteen years in prison, without bail. From prison he continued with his criminal activities. After paying his prison sentence, he returned to Colombia and died in Medellín on September 12, 2012, victim of an attack with hitmen (Tregunna, 2014b).

Today she is remembered as a ruthless woman who murdered both her opponents and her husbands to keep their property. She was one of the most important partners in the United States of the Medellín Cartel. She operated in Miami, from where she took care of the transit of the cocaine sent by Pablo Escobar. Since the 1970s, she appeared on the radar of the DEA, an organization that was looking for her because of the large amounts of narcotics she trafficked. It is still unknown who killed her, but no one is surprised, given the countless deaths she caused.

It is contradictory to call a person who has excelled in the criminal world a leader; however, "the word leadership, like many terms in social sciences, is polysemic and diffuse, sometimes even kaleidoscopic" (Delgado, 2005, cited by Andrade, 2013, p. 60). Leadership, then, can be defined (Kotter, 1990) as "an interpersonal process that involves attempts to influence other individuals to achieve a certain vision", through the formation of a cooperative network of people motivated and committed to realize the vision, and thus transform their reality. So, can we talk about a leadership of Griselda Blanco aka 'The Black Widow'?

Reviewing each of the elements of the definition of leadership, Griselda advanced an interpersonal process that influenced other individuals -specifically, Pablo Escobar—, which allowed them to constitute one of the most recognized criminal enterprises to date and fulfill the vision they had of their organization. As mentioned in the characterization of transnational organized crime, these structures function as a company; therefore, they achieve objectives and achieve goals. Griselda Blanco gained recognition as the first lady of illegal marijuana and drug trafficking

in the United States in the early 1970s, because she had the ability to understand that cocaine would be the product of the future. The difference between the sale price of the drug in the United States and the price of its purchase in Colombia and South America was tremendously attractive. Therefore, the vision of his criminal enterprise was focused on achieving transport from one country to another, and this was what Graciela Blanco effectively dedicated herself to when creating the modality of mules (Cruz, 2008).

The criminal woman must position herself within the positions of power of the criminal structure assuming a male or female role. Organized crime is exercised through organizations with a strong burden of gender implications, in which masculinity is a projection of power. Therefore, the presence of women in criminal organizations is generally associated with subordinate positions (Sodupe, pp. 119-200), so the case of Griselda turns out to be an exception, because in many of the criminal organizations the roles that women play are focused on the operational level, and in very few cases, at the managerial levels.

The power projection that Griselda Blanco used to position herself within the criminal organization was linked to trait theory and skill theory (Pariente, 2009; McCall & Lombardo, 1983; Kouzes & Posner, 2003; Katz, 1974). In the case of trait theory, according to which the person has a particular personality that predisposes him to become a leader, it is worth mentioning that Graciela was in the United States during the boom in marijuana trafficking in the seventies, and thanks to his personal characteristics he was able to enter and position himself within the criminal sector.

She started her empire with a relatively small operation, using other women with secret compartments sewn into their underwear to transport drugs. In order to thrive and expand his business, he moved from Columbia to New York and then to Miami, becoming one of the most violent and powerful drug traffickers in Miami's history. She played an important role in establishing a series of smuggling routes and distribution networks that were later taken over by the Medellín cartel. (Tregunna, 2014a)

As proposed by the theory of skills (Platonov, 1963), Griselda had the opportunity to learn behavioral patterns in her exercise as a leader, and to implement an authoritarian style leadership model, through the violent methods by which she was widely recognized.

Griselda Blanco, as a criminal woman, can be framed in the *transactional leadership*, defined by James MacGregor Burns (1978, cited by Pariente, 2006), as the one that establishes a kind of “exchange” between the leader and the members of the group. This figure is the one who guides or motivates his followers, through reward and punishment, towards the established goals, clarifying the roles and tasks necessary to achieve them (Cuadrado et al., 2008). Leadership refers, then, to the relationship of exchange between the leader and his followers in order for their interests to coincide (Mendoza et al., 2007), which can take the form of reward, active and passive administration by exception, which is closely associated with the administrative and work management aspects (Leithwood, 2010). This type of transactional leader strives to recognize and empower the members of the organization and is oriented to transform the beliefs, attitudes and feelings of his followers, since he not only manages the structures, but also influences the culture, with a view to changing it (Andrade, 2013, pp. 60-62).

In this sense, Griselda Blanco, also known as ‘The Queen of Cocaine’, had a Machiavellian mind, which allowed her to hold power against a predominantly male organization. The culture of illegality does not respond to principles or values, so he had to find a way to have the respect of his subordinates and peers within the criminal world, so he administered his own punishments, and some of them involved the death penalty. He ordered killings without discrimination; many of the men who interacted with her stated how difficult it was to understand or control her. Her organization was a family business, so three of her children were involved in the cocaine trade from an early age (Tregunna, 2014b).

In her role as a pioneer of a criminal organization, Griselda Blanco used her status as a woman and the stereotypes assigned to her by society - the idea that women respond to the stereotype of passive, inferior beings, conditioned by their biology, which conditions an “alleged female inferiority” (Sánchez, 2004 p. 243)— as a strategy to hide their own crimes. For society, it is contradictory that a woman in her role as a mother can commit murders. Griselda was adept at balancing her femininity with the masculine traits needed to thrive as America’s cocaine queen. She challenged the male and gender power structure (Shelden, 2001) and dominated their section of the cocaine trade. As a woman, she assumed her role as a mother, and being protective remained very close to Michael and Dixon, her two surviving children, until her death. In organized crime, a woman can go unnoticed, due to the stereotypes built around the figure of women. In the course of Operation Banshee,

which was aimed at capturing Blanco, the case agents found it difficult to “convince their superiors that she was a big deal.” (Tregunna, 2014).

Finally, it is important to clarify that the objective of this writing is not to highlight the criminal life of Griselda Blanco. However, it cannot be hidden that she played a decisive role in establishing the legacy and strengthening of a criminal organization that led drug trafficking in the world. Cocaine gave her wealth, notoriety, and power, but in return it took away two of her children and 20 years of her freedom and eventually led to her death. This history does not only belong to Griselda Blanco: the social and economic situations and the presence of criminal organizations in different parts of the national territory lead to Griselda’s history being repeated; hence the importance of the study of the phenomenon of women criminals.

Conclusions

The challenge of the security and defense sector to include other ways of approaching the problem of international organized crime, which means epistemological ruptures and paradigm shifts in the analysis of female crime in criminal organizations, cannot be ignored. The objective under which this research will continue is to understand the phenomenon of criminal women, which in the future could serve to dismantle and build categories of analysis and mobilize postulates, dogmas and prejudices. In order to use a new narrative to name and recognize the world in feminine; to make visible the situation of women who commit crimes in connection with social acts of power and economic violation (Salazar, 2012, p. 228).

The Colombian government’s strategy to confront organized crime, focused on strengthening the capabilities of the Public Force, has made it possible to exert significant pressure on those involved in this type of activity. In no way can the achievements achieved be ignored or underestimated. For example, capturing and discharging several leaders of criminal organizations such as El Clan del Golfo, and others who have been extradited, such as the drug trafficker alias Otoniel. However, we are facing a culture of illegality that is highly rooted in society, and which has the capacity to adapt to the military and police strategies that confront it, as proposed by Álvarez (2018). These criminal structures are not hierarchical, but have been atomized and specialized to generate links with other criminal organizations, such as the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico.

From the point of view of public policy, the definition of the problem must be strengthened: it is not enough to continue strengthening the Public Force, since

organized crime must also be faced as a multi-causal phenomenon; not only can the symptoms of the problem be addressed, but its causes must also be addressed. Unified Action is an important commitment that allows addressing the causes and prevention, but it must be strengthened with new approaches, which allow a better dimension of the criminal phenomenon as a company with high financial returns and that feeds on corruption and vulnerable populations.

According to Jorge Mantilla, of the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Zuleta, August 31, 2022),

[...] the expansion of crime and illegal economies in Colombia is also due to the fact that for many years the country concentrated on bringing the peace agreement with the FARC to a happy conclusion and on the fight against drugs, this caused a growing phenomenon of diversification of illegal economies to be left aside, where not only coca but other economies such as illegal mining, but mainly extortion, were expanding and consolidating.

Therefore, the panorama of the Colombian State is very challenging, in the sense that the configuration of the threat has financial resources to strengthen its structure with personnel and technology and uses corruption as a means to delegitimize the State.

In the context described the probability of more women like Griselda Blanco entering criminal organizations is increasingly high. Journalist Mariana van Zeller, from the documentary *Mercado Illegal*, from National Geographic, made a chapter called "Queens of Cocaine" (2021), in which she interviews women who operate in criminal organizations in Brazil and Colombia. In Rio de Janeiro, she entered the favelas and spoke with women who work for factions of Comando Vermelho, highlighting how women increasingly occupy important positions within the structure. She also met with a Los Caparros section commander in Colombian Bajo Cauca. Comparing the profile of the women interviewed with that presented in the development of this document - young women, between 21 and 35 years old who begin their criminal career at an early age, from socioeconomic strata 1 and 2, belonging to the subsidized level and with very low levels of schooling and a significant percentage of recidivism levels -, it can be concluded that there are coincidences, because the threat of transnational crime is a dynamic that affects the region.

References

- Alva, L. (2018). *La mujer en crimen organizado: rol, participación y posición de poder*. Universidad de Alicante.
- Álvarez, C., Zambrano, J., & Álvarez, C. (2017). *Escenarios y desafíos de la seguridad multidimensional en Colombia*.
- Andrade, R. (2013). El liderazgo comunitario y su importancia en la intervención comunitaria. *Psicología para América latina*, (25), 57-76.
- Cruz, A., & Rivera, D. (2008). El narcotráfico en Colombia. Pioneros y capos. *Historia y espacio*, 4(31), 169-207.
- Maritano, A. (2021, 28 septiembre). *Colombia - El papel de la mujer en el narcotráfico y su solución*. Diario Jurídico.
- Erazo, E., & Muñoz, G. (2007). Las mediaciones tecnológicas en los procesos de subjetivación juvenil: Interacciones en Pereira y Dosquebradas, Colombia. *Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Niñez y Juventud*, 5(2), 723-754.
- García, A. (2014). La delincuencia femenina. Una revisión teórica. *FORO. Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales, Nueva Época*, 16(2), 311-316.
- Herrero-Hernández, F. (2005). *De Husserl a Levinas. Un camino en la fenomenología*.
- Hikal, W. (2017). La teoría de la asociación diferencial para la explicación de la criminalidad y la articulación de una política criminal. *Derecho y cambio social*, 2(15), 1-15.
- Insight Crime (2020). *Mujeres y crimen organizado en América Latina: más que víctimas o victimarias*. Observatorio Colombiano del Crimen Organizado, Universidad del Rosario e Insight Crime.
- López, D. (2022, 22 de agosto). *Colombia es el segundo país del mundo con más organizaciones criminales*. El País.
- Mieles, M., Tonon, G., & Alvarado, S. (2012). Investigación cualitativa: el análisis temático para el tratamiento de la información desde el enfoque de la fenomenología social. *Universitas humanística*, (74), 195-225.
- Norza-Céspedes, E., González-Rojas, A., Moscoso-Rojas, M., & González-Ramírez, J. (2012). Descripción de la criminalidad femenina en Colombia: factores de riesgo y motivación criminal. *Revista Criminalidad*, 54(1), 339-357.
- Pérez, J., Nieto, J., & Santamaría, J. (2019). La hermenéutica y la fenomenología en la investigación en ciencias humanas y sociales. *Civilizar Ciencias Sociales y Humanas*, 19(37), 21-30.
- Pina, I. (2016). *Criminología feminista*. Centro para el estudio y prevención de la delincuencia.
- Quijano, A. (1994). Una introducción a Husserl. *Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades*, (33).
- Rincón, D. (2018). La política de ataques militares contra las bandas criminales en Colombia y su legitimidad a la luz del derecho internacional humanitario. *Ars Boni et Aequi*, 13(2).

- Rodríguez, L. (2016). El concepto de criminalidad organizada transnacional: problemas y propuestas. *Nuevo Foro Penal*, 86,(62).
- Rodríguez, S., Porra, L., & Lecompte, M. (2019). Los paradigmas emergentes de la identidad femenina. Resignificando los feminismos en espacios universitarios. *TS Cuadernos De Trabajo Social*, (19)
- Salazar, T., & Cabral, B. (2012). Miradas de género a la criminalidad femenina. *Fermentum. Revista Venezolana de Sociología y Antropología*, 22(64), 222-248.
- Sánchez, M. (2004). La mujer en la teoría criminológica. *Revista de Estudios de Género, La Ventana*, 2(20), 240-266.
- Sánchez-Mejía, A., Rodríguez, L., Fondevila, G., & Morad, J. (2018). *Mujeres y prisión en Colombia: desafíos para la política criminal desde un enfoque de género*. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Sampó, C. (2017). *Una primera aproximación al crimen organizado en América Latina: Definiciones, manifestaciones y algunas consecuencias*. Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado; Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia.
- Skulj, A. (2012). *Violencia de género en América Latina: aproximaciones desde la criminología feminista*. Delito y sociedad: revista deficiencias sociales, (35), 5-6.
- Sodupe, K. (2003). *La teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales a comienzos del Siglo XXI*.
- Steffensmeier, D., Schwartz, J., & Roche, M. (2013). Gender and twenty-first-century corporate crime: Female involvement and the gender gap in Enron-era corporate frauds. *American Sociological Review*, 78(3), 448-476.
- Steffensmeier, D., Allan, E., & Streifel, C. (1989). Development and female crime: A cross-national test of alternative explanations. *Social Forces*, 68(1), 262-283.
- Toledo, U. (2003). Fenomenología del Mundo Social. *Cinta de Moebio. Revista de Epistemología de Ciencias Sociales*, (18). <https://revistateoria.uchile.cl/index.php/CDM/article/view/26137>
- Tregunna, A. (2014). Cocaine cowgirl: the outrageous life and mysterious death of Griselda Blanco, the godmother of Medellín. *Trends in Organized Crime*, 17(1), 132-134.
- Zuleta, D. (2022, 31 agosto). *Colombia es el segundo país del mundo con más organizaciones criminales*. El País.

Chapter 12

The strategic thinking of George F. Kennan and the fourth-generation wars in the framework of the Cold War

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.12>

Miguel Antonio González Martínez

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: This paper aims to analyze, in the light of the concepts of the theories of war and armed conflict and of strategic leadership and prospective analysis, the Cold War and the participation of Colombia in that historical period. Specifically, the subject is studied through the lens of leader George F. Kennan (1904-2005) and his policy of containment exercised by the United States in that war. In addition, it is intended to complement the analysis by delving into the conceptual contributions of William Lind (2004) on *the generations of the war* and its impact on Colombia. An effect that, as will be seen, the author himself recognizes within his work. Methodologically, it is a qualitative-hermeneutical study based on Kennan's strategic thinking embodied in his intellectual production and Lind's concepts of generations of war.

Palabras clave: Colombia, containment, strategy, generations of war, Cold War.

Miguel Antonio González Martínez

Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in History, National University of Colombia. Professional, International Relations and Political Studies, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada. Junior researcher categorized by MinCiencias. Professor and research fellow, Army Department, Escuela Superior de Guerra.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6034-912X> - Contact: miguel.gonzalez@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: González Martínez, M. A. (2023). The strategic thinking of George F. Kennan and the fourth generation wars in the framework of the Cold War. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 241-262). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.12>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

The Cold War was a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR), the victorious superpowers of World War II from 1945 to 1989. From the academic level, there is a wide academic production referring to the interpretation of this ideological confrontation of the second half of the twentieth century, from different theoretical and conceptual approaches. However, this chapter expands and contributes to the debate based on two specific axes that determined the order and balance of the international system of the Cold War. The *policy of containment* and *fourth-generation wars*, embodied in the growth of guerrilla groups in the hemisphere.

This chapter first provides the background of the Cold War, and then enters into the analysis of the confrontation between the superpowers taking into account the horizon of the containment strategy used by the Americans. Specifically, the strategic leadership that inspired George F. Kennan, its architect, is analyzed in depth, based on an analysis of its belief system and symbols. Then the argumentation is spun, with the Cold War in Latin America and for the Colombian case. In this section we see how concepts about warfare such as *asymmetric warfare* and *fourth-generation wars* turn out to be an interpretative framework to explain the phenomenon of the Cold War in the hemisphere. The work concludes with a few brief final reflections.

Background

For many historians, there is still no specific consensus on a specific date for the start of the Cold War. A comparison between the Cold War and contemporary hybrid warfare (Mattis & Hoffman, 2005) based on the development of the means

and modes used leads to the finding of many similarities, since their practices were diffuse and indirect, which refers us to the *volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous* environment (VUCA), which characterizes the contemporary world; hence the challenge that this poses for the design of strategy. However, the truth is that some authors, such as Kissinger (1995) and Hobsbawm (1998) place as an important milestone of its beginning the diplomatic conferences between the victorious leaders of World War II. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945), Winston Churchill (1874-1965) and Joseph Stalin (1878-1953), who established the world order from the defeat of the powers of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, in Potsdam (July 17-2 August 1945) and Yalta (February 4-11, 1945). Other authors are usually located in the enunciation of the *Truman Doctrine* and the beginning of the program of reconstruction of Europe: the *Marshall Plan* (Bostdorff, 2008). However, in general and for the purposes of this work, the beginning of this period will be temporarily located in 1945, as the historical milestone that marks the beginning of the Cold War, given the characteristics and maneuvers in terms of strategy that can be identified practically from this year.

In consideration of the above, it will be presented as the main antecedents of the Cold War both to World War II (1939-1945) and to the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japanese sovereign territory, in August 1945. As a second precedent, the Chinese Revolution (1949) will also be cited, a historical fact traditionally overlooked in historiography, but which today, due to the geopolitical relevance of China, takes on a central importance when explaining the situation of actors in the international system of the present.

World War II

World War II was a conflict of an ideological nature that pitted France, Britain and the USSR - and subsequently, the United States - against Germany, Italy and Japan in the period 1939-1945 (Hobsbawm, 1998). Its origins can be traced to the convulsive "interwar" period (1919-1939), notorious for the widespread discontent in German domestic politics over the treatment received by his country because of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), at the end of the First World War, and led by the *German National Socialist Party* (Carr, 2004). Undoubtedly, the demands of this treaty on the part of Germany, and the geopolitical pretensions on the European stage on the part of Italy, and Japan, in Asia, created the environment conducive to a new war on a planetary scale.

The beginning of the war was caused by the events that occurred from the end of August 1939, with *Operation Himmler*, and that subsequently ended with the

invasion of Poland, during the first days of September of the same year. For the Nazis, the strategy was based on the tactic known as *blitzkrieg*, or *blitzkrieg*, after its German name, and which for William Lind (2004) emphasizes the importance of aviation, the replacement of infantry by heavy artillery, and collapse from the enemy's rear.

The Germans faced with the Second World War had to reformulate their strategy from the mistakes made during the World War I, in which the power of artillery was quickly contained with the tactics of the trenches, which turned the war into a war of attrition, which ended up leading them to imminent defeat. Thus, for World War II Germany used the *blitzkrieg* with greater mobility from the use of mechanized and armored (panzerkampfwagen), in addition with firepower of the same or greater intensity to the wars that allowed the incursion of the *second-generation wars*, when the Industrial Revolution and the military industry were incorporated. This new strategy allowed amazing advances in the spring and summer of 1940, on the eastern front (Benelux, France, Denmark and Finland) and on the western front, until the winter of 1941-1942, in an attempt to invade the USSR militarily.

However, from then on, the retreat of the German forces began, to the extent that their troops were worn out fighting two battlefronts without any practical result. In fact, by the end of 1943 it was known that the Nazis were going to lose the war, but what was not clear was how much they could continue to resist their fall, until in the summer of 1944, with the landing of *D-Day*, or *Operation Overlord* the German retreat on the western front began to take shape, while the Red Army advanced on the northern Slavic countries, until it reached Berlin, in April 1945.

While the military operations advanced successfully on the European front, on the Pacific front the cessation of hostilities seemed very far away. Japan continued to resist the onslaught of the Americans, who had just entered the war in the early winter of 1941, after the attack of the Japanese on the Pearl Harbor base, in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. A fact named by the President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt with the *Day of Infamy*. However, in August 1945 the newly inaugurated Harry Truman, his successor (1945-1953), gave the order to release two nuclear bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in a definitive attack to lead Japan to its surrender. It is estimated that at least 250,000 people died until the end of 1945 as a result of the radioactive footprint, and another 20,000 over the next two years (López Sánchez, 2016).

In short, the panorama that the two atomic bombs threw was a total rethinking of military strategy. The war reached a point of no return: a scenario where the survival of life on the planet was completely threatened. Hence, *game theory* achieved acceptance within the field of academia as a way of interpreting and predicting the

unilateral decisions and actions of the actors (*behaviorism*) in dispute in a confrontational scenario.

The Chinese Revolution

Including the 1949 *Chinese Revolution* as an antecedent of the Cold War is based on the purpose of identifying the roots of China's meteoric rise as a major power on the contemporary stage. In the same way, it is important to analyze the effects of the triumph of a revolution with communist ideology, which tipped the balance of the international balance during the Cold War - at least, ideologically - in favor of the communist bloc. While it is true that the Russian Revolution (1917) has been categorized as a proletarian revolution, and the Chinese Revolution, as a peasant revolution, it is no less true that both ideologies, apparently antagonistic within the thought of the left, served as intellectual influences of the subversive groups that developed throughout the so-called "Third World" (Escobar, 2007) within the framework of the conflict of the dominant superpowers in the second half of the twentieth century.

Until the beginning of the 20th century, China had been ruled, for millennia, through a dynastic system that ended with the Qing Dynasty (1636-1912). The leaders of the *Kuomintang* nationalist party were the architects of the overthrow of the dynasty in favor of the beginning of a republican government for China, and it was in this way that a new political period for the Asian giant began. However, Japan's continental territorial aspirations materialized with the invasion of China in 1937, until 1945, when, with the help of the United States, the Nationalist Party recovered the north of the country amid tension in the area with the Soviets. However, China soon fell back into civil conflict, and in 1946 the *People's Liberation Army* was created against the rule of the Kuomintang Nationalist Party.

The end of the civil conflict came with the triumph of the revolution led by Mao Zedong, who, after a long march, gained power after the exile of the Nationalist Party to the island of Taiwan. From then on, Greater China was divided into two territories, with a geopolitical tension in force to this day.

The Cold War

The Cold War, which, as already mentioned, could be categorized within the typologies of hybrid warfare, received its name because the United States and the USSR, the rivals, never entered a direct confrontation of fires, but competition occurred in

other scenarios, such as espionage (the Soviet KGB and the American CIA), propaganda, information and even *soft power* (sport, art and development, industrial, scientific and technological - the space race). For Eric Hobsbawm,

Entire generations grew up under the threat of a global nuclear conflict that, as many believed, could erupt at any moment and wipe out humanity. In reality, even those who did not believe that either side intended to attack the other found it difficult not to fall into pessimism, since Murphy's law is one of the generalizations that best fit the human being ("If something can go wrong, it will go wrong"). Over time, there were more and more things that could go wrong, both politically and technologically, in a permanent nuclear confrontation based on the premise that only the fear of "mutually assured destruction" (aptly summed up in English with the acronym MAD, "mad") would prevent either side from giving the signal, always on point, of the planned destruction of civilization. It didn't happen, but for forty years it was an everyday possibility. (1998, p. 230)

In the course of the war, two military blocs were established: initially, in 1949, the *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (NATO), led by the United States and formally constituted by the European countries called the "free world", rivaled the later created *Warsaw Pact* (1955-1991), whose members would be, mainly, the countries east of the *Curtain and Iron*, and which were called the "satellite countries" of the USSR, a strong division marked by *Fulton's Speech*, by Winston Churchill on the "Iron Curtain" (Muller, 1999). From the economic point of view, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) (1949-1991), as an economic organ of communist leverage, rivaled the Western financial aid contained in: the Marshall Plan, the Monnet Plan (1946-1950), the institution of the Economic Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) -which would become the antecedent of the European Economic Community (EEC), today the European Union (EU)-and, finally, more formally, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), of 1960.

Although, in essence, due to the arms and nuclear race developed by the United States and the USSR, a direct conflict between the powers would have implied mutually assured destruction, there were conflicts between the countries that orbited within one of the two ideologies. The first of these was the Korean War, between 1950 and 1953 - with direct participation of the Colombia Battalion supporting the United Nations contingent - and the Vietnam War, between 1955 and 1975. The latter, catalogued within the conceptual scheme of *guerrilla warfare* (Aznar Fernández-Montesinos et al., 2018, p. 92).

Already at the end of the seventies, the conflict had entered a stage of attrition and that demanded an early solution on the international stage, due to the pressure of the group of Non-Aligned Countries, led by Egypt, under the government, in turn, of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970), and with the good offices of Colombia, under the liberal government of Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978) (Cepeda Ulloa & Pardo Garcia-Peña, 1984). Moreover, in the late 1970s the USSR maintained a sustained war on the southern front with Afghanistan, by the *mujahideen*. Faced with the Soviet impossibility of achieving a victory, its military capacity was seriously questioned, its internal fractures within the Kremlin soon began to become visible. In the mid-eighties the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) assumed power in the USSR, who implemented *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*, which proved insufficient to contain his fall, and finally, the Soviet project ended up falling apart in 1991.

George Frost Kennan and the Politics of Containment

The case of the *politics of containment* is a clear example of how a person's ideas can decisively impact the course of events in history. George Frost Kennan was a diplomat in the newly created foreign service of the United States Department of State, and a political scientist and historian by training. He was a mentor of the containment strategy of Soviet expansion and considered one of the "wise men" of the group of foreign policy elders, along with leading figures such as Henry Kissinger (1923-). After his period of training in diplomatic academia, Kennan was sent to Europe for low-profile missions given his degree in foreign service; however, he gained prestige for the negotiations he led against Portugal for the use of the Azores islands as a military base, by the Allies, during World War II. Although a junior diplomat, his obstinacy, discipline, and interest in Soviet affairs led him to specialize in the study of Russian culture, and he was appointed to the corresponding embassy as an adjunct in trade relations.

In 1946, the then young diplomat sent the now famous *Long Telegram* to the State Department, in which he restated several controversial points about some "overvalued beliefs" that Washington had in relation to the Soviet Communist State (Kennan, 1988). With his first-hand knowledge and study of Russian culture, Kennan managed to accurately understand the strengths and weaknesses that the *Russian* people had from within, and that they externalized in their ways of exercising foreign policy. The containment proposal was published, academically, in *Foreign Affairs*,

under the pseudonym of Mr. "X"; thus he gained more popularity, for the mystery of a publication made under a suggestive pseudonym. In his writing, he argued that the Soviet regime was expansionist by nature, and that its influence should be *contained* in areas of strategic importance to the United States.

About Kennan's Leadership Beliefs

G. Kennan designed the bases of the containment strategy in the *Long Telegram* and published them anonymously in the journal *Foreign Affairs* (Kennan, 1998, p. 124); therefore, his beliefs are contained in these texts. A critical analysis of these publications can reveal that their beliefs were based on the sociological analysis of the "other"; a kind of "mirror game" that, from the point of view of constructivism, cemented the American political personality and its antagonism through its interpretation of communism and its meaning in the foundations of Russian society; Kennan, as an expert in Soviet affairs, knew very well the distinction between the Soviet and the *Russian*. Thus, for Kennan (1988), Russian socialist militants were

Frustrated, dissatisfied, with no hope of finding their own personality or too impatient to seek it within the restricted confines of the tsarist political system, though without receiving broad popular support in choosing a bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionaries saw in Marxist theory a rationalization highly suited to their own instinctual desires. (p. 140)

On the *Russian revolutionary dictatorial way*, he argued that

The circumstances of the immediate post-revolutionary period of civil war and foreign intervention in Russia, together with the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a small minority of the Russian people, made it necessary to establish a dictatorial power. The experiment with 'war communism' and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and increased bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. (Kennan, 1988, p. 141)

Regarding the totalitarian and greedy nature of the communist leaders, he stated:

But had it been so, Stalin and those whom he /Lenin led in the struggle to succeed Lenin in leadership could not tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power coveted by them. His sense of insecurity was too great. (Kennan, 1988, p. 141)

Of the need to create the external enemy, he expressed that

The need for the creation of the external enemy by the Soviets in capitalism, given that a serious or extensive opposition to the Kremlin that arose spontaneously from the liberated masses to which they ruled could not be admitted, had to reinforce the threat of capitalism beyond the borders, to justify the persistence of the dictatorship. (Kennan, 1988, p. 142)

It is clear that Keenan, through his ideas, represents a leadership in the mobilization of people who are in competition with the USSR, under political and psychological principles. Northhouse (2010) also identifies that "Leadership is a process by which a person influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal." This definition also conforms to Kennan's leadership, insofar as his proposal constitutes an international crusade against communism, which, in effect, materialized during the Cold War period.

On the Meanings of Kennan's Leadership

Following the theory of the *linguistic sign*, by Ferdinand de Saussure (1945), it can be inferred that Kennan built a network of meanings on basic signifiers such as ideology and the end of the human being in society. In this sense, it fed the totalizing *metanarrative* of modernity about the ends and purposes of human organizations and in the ideological discourses that were reinforced with the Industrial Revolution. The natural opposition between the leadership exercised in each ideological system: democratic capitalism and demagogic dictatorial communism, diverged, making them practically irreconcilable, giving positive values to capitalism, and negative values to communism in a kind of Manichaeism.

Perhaps there is no episode of confrontation as relevant in international history as the Cold War, with such a high load of Semitic meanings: signs and symbols arranged as a representation of identity built on both sides, and which played a special role. Thus, cartographies, advertisements, declarations, and statements formed a corpus of semiotic objects loaded with intention and content that sought to undermine the communist position vis-à-vis internal American public opinion.

The graphic semiosis of the Cold War

Cartographies

Figure 1. Map of the Cold War frontier: the Iron Curtain.



Source: La Nación (2019).

One of the best used elements since the beginning of the war was the euphemism Iron Curtain, which when taken to the maps of the war established a natural and insurmountable barrier between two worlds imagined by the statesmen of the time, as established in the map of figure 1. Maps are not neutral elements: they help shape geopolitical thinking and a way of seeing and analyzing reality. For Kennan and the Western world, everything that was "behind the Iron Curtain" was underdeveloped and hidden; and before some, even, with an infection that had to be fought.

Figure 2. "The communist contagion".



Source: Time Magazine (April 1, 1946, p. 27).

Cartoons

The cartography served to “caricature” the expansionist claims of Soviet control beyond the Iron Curtain. Kennan (1988) vehemently led the idea of containment to Soviet expansion, and his strategy created that way of interpreting the world by the “free world”. As he would say in his article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” “In these circumstances it is clear that the central element of any U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must be long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” (p. 145).


Figure 3. Stalin's attempts to extend Soviet control beyond Eastern Europe.



Source: British cartoonist Leslie Illingworth (June 1947).

Magazines and newspapers showed a sinister, armored, and dark world in the countries on the “other side” of the Iron Curtain, and thus an exotic and inhospitable world was created in the Western mentality through these images.

Figure 4. *“The Iron Curtain”*.



Source: British cartoonist Leslie Illingworth.

Propaganda

In the propaganda poster of the United States Information Service shown in figure 5, the anti-Soviet feeling of containment of communism is evident: in this one, Juan de la Cruz, a national symbol of the Philippines, is seen supporting the policy of containment of communism.


Figure 5. *Poster of the United States Information Service distributed in Asia.*



Source: National Archives at College Park (1951).

Figure 6 illustrates how communism is symbolically homologated with the tentacles of an octopus that stalk the world. The relevance of the color red, representative of communism, is notorious..


Figure 6. "How Communism Works".



Source: Catholic Library Service pamphlet (1938).

This is how the conjunction between beliefs, meanings and symbols constructed in Kennan’s mind emerges from a vision directed towards the containment of the enemy communist force, created in his mind as an innate strategist in favor of the political organization represented by the United States, his own country, and the countries allied to it in the Western bloc, also calling, metaphorically, “the free world”, as seen in figure 7.

Figure 7. G. Keenan's leadership system.



Source: Own elaboration.

The system of beliefs, meanings, and symbols endowed the leader with a vague, ethereal, and overrated perception of the Soviet in the culture of the United States, and thus projected it onto the minds of other American political leaders and those who followed him. The Western world had to exercise an ironclad foreign policy aimed at stopping, *containing*, the expansionist aspirations of the Soviets in the international system.

In *The Origins of Soviet Behavior*, George Kennan generated critical positions by those who attacked the proposal, for its intention to recruit, subordinate and manipulate satellite countries around the globe to effect such “containment”. However, the doctrine of containment became official Washington policy vis-à-vis that of Moscow from the arrival in the White House of Harry Truman (1945-1953).

Kennan gained even more notoriety when he collaborated with George Marshall, Secretary of State, as Director of Policy Planning, on the European Reconstruction Plan of the same name. Thus, it is possible to think that, in terms of studies in strategy, Kennan contributed and was a pioneer in terms of being a civilian *Policy Adviser* in an area of study classically enunciated from military studies in military training academies (Bueno, 2018, p. 241). The development of the strategy, in its practical sense, materialized in the foreign policy of the United States in the observed period. The subsequent governments, of Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961), J. F. Kennedy (1961-1963), Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969), Richard Nixon (1969-1974), Gerald Ford (1974-1977), Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and George Bush (1989-1993), continued to implement the policy in their respective mandates, until leading to the defeat of the Soviets in their claim to world domination, more than 30 years ago.

However, Kennan's popularity began to wane when he observed that the implementation of his policy took on a militaristic form, a view that coincided with the appointment of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State in 1949. In 1950 Kennan left the State Department, except for two brief commissions as a diplomat in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and already from academia he became a critic of American foreign policy. In effect, the policy of containment was a tool of the foreign policy of the northern country that strengthened its position in the face of the expansionist pretensions of communist ideology around the world. A palpable example can be illustrated from the hemispheric policy of the United States, in its objective of preserving an America united under the principles of freedom and democracy.

The Cold War in Latin America

In this scenario of confrontation, Latin America played a decisive role as a region of vital importance for the interests of the United States (Katz, 2004). In the same way that in World War II, under the leadership of the United States, the ideal of a united Latin America had materialized in the face of the threat of a Nazi *Fifth Column*, the aspiration of the colossus of the north was to exercise strategic control of the most important hemispheric areas that could violate the security of its *heartland*. However, it was a purpose that was not easy to achieve.

Indeed, Latin America's effort in the framework of World War II had concentrated on at least three tasks. The first of these was the sending of troops by the countries that had a greater human resource to reinforce the Allied lines and the fronts of the war (in the case of Brazil and Mexico). The second moment was the shipment of raw materials (rubber, aluminum, metals, etc.) for their transformation into the war industry (in the case of Colombia and the other Andean countries). The third was the defense of the hemisphere through the commitment of mutual assistance, reached in 1939, in Panama - and of some critical geostrategic points, such as the Panama Canal (Bushnell, 1989). However, at the Chapultepec Conference in 1945, during the central diplomatic moment facing the architecture of the new world order, Latin America sought a greater commitment from the United States to promote and develop its precarious economies, dependent on the products of the first sector of the economy. This aspiration transcended until the end of the war, when the United States launched plans for the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, and therefore postponed hemispheric attention to the threat of the Soviets.

However, in 1948 a hemispheric breakthrough was achieved in the face of the tense situation created on the international scene by the confrontation between the United States and the USSR. In Bogotá, in the middle of Bogotazo, with the celebration of the IX Pan American Conference, the Organization of American States (OAS) was created; a diplomatic forum for the debate on inter-American problems in terms of safety, health, finances and Human Rights, among other areas, but also, to ratify the democratic commitment of the countries of the hemisphere. In the same way, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), also called the *Treaty of Rio*, signed on September 2, 1947, was a purely defensive agreement, an inter-American alliance of mutual defense that reaffirmed the commitment of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Panama City, September 1939.

In the fifties, an important part of the administration of Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961) concentrated its efforts on the American presence on the European front, with the exception of the coup against Jacobo Árbenz, in Guatemala, in 1953. And on the containment of the first pro-communist revolutionary guerrillas that were present in practically all of Latin American territory. However, in 1959, with the triumph of the *Cuban Revolution*, a new stage in history and hemispheric relations began within the framework of the Cold War (Katz, 2004), since the United States had to overcome the strategy of military containment in favor of an aid program aimed at strengthening the social and economic fabric of the countries. According to Stephen Rabe, cited by González et al. (2002),

One of the aspects to be highlighted according to this conception is that in 1954 the United States, in the voice of President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961), made clear the strategic importance of Latin American territory in the fight against Soviet socialism. The president referred to his Latin American policy as a chapter of 'the Cold War against our enemies' and indicated that in Latin America a war against communism was being fought. (w. p.)

Thus, starting in the 1960s, the strategy of hard power in Latin America was rethought, in favor of strategies such as the *Alliance for Progress*, designed from the *theory of modernization*, studied and taught in the main American universities, as a "recipe" to achieve the development of poor countries (Rojas, 2010). Colombia was a pilot in its implementation, and thus housing solutions were created in the capital of the Republic, as a response to the numerous wave of peasant migrants fleeing the rural conflict. Even a second agrarian reform even materialized, at the recommendation of the program emanating from Washington.

Colombia in the Cold War and the Asymmetric War

Although the historic bipartisan conflict in Colombia had resulted in at least nine civil wars during the nineteenth century, the first half of the twentieth century, for a good part, was characterized by an atmosphere of widespread peace throughout the national territory (Bushnell, 2004). However, in 1930 the arrival of the liberals to power, with Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930-1934), stoked the old rivalries between liberals and conservatives, to the point of resulting in sporadic acts of violence in some parts of the country. The opposition exercised by Laureano Gómez in the

Senate of the Republic, the liberal reforms carried out in the first government of Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934-1938) and that of Eduardo Santos Montejó (1938-1942). And, finally, the murder of the liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, on April 9, 1948, caused the episode known as *La Violencia* (1948-1953) to formally explode, until the amnesty promised under the military government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1958) (González & Chavez, 2021).

The liberal strongholds that did not enter the amnesty -particularly in the south of Tolima (Republic of Marquetalia)— as a direct effect of the ideological confrontation in the international system, in 1964 took up arms against the Colombian State under a Marxist-Communist ideological inspiration, and thus created the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In the same year the National Liberation Army (ELN) was founded, and entered into operations the following year, in the oil zone in the Santanderes, while the Movimiento 19 de abril (M-19), another representative group, saw the light six years later, in 1970, after the controversial presidential elections where the conservative candidate Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970-1974) was elected (Melo, 2017).

The bloody internal war that the Colombian State has waged against the guerrillas fits with asymmetric warfare, which, in a specific definition, can be said to “constitute a violent conflict, in which there is a considerable difference, quantitative and qualitative, of military, technological, diplomatic and/or media power” (Gajate Bajo, 2019). From here different maneuvers and tactics emerge to balance the asymmetry in favor of the “lower” power, such as *guerrilla warfare*. Indeed, under the inspiration of the Chinese Revolution, in the framework of the Colombian conflict¹, concepts such as the *prolonged people's war* and the *combination of forms of struggle* were discussed. These strategies drove the maneuver towards attrition, undermining morale from within the enemy troop, in the face of “uncertainty”, and thus reaching victory. In a clear example, the Colombian conflict has lasted for more than 60 years.

While regarding the typology of conflicts established by William Lind (2004), the Colombian conflict could clearly be located in the fourth-generation wars as derived from the analysis presented by María Gajate Bajo:

¹ According to Hobsbawm, “At the very moment when the young and hopeful leftists were citing Mao Zedong’s strategy to make the revolution triumph by mobilizing the countless millions of peasants against the beleaguered urban fortresses of the system, those millions were leaving their villages for the very cities. In Latin America, the percentage of peasants halved in twenty years in Colombia (1951-1973), in Mexico (1960-1980) and -almost- in Brazil (1960-1980), and fell by two-thirds, or close to it, in the Dominican Republic (1960-1981), Venezuela (1961-1981) and Jamaica (1953-1981)” (1998, p. 243).

[...] in fourth-generation struggles, the most momentous mutation would be that the State loses its monopoly in the exercise of war. Thus, new actors appear, such as the media, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), religious groups... Winning in the tactical and physical realm does not automatically imply a strategic or mental triumph. (2019, n.d.)

Indeed, other authors, such as F. Münkler (2005) and M. Kaldor (2001), agree that in *new wars* there seems to be a return to the premodern phase of States, in which the permanent dispute for the right of sovereign subsistence of States was the constant dispute. Although the Westphalian pact laid the foundations of a new international system based on respect for the sovereignty of territorial entities, it seems that the dispersion of the nature of the actors erodes the monopoly of the use of internal force of the States, as William Lind himself argues, and links the Colombian guerrillas as an example of the fourth generation of war, in the following terms:

Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting nonstate opponents such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Almost everywhere, the state is losing. (2004, p. 13)

Conclusions

Once the above analysis has been made, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Although the Cold War was not a conflict in which direct military strategies were put in place, since its antagonists did not come into direct fire, it can be established that in their derivative conflicts, such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War or even the guerrilla wars in Latin America, they were able to incorporate elements that have been extensively analyzed from the perspective of strategic and military studies. Indeed, for William Lind (2004) the case of Colombian guerrillas may be the empirical evidence for his concept of *fourth-generation wars*.

An important element to highlight is that, on the contemporary level, from the studies of Hoffman and Mattis (2005), of Valery Gerasimov and of unrestricted

warfare, of the Chinese colonels Liang and Xiangsui (1999), one can speak of hybrid warfare scenarios. However, within the framework of the direct confrontation between the United States and the USSR, it can be argued that many elements that the aforementioned authors highlight as the classic tactics of contemporary hybrid warfare were presented in their means and strategic modes.

From the conceptual point of view, it is striking the wide range of concepts that have been used here, and others that have remained in the pipeline, such as irregular warfare, war of positions and war of movements, among others that seem to accommodate, complement and even redound to other interpretations.

Finally, the point of the strategy is central to this work. The role of George Kennan is highlighted, who can be cited as the precursor of strategic studies, from a civilian perspective, in a field traditionally dominated by the military. The belief system based on the defense of liberalism, democracy and the free world, of ideological meanings based on natural opposition between the leadership exercised in each ideological system (democratic capitalism and demagogic dictatorial communism) diverged and made both positions practically irreconcilable, granting positive values to capitalism, and negative values to communism, as well as symbols and signs that fed cartographies, advertisements, statements and statements by leader George F. Kennan, was the antecedent towards the international containment of communism, which was satisfactorily implemented and, ultimately, led to the victory of the United States in the Cold War.

The mind of this leader shaped a vision that projected the United States towards an indirect form of confrontation that could be sustained throughout the Cold War without reaching a warlike confrontation between the two superpowers, and whose result would have been catastrophic for the survival of life on the planet. This, in an epistemological moment when it began a methodological revolution of studies based on *behavior*-behaviorism- of the fifties, accompanied by quantitative methodology when explaining -and even trying to predict- the action of the actors in conflict.

References

- Aznar, F., Sánchez, G., Gómez, A., Díaz, F., & Sánchez, E. (2018). *Amenazas pasadas presentes y futuras: las Guerras asimétricas*. Universidad Santo Tomás.
- Bostdorff, D. (2008). *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine. The Cold War Call to Arms*. A&M University Press.
- Bueno, A. (2018). De los Estudios Estratégicos. Conceptualización y evolución de un campo de estudio. *RESI. Revista de Estudios de Seguridad Internacional*, 4(1), 237-256. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18847/1.7.14>
- Burns, J. (1978). *Leadership*. Harper & Row.
- Bushnell, D. (1989). *Eduardo Santos y la Política del Buen Vecino*. El Áncora.
- Bushnell, D. (2004). *Colombia una nación a pesar de sí misma. De los tiempos precolombianos a nuestros días*. (C. Montilla, Trad.). Planeta.
- Carr, E. (2004). *La Crisis de los Veinte Años (1919-1939). Una introducción al estudio de las relaciones internacionales*. (E. B. Alonso, Trad.). Catarata.
- Cepeda, F., & Pardo, R. (1984). La política exterior colombiana (1946-1974). En A. Tirado (Ed.), *Nueva Historia de Colombia Tomo III Relaciones Internacionales; Movimientos Sociales*. Planeta.
- Croce, M. (1992). Algunos elementos geopolíticos del Pacto Cafetero. *Cuadernos de administración*, 13(18), 23-34.
- Escobar, A. (2007). *La invención del Tercer Mundo: Construcción y Decostrucción del Desarrollo*. Fundación Editorial El Perro y la Rana.
- Gajate, M. (2019). Reflexiones sobre la guerra asimétrica a través de la historia. *URVIO, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad*, (24), 204-220. [dx.doi.org/10.17141/urvio.24.2019.3522](https://doi.org/10.17141/urvio.24.2019.3522)
- González, M. (2002). Colombia y la OTAN: ¿Una alianza estratégica de disuasión o de contención? *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad*, 17(1), 87-100. [doi:https://doi.org/10.18359/ries.6056](https://doi.org/10.18359/ries.6056)
- Gonzalez, M. (2016). *¡Café y Buenos Vecinos! Una mirada a las relaciones colombo estadounidenses a través del Acuerdo Interamericano del Café de 1940*. Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- González, M., & Chávez, C. (2021). En D. González (Ed.), *De Angostura a La Habana: Doscientos años buscando la paz en Colombia*. Neogranadina.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1998). *Historia del Siglo XX*. Crítica.
- Kaldor, M. (2001). *Viejas y Nuevas Guerras*. Tusquets.
- Katz, F. (2004). La Guerra Fría en América Latina. En D. Spenser. (Coord.), *Espejos de la guerra fría: México, América Central y el Caribe*. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social.

- Kennan, G. (1988). Los orígenes de la conducta soviética. *Secuencia*, 11(221), 138-150.
<https://doi.org/10.18234/secuencia.v0i11.221>
- Kennan, G. (1998). *Al Final de un Siglo*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Kissinger, H. (1995). El comienzo de la guerra fría. *Política Exterior*, 9(44), 55-68.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20643681>
- La Nación. (2019, 20 de agosto). La "Cortina de Hierro" de la Guerra Fría. *La Nación*.
https://www.lanacion.com.py/tendenciaedicion_impresa/2019/08/20/la-cortina-de-hierrode-la-guerra-fria/
- Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. (1999). *Unrestricted Warfare*. PLA Literature and Arts. Publishing House.
- Lind, W. (2004). Understanding Fourth Generation War. *Military Review*, 12-16.
- López, G. (2016, 13 de agosto). *El terror radiactivo de Hiroshima y Nagasaki*. ABC Ciencia.
https://www.abc.es/ciencia/abci-terror-radiactivo-hiroshima-y-nagasaki-201608131823_noticia.html
- Mattis, J., & Hoffman, F. (2005). *Future warfare: The rise of hybrid warfare*. US Naval Institute.
- Melo, J. (2017). *Historia Mínima de Colombia*. Turner Colegio de México.
- Muller, J. (1999). *Churchill's "Iron Curtain" Speech Fifty Years Later*. University of Missouri Press.
- Münkler, H. (2005). *Viejas y Nuevas Guerras*. Siglo XXI Editores.
- Northouse, P. (2010). *Leadership: Theory and Practice*. Thousand Oaks.
- Rojas, D. (2010). La alianza para el progreso de Colombia. *Análisis Político*, 23, 91-124.
- Saussure, F. (1945). *Curso de lingüística general*. Editorial Lozada.

Chapter 13

The Cenepa War from the theory of General Jomini. The war between Ecuador and Peru

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.13>

Faiver Coronado Camero

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: This chapter takes a historical approach to the Cenepa war, seen from the classical theory of Jomini's war. Relevant methods are used from the historical context and applied in research from a chronology, geography and ethnography perspective. Through a review of the literature on these events, observing that not many studies have been carried out on this historical episode beyond the chronicles and approaches made by Peruvian and Ecuadorian academics and journalists, the particularities of the events that occurred as part of the construction of the memory of the Latin American context are exalted.

Keywords: war conflict, ethnography, multidimensional, military theory.

Faiver Coronado Camero

Lieutenant Colonel (R), Ejército Nacional de Colombia. Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master and specialist in National Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Professional, Military Sciences, Escuela Militar de Cadetes "General José María Córdova". Professor and research fellow, Escuela Superior de Guerra.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0640-7907> - Contact: faiver.coronado@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: : Coronado Camero, F. (2023). The Cenepa War from the theory of General Jomini. The war between Ecuador and Peru. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp. 263-280). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.13>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

The Cenepa-Cordillera del Cóndor war, which occurred in 1995, was an armed conflict between two sister countries: Ecuador and Peru. This book chapter aims to analyze the Cenepa war from the perspective of Jomini's *classical theory of war*.

Jomini's classical theory of war refers to military strategy that focuses on offensive warfare, the use of force, and the concentration of troops. The goal is to carry out a quick and decisive campaign that allows for territory control and victory. For Jomini, military strategy is essentially a science that can be learned and refined, and whose goal is success on the battlefield.

In the case of the Cenepa War, both nations used that theory to plan their respective military strategies. Ecuador intended to regain territories lost in the 1941 war, while Peru sought to control the mineral-rich border region of Cenepa. The war began on January 26, 1995, when Ecuadorian forces invaded Peruvian territory, prompting an immediate response by the Peruvian Armed Forces.

The military strategy employed by Ecuador in the Cenepa War focused on the concentration of its troops, offensive warfare, and the use of force to achieve victory. Ecuadorian forces were organized into three brigades at the border, able to mobilize quickly through the jungle. The Ecuadorian offensive was led by the Amazonas and Marcavalle brigades, which advanced on the Cenepa region. The idea was to establish a military base in the area to consolidate its presence there.

On the other hand, the military strategy employed by Peru in this war was more focused on the defense of the territory. Peru had a defense line on the border, consisting of three military posts that guarded access to the Cenepa region. The first line of defense was 60 km from the border, while the second line was in the heart of the conflict zone.

Peru's plan was to contain the Ecuadorian offensive and prevent its forces from entering the Cenepa region. To do this, the Peruvian Armed Forces mobilized five brigades and a tank division to the border. The mobilization of the troops was rapid and surprised the Ecuadorian forces, who did not expect such a vigorous response from Peru.

The Cenepa War unfolded on difficult terrain, which hindered the movement of troops. The Cenepa region is located in a mountainous area, with little vegetation and temperatures ranging from 15°C to 32°C. The terrain is suitable for guerrilla warfare and makes it difficult to use artillery and tanks, which makes the combat very intense and difficult.

The military strategy employed by both nations reflected the classical thinking of Jomini's war. Ecuador tried to carry out an offensive and rapid campaign using the concentration of its troops and force, while Peru focused on the defense of the territory and the rapid mobilization of troops to contain the Ecuadorian offensive.

In conclusion, the Cenepa War was an armed conflict that took place on difficult terrain and in an adverse climate. Both nations used Jomini's classical theory of warfare to plan their own military strategies. Ecuador focused its strategy on the concentration of its troops, offensive war and the use of force, while Peru focused on the defense of the territory and the rapid mobilization of its troops to contain the Ecuadorian offensive. The Cenepa War was a clear sign that Jomini's theory remains relevant to this day.

Background that caused the Cenepa war

Latin America had to go through a difficult process to be an independent region. For this reason, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a series of disagreements, conflicts and treaties between countries in the region, which strengthened some and weakened others. In the same way, it happened between Ecuador and Peru, where the problem was related to the issue of the definition of borders, a conflict that encompassed more than 168 processes of wars and negotiations, from colonial to republican times (Carranza, 2002).

As early as the beginning of the 19th century, there was an intermittent border dispute between Ecuador and Peru regarding the sovereignty of a part of the Amazon. After multiple failures trying to demarcate the border, both countries entered the war in 1941, a conflict that was resolved through the Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942. In said treaty, the guarantor countries were Argentina, Chile, Brazil and


the United States, which acted first as mediator countries, and later, as arbitrators. However, what does it mean that these countries acted as “guarantors”? According to Beth A. Simmons’ approach, what differentiates *guarantors* from *mediators* or *arbitrators* is that they assume a legal obligation to facilitate the execution of the agreement, which extends to military and diplomatic functions.

Thus, although they act as mediators and can make conciliatory recommendations, these must be accepted by the parties to be implemented, since, legally, they cannot decide for them, but they can and should facilitate the execution of the agreement.

However, this caused Ecuador to lose about 5,000 square miles. Faced with this declaration of demarcation, a problem arose in practice: when the border was being recognized on the ground, it was evident that another independent river extends between the Santiago and Zamora rivers: the Cenepa river, which ends in the Condor mountain range. In this way, the border could not be delimited in practice, and hostilities continued for more than half a century, which showed the inefficiency of the mediating activity of the guarantors and their quality as arbitrators, as they did not facilitate the execution of the protocol.

The hostilities that took place over five decades were marked by Ecuadorian declarations that highlighted the fact that the Rio Protocol had been signed with incomplete information at hand, and that they, the Ecuadorians, had signed under pressure, as a result of the defeat against Peru. Thus, Ecuador became a claim to territory in the Amazon, while Peru affirmed the validity of the protocol and its sovereignty in the disputed territories, denying the existence of a border conflict. As already mentioned, this conflict, not resolved by the failed mediation and the inefficient implementation of an agreement, resulted in a very long intermittent conflict, which had a critical point on December 14, 1994, when Ecuadorian and Peruvian skirmishes took place in the southeastern sector of the Condor mountain range. In this context, on January 9, 1995, Ecuadorian forces captured a Peruvian patrol within the disputed territory. Thus began the armed conflict, which, although it was of low intensity, lasted 19 days and was characterized by the massive mobilization of troops and military, naval and air contingent to the border. Throughout those 19 days there was no territorial gain. There was indeed intense diplomatic activity, which resulted in the containment of the conflict and that both countries sat down at the table to negotiate. The armed conflict resulted in between 200 and 1,500 casualties and a high cost of military equipment.

Figure 1. Geographical map of the disputed region.



Source: retrieved from: <http://www.geocities.ws/vencedoresdelcenepa/conflicto-del-cenepa.html>

Historic boundary dispute

The northern border historically had serious problems of jurisdiction, dating back to the last stage of the colonial period, when the viceroalties of Peru and New Granada claimed for themselves the territories of Guayaquil, Tumbes, Jaén and Maynas. It is documented that in 1802 the Spanish crown returned the Amazonian territory of Maynas to the Viceroyalty of Peru, after being under the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of New Granada for more than 60 years. The following year Guayaquil was also handed over militarily to Peru, but the commercial administration continued to maintain relations with New Granada until 1806, when it came under the total control of Peru (Cayo, 2000). These territorial variations occurred at a time when American independence processes were beginning to take shape in

several regions of the continent and the new rulers also assumed different notions about their border delimitation.

Thus, for example, in 1822 Simón Bolívar called on Guayaquil to remain united with the nascent Gran Colombia, because among the Guayaquileños there were groups with a Properan tendency and others that proposed the total autonomy of Lima and Bogotá (Paz, 1868). Finally, the will of Simón Bolívar was reaffirmed with the occupation, by the Colombian army, of Guayaquil, and after the meeting that Bolívar had with José de San Martín (Paz, 1868; St. John, 1999). With the formation of the new nations it was necessary to establish their territorial limits. Thus, we have that the republics were born guided by the colonial heritage of the territories in force until 1810 and by the manifest self-determination of some border peoples towards a certain nation. But, predictably, each country had a particular interpretation of its border areas.

The new government ordered the cessation of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru, signing a peace treaty in 1829, in which both parties undertook to fix the border, but the boundaries between Peru and Gran Colombia were never established, due to the dismemberment of the latter in the countries that we now call Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. However, Ecuador later claimed that the Pedemonte-Mosquera Treaty was signed, which supposedly recognized the Amazon River as the boundary between the two nations. However, the original document of the alleged treaty could never be shown (Gaius, 2000).

Peru only established diplomatic relations with Ecuador in 1831, after gaining independence from Gran Colombia in 1830. In 1832 both countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance that recognized the principle of *uti possidetis*, with which the South American States were born. Peru interpreted it as an explicit recognition of the border territories of Tumbes, Jaén and Maynas, which had Peruvian authorities. However, from 1840 Ecuadorian claims to the aforementioned territories began, with a series of diplomatic disputes and warlike frictions. As we have observed, the Ecuadorian argument claimed the alleged Pedemonte-Mosquera Treaty, of which there is no official copy, and the Royal Decree of 1739, which incorporated the region of Maynas to the Court of Quito.

Likewise, Ecuador was unaware of the Royal Decree of 1802, which returned the territory in question to the Viceroyalty of Peru (Cayo, 2000). A first dispute that led to the mobilization of Peruvian troops occurred in 1859, when Ecuador sought to hand over part of the Amazonian territory that it considered its English creditors. After the Peruvian intervention of the port of Guayaquil, ordered by President

Castilla, Ecuador gave up its intentions and the Treaty of Mapasingue was signed, which recognized the validity of the 1802 certificate. But in 1861 the Ecuadorian Government, led by García Moreno, ignored the agreement (Garibaldi, 2009). Years later, after the Chilean occupation of Peru, an agreement was negotiated in 1890 that favored Ecuador with access to the Marañón River. However, the Peruvian parliament did not approve the final document, while the Ecuadorian congress did not accept the latest modifications suggested by Peru; therefore, a definitive agreement could not be reached. Ambassador Wagner (1964) explains that at first the Peruvian negotiators agreed to cede territory to maintain good relations with the north and, in this way, to be able to concentrate on the Tacna-Arica dispute that was being held with Chile, an issue that has always been one of the main concerns of the Peruvian State, since the fall of Lima in the hands of the Chilean army meant a national tragedy that even led to critically rethinking the possibilities of Peru as a nation (Burga, 1999).

Subsequently, Peru and Ecuador requested, towards the end of the 19th century, an arbitration from the King of Spain to solve the border problem. In 1910, after it was unofficially known that the award would accept the Peruvian theses, mobs attacked Peruvian diplomatic headquarters in Ecuador, which generated a climate that seemed to degenerate into an outbreak of war (St. John, 1999).

Faced with this situation, the Spanish crown decided not to issue its verdict on the border. With the intervention of Argentina, Brazil and the United States, the climate of peace was restored, and these countries recommended that Peru and Ecuador submit their dispute to the Court of The Hague, a proposal that was rejected by Ecuador (Basadre, 1968). In 1922 Ecuador suffered a strong diplomatic blow with the Solomon-Lozano Treaty between Peru and Colombia, which was ratified in 1928. After fighting broke out in the Amazonian area of Leticia, the Peruvian and Colombian governments reached an agreement to establish their definitive limits.

Peru ceded Leticia so that Colombia had an outlet to the Amazon River and Colombia gave Peru the territories south of Putumayo, an area that Ecuador had ceded to the Colombians years ago. Now, Ecuador had Peru not only to the south, but also to the east. Thus, Ecuador lost a strategic ally in its Amazon claim (Bákula, 1988). It should be noted that, in 1932, soldiers from Iquitos, who during the rubber *boom* controlled the region with the support of business settlers, expelled the Colombian authorities from Leticia, which caused a new conflict with Colombia. But everything ended the following year, with the ratification of the Solomon-Lozano Treaty, in Rio de Janeiro (Garay, 2009).

Another important moment in binational relations occurred in the mid-1930s, when Ecuador and Peru again engaged in dialogues to resolve the border issue. This time, the mechanism chosen was bilateral negotiations and arbitration by the United States, to overcome the discrepancies. In this period, an important fact was the presentation, by Peru, of “a line of Quo Status by virtue of which neither Peru nor Ecuador would advance beyond their respective positions in the area of dispute” (CAL, 1997, p. 23).

Then, this *status quo* line would be recognized as the basis for drawing the current border. But on that occasion the negotiations ended in 1938 without any agreement. Subsequently, from 1939, tensions increased in the face of irreconcilable positions (Domínguez, et al., 2004). Thus, we arrived in 1941, when war broke out between Peru and Ecuador. As a result of the Peruvian offensive, the battle of Zarumilla and the military occupation of the Ecuadorian province of El Oro took place. In addition, clashes were recorded in some sectors of the east (Peru). The military movements lasted less than a month. At the request of mediating countries, which intervened to resolve the conflict, the Peruvian army paralyzed its operations.

The ceasefire was formalized with the signing of the Talara Act of October 1941. The legal instrument was approved by the congresses of Peru and Ecuador, and ratified on March 31, 1942 (Ponz, 1980). According to the American geographer George McBride, who prepared for his country a report on the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border, with the peace negotiations and the 1942 protocol, Ecuador was saved from being occupied by Peruvian forces and the guarantors allowed to reach a relatively impartial agreement that took the *status quo* of 1936 as a reference for the drawing of the border line. On the border line established at the 42nd meridian, Peruvian diplomacy recognizes that, on the division of the disputed territory, Peru obtained a greater area, but, at the same time, indicates that Ecuador lost very little territory than it would have actually possessed, since it never established towns, nor political authorities or garrisons on the Amazon River or in nearby areas, which then claimed their Ecuadorian membership (Arbitraje-Pareceres, 1996, p. 78).

However, since 1943 Ecuador has presented a series of discrepancies on the demarcation of some specific areas; among them, the Condor mountain range. Brazil, as guarantor of the protocol, proposed to resolve the problem with an arbitration by the Argentine Jurist María Estela Días de Aguilar, whose ruling would have the characteristic of being unappealable. In addition, at the request of the parties, the United States designed in 1947 an Aero photogrammetric map, with the aim of dispelling any doubts on the ground; which, finally, coincided with the geographical

observations of the arbitration. On the subject, Peruvian diplomats indicated that Peru was harmed with the results of the 1945 arbitration, while Ecuador celebrated the award (Arbitraje-Pareceres, 1996).

But soon after the placement of landmarks restarted, Ecuadorian claims arose again, in 1947. On the grounds that it was necessary to verify the existence of the *divortium aquarum* between the Zamora and Santiago rivers, the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry proposed the creation of a special mixed commission to study the sector. At the end of 1948, with the arrival of Ecuadorian President Galo Plaza, the northern country suspended its participation in the Peruvian-Ecuadorian Boundary Demarcation Commission, when work was being done on the border area that remained without milestones. In 1949 Ecuador presented an observation on the milestones set in the Lagarto Cocha sector. A year later, he maintained that the arbitration ruling of Días de Aguiar was applicable only to the northern area of the Condor mountain range. As we have seen, the Ecuadorian position was radicalized. In 1951, after indefinitely suspending Ecuadorian participation in the border demarcation, President Galo Plaza announced that he would not accept a border that did not ensure an exit to the Marañón for Ecuador. Nine years later, President José María Velasco Ibarra sought to unilaterally annul the Rio de Janeiro Protocol. But after Peruvian diplomatic efforts, in December 1960 the foreign ministries of the guarantor countries expressed that the aforementioned protocol was a valid instrument and should be complied with. However, in 1976 Ecuador demanded before the UN a renegotiation of the Rio Protocol, and for this reason it made a certain echo in the US administration of Carter, which fueled the increase in Ecuadorian expectations about its claims (Mercado, 1981).

The situation worsened from 1980, when "Ecuador developed a reprehensible policy of aggression against our country, infiltrating soldiers into Peruvian territory in open military provocation" (CAL, 1997, p. 30). Thus, in 1981 there were armed clashes that ended with the eviction of a post that the Ecuadorian army was installing in the Peruvian area of the Condor mountain range. The incident was known in Peru as *False Paquisha*, for being a case of double toponymy (de la Puente, 1997). Two years later, similar to the actions of President Velasco Ibarra in the 1960s, the Ecuadorian congress declared the Rio Protocol null and void. However, in these years Peru did not firmly insist on ending the placement of border landmarks (Mercado, 1988) and the guarantors of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol remained oblivious to the issue (de la Puente, 1997). As we can see, the problem of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border has a long history. Throughout its republican life, Peru built the

image of an Ecuador reluctant to accept legal arguments (Cayo, 2000; de la Puente, 1997; Garibaldi, 2009; Mercado, 1988; Ponz, 1980).

This thesis was reinforced by Ecuador's lack of knowledge of the only official document that delimited the border between the two countries: the Rio de Janeiro Protocol (Arbitraje-Pareceres, 1996; CAL, 1997). But, for different reasons, instead of seeking a negotiated solution to the problem since Ecuador abandoned the placement of milestones on the border, the Ecuadorian rebellion was confronted by the Peruvian Foreign Ministry with the denial of any problem (Mares, 2008). This meant not talking about any attempt to observe the limits of the 1942 Protocol, a situation that led both countries to experience several moments of tension in recent decades; fundamentally, in the 78 km without milestones in the Condor mountain range.

Sociocultural situation of the Peru-Ecuador scenario, and strategy implemented

The sum of elements or cultural traits that are not compatible between cultures is what favors the emergence of a conflict or the escalation of it. The main factors to consider are religion, ethnicities, traditions, customs, languages and cultural practices. It should be noted that, given the infinity of cultural manifestations, it is impossible to avoid confrontations. However, it is possible to create multicultural or pluricultural states where cultural exchange is encouraged without detriment to the preservation of independence and uniqueness of the cultures involved. The point of view of the Peruvian nations (Territorial sovereignty) maintains that the lands in dispute in the Cenepa region have always been part of their territory and that they have legitimate rights over them is based on historical arguments and on the part of the Ecuadorian nation around the border confrontation Ecuador argues that the border in the Cenepa region has not been clearly defined and that there are differences in the interpretation of bilateral treaties and agreements. The causes of this reinforced by the nationalism of both Ecuador and Peru are emphasized. In turn, the historical visions and interests of both actors are considered from the beginning of the divergences. To this end, the 1941 war is presented as a historical cultural milestone that led to the escalation of the conflict and, in more detail, the clashes of Paquisha, in 1981, and Alto Cenepa, in 1995 (Mercado, 1988). The legal aspect linked to the conflict is taken into account in a brief summary of the bilateral treaties and agreements signed for the definitive demarcation of borders. Due to its

historical and legal relevance, the Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries of Rio de Janeiro is studied more extensively.

For Peru and Ecuador, both the educational policies of the study of border disputes and the multiple negotiations had an impact on the escalation of the conflict, despite the different approaches of the nations involved. For Ecuador, the border problem always had a high relevance in the educational system, due to the declaration of nullity of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, while for Peru it sealed the differences. Peruvian education was less focused and sought to impart general knowledge that can be linked from the local to the international. For its part, Ecuador gave the issue a priority until the establishment of the foundations of the definitive peace. It is worth mentioning that the confrontation in Paquisha strengthens, on the part of both nations, the educational reinforcement around the hostilities to the point of equalizing the importance given to the conflict. Despite this, Ecuadorian students had decades of educational reinforcement related to the subject, while in Peru these topics - apparently of little importance - were dealt with only over the last fifteen years (Galvani, 1981, pp. 680-681).

Report of material and human losses reported by Peruvian and Ecuadorian newspapers

The official death toll varies depending on the version of each country. Ecuador officially reported the deaths of 38 soldiers and 70 wounded; Peru acknowledged the deaths of 60 of its soldiers and 120 wounded. It is difficult to establish whether there was a concealment of the truth by the two countries. Some NGO estimates speak of a total figure of 500 deaths added between both sides, while other documentation centers speak of a figure of 120 deaths.

The main losses of war material for the countries are reported in different print media of Peru and Ecuador, as follows. Peru, two supersonic Sukhoi aircraft and one A-37 aircraft shot down in combat; two aircraft lost outside the combat zone: a Canberra and a naval; four helicopters shot down in combat and a helicopter crashed while fulfilling a supply logistics mission. Ecuador officially reported losses of war material like this: a T33 aircraft in an accident in Manta and the breakdown of an A37 aircraft in combat.

Economic cost reported by the two nations

Despite being a short war, the economic losses were very high for both nations.

In Ecuador, Finance Minister Modesto Correa reported that the cost of the war was 250 million dollars, which is equivalent to 1% of the national GDP. Peru, in turn, reported an expenditure of approximately 400 million dollars during the conflict. (Chiriboga, 2004, n.d.)

Jomini's classical theory of war in the framework of the Cenepa war

Jomini is a theorist and strategist who has lectured extensively on war. For Jomini, war is understood from the basic principles of conducting war. According to Jomini, (1977), the *art of war* is made up of six parts. The first one is the *art of governing*, in its relation to war. The second one is *strategy*, or the art of leading masses into the theater of war (whether for defense or invasion). The third one is the *grand tactic*, or art of staking troops on the battlefield according to terrain accidents, of taking them into action and fighting on the ground (as opposed to planning it on a map). The fourth one is logistics, or the art of moving armies. The fifth one is *engineering*, or attacking and defending fortifications. The sixth one is *minor tactics*.

Within the historical context, the 18th century, the period of the Enlightenment, is known, for this reason, as 'The Age of Enlightenment' and the establishment of faith in progress. Important ideas such as the pursuit of happiness, the sovereignty of reason and the evidence of the senses as primary sources of learning were born during this era; also, ideals such as freedom, equality, progress, tolerance, fraternity, constitutional government and separation Church-State. Enlightenment thinkers argued that human knowledge could combat ignorance, superstition and tyranny to build a better world. The Enlightenment had a great influence on scientific, economic, political and social aspects of the time. Hence the military thought and genius of the war, built in this academic environment of History, and which deeply influenced Jomini.

Jomini argued that war could be reduced to rules and principles of universal validity and mathematical certainty. But he also considered that it was changeable

and required the genius of a general. However, nowhere in his work does Jomini care to determine any definition of war.

During the Cenepa War, the application of Jomini's classical theories of the art of war was observed, according to some scholars of the subject. Such theories focus on the importance of strategic territory management, the effective use of force, and the need for proper coordination among military forces. In this way, applying these theories in the Cenepa war sought to obtain tactical superiority against the enemy and optimize the resources available on the battlefield.

However, in trying to reduce the theory of war to a systematic science of clearly classified elements governed by immutable universal principles, Jomini may have confused generations of future strategists about the true nature of war (Arquilla & Nomura, 2015).

As a model of war analysis, Jomini's scientific approach is based on the study of military strategy focusing on the analysis of geography and topography, as well as on the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of one's own army and the enemy's.

In the 1995 Cenepa War, this approach was applied to analyze the human affairs of military history through the evaluation of decisions made by both sides in the conflict. In this sense, a detailed study of the military strategies applied by the Peruvian and Ecuadorian armies in the region of El Cenepa was carried out, evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each of them.

In addition, the role played by military and political leaders in the development of the conflict was examined by analyzing their decisions and their repercussions on the course of the war. The impact of factors such as logistics, training and armament on the results of military operations was also assessed.

In short, the application of Jomini's scientific approach made it possible to analyze the human aspects of the conflict, identifying the successes and mistakes made by both sides and offering a more complete and objective view of the development of the Cenepa war.

In our case study of the Cenepa war, we can appropriate the leadership behaviors of the two presidents of the countries in dispute: in Peru, Alberto Fujimori, and in Ecuador, Sixto Duran, attributing to them a Wever leadership model of charismatic leaders, since their followers attribute conditions and powers superior to those of others, and whoever has them is the one who has the ability to generate enthusiasm, to the point of leading their countries to war over a territorial dispute that, beyond the historical border disputes, could have been resolved in the context of diplomacy and arbitration before international courts.

The following statement applies to the Cenepa war: the nature of war is the result of the interaction of the strategic objectives of both parties in conflict, their societies, their governments and their Armed Forces, as well as the positions of allies and neutrals the above from the perspective of study and analysis of Gonzalo Portocarrero Maisch and Carlos de la Torre from their sociological and political vision. On the other hand, Claude Féal, French geostrategist specialized in Latin American affairs, highlights that "the Cenepa war is a lesson in history", the importance of strategic objectives and the nature of the war in the development of the conflict, as well as the implications for bilateral relations between Ecuador and Peru.

It is the optics with which it can be deduced that the presidents of Peru and Ecuador decide to take their countries to a war for border issues, as occurred in 1995, in the Cenepa war. Strategic leaders require an appropriate combination of creativity, emotional intelligence, empathy, character and each of the six skills enunciated by Jomini, which allow them to cope with the constant changes of their time and their environment. That is, authentic strategic leaders are those who, in addition to living and facing moments of crisis, are part of the entire process of change to the point of persuading their people to go to war, in accordance with the postulates described by Jomini and detailed in this analysis. Consequently, here we observe that change can be stimulated in each individual to set aside particular interests and pursue the collective interest that the highest values of the national interest of Peru and Ecuador, justified by each country in the confrontation of the Cenepa war, externalize.

Conclusions

The Cenepa war, in 1995, highlighted the need to consider a peaceful solution to territorial conflicts between countries, rather than a violent solution.

Although it was a low-intensity armed conflict, the Cenepa war demonstrated that even these conflicts can be very deadly and costly in economic and human terms. The conflict highlighted the importance of diplomacy and negotiation to resolve territorial conflicts, rather than military force, and highlighted the need for closer regional cooperation in Latin America to prevent similar conflicts in the future.

Moreover, this war underscored the importance of investment in modern and sophisticated military infrastructure for the Armed Forces, as both countries faced some major logistical challenges in the midst of the conflict. It also showed that

mutual trust and respect are fundamental to establishing stronger diplomatic and economic relations between different countries.

The Cenepa war highlighted the importance of international agencies and the community acting as neutral mediators in territorial conflicts and reshaped the perception of politics and diplomacy in Latin America, especially on issues of geographical boundaries between sister nations.

The Cenepa war served as a reminder that trade and economic relations between countries can help prevent armed conflicts, and as a call for reflection on the historical, geographical and cultural integrity that all South American countries must recognize and respect to avoid warlike confrontations in the future.

References

- Arquilla, J., & Nomura, G. (2015). *Teoría de la Guerra: una ciencia sistemática*. Editorial Militar.
- Bákula, H. (1988). La delimitación marítima en la Conferencia de Río de Janeiro. *Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional*, 6(12), 39-45.
- Basadre, J. (1968). *Historia de la República del Perú*. Editorial Universitaria.
- Burga, M. (1999). *Perú: posibilidades como nación*. Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú.
- Cámara de Comercio Internacional. (1996). *Arbitraje: pareceres emitidos por el comité francés de la CCI (1986-1990)*. Editorial Cámara de Comercio Internacional.
- Carranza, P. (2002). *La difícil definición de una frontera: el caso del norte peruano y el sur ecuatoriano*. Rumbo sur.
- Cayo, G. (2000). *El protocolo de Rio de Janeiro y la cuestión de límites entre el Ecuador y Perú: análisis de los argumentos jurídicos ecuatorianos*. Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar.
- Cordero, J. (1999). La guerra del Cenepa en el contexto de las relaciones entre Ecuador y Perú. *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad*, 1(1), 27-40.
- Chiriboga, M. (2004). *La Guerra del Cenepa*. La Hora.
- de la Puente, M. (1997). *La delimitación marítima entre el Perú y el Ecuador*. Fondo Editorial Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
- Domínguez, L., Lowenthal, A., & Yoshitake, K. (2004). *Constructing democratic governance in Latin America*. JHU Press.
- Fuentes, J. (2014). *Guerra del Cenepa: los hechos, cifras y consecuencias*. El Comercio.
- Galvani, R. (1981). Las Agresiones del Perú en el alto Cenepa y Paquisha. *Revista del Instituto de Investigaciones Histórico- sociales*, 27, 680-681.
- Garay, L. (2009). *Geopolítica y relaciones internacionales en el siglo XXI: Una visión desde Colombia*. Editorial Académica Española.
- Garibaldi, G. (2009). *Anuario Jurídico*. Instituto Nacional de Derecho de Autor.
- Hidalgo, H. (2013). Ecuador-Perú: La Guerra del Cenepa. *Desarrollo y Defensa*, 25(1), 13-20.
- Jarrín, R. (2013). La Guerra del Cenepa y sus consecuencias para la integración sudamericana. *Revista Uruguay de Ciencia Política*, 22, 111-128.
- Jomini, A. (1977). *El arte de la guerra*. EDAF.
- Menéndez, J. (2005). *Guerra del Cenepa: la importancia de la defensa nacional*. Fondo de Publicaciones de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina.
- Mercado, R. (1988). *El conflicto Militar sin Guerra: Frontera y Desarrollo del Ecuador*. Corporación editora nacional.
- Paret, P. (1986). Clausewitz and Jomini. *The American Historical Review*, 91(3), 567-593.

- Paz, M. (1868). *La conformación de las nuevas naciones en sus límites territoriales*. Biblioteca Digital Andina.
- Ponz, E. (1980). *Competencia territorial y jurisdicción civil en el derecho internacional privado*. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- St. John, R. (1999). *The Panama Canal and the crisis in historical perspective*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wagner, G. (1964). The United States and Peru: Cooperation in a vital area. *Foreign Affairs*, 42(1), 128-139.

Chapter 14

The Transformation of Leadership and Political Systems in the Six-Day War

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.14>

William Alfredo Sierra Gutiérrez

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto"

Abstract: Conflicts on an international scale have had a significant impact on the transformation of political systems around the world. These conflicts have triggered a series of political, social and economic changes in the affected countries and have led to the emergence of new political actors and ideologies. This paper analyzes how once the conflict called the Six-Day War ended, the Middle East has been the scene of strong shocks, going through a very difficult time, such as the popular uprisings of 2011, better known as the Arab Spring, which alludes to the clashes between two spheres of regional actors with international links and the repercussions on existing conflicts. Likewise, the appearance of new non-state actors that energize conflicts in the Middle East is analyzed, which allows us to observe how the situation is becoming more warlike every day.

Keywords: autocracy, democracy, democratization, air war, Arab Spring, authoritarian regimes.

William Alfredo Sierra Gutiérrez

Lieutenant Colonel (R), Ejército Nacional de Colombia. Ph.D. student in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto". Master's Degree in National Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra. Master's degree in International Relations and Business and Business Administrator, UMNG. Professional, Military Sciences, Escuela Militar de Cadetes "General José María Córdova". Professor and research fellow, Center for Strategic Studies on National Security and Defense, Escuela Superior de Guerra.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0640-7907> - Contact: william.sierra@esdeg.edu.co

APA citation: Sierra Gutiérrez, W. A. (2023). The Transformation of Leadership and Political Systems in the Six-Day War. In S. Uribe-Caceres & D. López Niño (Eds.), *Theoretical Approach to Notions of War and Strategic Leadership* (pp.281-300). Sello Editorial ESDEG. <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502.14>

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

ISBN (print): 978-628-7602-49-6

ISBN (online): 978-628-7602-50-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/9786287602502>

Security and Defense Collection

Sello Editorial ESDEG

Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes prieto"

Bogotá D.C., Colombia

2023



Introduction

Once the socio-political situation that existed in the Middle East for the 1960s has been decanted and recognized, and that is lived even now, in the second decade of the 21st century, we will mention two historical events that left a reference throughout history: the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring.

The Six-Day War was the confrontation between, on the one hand, the Israelis (Jews), the new State of Israel, and different Arab countries. And where the capacity of air power was demonstrated as a determining factor for the achievement of early victory by the State of Israel.

This conflict lasted between June 5 and 10, 1967; that is why it is known as the Six-Day War. In fact, it was a stunning defeat for the Arabs. That is, Israel annihilated the Armed Forces of the different Arab countries, with which the geopolitical chessboard of the region was radically transformed, since Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank (Bermúdez, 2017).

The Arab Spring is the name by which the media has identified the series of popular and political demonstrations that took place in the Arab region, mainly since the beginning of 2011, and which led to the fall of the dictatorships of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, along with the reinforcement of violence in Yemen, under the political leadership of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who resigned after the opposition protests that began in January 2011, and the civil war in Libya, energized under the mandate of Muammar Gaddafi, also referred to as the period of Gaddafi Libya, which covers a period of about 42 years, from September 1, 1969 to August 25, 2011 (Figueroa, 2011). All these were situations of internal conflict that led to transformations in the political systems of the aforementioned countries, as a response to the problem of the struggle for democratization and justice.

In the Six-Day War, the problem lay in the security and integrity of the State of Israel, which was surrounded by hostile Arab countries. However, the continuation of armed conflicts and the lack of a diplomatic solution intensified political and ideological polarization, further reinforcing the political systems of control and restriction in the region.

In the case of the Arab Spring, the problem lay in the oppression of authoritarian regimes that denied Human Rights and the demands of the population. In many cases, repression and corruption were severe, and the population had been living in unsustainable political and economic conditions for decades. As a result, people began to demand a radical change and transformation of political systems.

In both cases, the result was growing social and political pressure for a transformative change in political systems, in search of more democratic and just systems that guaranteed the rights of the population and decreased repression and violence. In this sense, the struggle for democratization became the key factor and trigger for political transformation in these countries.

Wars, leadership and political transformation

The changes referred to here require leadership such as that proposed by Kouzes and Posner (2018). The authors base their research on more than 20 years of surveys of thousands of leaders around the world, allowing them to identify the patterns that distinguish the most successful leaders from the least successful.

In the book *The Leadership Challenge. How to make extraordinary things happen in an organization*, Kouzes and Posner argue that leadership is not an innate trait, but a skill that can be learned and developed. To do this, they present five key practices that leaders must follow:

1. **Shaping the Path:** Effective leaders must set an example for their team to follow, and they must act in a manner consistent with the values and principles they espouse.
2. **Inspire a shared vision:** Leaders must be able to communicate a clear and compelling vision of the future, and inspire their team to pursue it.
3. **Challenging the status quo:** Leaders must be willing to take risks and make changes to improve the organization.
4. **Empower others to act:** Leaders should foster collaboration and autonomy in their team, and should help their members develop their skills and knowledge.

5. **Show the way.** Leaders must be able to lead and coordinate their team to achieve organizational goals.

Likewise, it is mentioned that leaders must prospectively imagine what the desired final state should be, where the future is seen as a perfect and conducive environment, said ideal state refers to preferences in terms of economic relations, values, social policies and technological advances, among others. The objective sought is a *long-term extension*, which refers to the recognition of the ideal objectives pursued by political decision-makers through practical actions in favor of the implementation of adequate public policies that meet the social needs of the population.

Likewise, the effectiveness of leadership has been a concept highly vulnerable to socio-historical and cultural changes. The criterion of effectiveness is linked to the effect to be achieved through the exercise of leadership. Although the effectiveness of leadership depends on the quality of the processes and the results achieved - including political, social, economic and even cultural processes - perhaps the most important thing, and which underlies the above, is the ethical and responsible way of leading, as it generates trust and interest in others. The latter depends, to a large extent, on the characteristics of the organization, its climate and the other variables that encourage the development of certain types of leaders, with principles and values that lead to leadership styles that generate particular dynamics that favor certain aspects of the organization to the detriment of others. Or on the contrary, leaders who manage to favorably embrace all the axes of the organization, within a flexible structure that encourages it.

Leadership played a very important role in both the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring, and in both cases contributed to the change of political systems in the region.

In the Six-Day War, Israel's leadership was central to the country's success during the conflict. Levi Eshkol, Israeli prime minister at the time, demonstrated a great ability to lead and make difficult decisions. He was able to cope with international pressures and made the decision to launch a preemptive strike against his Arab enemies, resulting in a decisive victory for Israel (Regev, 2017).

In the Arab Spring, the role of leadership was more ambiguous. In some countries, leaders were the main obstacle to political and social changes, while in others leaders were at the forefront of protests and fought against dictatorial regimes.

For example, in Tunisia, Rached Ghannouchi, leader of the opposition party, used his leadership skills to mobilize the population and lead a peaceful revolution that overthrew the authoritarian government of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Driss, 2011).

In Egypt, opposition leader Mohamed El-Baradei was one of the main drivers of the Arab Spring demonstrations. His leadership in the struggle against the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak was a key factor in the fall of the regime (Ajansi, 2021).

In conclusion, leadership played a crucial role in the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring. In both cases, leaders were instrumental in achieving desired outcomes and promoting political change in the region. Moreover, these historic events demonstrated that leadership can play an important and decisive role in conflict resolution and in the transformation of political systems.

For the aforementioned and in relation to the socio-political situation for the time of the Six-Day War - during the sixties, at a time and an area of the world where tension was growing noticeably - it is worth mentioning the political decisions made by the rulers of the time, since each of the parties doubted the other more and more. In the decision-making by the leaders of the moment, in that part of the world, the control of water had a lot to do, since it is a very desert territory. In fact, in 1963 Israel decided to divert water from the Jordan River, to which the Arabs responded by doing the same (Seivane et al., 2005).

•Burns (1978) "Leadership over human beings is exercised when people with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources in order to awaken, encourage, and satisfy the motives of followers."

In the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring, leaders mobilized their followers based on the theory of leadership over human beings for political, ideological and psychological reasons, using some resources or tools such as, for example, the political discourse used by leaders through persuasive language and a political discourse that appealed to the emotions and motivations of followers. In the Six-Day War, Israel used a *discourse* that emphasized its right to defend itself and protect its people. In the Arab Spring, opposition leaders used a discourse that appealed to freedom, social justice, and democracy. As a second resource we have the *propaganda* used by leaders to spread their message and mobilize followers. In the Six-Day War, both Israel and the Arab countries used propaganda to present their version of events and justify their intervention in the conflict. In the Arab Spring, opposition leaders used social media and other means to spread their message and mobilize the population.

The *mobilization of institutional resources* was another resource that leaders used: mobilizing the institutional resources at their disposal - such as political parties, social organizations, and religious institutions - to rally followers. In the Six-Day War, the Government of Israel mobilized all state institutions to support the war effort. In the Arab Spring, opposition leaders used civil society organizations and religious institutions to mobilize the population, which led to the creation of symbols and myths to mobilize followers and generate a sense of collective identity. In the Six-Day War, Israel used the myth of David versus Goliath to mobilize the population. In the Arab Spring, the symbols of the revolution were the raised fist and the national flag.

It can be said, then, that leaders in the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring used various mobilization purposes to encourage and satisfy the motives of followers, including political discourse, propaganda, the mobilization of institutional resources, and the creation of symbols and myths.

Giving scope to the previous statement, Bass (1999) developed an investigation on the type of *transformational leadership*. Thanks to Bass's research in 1999, this type of theory on leadership was put into practice, and it was scientifically demonstrated that the application of this leadership model allows obtaining results of greater importance.

Previously, Bass had designed in 1985 the method to evaluate or measure transformational leadership, which is measured by taking into account the influence of the leader on his followers and their ability to seek new solutions. Thanks to the development of Bass, the concept has been applied in different contexts. Thus, its conclusions are used in the business world, as well as in educational, military and religious fields (Bass, 1985).

Followers identify with the leader's mission and goals, and they articulate with each other and reach higher levels of motivation.

According to Bass, transformational leadership is made up of four major factors or components:

- **Charisma, or idealized influence:** The leader is clear about his set of values that he respects at all times by showing exemplary behavior. In this way, he appears as a model to imitate before his followers.
- **Inspiration, or inspirational motivation:** The leader articulates a forward-looking and optimistic vision, so that he manages to inspire and motivate his followers.

- **Intellectual stimulation:** The leader also knows how to stimulate creativity and encourages his followers to look for new solutions, or new ways of doing things.
- **Individual Consideration:** The leader knows how to appreciate the individual contribution of each of the team members to the overall objective, and therefore manages to motivate his followers with recognition.

In the Six-Day War, the charismatic leaders were Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and General Moshe Dayan, who articulated a vision of defending Israel's very existence, inspiring soldiers and convincing the population of the threat posed by a possible invasion. In addition, these leaders were models to continue demonstrating exemplary behavior and respecting the values that the country represented. There was also intellectual stimulation for innovation and development of new and innovative military tactics that aided success in warfare.

In the Arab Spring, there were charismatic leaders like Mohamed Bouazizi, who became a symbol of the struggle against oppression and unemployment in Tunisia after his self-immolation. There were also leaders who articulated an optimistic vision and motivated people to fight for democracy and the Human Rights like the Egyptian Mohamed El Baradei. In addition, these leaders valued the individual contribution of activists and devoted time and resources to recognizing the importance of the role each of them played in the collective struggle. There was a stimulation of critical thinking and creativity in the search for new forms of peaceful action and political demonstrations.

In both the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring, charismatic and motivational leaders were able to articulate an inspiring vision and recognize the importance of creativity and the individual contribution of followers. These leadership traits helped mobilize and motivate people to fight for what they believed in.

According to the previous theories and with the events that occurred during the Arab Spring, where the rivers of blood and the clouds of gunpowder and dust that rose over Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and other territories of the Middle East since 2011 (Conde, 2018). Social mobilizations against oppressive governments turned into large social outbursts that began to seek the necessary social and political transformation in a region so devastated by war.

Since December 2010, several Arab peoples have risen up against their dictatorial regimes. These uprisings gave different results for and against the shift regimes. The different rebellions that took place on a regional and global scale produced changes in the political systems of government.

This has generated, around the conflict between peoples and rulers, the clash of alignments of States that try to promote their regional interests and roll back those of their adversaries; conflicts that have led to the loss of leadership by the rulers. According to Zaleznik (1997), leadership inevitably requires the use of power to influence the thoughts and actions of others, because there is a close relationship between power and leadership. Power is a means to obedience. On the other hand, leadership is a process of influencing the behavior of others. Both power and leadership result in the effect an individual exerts on the behavior of other people.

The close relationship between power and leadership can be clearly seen in the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring. In both cases, the leaders exerted great influence over their followers and managed to mobilize the masses to achieve their goals. In the case of the Six-Day War, Israeli leaders used the military and political power they had to mobilize the population and create a sense of urgency in defending the very existence of the State of Israel.

In the Arab Spring, social movement leaders used their convening and mobilizing power to challenge established authoritarian regimes and fight for democracy and the Human Rights. Through their inspiring leadership, these activists managed to mobilize the population and create a sense of empowerment to fight for their rights and freedom.

In both the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring, leaders used their power and leadership to influence the behavior of others and achieve their goals. The combination of both elements was essential to the success of these social and political change movements.

The Six-Day War within the framework of Douhet's theory of air warfare

According to Yukl and Van Fleet (1990), leadership is seen as a process that includes influencing the objectives of the tasks and strategies of a group or organization, as well as the people of the organization, to implement the strategies and achieve the objectives, including air power as the decisive element in contemporary warfare conflicts. A review of the conflagrations of the 21st century will show that the strongest side makes extensive use of air power, which sometimes becomes the only element used for extended periods. This modality is based on the belief

that air power has the capacity to induce the surrender of those who suffer such attacks, due to the devastating nature of bombing from the air (Díaz, 1987).

In the case of the Six-Day War, Israel's air superiority was central to its victory in the conflict. Israel's initial airstrike destroyed much of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian military capability, and allowed ground forces to rapidly advance into enemy territory. In addition, airspace control allowed Israel to spy on its enemies and gain valuable information about their movements and defenses.

In terms of the impact on changing political systems, the Six-Day War intensified political polarization in the region and further reinforced political systems of control and restraint. After the war, Israel occupied the Palestinian territories and began a policy of settlements in them, which increased Palestinian tension and resistance. In addition, the war reinforced the Arab nationalist stance, leading to an increase in militancy and extremism in the region.

Douhet's *theory of air warfare* provides an interesting perspective for analyzing the Six-Day War by highlighting the importance of air superiority in military victory. However, in terms of the impact on changing political systems, the war further polarized the region and reinforced political systems of control and restraint, rather than driving a political transformation towards greater freedom and greater democracy.

The aerial struggle can only develop through quick and violent blows. A state of inferiority can only be transformed into a state of superiority through swift and more violent action than that of the enemy. Therefore, a nation whose air forces are defeated by those of the adversary will expose its own unarmed body to enemy air offensives and will have the Army and Navy with their backs unprotected, just as happened in the Yom Kippur War, in 1973 (Baez, 2018).

In the case of the Six-Day War, which confronted Israel and the Arab countries of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq in a confrontation that would last Six Days, and which would leave for history a great strategic example of the use of air capabilities to define a conflict from the beginning of it, Israel's military capabilities are shown in order to anticipate the attack of the Arab countries and even more so the great air strategy that resulted in the dismantling of the air strengths of the adversary countries.

As a result of these attacks, the military capabilities of the allied Arab countries were totally decimated by having lost all their air capacity after a large well-planned and better executed air attack, which destroyed the vast majority of enemy aircraft still stationed on the ground, and which gave the Israelis an explainable advantage

during the air battle against the few Arab aircraft that managed to take flight. This was a determining factor in defining an early victory by the Israeli state over the Arab countries.

Behavioral Theory in the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring

Behavioral theory classifies leaders based on their behaviors. This qualification can be understood and analyzed through the training that the different leaders who participated as rulers during the Arab Spring have had and that give rise to leadership styles: autocratic, democratic, and *laissez-faire*. Behavioral theory can be related to the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring in terms of the different leadership styles that were adopted in each case.

In the Six-Day War, Israeli leaders adopted an autocratic leadership style exercising a high level of control and authority in decision-making and handling the situation. They focused on accomplishing the tasks assigned to them and on achieving strategic military objectives effectively. However, they also demonstrated relationship leadership skills; particularly, in inspiring and motivating their people during a time of great tension.

In the Arab Spring, leaders adopted a more democratic leadership style, involving the population in decision-making and empowering the masses to fight for freedom and social justice. In addition, they valued the importance of interpersonal relationships and solidarity between protesters and social movements.

In both the Six-Day War and the Arab Spring you can see different leadership styles adopted by leaders based on the tasks they had to accomplish and the need to handle complex political and social situations. In addition, the importance of the relationship between leaders and their followers to achieve the desired objectives was assessed.

According to Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958), contingency leadership theories hold that the type of leadership varies depending on conditions and situational variables, such as the relationship between the leader and his followers. In connection with this theory, one must consider the links between rulers and ruled in Arab countries that came into controversy and opposition with political leaders on the grounds that the Arab Spring phenomenon took place in mid-2011 with a series of social movements and protests in North Africa and the Middle East. This

phenomenon was mainly aimed at making a political, economic, and social change. In most of the countries where the Arab Spring took place, an authoritarian government prevailed, the State was excessively corrupt and, above all, what the insurgent crowds asked for were better living conditions.

The country where the popular uprising arose was Tunisia, when Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old, blew himself up in a public square in protest against the Tunisian government. This event motivated different social groups to unite to seek change in all areas: political, economic, and social, since they were subject to an authoritarian regime, led at that time by former President Ben Ali, who was the first leader of the Arab Spring to leave power. But this was only the beginning of the movement: the next country was Egypt, when it overthrew the regime imposed by Hosni Mubarak, and whose fall was followed by that of Muammar Gaddafi, in Libya, and those of the dictators of other countries, such as Yemen and Morocco.

One of the most important factors in the Arab Spring, and that we must understand, is the *conservation of the leaders*; that is, the seniority they had in power, which they had hoarded for years, and the fact that they themselves chose their successors; they even enthroned their relatives in positions of importance within the government, and in this way guaranteed absolute control over the institutions (Amnesty, 2016).

Economic factors also triggered discontent in society. The situation was very difficult, due to the increase in the prices of food and raw materials: in some of these countries increases of up to 80% were reached. In the case of Egypt, for example, one of the many mobilizations took place in Tahrir Square; the protesters had as their slogan: "Bread, freedom and social justice" to demand an improvement in living conditions from the Egyptian Government.

We cannot forget the role of the State apparatus, since it did not respect the Human Rights of the citizens. In fact, the leaders of the mobilizations were persecuted, and not infrequently their physical integrity was violated. Another common denominator in all the protests was the demand, on the part of the governed, for freedom: they were subjected to a regime where there was no democracy. And without a democracy, therefore, there was no citizen participation nor, much less, political rights, nor freedom of expression, etc.

As we know, the Arab Spring was a phenomenon that imposed a before and after in the countries that were involved; the factors that constituted this movement are different, and they are not enough to explain the complexity of this phenomenon. The economic, political and social change that was made was historic, because the

opportunity for a democracy to exist in some Arab or Islamic-influenced country had never been thought of, and it is now possible to think that way. The leadership described here was fundamental in the achievement of the objectives, as well as the area in which air power is exercised, as evidenced in different conflicts in which humanity has fallen.

Air supremacy as a relevant aspect to win wars

Air supremacy is the most favorable air control status that exists within the three that define NATO and the US Department of Defense. The concrete definition that both entities offer is that degree of superiority in which the enemy air force is unable to make any effective interference (Nievas, 2016).

Air supremacy is often invoked as the highest degree of air control. Defined as “degree of superiority to which the enemy air force is incapable of making any effective interference.” At present, air supremacy is the key to North American aggressions. From the first moment, bombing is carried out using high technology to suppress the batteries of air defense, destroy the runways of airports and hostile aircraft on the ground, which usually if they could reach to fly would have to operate in such a lower environment, monitored from all angles and where the aggressors also have supremacy in electronic warfare, which would practically be shot down in the first actions (Carreras, 1995).

After the First World War, the first in which aviation played an important role, many specialists considered the importance of air supremacy. In his book *The Mastery of the Air*, General Giulio Douhet referred to it. Thus, at the beginning of World War II, the main combatants took into account the capital importance of air control.

Air power remains a fundamental part of military strategies today, as detailed in the book *The Future of Air Power: In the Aftermath of the Gulf War*, by Richard H. Shultz and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, where the importance of air power in modern military operations is presented. The book indicates that airpower is vital for a wide range of military missions, including surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as transportation and logistics, strategic attack, and close air support (Shultz & Pfaltzgarff, 1992).

At present, countries such as the United States, Russia, China and the United Kingdom continue to invest in improving air power by developing advanced

technologies and modernizing their air forces. This reflects the continuing importance of air power in warfare and national defense today.

The importance of air power in the present is reflected in the wide range of military missions that such power can perform and the considerable investments in its development and modernization by the major world powers.

Current air power remains a fundamental part of military strategies, and its importance has been accentuated in the context of globalization and growing international interconnection. Therefore, some reasons are presented that highlight the importance of air power in current and future conflicts:

- **Surveillance and reconnaissance:** Air superiority allows detailed observation of the battlefield as well as enemy activities and movements. Through technologies such as satellites, drones, and reconnaissance aircraft, air power provides an important advantage in monitoring enemy activities.
- **Transportation and logistics:** Military aircraft are vital for the transportation of personnel, weaponry, and supplies, especially in conflict or hard-to-reach areas. In addition, resupply planes allow expanding the range of action and prolonging missions.
- **Strategic attack:** Airstrikes can be used to neutralize strategic targets, such as military bases, command centers, and air defense systems. Today, cruise missile systems enable precise air strikes from long distances.
- **Close air support:** Cooperation between ground and air forces is critical to successful military operations. Combat aircraft can provide close air support for ground troops by attacking nearby enemy targets and providing air protection.

Air power remains central to today's military strategies providing advantages in surveillance, transportation, strategic attack, and close air support. Its ability to act quickly and dynamically makes it an invaluable resource for meeting current and future military challenges; this power has played a crucial role in numerous military campaigns throughout history. Three events in particular illustrate the importance of air power in warfare: the 1991 Gulf campaign (Calvo, 2014), the German bombing of London during World War II (Arango & Pedraza, 2020), and the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Galletti, 2023).

In the 1991 Gulf Campaign, the West, with a US-led coalition, used air superiority to conduct a strategic bombing campaign in Iraq. The coalition launched a total of more than 100,000 air missions over Iraqi territory, including the use of advanced technology and the coordination of multiple weapons systems to achieve its

objectives. Air power was instrumental in the coalition's victory, inflicting damage on enemy forces, disrupting Iraqi logistics, and destroying much of the country's infrastructure.

In 1940, the German Luftwaffe used air power against Britain, in the framework of the Battle of Britain and the *Blitz* of London (Navarro, 2016). The aerial bombardment was carried out by the Luftwaffe and was aimed at attacking infrastructure and the civilian population. While the attack did not achieve the goal of demoralizing the British, air power did play a crucial role in the British victory, providing the British with the means to repel air attacks.

In 1999, NATO carried out an aerial bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, in response to the conflict in Kosovo (Gómez, 2009). The bombing campaign was designed to degrade Yugoslavia's military capability, but it also resulted in the destruction of civilian infrastructure and the deaths of hundreds of civilians. Air power was used to attack a number of military targets in Yugoslavia, which weakened the Yugoslav army's ability to continue the campaign against Kosovar troops.

Air power has proven to be a key tool for conducting successful military operations in various conflicts. Both the Gulf campaign and the German bombing of London and NATO bombing of Yugoslavia illustrate the importance of air power in warfare and how its use can have both military and civilian consequences.

Conclusions

Air power has had a significant impact on the transformation of political systems into military and social conflicts. Two cases that exemplify such changes are the Six-Day War, in 1967, and the Arab Spring, which began in 2010.

In the Six-Day War, Israel achieved a stunning victory by using its air force effectively to destroy most Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air and ground forces. Israeli air superiority allowed ground forces to advance with ease and capture important territories, including the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. This victory transformed not only the military situation in the Middle East, but also the region's political systems. As a result, Israel strengthened ties with the United States and became a regional power in the Middle East. In addition, the Six-Day War led to a rise in Palestinian nationalism and the creation of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah.

In the Arab Spring, air power also played an important role in political transformation. In 2011, the Arab Spring began with peaceful protests in Tunisia, which

quickly spread throughout the region. In Libya, NATO military intervention, with bombing and close air support, helped the rebels overthrow the Gaddafi regime. In addition, the use of drones by the United States and its allies enabled the Armed Forces Identify, locate and attack specific targets in remote locations. In Syria, the Assad regime's air force used airstrikes and shelling against civilians, prompting an international response and growing opposition to the regime.

As a result of these military and social conflicts, significant political transformations were carried out led by people who were characterized by combining cognitive capabilities about air power, knowledge of the enemy, understanding of their own culture and that of the counterpart, and exploring technological and strategic innovation. That leadership gave the necessary strength to people who managed to influence the minds of broad sectors of the population, motivating them to fight to solve some personal problems, but which are ultimately identified as common problems, and achieving levels of democracy capable of promoting justice and freedom simultaneously.

It is evident that air power continues to have a significant impact on the transformation of the political systems of countries in military and social conflict. The Six-Day War and the Arab Spring show how air superiority has allowed armies to occupy territory and defeat their enemies. They have also led to increased international attention on countries' political systems, their functioning, corruption, and lack of civil liberties. Air warfare has changed both the political and social spheres; in some cases, it has done so positively, but it has also generated political and social instability, and protracted military conflicts.

References

- Ajansi, A. (2021, 25 de enero). *Los egipcios celebran una década de la Primavera Árabe*. Anadolu Ajansi. <https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/los-egipcios-celebran-una-d%C3%A9cada-de-la-primavera-%C3%A1rabe/2122353#>
- Amnesty. (2016). *La Primavera Árabe cinco años después*. Amnistía Internacional. <https://www.es.amnesty.org/en-que-estamos/reportajes/primavera-arabe-5-anos-despues/>
- Arango, C., & Pedraza, M. (2020). Poder aéreo y el concepto de centro de gravedad: la Batalla de Inglaterra como estudio de caso. *Revista científica general José María Córdova*, 18(31), 483-494. <https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.637>
- Baez, F. (2018). *La acción militar conjunta para el logro de la superioridad aérea*. <http://www.cefadigital.edu.ar/bitstream/1847939/1183/1/TFI%2002-2018%20BAEZ.pdf>
- Bass, B. (1985). *Leadership and performance beyond expectations*. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/hrm.3930250310>
- Bass, B. (1999). Two decades of research and development in transformational leadership. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 8, 9-32. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/135943299398410>
- Bermúdez, A. (2017, 5 de junio). *Guerra de los Seis Días: el conflicto relámpago ocurrido hace medio siglo entre Israel, Egipto, Jordania y Siria que cambió para siempre Medio Oriente*. BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-40139818>
- Burns, J. (1978). *Leadership*. Harper & Row.
- Calvo, J. (2014, 12 de noviembre). *El poder aéreo y la campaña contra el Estado Islámico*. Defensa.com <https://www.defensa.com/analisis-gesi/poder-aereo-campana-contra-estado-islamico>
- Carreras, E. (1995). *Por el dominio del aire*. Editora Política de las FAR.
- Conde, G. (2018). *El Medio Oriente: entre rebeliones populares y geopolítica*. <https://revistas.uexnado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/view/5325/8980>
- Díaz, J. (1987). *El dominio del aire*. <http://www.ecema.edu.uy/Anexo/LibrosLibros/69.pdf>
- Driss, A. (2011). *Reflexiones sobre la revolución tunecina (ARI)*. <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/reflexiones-sobre-la-revolucion-tunecina-ari/>
- Gómez, J. (2009). *Análisis de la intervención de la OTAN en la crisis de Kosovo, como reflejo de las transformaciones del concepto estratégico de la alianza de 1999* [Tesis de pregrado]. Universidad Colegio Mayor Nuestra Señora del Rosario. <https://repository.urosario.edu.co/server/api/core/bitstreams/d0ee5870-feef-4b01-a4e0-3d82a-c3ae67f/content>
- Galletti, D. (2023, 24 de marzo). *¿Cómo la OTAN demostró su poderío militar sobre Yugoslavia?* Prensa Latina <https://www.prensa-latina.cu/2023/03/24/como-la-otan-demonstro-su-poderio-militar-sobre-yugoslavia>

- Kouzes, M., & Posner, B. (2018). *El desafío del liderazgo. Cómo hacer realidad cosas extraordinarias en una organización*. <https://www.reverte.com/media/reverte/files/book-attachment-3197.pdf>
- Navarro, C. (2016). La Estela del Blitz: el constructo cultural británico tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial. *Revista de Filología Románica*, 33. <https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA501079113&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=19882815&p=IF-ME&sw=w&userGroupName=anon%7Eb1963c20&aty=open+web+entry>
- Nievas, F. (2016). *El mito de la supremacía aérea como aspecto fundamental en la guerra*. http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/bitstream/handle/10915/74821/Documento_Completo.pdf-PDFA.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Regev, D. (2017, 5 de julio). *Opinión: 1967, la guerra que nunca terminó*. DW. <https://www.dw.com/es/opini%C3%B3n-1967-la-guerra-que-nunca-termin%C3%B3/a-39115048>
- Figueroa, M. (2011). *La problemática político-social en Libia en 2011, estudiada desde la perspectiva Constructivista de las Relaciones Internacionales* [Tesis de maestría]. Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey. <https://repositorio.tec.mx/bitstream/handle/11285/629006/33068001103481.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Seivane, R., Trigo, L., & Velaz, F. (2005). *Conflictos por el agua en la cuenca del Jordán*. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4578908.pdf>
- Shultz, R., & Pfaltzgarff, R. (1992). *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0048_SHULTZ_FUTURE_OF_AIRPOWER.pdf
- Tannenbaum, L., & Schmidt, J. (1958). *Teoría de Tannenbaum y Schmidt*. <https://es.scribd.com/doc/292872273/Teoria-de-Tannenbaum-y-Schmidt-docx>
- Yukl, G., & Van Fleet, D. (1990). Theory and Research on Leadership in Organizations. M. Dunnette, & L. Hough (Eds.), *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology* (pp. 147-197). Consulting Psychologists Press. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286930761_Theory_and_Research_on_Leadership_in_Organizations
- Zaleznik, A. (1997). *Managers and Leaders: Are They Different*. <https://hbr.org/2004/01/managers-and-leaders-are-they-different>



Theoretical approach to the notions of war and strategic leadership

The noted Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Prussian strategist and general, stated in his renowned work *On War*: "War is not an exercise of will directed at inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical arts, or at matter that is animated but passive and docile, as is the case with mind and human emotions in the arts. In war, the will is directed at a reactive animated object." In turn, Alfred T. Mahan, renowned historian and strategist of the U.S. Navy (1840-1914), stated: "Possession of a powerful fleet is essential to ensure national security and trade, as it protects shipping lanes and projects naval power globally."

This work deals with the critical and propositional analysis of these concepts – as well as others equally valuable and complementary – while delving into theories of war and strategic leadership, as a contribution of the teachers and students of the first cohort of the Doctorate in Strategic Studies, Security and Defense, of the Escuela Superior de Guerra "General Rafael Reyes Prieto", to the study and research of these pertinent topics, so indispensable to understand Colombia of the last 50 years.



ISBN 978-628-7602-49-6

