

Chapter 6

An institutional response to confront terrorism in the Colombian armed conflict (1992-2012)

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Abstract: Terrorism as a multisystemic social phenomenon, difficult to conceptualize due to its multiple backgrounds, origins, causes and effects, deserves to be studied in its different manifestations and interpretations for its understanding. Under the light of the leadership exercised at the strategic level in the period 1992-2012, the greatest upheaval in the recent history of Colombia: the armed conflict, which coincides with the so-called hybrid wars and their connivance with transnational organized crime. The aim is to deepen the conceptualization of hybrid wars, and terrorism, as its main component, based on modern theories of war, highlighting the importance of institutionality and transformational leadership in response to the great difficulties of the moment. Establishing what the scenario for the Public Force could be, in light of the current dynamics of the war or conflict in Colombia, and its internal and external repercussions.

Keywords: conflict, terrorism, hybrid wars, transformational leadership, prospective.

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THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NOTIONS OF WAR AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

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Introduction

Many views on the armed conflict in Colombia point him to describe it as a process of assimilation, adaptation, and transformation of circumstances in time, space and contexts that define it as an evolving multisystemic phenomenon. And that, due to its connotations of social, political, economic, ideological, cultural, religious and, of course, security order, does not escape similar experiences in the region or in the world, because it gathers nuances studied from modern theories, the so-called *generations of war* and, above all, experiences of many years (Lasprilla, 2022).

The fundamental purposes of this paper are, on the one hand, to analyze the dominant factors that contributed to the dynamization of the Colombian armed conflict in the period 1992-2012, from the perspective of terrorism. Within the framework of the theory of fourth-generation wars. On the other, to establish what was the response of the State in the field of institutionalism. In the light of the transformational leadership that allowed to improve security conditions, promote the development of the country and recover governability.

Starting from examining the different existing approaches in relation to the theory of fourth generation wars, new wars or hybrid wars, we will try, first, to point out the background, conditions, characteristics and particular manifestations of the armed conflict in Colombia, taking into account terrorism as a cardinal component to specify the persistent elements (nature), the motivations (character) and the specific forms as it has been given (conduct) as governing factors.

As a second measure, it seeks to identify the characteristics of the selected leader of greater importance, the aspects of leadership found in the broad-spectrum strategy that was applied to reverse the adverse conditions of the time and mention the school of leadership whose reference was necessary in overcoming difficulties.

Finally, it will be concluded, in the light of a prospective analysis of the political, social, economic, environmental and defense and security conditions, what that future immersion scenario for the Armed Forces could be, and the National Police in the face of the current dynamics of the conflict and the repercussions at the global, regional and local levels of action in the context of hybrid wars and the preponderant role of the military leader in decision-making in volatile, complex, uncertain and ambiguous environments (VUCA).

Being the theory of war, in general terms, an analyzed historical compilation of confrontations, to conceive the evolution of military strategic thinking and the doctrinal, strategic, operational, and tactical transformations that have taken place based on the interdependence between political configurations taken by humanity and the means of warfare used for defense. Terrorism, as a fundamental component of hybrid wars. Due to the implications, it has had in various scenarios and contexts, must be considered, for its epistemological approach, in a separate chapter.

By understanding the principles and foundations that govern the theory of war and recording its march in time. While seeking to understand thinkers, theoretical guidelines, historical moments that determine the structural basis of human conflict and its main instrument, which is war, together with who makes it and why, it also focuses on knowing the nature (essence), the character (typology) and conduct (how) of war.

In Modernity, and due to the importance of its impact, the dilemma around understanding terrorism from multidimensional and multifactorial perspectives as an instrument to achieve the ends of wars and conflicts. Today imposes a significant challenge to academics, experts, civil and military leaders, which consists of establishing the level of dependence that hybrid wars and transnational organized crime have on this phenomenon, to dimension its true scope.

In this particular case, the armed conflict in Colombia has gone through external and internal dynamics that have corresponded to the historical evolution of similar global, regional and local processes, of political, ideological and armed roots, intrinsically connected and carried out by illegal groups of all origins and characteristics, which in recent decades have found in terrorism their main ally in the achievement of objectives, having as a corollary the affectation of territorial integrity, the civilian population, the Government and institutions -including the Public Force-, as well as infrastructure, the economy and the environment.

The State as an institution has undoubtedly marked a response to terrorism, in line with the trends of each era, the governments of the day and their dependence on external strategic allies. In such a way that it has had variations between thematically focused decisions, public policies, government policies and the implementation of strategies through its Armed Forces and the National Police, which in some cases have had interagency and multilateral efforts and, despite the imponderables, vicissitudes, and errors, have partially mitigated the causes and prevented the extension of the effects.

In line with the proposed task of understanding the phenomenon of terrorism in Colombia as a means, from the perspective of hybrid wars as an end, and of transformational leadership as the foundation of the institutional role of the State to face the armed conflict during the period 1992-2012. Given the most recent cognitive approaches and the identification of the dominant factors, they could illuminate the path of uncertainty that exists from the conceptual, interpretative, analytical, and conclusive points of view around the main theme of the paper.

A look into the conceptualization of hybrid wars, and terrorism, as its main component, from modern theories of war

The thinking of the great strategists, military men, scholars and experts of old, such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides and Alexander the Great, served as inspiration for Napoleon, Machiavelli, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. In turn, the postulates of Clausewitz, Jomini and Liddell Hart, were a reference to strengthen the concepts of war in contemporary times, and to this day, both have survived despite significant changes. Especially, in the character and conduct of war.

“The whole art of war is based on deception and the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” (Sun Tzu, 500 BC). In the deepening of its essence, typology and strategies, perhaps a reflection on some of the episodes of the great conflagrations. The post-war conflicts, the wars of the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq, they incorporated those postulates that have not yet lost their validity.

The Thucydides Trap “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that it instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable” - lethal structural tension that occurs when a new power challenges an established one, and creates the conditions for a war to break

out - has been, perhaps, the greatest excuse for some countries to invade others, impose their will and maintain a dominant pulse for power.

The Cold War itself, between the United States and the Soviet Union (it represents success in escaping the Thucydides Trap to avoid a nuclear provocation). And, in the current circumstances, between China and the United States, for antagonistic positions on the internationally called seas of China, their vital interests are at stake. For the first one, it is about the use of the seas for one's own benefit, while for the second one it is about free navigation through all of them (Figuerola, 2021).

The possible trend towards war when an emerging power threatens to displace an existing great power, with international hegemony, corresponds to a fateful structural tension that occurs at the behest of the challenge of a new power to an established one, which creates the conditions for a war to break out (Allison, 2015).

But it is, perhaps, in a chronological connection and more recent events, since Mao-Zedong, who conceptualized and carried out in China the model of *protracted people's war* (Taber, 2002). Where we delve into: the so-called *new wars*, by Mary Kaldor (2001). In the "Hybrid Wars, When the Context is Everything", by Colom, P. (2018). In the *fourth generation wars*, by Lind, W. (2004). In *The Non-Trinitarian War*, by Van Creveld, M. (2004), and in *the Epochs of War*, by Bunker, R. (2011), to name just some of the references on the main theme: terrorism and its symbiosis with transnational organized crime and hybrid wars, which, according to these approaches, cannot be ignored.

From a more updated and grounded perspective, with a different connotation, in his article "Terrorist and Criminal Dynamics: A Look Beyond the Horizon", from the book *Beyond Convergence*, Dishman (2016) refers "that from the 80s an additional ingredient increased the complexity in the interpretation and fight against terrorism originated in multiple motivations: Political, ideological, theological and particularly economic by the alliances between criminals and terrorists" (p. 139). Perhaps here we find a first dominant factor in the problematization of the armed conflict in Colombia in the last 30 years.

In an attempt to consolidate the path towards a vision perhaps different in the essence, peculiarities and conduct of war, and coinciding, in part, with the assessments of authors such as Kaldor (2001). In what has been called *the new wars*. Guattari (1977) and López (2021), with "The Molecular Revolution" and "The Molecular Revolution Dissipated", respectively, or the so-called "Latin American Spring", of Austria (2021). "Asymmetric Wars", by Humire (2021) and *The Hybrid Wars*, by Giles (2016), in whose works it can be seen that, undoubtedly, they have

been nourished by the wisdom of their own experiences and knowledge, genuinely expressed in their writings, but at the same time they have received the influence of political, social, military and especially, academic scenarios of their sphere of action.

Of course, there is no exact model, neither exclusive nor pure (Barrera, 2010a). Theories are not totalizing nor, much less, a finished product, given their evolutionary and progressive nature. Therefore, they share some aspects of previous doctrines, coinciding in points of view that perhaps add up when it comes to clearing the way for inconsistencies, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the attempt to approach an underlying reality.

But if something is evident, it is that the authors, collectively, consider that tensions escalate to a war and power, threats, interests are calculated as criteria for launching a war. For Sir Lawrence Freedman, wars of any kind invariably lead to unsuspected consequences.

For her part, Mary Kaldor (1999) does not depart from Clausewitz's Trinitarian concept to refer to the total wars of the first half of the twentieth century. On the contrary, she highlights the notion of *absolute war* with the discovery of nuclear weapons. However, some of the characteristics of the new wars were already announced. The irregular and informal wars of the second half of the twentieth century, starting with the resistance movements and guerrilla warfare of Mao Zedong and his successors, are the prelude to what Luttwak calls "the new bellicosity".

Clausewitz's trinity and revolutionary thought in the context of the Vietnam War, mentioned by Moisés de Pablo (2019), also come together to mean that both Mao Zedong, creator of the revolutionary war, and Ho Chi Minh based their strategic current on the State-People-Army trilogy. Under the concepts of the mobilization of the people in arms as a psychological factor and moral sustenance and the strategy of time, uniting political and military theory in an indivisible whole, combining the eastern vision of war, by Sun Tzu, with Clausewitz's main conceptualization.

In the eagerness to achieve a coherent response to the presence of differential elements in the successive wars of the 1990s and in the new millennium, which were characterized by the disparity of opponents. The combination of regular and irregular methods, the presence of criminal economies and terrorism as a means, emerge in the military academic domain the so-called *Generations of War* (Lind, 2004). *Epochs of War* (Bunker, 1994); *Ages of War* (Fuller, 1949); *The Wars of the Future* (Toffler, 1994), and *The Non-Trinitarian War* (Creveld, 1991), which mean new approaches or dimensions on wars.

A way of associating wars with geographical, chronological, factual, phenomenological factors, and that correspond to ideas, technological bases, resizing according to threats, dominant strategies, suppose a "Revolution of Military Affairs"- which allows differentiating between types of wars and distinguishing between periods.

In the opinion of some authors, this revolution must be guided by three essential conditions: the application of a new technology, a modification of procedures and a generational change, and that all of which results in a change in the way of making war that determines a variation in the schemes of thought and doctrine.

For this, new and old factors are valued, which operate contrary to the traditional thesis of war: psychological operations, new communication technologies, rights and freedoms of societies that are used against them. Also, surprise, speed, indirect approach, the use of adversary vulnerabilities and terrorism as the main resource, all of which are part of the portfolio of opportunities of the contenders.

Technology has a fundamental role: robotics and artificial intelligence applied to the autonomy of vehicles and soldiers, and cultural intelligence as an integrating element in terms of *command, control, communication, cyber and computerized system (C4I)*.

The interventions of the United States in Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan; those of France in Indochina and Algeria; those of Great Britain in Africa and Asia; those of the USSR in Afghanistan and, recently, Russia in Ukraine - all of them, of course, coinciding in having been defeats for the great powers - demonstrate, on the one hand, enormous gaps in the interpretation of the nature, character and conduct of the confrontations, difficulties in defining the strategic political objective and, above all, a call to understand that terrorism has been present in each of these conflicts as a means and not as an end in itself. Hence a second dominant factor when pondering the Colombian conflict: the asymmetry of war is faced by understanding the ultimate goal and applying the correct strategy.

Of the advanced theories, the one corresponding to hybrid wars is, perhaps, the one that most fits within the current scenarios of confrontation, as a variant of the nature of war, its character and conduct based on the adaptation of elements of irregular warfare. And the fact of using the scope of globalization, violence as a strategic resource and transnational organized crime, among others, to support its own structure.

Points of view found around the subject, and that lead us to deep reflections, include that of Frank Hoffman, the main exponent of hybrid wars (2007, p. 43). And

who, paraphrasing Cohen, says: “the conventional military doctrines of the twentieth century directed against nation states and mass armies of the industrial era are effectively dead”. Or as Colom (2018) establishes,

“[...] when the context is everything, where threats are more diffuse, the battlefield is society in general, the centers of gravity public opinion and political legitimacy. And the manipulation of social networks the vehicle to exacerbate tempers and promote terrorist acts of impact”. (w. p.)

At the beginning of this work it was pointed out that the theoretical references of all eras cannot be ignored. On the contrary, there are aspects that have given life to the new approaches, in such a way that, inevitably, they must be taken into account. Times and contexts are completely different and have their own dynamics. And terrorism has been a persistent phenomenon -especially in the wars and conflicts of Modernity-. And it has been energized by transnational organized crime, which requires understanding it from the perspective of the means, and not of the ends. And where appropriating the legacy of great thinkers of Antiquity and merging their teachings with the new paradigms is not in itself a weakness, but a strength.

So hybrid wars, according to Hoffman (2007), so-called *irregular wars*, in this new era will be increasingly common, but with “greater speed and lethality than in the past, due in part to the spread of advanced military technology” (p. 16).

Conventional and unconventional tactics, battlefield preferably constituted by developing urban centers and combat zones “include the dense urban jungles and congested coastlines where most of the world’s population and economy is concentrated”.

These areas provide safe havens for terrorists or urban guerrillas where population density, transportation networks, infrastructure and utilities, and structures provide them with multiple escape routes and the ability to hide while planning and practicing (future) operations.

With regard to the time factor, these adversaries, States and non-state actors, will try to extend the conflict indefinitely, avoiding the predictable, the decisive confrontation and seeking the advantage of “unexpected ways and with forms of surprise attacks” (Hoffman, 2007). For Mao Zedong, time and people were his best allies.

Russia, to achieve its political objectives, has apparently employed a mixture of special operations, economic pressure, intelligence agents, instrumentalization of

the flow of natural gas, cyberattacks, information warfare and the use of conventional military force as a measure of pressure/deterrence. All this, perfectly synchronized as part of an operations plan... which can be totally framed within what has been called *hybrid warfare* (Sánchez, 2014).

Finally, in 2006, during the conflict with Israel, Hezbollah turned to a mix of militiamen, specially trained forces, anti-tank missile equipment, signals intelligence, tactical and operational deployment of rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which in many cases were state-of-the-art equipment and weaponry.

Having explored historical patterns and universal experiences in the light of war theories and the most recent approaches to fourth-generation wars, irregular wars and hybrid wars. Mentioning the armed conflict in Colombia is a fact that the violence has been chronic, deep-rooted and with its genesis in accumulated events, phenomena and actors, cyclical in the transformation of its protagonists (peasant self-defense groups, guerrillas, paramilitaries, organized armed groups [GAO]). Permanent insofar as there has been no place for peace and understandable in the transition it has suffered from a revolutionary-type conflict to a new model of organized and criminal violence that has the veneers of a hybrid war (Lasprilla, 2022).

For its part, the armed conflict has been conditioned by globalized political, social, economic and cultural phenomena, and therefore has its foundation in marked ideological bases that have remained over time and have been transformed: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao, Castro, Chaves. And according to power relations, they have adapted or transcended from the external to the internal: France, England, USSR, Asia, Africa, Latin America.

From a global project (socialism, communism, Islamism) with a persistent ingredient of violence that aims to subvert the State and institutions, to differential models of local populism; illegal economies and dynamizing terrorism.

Immersed in the tensions of Bipolarity (after World War II within the framework of the Cold War) he gave way, depending on the conditions, to unipolarity (fall of the Berlin Wall) or multipolarity (alignment by interests). This meant that the roots and evolution of the conflict in Colombia corresponded to a pendulum movement according to the times and phenomena that conditioned it.

As it has its origin in the model, implanted in China, of *prolonged people's war*, where the political-armed effort is prioritized by incorporating all forms of struggle for the seizure of power, it sought to channel dissatisfaction to manipulate objective causes.

A countless number of actors - banditry, guerrillas, self-defense groups, liberals, conservatives, communists - gave violence a cyclical character - reflected in the greatest peaks -, mutant - agents that generate violence - and permanent politics nor violence are alien to it.

To refer to the dominant factors that contributed to the dynamization of the armed conflict in Colombia in the period 1992-2012 from the perspective of terrorism, within the framework of the theories of fourth-generation wars, irregular wars or hybrid wars, already widely addressed. It should be noted that, externally, four events gained the attention of the world for their political and security significance. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, the emergence and prominence of the terrorist groups Al Qaeda and Isis and the Arab Spring.

Coinciding with the world events that marked a milestone in history and had as protagonists terrorism associated with transnational organized crime and social explosions with political and economic repercussions, the 1990s and 2000s reflected in Colombia the highest rates of expressions of violence, caused by all existing armed groups, which showed a great weakness of the State and its law enforcement agencies to confront and weaken them.

A parochial vision and traumatic relations with the United States, due to the so-called 8,000 Process, which decertified Colombia and left it *ad portas* of being considered a failed State, reduced room for maneuver in the diplomatic field and considerably affected the legitimacy of the governments of the day.

Political changes in Latin America; triumphs of the democratic left in Brazil. Uruguay, Chile and El Salvador, and radical governments in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, favorable to the FARC, sought to support the status of belligerence. In accordance with their strategic plan and the pretensions around achieving the dynamic balance of the Forces, which was decisive when prioritizing the armed part of the agenda over the political scope.

The participation of the FARC in the entire drug trafficking chain and the depredation of natural and private resources and other practices associated with criminal economies consolidated the financial logistics structure and gave strength to the sustainability of the organization. Kidnappings, extortion, money laundering and front organizations supported its growth and projection.

The transition from the guerrilla warfare phase to the movement warfare phase. As a result, the permanent offensive attitude of the FARC, coups against the public force, assaults on populations and mass kidnappings created in the collective

imagination of the civilian population the perception of military defeat and the possibility of the seizure of power by arms.

The de-escalation zone (1999-2002) was the great opportunity and the greatest laboratory to boost the qualitative and quantitative leap of the FARC, strengthen itself from illicit finance, expand its influence towards the civilian population and negotiate, as had been traditional, from a favorable position. If the intention was to delay the process, they succeeded at the expense of weakening the government and wearing down the Armed Forces and the National Police.

The empowerment of the FARC against the Colombian State and the possibility of gaining time to consolidate its strategic plan unraveled the concepts of the *war of attrition*, conceived by Clausewitz. The *indirect approach*, proposed by Liddell Hart, and the *new wars*, suggested by Mary Kaldor, as a prelude to the outcome of a project whose desired final state was always the seizure of power through the combination of all forms of struggle, and where terrorism associated with criminal economies was its center of gravity.

Institutionality and transformational leadership as a response of the State

Unraveling epistemological positions, hermeneutics and the use of phenomenology, in order to give reading to those who, as academics and experts, with their dissertations, have contributed to the study of wars and conflicts. Following the legacy of Clausewitz's trilogy, could help clear the fog around the three factors that were decisive to overcome the almost disadvantage of institutionality in the confrontation that Colombia had with terrorist groups, self-defense and transnational crime during the period 2002-2012.

In that sense, the political will and leadership, the support of the civilian population and a sustained combination of State policies, national government plans, strategic design and joint employment of the Armed Forces, and coordinated with the National Police, marked the sustained weakening of the FARC, which resulted in a reduction in their capabilities by more than 70% (MDN, 2012).

In the introductory study on the new institutionalisms: their differences, their closeness, Jorge Javier Romero (1991) points out that the institutional question has regained prominence in political and economic analysis in recent years. And various authors have incorporated institutions as a central part of the examination

of social reality. Thus, we have begun to talk about the existence of a contemporary current in the social sciences: the *new institutionalism*.

In fact, this is where the overcoming of disagreements, of conceptual heterogeneity, of differences in approaches in relation to social phenomena. And, particularly, on the way of seeing terrorism in all its dimensions as a component of hybrid wars and its symbiosis with transnational organized crime, as we have already addressed it, and as a fundamental reference of restrictions for political-strategic decision-makers.

Institutions are those that formulate the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the constraints or obligations created by human beings that shape human interaction. Consequently, such institutions structure the incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic. Institutional change delineates the way society evolves over time and is, at the same time, the key to understanding historical change (North, 1990, p. 3).

To corroborate the importance of institutions and, perhaps, highlight the effects of the incoherence between ends, modes and means in the face of the dysautonomy between politics and grand strategy. A BBC interview with Mary Kaldor in London, on the subject "New wars as a way of organizing society through violence" (2021), suggests the dilemma that the United States had in Afghanistan. On the one hand, in the task understood by the Expeditionary Force to build a nation, create a centralized and unified democracy, protect the population and bring development. On the other, in the face of the political approach, expressed by President Joe Biden, of undermining nation-building, in his approach to the war against terrorism and his concern more to defeat Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Islamic State than to create conditions for the well-being of the Afghan people.

With this great reference, he testifies to the importance of institutions as forgers or not of security and development, and transfers these musings to the armed conflict in Colombia, at the end of the nineties and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Perhaps, a myopic vision of the real context at the different levels of political-military decision and external factors. Such as the decertification of the country, the feeling of a failed state and the weakening of the Public Force contributed to the greater armed and financial strengthening of the FARC, the ELN and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), as main narcoterrorist groups that disputed territories of great strategic value, criminal economies and the influence on the civilian population, and imposed immense challenges on the State and its institutions in terms of defense, security and development (McKenzie, E. 2007).

It is worth taking into account the introductory prologue of Spanish Admiral Fernando García Sánchez, in the book *Repensando el Liderazgo Estratégico*, by Federico Aznar Fernández-Montesinos, when quoting General George Casey:

The strategic leader leads to the achievement of their organizational vision. In a high-level framework through the development of policies and strategies, building consensus, acquiring and allocating resources, influencing organizational culture and shaping a complex and ambiguous context. Leads by example to build an effective organization, develop the next generation of leaders, energize subordinates, seek opportunities to advance organizational goals and personal and professional balance.

The aforementioned prologue points out, for the particular case of our country, the characteristics and competencies of strategic leadership in the fundamental role played in the transformation of the Army by General Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel for the recovery of the values, capacities and strengths of the institution in the face of the challenge of facing with height and patriotic courage one of the most critical periods of the armed conflict in Colombia.

In his article "Instituciones y conflicto colombiano: la metáfora del espejo" (2017), Álvaro Alban Moreno states that

[...] the historical configuration of the Colombian social order and its exclusionary and refractory character to changes, is reflected, as an image in the mirror. In an institutional order in which any transformation in a post-conflict context would be sterile as long as the factual conditions of the population subject to the transformations remain unchanged. Once again frustrating development aspirations, as has been evidenced in Colombian history. (Moreno, 2017, p. 1)

This reflection leads us to understand that overcoming the objective causes of the conflict must be considered when designing a State policy that, with a holistic approach, integrates interagency efforts, broad-spectrum strategy, general military strategy and operational strategies.

From the previous concerns, some considerations emerge that it is important to take into account to understand what the State's response was in the field of institutionality and, in light of the transformational leadership applied as a watering hole to reverse the existing adverse security conditions and pave the way towards the search for true peace.

There is no state or nation building if there is no strengthening of institutions hand in hand with genuine leadership that stimulates the changes necessary to overcome the vicissitudes posed by the challenges of the moment. Great men forge great institutions, and these, in turn, arise from the most difficult battles (Lasprilla, 2022).

In the face of this uncertain panorama of continuous military defeats, acts of extreme violence, institutional weakness and national clamor for a change that was necessary and urgent, and in the face of the dilemma of understanding the phenomenon of terrorism, a component of hybrid wars (Colom, 2018), as a means used by these violence-generating agents (FARC, ELN, AUC) to achieve their main end, and in the task of proposing plausible, comprehensive, multilateral, regional and local solutions on their causes and effects and -perhaps, what was more important-. In a prospective way, anticipating their manifestations, the national government of the moment drew up a holistic policy, whose interpretation, conception and execution required leadership as a fundamental factor.

The then government of President Andrés Pastrana, which had granted guarantees to the narcoterrorist groups beyond the logic of negotiation, was forced to harden its position and resort to a *systemic type of leadership*. Which, in the words of General Mc Crystal (2014), "is exercised in the midst of very complex systems and subsystems, relies on consolidated state bureaucracies, requires communication and coordination skills, high-level strategic decisions, and far-reaching effects and repercussions".

In general terms, leadership is a process of influence that has been categorized according to circumstances and styles, which does not admit schemes or formulas and is considered an empirical and factual discipline. So it can be said that the best leadership style is the one that best suits the leader, his followers, the environment and the situation. Therefore, success is the only criterion of truth, even if it is useful to look for objective conditions that can serve as a framework for its development (Aznar, 2018).

Certainly, the best leadership is that promoted through example, and more, among the military. Example is commitment and expression of a firm belief. Words seduce and example creates highways of virtue, but only example drags (Aznar, 2018)

According to the previous analysis between the duty to be, the definitions of leadership and the intrinsic value of the example, General Mora exercised a model of charismatic-transformational leadership. Since he identifies with Burns (1978),

who states: "leaders and followers do with each other to advance to a higher level of morale and motivation". With this he intended to bring out the consciousness of subordinates. And he also emphasizes: "what you can do for your country." This indicates the superlative purposes of the mission: the homeland is above personal interests. It is focused on human needs, related to personal growth, self-esteem and self-actualization, inspiring commitment and union, projecting a desirable future for all (Aznar, 2018).

The strategy undoubtedly pointed the way towards transformation. From the highest level of decision, the ends, ways and means were harmonized in the Democratic Defense and Security Policies and the Consolidation of Democratic Security, and in the Defense and Security Policy for Prosperity, which aimed to consolidate territorial control and strengthen the social rule of law. To protect the population by maintaining strategic initiative. To minimize the production of narcotics and eliminate their illicit trade. To maintain a legitimate, modern and effective Public Force. To maintain the decreasing trend of all crime indicators. To dismantle the Outlaw Organizations (OAML) and create sufficient security conditions for consolidation. To move towards a credible, integrated and interoperable system of deterrent capacities; to contribute to timely attention to natural disasters and catastrophes, and to strengthen the institutionality and well-being of the national security and defense sector (MDN, 2015).

An adequate interpretation of the great strategy of the national government and its defense policies emanating from the Ministry of Defense was manifested in the Colombia, Patriot, Consolidation, Bicentennial and Sword of Honor war plans of the General Command of the Military Forces, which gave life to the General Military Strategy, whose campaign plans became the backbone of the operational military strategy.

As John Kotter (1997) points out, "leaders define the vision for the future and set the strategies for getting there." And according to Federico Aznar (2018), "that is the fundamental task of the strategic leader: to define the strategic framework". This was relevant for General Mora to sow a motivation in the mind and heart of each soldier and forge in all of them a change of attitude and behavior that, as an armor, invigorated them in the face of stumbles and difficulties.

Each leader has had in his life -especially the military- a pedagogy, an experience that validates his knowledge and historical icons that in the art of war are definitive for decision-making. However, the relationship with leadership schools marks particular characteristics that need their strengths. Especially, in the management of chaos and uncertainty.

The book *Repensando el Liderazgo Estratégico* (Aznar, 2018), highlights, in relation to schools in the study of strategic leadership, how, on the one hand, there is the *Cultural School*, which heralds the process of strategy formation as a collective product based on the beliefs demonstrated by the members of the organization, and operates internally, supported by symbolic actions, vision and creation of meaning. On the other hand, in the *School of the Environment* leadership is applied knowing the structure and functioning of the groups where it is manifested, and sets the strategy in the environment rather than in the organization itself.

In the particular case of General Mora, as a transformative leader, he managed to integrate these two schools (Cultural and Environmental) as a cross between the culture he offers and what the environment demands for the achievement of a mission. A change in the attitude of the members of the institution, through awareness of their role, understanding the arms race as a vocation dedicated to the service of the homeland and professionalization at all levels, as well as changing the image of an Army defeated by an efficient institution, were the expressions of that fusion.

Leadership, undoubtedly, is weighted by the results of a management based on the motivation, example and commitment of each of the members of the organization, regardless of the leadership style or the school with which it best identifies or the one that best fits the profile of the leader and the demands of the environment.

The strategy of General Jorge Mora Rangel, supported by his transformative leadership style and the successive leaders -in others, General Carlos Ospina Ovalle-, could be summarized in the following achievements:

- Decisive strategy in contributing to the strategic political objective of the State (neutralizing the FARC's strategic plan for the seizure of power).
- Confront and substantially weaken the FARC and other narco-terrorist organizations.
- Prevent the staggering of FARC structures over the Strategic Deployment Center (CDE).
- Break the expectations of the FARC in relation to campaigns sustained in time and space.
- Configure the unobjectionable defeat of the FARC, to the extent that its command and control (operations against ringleaders and structures of high strategic value) was considerably affected. Interruption of its communications and coordination capacity, as well as its logistical and financial structure (occupation of mobility corridors and affectation to the flows of criminal economies), its financial ringleaders, and its collection centers,

lines and distribution axes. Affectation of the recruitment capacity, to the detriment of its growth, expansion and influence plan.

- Recovery of the territory, key regions, governance and the rule of law and legality.
- Example of synergy as a reference for joint, coordinated, interagency work; creation of conditions for Unified Action.
- Play a decisive role in the FARC's forced decision to accept a negotiated solution to the conflict.
- Intelligence, in-depth operations, territorial control, special operations, mobility, application of force, synchronization, humanitarian assistance programs for demobilized and prevention of recruitment and comprehensive action, as well as leadership as an irreplaceable intangible, were determining factors in the conduct and success of the strategy.

Conclusions

A great historical component has surrounded politicians, scholars, writers and specialists when it comes to conceptualizing the issue of violence, to integrate, dismantle or observe its components, including terrorism as a means or as an end, depending on how it has been treated; this corroborates that we have been in the presence of one of the main obstacles in the search for unity of epistemological criteria.

For the first time it is possible to differentiate the levels of war: the grand strategy (Álvarez & Fernández, 2018), formulated by the political leader, and included in the Democratic Defense and Security Policy (2002-2006), and the Democratic Security Consolidation Policy (2006-2010). The general military strategy expressed in the war plans (Colombia-Patriot-Bicentennial) of the General Command of the Military Forces, and the Operational Military Strategy, conceived through the campaign plans of the forces, joint task forces and joint commands, with a synergistic approach to operations and integral action.

Three pillars were decisive in reversing the tendency of the FARC, the ELN and the AUC in the face of initial gains and discouraging terrorist actions: territorial control and the campaign of the Omega Joint Task Force, which confronted and defeated the FARC's strategic plan and special operations.

It should be noted that an institutional vision beyond the horizon underpinned the path of operational military strategy, in response to the political objective established at the time, and that, despite having focused on reducing the causes and

effects of terrorism, in the long term it also served as a prelude to confronting and defeating the FARC's strategy for the seizure of power through the combination of all forms of struggle. With this, General Mora gave meaning to the constitutional mission of an Army in transformation, by harmonizing ends, ways and means and channeling consensus around a task that involved understanding it from a philosophy of life: the military vocation.

To give a practical reading to Aznar's work and that of Luhmann in his theory of the environment and functional structuralism, respectively, and incorporate Saskia Sassen's concept of important changes in complex systems. Through the Venh diagram of set theory, used in mathematics and probabilities, it would be worth reflecting on the approach of an approach to a suggested model such as *the diagram of the logic of effectiveness*, which contemplates the dynamics of integration of leadership, strategy and foresight, adding another fundamental element, which is governance, and which can respond to the demand for a comprehensive defense and security system.

Governance, as an exercise in political articulation that involves different actors in the process of deciding, executing and evaluating decisions on matters of public interest, carries out an interactive management by the convergence of different sectors and their interests that impact on the quality of life of the system and of individuals. At the same time, it is *inclusive*, as it seeks to form teams of excellence (balance between the political and the technical).

By seeking a relationship for the complementarity of roles (joint, coordinated, interagency, multilateral, combined operations), it establishes unified action (institutional harmonization).

As long as the strategy is determined by actions that are carried out to achieve an end, it involves setting long-term goals, choosing the actions and allocating the resources necessary to achieve them.


Foresight is an instrument to think about the future and achieve proactive action through the correct formulation and execution of vision, mission, capacities and learning for the achievement of adequate governance and for the formulation of effective policies.

Leadership and information are at the intersection of governance, strategy and foresight, increasing results in the face of expectations that impact the defense and security system, reducing risks, reducing complexities and enhancing capabilities.

At that intersection of components, and which corresponds to their intertwining, value is created for the system, for its elements and depending on the

common objectives of the nations in particular or as a whole, on a neighboring, regional, or global scale.

Figure 1. *Diagram of the logic of effectiveness.*



Source: Own elaboration.

Future scenario

- Confront adverse political and ideological dynamics that seek to weaken the capacities of the Armed Forces: legal shielding, strategic platforms, professionalization, resources.
- Territorial extension vs. political leadership and military-population-control-mobility (if there is disconnection, it must be compensated).
- Permeable borders vs. capacity for military-police control and state control (if development does not occur, effective military-police control of the area is imperative).
- Difficulty in communications vs. availability of communication lines, means of transport and connectivity (road infrastructure, communications).
- Border law based on the connectivity and development of the national territory and the increase in security and defense coverage that requires sustained investment by the State.

- Defense and Security Law: security and defense considered an asset of the nation, moving from government policy to the integral dimension of the State.
- Organized transnational crime vs. response capacity, and transition to the concept of combined operations.
- Marginal gains vs. possibilities of sovereignty and effective territorial integrity: coherence between ends, strategy and means.
- Facing challenges to authority; governability; legal shielding vs. legitimacy.

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