

## Chapter 13

# The Cenepa War from the theory of General Jomini. The war between Ecuador and Peru

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**Abstract:** This chapter takes a historical approach to the Cenepa war, seen from the classical theory of Jomini's war. Relevant methods are used from the historical context and applied in research from a chronology, geography and ethnography perspective. Through a review of the literature on these events, observing that not many studies have been carried out on this historical episode beyond the chronicles and approaches made by Peruvian and Ecuadorian academics and journalists, the particularities of the events that occurred as part of the construction of the memory of the Latin American context are exalted.

**Keywords:** war conflict, ethnography, multidimensional, military theory.

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## **THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP**

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## Introduction

The Cenepa-Cordillera del Cóndor war, which occurred in 1995, was an armed conflict between two sister countries: Ecuador and Peru. This book chapter aims to analyze the Cenepa war from the perspective of Jomini's *classical theory of war*.

Jomini's classical theory of war refers to military strategy that focuses on offensive warfare, the use of force, and the concentration of troops. The goal is to carry out a quick and decisive campaign that allows for territory control and victory. For Jomini, military strategy is essentially a science that can be learned and refined, and whose goal is success on the battlefield.

In the case of the Cenepa War, both nations used that theory to plan their respective military strategies. Ecuador intended to regain territories lost in the 1941 war, while Peru sought to control the mineral-rich border region of Cenepa. The war began on January 26, 1995, when Ecuadorian forces invaded Peruvian territory, prompting an immediate response by the Peruvian Armed Forces.

The military strategy employed by Ecuador in the Cenepa War focused on the concentration of its troops, offensive warfare, and the use of force to achieve victory. Ecuadorian forces were organized into three brigades at the border, able to mobilize quickly through the jungle. The Ecuadorian offensive was led by the Amazonas and Marcavalle brigades, which advanced on the Cenepa region. The idea was to establish a military base in the area to consolidate its presence there.

On the other hand, the military strategy employed by Peru in this war was more focused on the defense of the territory. Peru had a defense line on the border, consisting of three military posts that guarded access to the Cenepa region. The first line of defense was 60 km from the border, while the second line was in the heart of the conflict zone.

Peru's plan was to contain the Ecuadorian offensive and prevent its forces from entering the Cenepa region. To do this, the Peruvian Armed Forces mobilized five brigades and a tank division to the border. The mobilization of the troops was rapid and surprised the Ecuadorian forces, who did not expect such a vigorous response from Peru.

The Cenepa War unfolded on difficult terrain, which hindered the movement of troops. The Cenepa region is located in a mountainous area, with little vegetation and temperatures ranging from 15°C to 32°C. The terrain is suitable for guerrilla warfare and makes it difficult to use artillery and tanks, which makes the combat very intense and difficult.

The military strategy employed by both nations reflected the classical thinking of Jomini's war. Ecuador tried to carry out an offensive and rapid campaign using the concentration of its troops and force, while Peru focused on the defense of the territory and the rapid mobilization of troops to contain the Ecuadorian offensive.

In conclusion, the Cenepa War was an armed conflict that took place on difficult terrain and in an adverse climate. Both nations used Jomini's classical theory of warfare to plan their own military strategies. Ecuador focused its strategy on the concentration of its troops, offensive war and the use of force, while Peru focused on the defense of the territory and the rapid mobilization of its troops to contain the Ecuadorian offensive. The Cenepa War was a clear sign that Jomini's theory remains relevant to this day.

## Background that caused the Cenepa war

Latin America had to go through a difficult process to be an independent region. For this reason, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a series of disagreements, conflicts and treaties between countries in the region, which strengthened some and weakened others. In the same way, it happened between Ecuador and Peru, where the problem was related to the issue of the definition of borders, a conflict that encompassed more than 168 processes of wars and negotiations, from colonial to republican times (Carranza, 2002).

As early as the beginning of the 19th century, there was an intermittent border dispute between Ecuador and Peru regarding the sovereignty of a part of the Amazon. After multiple failures trying to demarcate the border, both countries entered the war in 1941, a conflict that was resolved through the Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942. In said treaty, the guarantor countries were Argentina, Chile, Brazil and


the United States, which acted first as mediator countries, and later, as arbitrators. However, what does it mean that these countries acted as “guarantors”? According to Beth A. Simmons’ approach, what differentiates *guarantors* from *mediators* or *arbitrators* is that they assume a legal obligation to facilitate the execution of the agreement, which extends to military and diplomatic functions.

Thus, although they act as mediators and can make conciliatory recommendations, these must be accepted by the parties to be implemented, since, legally, they cannot decide for them, but they can and should facilitate the execution of the agreement.

However, this caused Ecuador to lose about 5,000 square miles. Faced with this declaration of demarcation, a problem arose in practice: when the border was being recognized on the ground, it was evident that another independent river extends between the Santiago and Zamora rivers: the Cenepa river, which ends in the Condor mountain range. In this way, the border could not be delimited in practice, and hostilities continued for more than half a century, which showed the inefficiency of the mediating activity of the guarantors and their quality as arbitrators, as they did not facilitate the execution of the protocol.

The hostilities that took place over five decades were marked by Ecuadorian declarations that highlighted the fact that the Rio Protocol had been signed with incomplete information at hand, and that they, the Ecuadorians, had signed under pressure, as a result of the defeat against Peru. Thus, Ecuador became a claim to territory in the Amazon, while Peru affirmed the validity of the protocol and its sovereignty in the disputed territories, denying the existence of a border conflict. As already mentioned, this conflict, not resolved by the failed mediation and the inefficient implementation of an agreement, resulted in a very long intermittent conflict, which had a critical point on December 14, 1994, when Ecuadorian and Peruvian skirmishes took place in the southeastern sector of the Condor mountain range. In this context, on January 9, 1995, Ecuadorian forces captured a Peruvian patrol within the disputed territory. Thus began the armed conflict, which, although it was of low intensity, lasted 19 days and was characterized by the massive mobilization of troops and military, naval and air contingent to the border. Throughout those 19 days there was no territorial gain. There was indeed intense diplomatic activity, which resulted in the containment of the conflict and that both countries sat down at the table to negotiate. The armed conflict resulted in between 200 and 1,500 casualties and a high cost of military equipment.

**Figure 1.** *Geographical map of the disputed region.*



**Source:** retrieved from: <http://www.geocities.ws/vencedoresdelcenepa/conflicto-del-cenepa.html>

## Historic boundary dispute

The northern border historically had serious problems of jurisdiction, dating back to the last stage of the colonial period, when the viceroyalties of Peru and New Granada claimed for themselves the territories of Guayaquil, Tumbes, Jaén and Maynas. It is documented that in 1802 the Spanish crown returned the Amazonian territory of Maynas to the Viceroyalty of Peru, after being under the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of New Granada for more than 60 years. The following year Guayaquil was also handed over militarily to Peru, but the commercial administration continued to maintain relations with New Granada until 1806, when it came under the total control of Peru (Cayo, 2000). These territorial variations occurred at a time when American independence processes were beginning to take shape in

several regions of the continent and the new rulers also assumed different notions about their border delimitation.

Thus, for example, in 1822 Simón Bolívar called on Guayaquil to remain united with the nascent Gran Colombia, because among the Guayaquileños there were groups with a Properan tendency and others that proposed the total autonomy of Lima and Bogotá (Paz, 1868). Finally, the will of Simón Bolívar was reaffirmed with the occupation, by the Colombian army, of Guayaquil, and after the meeting that Bolívar had with José de San Martín (Paz, 1868; St. John, 1999). With the formation of the new nations it was necessary to establish their territorial limits. Thus, we have that the republics were born guided by the colonial heritage of the territories in force until 1810 and by the manifest self-determination of some border peoples towards a certain nation. But, predictably, each country had a particular interpretation of its border areas.

The new government ordered the cessation of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru, signing a peace treaty in 1829, in which both parties undertook to fix the border, but the boundaries between Peru and Gran Colombia were never established, due to the dismemberment of the latter in the countries that we now call Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. However, Ecuador later claimed that the Pedemonte-Mosquera Treaty was signed, which supposedly recognized the Amazon River as the boundary between the two nations. However, the original document of the alleged treaty could never be shown (Gaius, 2000).

Peru only established diplomatic relations with Ecuador in 1831, after gaining independence from Gran Colombia in 1830. In 1832 both countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance that recognized the principle of *uti possidetis*, with which the South American States were born. Peru interpreted it as an explicit recognition of the border territories of Tumbes, Jaén and Maynas, which had Peruvian authorities. However, from 1840 Ecuadorian claims to the aforementioned territories began, with a series of diplomatic disputes and warlike frictions. As we have observed, the Ecuadorian argument claimed the alleged Pedemonte-Mosquera Treaty, of which there is no official copy, and the Royal Decree of 1739, which incorporated the region of Maynas to the Court of Quito.

Likewise, Ecuador was unaware of the Royal Decree of 1802, which returned the territory in question to the Viceroyalty of Peru (Cayo, 2000). A first dispute that led to the mobilization of Peruvian troops occurred in 1859, when Ecuador sought to hand over part of the Amazonian territory that it considered its English creditors. After the Peruvian intervention of the port of Guayaquil, ordered by President

Castilla, Ecuador gave up its intentions and the Treaty of Mapasingue was signed, which recognized the validity of the 1802 certificate. But in 1861 the Ecuadorian Government, led by García Moreno, ignored the agreement (Garibaldi, 2009). Years later, after the Chilean occupation of Peru, an agreement was negotiated in 1890 that favored Ecuador with access to the Marañón River. However, the Peruvian parliament did not approve the final document, while the Ecuadorian congress did not accept the latest modifications suggested by Peru; therefore, a definitive agreement could not be reached. Ambassador Wagner (1964) explains that at first the Peruvian negotiators agreed to cede territory to maintain good relations with the north and, in this way, to be able to concentrate on the Tacna-Arica dispute that was being held with Chile, an issue that has always been one of the main concerns of the Peruvian State, since the fall of Lima in the hands of the Chilean army meant a national tragedy that even led to critically rethinking the possibilities of Peru as a nation (Burga, 1999).

Subsequently, Peru and Ecuador requested, towards the end of the 19th century, an arbitration from the King of Spain to solve the border problem. In 1910, after it was unofficially known that the award would accept the Peruvian theses, mobs attacked Peruvian diplomatic headquarters in Ecuador, which generated a climate that seemed to degenerate into an outbreak of war (St. John, 1999).

Faced with this situation, the Spanish crown decided not to issue its verdict on the border. With the intervention of Argentina, Brazil and the United States, the climate of peace was restored, and these countries recommended that Peru and Ecuador submit their dispute to the Court of The Hague, a proposal that was rejected by Ecuador (Basadre, 1968). In 1922 Ecuador suffered a strong diplomatic blow with the Solomon-Lozano Treaty between Peru and Colombia, which was ratified in 1928. After fighting broke out in the Amazonian area of Leticia, the Peruvian and Colombian governments reached an agreement to establish their definitive limits.

Peru ceded Leticia so that Colombia had an outlet to the Amazon River and Colombia gave Peru the territories south of Putumayo, an area that Ecuador had ceded to the Colombians years ago. Now, Ecuador had Peru not only to the south, but also to the east. Thus, Ecuador lost a strategic ally in its Amazon claim (Bákula, 1988). It should be noted that, in 1932, soldiers from Iquitos, who during the rubber *boom* controlled the region with the support of business settlers, expelled the Colombian authorities from Leticia, which caused a new conflict with Colombia. But everything ended the following year, with the ratification of the Solomon-Lozano Treaty, in Rio de Janeiro (Garay, 2009).



Another important moment in binational relations occurred in the mid-1930s, when Ecuador and Peru again engaged in dialogues to resolve the border issue. This time, the mechanism chosen was bilateral negotiations and arbitration by the United States, to overcome the discrepancies. In this period, an important fact was the presentation, by Peru, of “a line of Quo Status by virtue of which neither Peru nor Ecuador would advance beyond their respective positions in the area of dispute” (CAL, 1997, p. 23).

Then, this *status quo* line would be recognized as the basis for drawing the current border. But on that occasion the negotiations ended in 1938 without any agreement. Subsequently, from 1939, tensions increased in the face of irreconcilable positions (Domínguez, et al., 2004). Thus, we arrived in 1941, when war broke out between Peru and Ecuador. As a result of the Peruvian offensive, the battle of Zarumilla and the military occupation of the Ecuadorian province of El Oro took place. In addition, clashes were recorded in some sectors of the east (Peru). The military movements lasted less than a month. At the request of mediating countries, which intervened to resolve the conflict, the Peruvian army paralyzed its operations.

The ceasefire was formalized with the signing of the Talara Act of October 1941. The legal instrument was approved by the congresses of Peru and Ecuador, and ratified on March 31, 1942 (Ponz, 1980). According to the American geographer George McBride, who prepared for his country a report on the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border, with the peace negotiations and the 1942 protocol, Ecuador was saved from being occupied by Peruvian forces and the guarantors allowed to reach a relatively impartial agreement that took the *status quo* of 1936 as a reference for the drawing of the border line. On the border line established at the 42nd meridian, Peruvian diplomacy recognizes that, on the division of the disputed territory, Peru obtained a greater area, but, at the same time, indicates that Ecuador lost very little territory than it would have actually possessed, since it never established towns, nor political authorities or garrisons on the Amazon River or in nearby areas, which then claimed their Ecuadorian membership (Arbitraje-Pareceres, 1996, p. 78).

However, since 1943 Ecuador has presented a series of discrepancies on the demarcation of some specific areas; among them, the Condor mountain range. Brazil, as guarantor of the protocol, proposed to resolve the problem with an arbitration by the Argentine Jurist María Estela Días de Aguilar, whose ruling would have the characteristic of being unappealable. In addition, at the request of the parties, the United States designed in 1947 an Aero photogrammetric map, with the aim of dispelling any doubts on the ground; which, finally, coincided with the geographical

observations of the arbitration. On the subject, Peruvian diplomats indicated that Peru was harmed with the results of the 1945 arbitration, while Ecuador celebrated the award (Arbitraje-Pareceres, 1996).

But soon after the placement of landmarks restarted, Ecuadorian claims arose again, in 1947. On the grounds that it was necessary to verify the existence of the *divortium aquarum* between the Zamora and Santiago rivers, the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry proposed the creation of a special mixed commission to study the sector. At the end of 1948, with the arrival of Ecuadorian President Galo Plaza, the northern country suspended its participation in the Peruvian-Ecuadorian Boundary Demarcation Commission, when work was being done on the border area that remained without milestones. In 1949 Ecuador presented an observation on the milestones set in the Lagarto Cocha sector. A year later, he maintained that the arbitration ruling of Días de Aguiar was applicable only to the northern area of the Condor mountain range. As we have seen, the Ecuadorian position was radicalized. In 1951, after indefinitely suspending Ecuadorian participation in the border demarcation, President Galo Plaza announced that he would not accept a border that did not ensure an exit to the Marañón for Ecuador. Nine years later, President José María Velasco Ibarra sought to unilaterally annul the Rio de Janeiro Protocol. But after Peruvian diplomatic efforts, in December 1960 the foreign ministries of the guarantor countries expressed that the aforementioned protocol was a valid instrument and should be complied with. However, in 1976 Ecuador demanded before the UN a renegotiation of the Rio Protocol, and for this reason it made a certain echo in the US administration of Carter, which fueled the increase in Ecuadorian expectations about its claims (Mercado, 1981).

The situation worsened from 1980, when "Ecuador developed a reprehensible policy of aggression against our country, infiltrating soldiers into Peruvian territory in open military provocation" (CAL, 1997, p. 30). Thus, in 1981 there were armed clashes that ended with the eviction of a post that the Ecuadorian army was installing in the Peruvian area of the Condor mountain range. The incident was known in Peru as *False Paquisha*, for being a case of double toponymy (de la Puente, 1997). Two years later, similar to the actions of President Velasco Ibarra in the 1960s, the Ecuadorian congress declared the Rio Protocol null and void. However, in these years Peru did not firmly insist on ending the placement of border landmarks (Mercado, 1988) and the guarantors of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol remained oblivious to the issue (de la Puente, 1997). As we can see, the problem of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border has a long history. Throughout its republican life, Peru built the

image of an Ecuador reluctant to accept legal arguments (Cayo, 2000; de la Puente, 1997; Garibaldi, 2009; Mercado, 1988; Ponz, 1980).

This thesis was reinforced by Ecuador's lack of knowledge of the only official document that delimited the border between the two countries: the Rio de Janeiro Protocol (Arbitraje-Pareceres, 1996; CAL, 1997). But, for different reasons, instead of seeking a negotiated solution to the problem since Ecuador abandoned the placement of milestones on the border, the Ecuadorian rebellion was confronted by the Peruvian Foreign Ministry with the denial of any problem (Mares, 2008). This meant not talking about any attempt to observe the limits of the 1942 Protocol, a situation that led both countries to experience several moments of tension in recent decades; fundamentally, in the 78 km without milestones in the Condor mountain range.

## Sociocultural situation of the Peru-Ecuador scenario, and strategy implemented

The sum of elements or cultural traits that are not compatible between cultures is what favors the emergence of a conflict or the escalation of it. The main factors to consider are religion, ethnicities, traditions, customs, languages and cultural practices. It should be noted that, given the infinity of cultural manifestations, it is impossible to avoid confrontations. However, it is possible to create multicultural or pluricultural states where cultural exchange is encouraged without detriment to the preservation of independence and uniqueness of the cultures involved. The point of view of the Peruvian nations (Territorial sovereignty) maintains that the lands in dispute in the Cenepa region have always been part of their territory and that they have legitimate rights over them is based on historical arguments and on the part of the Ecuadorian nation around the border confrontation Ecuador argues that the border in the Cenepa region has not been clearly defined and that there are differences in the interpretation of bilateral treaties and agreements. The causes of this reinforced by the nationalism of both Ecuador and Peru are emphasized. In turn, the historical visions and interests of both actors are considered from the beginning of the divergences. To this end, the 1941 war is presented as a historical cultural milestone that led to the escalation of the conflict and, in more detail, the clashes of Paquisha, in 1981, and Alto Cenepa, in 1995 (Mercado, 1988). The legal aspect linked to the conflict is taken into account in a brief summary of the bilateral treaties and agreements signed for the definitive demarcation of borders. Due to its

historical and legal relevance, the Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries of Rio de Janeiro is studied more extensively.

For Peru and Ecuador, both the educational policies of the study of border disputes and the multiple negotiations had an impact on the escalation of the conflict, despite the different approaches of the nations involved. For Ecuador, the border problem always had a high relevance in the educational system, due to the declaration of nullity of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, while for Peru it sealed the differences. Peruvian education was less focused and sought to impart general knowledge that can be linked from the local to the international. For its part, Ecuador gave the issue a priority until the establishment of the foundations of the definitive peace. It is worth mentioning that the confrontation in Paquisha strengthens, on the part of both nations, the educational reinforcement around the hostilities to the point of equalizing the importance given to the conflict. Despite this, Ecuadorian students had decades of educational reinforcement related to the subject, while in Peru these topics - apparently of little importance - were dealt with only over the last fifteen years (Galvani, 1981, pp. 680-681).

## Report of material and human losses reported by Peruvian and Ecuadorian newspapers

The official death toll varies depending on the version of each country. Ecuador officially reported the deaths of 38 soldiers and 70 wounded; Peru acknowledged the deaths of 60 of its soldiers and 120 wounded. It is difficult to establish whether there was a concealment of the truth by the two countries. Some NGO estimates speak of a total figure of 500 deaths added between both sides, while other documentation centers speak of a figure of 120 deaths.

The main losses of war material for the countries are reported in different print media of Peru and Ecuador, as follows. Peru, two supersonic Sukhoi aircraft and one A-37 aircraft shot down in combat; two aircraft lost outside the combat zone: a Canberra and a naval; four helicopters shot down in combat and a helicopter crashed while fulfilling a supply logistics mission. Ecuador officially reported losses of war material like this: a T33 aircraft in an accident in Manta and the breakdown of an A37 aircraft in combat.

## Economic cost reported by the two nations

Despite being a short war, the economic losses were very high for both nations.

In Ecuador, Finance Minister Modesto Correa reported that the cost of the war was 250 million dollars, which is equivalent to 1% of the national GDP. Peru, in turn, reported an expenditure of approximately 400 million dollars during the conflict. (Chiriboga, 2004, n.d.)

## Jomini's classical theory of war in the framework of the Cenepa war

Jomini is a theorist and strategist who has lectured extensively on war. For Jomini, war is understood from the basic principles of conducting war. According to Jomini, (1977), the *art of war* is made up of six parts. The first one is the *art of governing*, in its relation to war. The second one is *strategy*, or the art of leading masses into the theater of war (whether for defense or invasion). The third one is the *grand tactic*, or art of staking troops on the battlefield according to terrain accidents, of taking them into action and fighting on the ground (as opposed to planning it on a map). The fourth one is logistics, or the art of moving armies. The fifth one is *engineering*, or attacking and defending fortifications. The sixth one is *minor tactics*.

Within the historical context, the 18th century, the period of the Enlightenment, is known, for this reason, as 'The Age of Enlightenment' and the establishment of faith in progress. Important ideas such as the pursuit of happiness, the sovereignty of reason and the evidence of the senses as primary sources of learning were born during this era; also, ideals such as freedom, equality, progress, tolerance, fraternity, constitutional government and separation Church-State. Enlightenment thinkers argued that human knowledge could combat ignorance, superstition and tyranny to build a better world. The Enlightenment had a great influence on scientific, economic, political and social aspects of the time. Hence the military thought and genius of the war, built in this academic environment of History, and which deeply influenced Jomini.

Jomini argued that war could be reduced to rules and principles of universal validity and mathematical certainty. But he also considered that it was changeable

and required the genius of a general. However, nowhere in his work does Jomini care to determine any definition of war.

During the Cenepa War, the application of Jomini's classical theories of the art of war was observed, according to some scholars of the subject. Such theories focus on the importance of strategic territory management, the effective use of force, and the need for proper coordination among military forces. In this way, applying these theories in the Cenepa war sought to obtain tactical superiority against the enemy and optimize the resources available on the battlefield.

However, in trying to reduce the theory of war to a systematic science of clearly classified elements governed by immutable universal principles, Jomini may have confused generations of future strategists about the true nature of war (Arquilla & Nomura, 2015).

As a model of war analysis, Jomini's scientific approach is based on the study of military strategy focusing on the analysis of geography and topography, as well as on the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of one's own army and the enemy's.

In the 1995 Cenepa War, this approach was applied to analyze the human affairs of military history through the evaluation of decisions made by both sides in the conflict. In this sense, a detailed study of the military strategies applied by the Peruvian and Ecuadorian armies in the region of El Cenepa was carried out, evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each of them.

In addition, the role played by military and political leaders in the development of the conflict was examined by analyzing their decisions and their repercussions on the course of the war. The impact of factors such as logistics, training and armament on the results of military operations was also assessed.

In short, the application of Jomini's scientific approach made it possible to analyze the human aspects of the conflict, identifying the successes and mistakes made by both sides and offering a more complete and objective view of the development of the Cenepa war.

In our case study of the Cenepa war, we can appropriate the leadership behaviors of the two presidents of the countries in dispute: in Peru, Alberto Fujimori, and in Ecuador, Sixto Duran, attributing to them a Wever leadership model of charismatic leaders, since their followers attribute conditions and powers superior to those of others, and whoever has them is the one who has the ability to generate enthusiasm, to the point of leading their countries to war over a territorial dispute that, beyond the historical border disputes, could have been resolved in the context of diplomacy and arbitration before international courts.

The following statement applies to the Cenepa war: the nature of war is the result of the interaction of the strategic objectives of both parties in conflict, their societies, their governments and their Armed Forces, as well as the positions of allies and neutrals. The above from the perspective of study and analysis of Gonzalo Portocarrero Maisch and Carlos de la Torre from their sociological and political vision. On the other hand, Claude Féal, French geostrategist specialized in Latin American affairs, highlights that "the Cenepa war is a lesson in history", the importance of strategic objectives and the nature of the war in the development of the conflict, as well as the implications for bilateral relations between Ecuador and Peru.

It is the optics with which it can be deduced that the presidents of Peru and Ecuador decide to take their countries to a war for border issues, as occurred in 1995, in the Cenepa war. Strategic leaders require an appropriate combination of creativity, emotional intelligence, empathy, character and each of the six skills enunciated by Jomini, which allow them to cope with the constant changes of their time and their environment. That is, authentic strategic leaders are those who, in addition to living and facing moments of crisis, are part of the entire process of change to the point of persuading their people to go to war, in accordance with the postulates described by Jomini and detailed in this analysis. Consequently, here we observe that change can be stimulated in each individual to set aside particular interests and pursue the collective interest that the highest values of the national interest of Peru and Ecuador, justified by each country in the confrontation of the Cenepa war, externalize.

## Conclusions

The Cenepa war, in 1995, highlighted the need to consider a peaceful solution to territorial conflicts between countries, rather than a violent solution.

Although it was a low-intensity armed conflict, the Cenepa war demonstrated that even these conflicts can be very deadly and costly in economic and human terms. The conflict highlighted the importance of diplomacy and negotiation to resolve territorial conflicts, rather than military force, and highlighted the need for closer regional cooperation in Latin America to prevent similar conflicts in the future.

Moreover, this war underscored the importance of investment in modern and sophisticated military infrastructure for the Armed Forces, as both countries faced some major logistical challenges in the midst of the conflict. It also showed that

mutual trust and respect are fundamental to establishing stronger diplomatic and economic relations between different countries.

The Cenepa war highlighted the importance of international agencies and the community acting as neutral mediators in territorial conflicts and reshaped the perception of politics and diplomacy in Latin America, especially on issues of geographical boundaries between sister nations.

The Cenepa war served as a reminder that trade and economic relations between countries can help prevent armed conflicts, and as a call for reflection on the historical, geographical and cultural integrity that all South American countries must recognize and respect to avoid warlike confrontations in the future.



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